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Abstract
Large-scale distributed systems and distributed computing are the pillars
of IT infrastructure and society nowadays. Robust theoretical principles for
designing, building, managing and understanding the interactive behaviours
of such systems need to be explored. A promising approach for establishing
such principles is to view the session as the key unit for design, execution
and verification.
Governance is a general term for verifying whether activities meet the spec-
ified requirements and for enforcing safe behaviours among processes. This
thesis, based on the asynchronous pi-calculus and the theory of session types,
provides a monitoring framework and a theory for validating specifications,
verifying mutual behaviours during runtime, and taking actions when non-
compliant behaviours are detected. We explore properties and principles
for governing large-scale distributed systems, in which autonomous and het-
erogeneous system components interact with each other in the network to
accomplish application goals.
This thesis, incorporating lessons from my participation in a substantial
practical project, the Ocean Observatories Initiative (OOI), proposes an
asynchronous monitoring framework and the process calculus for dynami-
cally governing the asynchronous interactions among distributed multiple
applications. We prove that this monitoring model guarantees the satisfac-
tion of global assertions, and state and prove theorems of local and global
safety, transparency, and session fidelity. We also study and introduce the
semantic mechanisms for runtime session-based governance and the princi-
ples of validation of stateful specifications through capturing the runtime
asynchronous interactions.
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1Introduction
1.1 Motivations and Objectives
Motivations Governance is the collection of activities of governing. The purpose of
governance for a large system is to ensure that independent system components (e.g.
system agents, normal users, endpoint devices, etc.) can securely achieve their respec-
tive goals and, at the same time, the overall performance of the system is maintained
and consistent. The related topics for achieving this purpose include access control
mechanisms (e.g. access control matrix (105), DAC, MAC (53), and RBAC (62, 141),
etc.), information flow control (28, 29, 65, 126, 140, 162), and policy languages for
describing laws and regulations or specifying contracts and commitments (17, 54, 144).
Over the last two decades, we have witnessed computing systems evolve from isolated
machines to network environments, from the centralised to the distributed; such evolu-
tion gives systems the benefits of performing tasks through densely coordinated actions
among multiple heterogeneous components with distributed resources (19, 74, 112, 127).
Communication in distributed components is becoming crucial for building large-scale
applications, aided by a rapidly developing infrastructural support for portable dis-
tributed devices through technologies such as cloud computing, messaging and dis-
tributed stores. While distribution leads to such virtues as scalability, sharing and
resilience (42, 125), specifying and ensuring the diverse correctness properties that in-
dividual applications demand poses new technical challenges.
1
1. INTRODUCTION
In order to understand and formalise interactive behaviours among communicating
processes, robust theoretical foundations for such systems are needed. Without cap-
turing the interactive behaviours, we can not judge the safety and reliability of target
applications, and hence can not even set the baseline that our governance systems must
meet. The traditional framework of sequential computing, such as objects and functions,
does not enable us to effectively apprehend the behaviours and properties of distributed
computing as a whole, since the central mode of computation in this new context is
communication rather than, for example, assignment and function application.
In the concrete engineering setting of a large-scale distributed system, for example,
the large IT infrastructure for ocean sciences (129), which is our leading example, ap-
plications are predominantly built as asynchronous interactions among heterogeneous
distributed components. To cater for scalability and flexibility (23), it must be possible
for each component to be implemented in a different programming language, and like-
wise for some of its components to be contributed by a third party, and these may be
buggy or untrusted; moreover, it is also possible that the properties of services provided
by contributors are dynamically discovered and changed. With the issues mentioned
above and the problems addressed in (152, 153, 154), foreign components may not have
been statically checked and runtime behavioural checks must be enforced.
In reality, most modern large-scale systems are distributed, but their governance
relies on ad-hoc monitoring, complex safety enforcement mechanisms, centralised pro-
tocols, and expensive testing. And they still fail. Therefore, there is both a practical
and theoretical need for the dynamic adjustment of a global specification in order to
protect endpoints from malicious attacks and, at the same time, prevent them from
producing malicious messages that pollute the network. Session-based governance, in
which session types direct the computing, promises to offer a completely distributed,
asynchronous governance framework for real-life systems, from fine-grained capability-
passing pi-calculus, to the semantics of stateful specifications.
Objectives This thesis aims to identify principles to harness the complexity of asyn-
chronous interactions among distributed heterogeneous components through capturing
processes’ runtime behaviours. With this purpose in mind, we propose the formalism
of a session-based dynamic-asynchronous monitoring framework:
2
1.1 Motivations and Objectives
1. The framework consists of external observers or monitors. The prototype of a
monitor adopted in this thesis is similar to the one defined in (11, 103, 104). A
monitor acts as an endpoint guard, rather than a central mediator.
2. The observers or monitors in the framework asynchronously and distributedly ver-
ify interactions among endpoints, which may come from heterogeneous domains.
3. The monitoring and verification mechanisms of this framework ensure, during
runtime, the safe interactions of endpoints in a session through session-type-based
local specifications, which are obtained by projection from global protocol speci-
fications.
This framework is general enough to represent most large-scale distributed systems.
With this framework, we introduce and prove governance theories for safety, trans-
parency, session-fidelity, and the validation of stateful specifications.
One critical issue is how to deal with asynchrony. Two difficulties arise when this
framework is applied. The first comes from adopting external monitors, which is com-
mon in practice, because inserting system internal monitors at every endpoint is ex-
pensive and they might be polluted by malicious local processes. This setting however
results in asynchronous interactions between endpoints and their corresponding mon-
itors since one monitor may economically guard more than one endpoint process. To
deal with asynchrony, the mechanism of permutation is proposed and formalised.
The second difficulty comes from the desire to specify the endpoint state in specifi-
cations. A monitor, for guarding interactions, relies on a specification as a judgement
base when it evaluates whether local process behaviour fulfill the intended requirements
through observing the asynchronous messages passing from one process to another. In
large-scale distributed systems, the use of state is omnipresent in specifications to cap-
ture real-life scenarios, where the (expected) states of participants in applications, such
as the credit of a client for on-line shopping or the booking number for a transaction,
play a critical role in specifications. A specification language for dynamic observa-
tions becomes non-trivial when states and asynchrony are both counted. An issue in
the semantics of a specification language arises. The issue is that a monitor may be in
asynchronous communication with the endpoint it monitors, and some interactions may
update the endpoint’s state. For example, assume a local specification specifies that a
ticket allocation server, with a state called counter, should assign a fresh ticket whose
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value is equal to the value of counter for a client’s request and the value of counter is
increased by one after every assignment. Thus, the server is required to assign ticket
numbers as a sequence 1,2,3,4,5,.... Intuitively, the local specification of the server can
assert that the output ticket value, say x, should be equal to the current value of state
counter i.e. x = counter, and can stipulate the update of state as counter := counter+ 1
once an output takes place. We call this kind of specification a stateful specification. It
seems natural that a monitor can use such stateful specification to judge if the server
manages state counter according to the specification. However, when the interaction be-
tween a monitor and its corresponding local process is asynchronous, the monitor may
see ticket assignments out of order and hence some stateful specifications, particularly
the one in the above example, may lead a monitor to a wrong judgement in determining
whether a local process is well-behaved or not. This issue poses a fundamental challenge
to the endeavour to provide a consistent specification-verification framework.
In summary, this thesis presents the following contributions for governance of large-
scale distributed systems:
1. We provide dynamic monitoring of runtime endpoint behaviour and prove that it
guarantees the satisfaction of global specifications.
2. We state and prove the following properties:
• Dynamic global safety assurance ensuring endpoint communication confor-
mance (communication safety in (86)) and stating that a fully monitored
network behaves well with respect to the given global specification.
• Dynamic global transparency (43, 143) ensuring that if every endpoint pro-
gram conforms to its local specification, the presence of monitors do not
change the global interactions.
• Session fidelity (86) ensuring that interactions in a session always follow
stipulated global specifications step by step.
3. We introduce the semantics of specifications for dynamic adjustment and prove the
properties of satisfaction and validation of stateful specifications for a formalism.
Ongoing and future work addresses the development of policy languages and the
properties for commitments.
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1.2 Contributions
This dissertation focuses on the theories of dynamic distributed monitoring and specify-
ing stateful specifications. It covers a wide range of specifications and semantics, while
presenting a complementary approach for runtime verification. The main contributions
of this thesis are divided into three parts:
Capability-passing pi-calculus. This part is covered in Chapter 5, which contributes:
1. The introduction of a multi-party session-based pi-calculus with new capabil-
ity passing primitives for fine-grained control of endpoint behaviour through
session creation.
2. The presentation of an exact semantic account of how a session can be initi-
ated linearly with our calculus.
3. The introduction of a framework with an accurate view of the reality of
distributed systems (15) through formalising session-roles, name-passing, and
asynchronous messaging.
4. The presentation of an abstraction of asynchronous operational semantics for
both endpoint processes (locally) and the network (globally).
Dynamic distributed monitoring. This part is covered in Chapters 6 and 7, which
contribute:
1. A model of dynamic asynchronous monitoring for distributed systems fea-
turing the following elements:
• The endpoints which are interacting with one another may come from
heterogeneous domains, each of which may have different data structure,
interface, typing compiler, or authentication policies. The endpoint code
contributed by a heterogeneous domain may be written in a different
language or possibly malicious.
• The external monitors, each of which may guard more than one endpoint,
protect endpoints from malicious attacks in the network and, at the
same time, prevent endpoints from polluting the network. This practical
setting results in asynchronous interactions between endpoints and their
corresponding monitors.
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• The global specifications (22) enable concise application-level multi-party
protocols, and local monitoring guarantees overall network conformance
to stipulated global protocols at runtime.
2. The required permutation mechanism for external monitors. Due to asyn-
chrony, the order of messages is not preserved during runtime; the permu-
tation mechanism is therefore needed for monitors to capture the real-world
asynchronous messagings.
3. The formalisation and establishment of properties of the monitored network,
including:
• Local and global safety. Local safety (Theorem 7.4.3) states that a mon-
itored process always behaves well with respect to the specification.
Global safety (Theorem 7.4.16) states that a fully monitored network
behaves well with respect to the given global specifications.
• Local and global transparency (43, 143). Local transparency (Theorem
7.4.5) states that a monitored process behaves as an unmonitored process
when the latter is well-behaved (e.g., it has been statically checked).
Global transparency (Theorem 7.4.17) states that a monitored network
and an unmonitored network have equivalent behaviour when the latter
is well-behaved with respect to the same collection of local specifications,
which are projected from well-formed global specifications.
• Session fidelity (86) (Theorem 7.4.28) states that, if all session message
exchanges in a monitored/unmonitored network behave well with respect
to the specifications (as communications dynamically unfold), then this
network exactly follows the original global specifications.
• Conformance with respect to the global observables (Proposition 7.5.7)
states that, whenever the global observable behaviours are coherent, as
every possible endpoint action takes place, the resulting global observ-
able behaviours, after the transition, are still coherent. Note that, the
global observable behaviours are those which can be witnessed globally
(introduced in Section 7.5). We formalise it because, during runtime,
there is always a time lag due to asynchrony making the local specifica-
tions for the sender and the receiver inconsistent.
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Specifying stateful specifications. This part is covered in Chapter 8, a full version
of my paper (40), which contributes:
1. An introduction of an intuitive stateful specification, which is suitable for de-
scribing asynchronous stateful behaviours among multi-party sessions, and
enriches (22) with set-based stateful operations (Sections 8.1 and 8.2 in Chap-
ter 8).
2. An identification of a semantic issue when specifying asynchronous interac-
tive behaviour combined with updatable states.
3. A formal analysis of the issue through asynchronous trace semantics. We
reach several criteria for asynchronous verifiability of specifications (healthi-
ness conditions (81)), including a decidable one which can express a rich set
of specifications.
4. The properties of stateful specifications, which include the definition and
analysis of the strongest asynchronous specification w.r.t a given synchronous
one, and the theorems of safety satisfaction and the validation of stateful
specifications.
1.3 Publications & Detailed Contributions of the Author
1. Kohei Honda, Aybek Mukhamedov, Gary Brown, Tzu-Chun Chen, Nobuko
Yoshida: Scribbling Interactions with a Formal Foundation. ICDCIT 2011: 55-75.
(83).
Author’s contribution: The Scribble language was first developed by Dr Kohei
Honda and Dr Gary Brown. My contribution was part of the theoretical founda-
tion for Scribble. This work was majorly carried out under the advice and the
support of Dr Kohei Honda. The development of Scribble, which is not in the
scope of this thesis, is ongoing (87).
Corresponding Part: Chapter 9.
2. Tzu-Chun Chen, Laura Bocchi, Pierre-Malo Deniélou, Kohei Honda, Nobuko
Yoshida: Asynchronous Distributed Monitoring for Multi-party Session Enforce-
ment. TGC 2011: 25-45. (39).
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Author’s contribution: Parts of theories and ideas. The ideas and formula-
tions of asynchronous linear session establishment, the permutation mechanism
of specifications and global observables, paper’s writing (mainly for the theory
parts).
Corresponding Part: Chapters 5, 6, and 7.
3. Tzu-Chun Chen, Kohei Honda: Specifying Stateful Asynchronous Properties
for Distributed Programs. CONCUR 2012: 209-224. (40).
Author’s contribution: The ideas, theories, writings, and proofs. This is a
paper of my own.
Corresponding Part: Chapter 8.
4. Laura Bocchi, Tzu-chun Chen, Romain Demangeon, Kohei Honda, and Nobuko
Yoshida: Monitoring Networks through Multiparty Session Types. FORTE/FMOODS
2013. To appear (20).
Author’s contribution: Parts of theories and writings. The complete proofs of
local/global safety, local/global transparency, and session fidelity.
Corresponding Part: Chapters 5, 6, and 7.
1.4 Synopsis
The dissertation is divided into 9 chapters, covering the background and related works,
the main theories, and the future directions.
Chapter 2 introduces the background of large-scale distributed systems, our lead-
ing example, and the asynchronous pi-calculus and the multi-party session types,
which are the theoretical foundations of this thesis.
Chapter 3 gives an overview of related works and the comparisons of our work with
those related ones.
Chapter 4 gives the assumptions and defines the terminologies used in this thesis.
This chapter provides an overall picture of the system and framework that we are
interested in, and the assumptions supporting our formalisms and theories.
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Chapter 5 introduces the capability-passing pi-calculus. This chapter, although does
not include any main theory, gives the basis for the design of governance specifi-
cations and the calculus of dynamic asynchronously monitoring.
Chapter 6 introduces the syntax and semantics of the session-type based global/local
specifications. This chapter grounds the specifications used in the following chap-
ters and introduces the consistency principles and several useful mechanisms for
working with specifications, such as the projection and the permutation rules.
Chapter 7 introduces the dynamic asynchronously monitoring calculus on the base
established in Chapter 5 and 6. Several main theorems, such as local/global
safety, local/global transparency, and session fidelity, are established here.
Chapter 8 extends the specifications, introduced in Chapter 6, to stateful specifica-
tions. It addresses the semantic issue while the stateful specifications are applied
to external monitors in asynchronous monitoring environments. Also, it proposes
theories and several properties of satisfaction of the sequence of actions and the
validation of stateful specifications.
Chapter 9 concludes the dissertation by summarising the main theory chapters (i.e.
Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8). It also focuses on important future work which can pave
the way to design session-based policy languages useful in practice based on the
fundamental theories developed in the main parts.
Appendix includes three parts: Part A contains the notes of Chapter 5. Part B
contains all proofs of the theorems introduced in Chapter 7 and their auxiliary
definitions and lemmas. Part C contains the proofs of results from Chapter 8
which are not proved directly there.
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2Background and Theoretical Foundations
2.1 Large-scale Distributed Systems
Tanenbaum and Steen (155) define a distributed system as “a collection of independent
computers that appears to its users as a single coherent system.”; while Leslie Lamport
(12) says “you know you have a distributed system when the crash of a computer you’ve
never heard of stops you from getting any work done”. According to them, a distributed
system is a collection of computing tasks that sometimes goes very wrong because of its
complexity and the difficulties of its maintenance. In this dissertation, we are concerned
with large-scale distributed systems from the point of view of their usage. From our
perspective, the key property is:
people residing in different domains want to conveniently and efficiently
enjoy cooperation on tasks across domains.
Here “people” can be replaced by system components or any electronic devices. The ref-
erence to “different domains” implies that they may have different system policies, access
control rules, and different verification mechanisms. The requirement of “conveniently
and efficiently” implies that time and spatial limitations should be minimised. And
“cooperation on tasks across domains” implies that if a user wants to access cooperative
data in another domain, he or she should be able to do so through proper authenti-
cation. In a large-scale distributed system, participants may be geographically remote
11
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and the system must be scalable enough to cater for heterogeneous remote components
joining or leaving the system.
Jean Bacon carried out an extensive survey of large distributed systems and con-
cluded that they are hard to maintain (14). The particular challenges that she identified
include concurrency, naming, and failure recovery. The same issues are also prominent
in the analysis of Anderson (12). This thesis, based on the pi-calculus, takes concur-
rency of processes as the norm, uses names to denote endpoints, and equips primitives
for name passing to control mobility. For failures (i.e. errors), the monitoring mecha-
nism proposed in this thesis straightforwardly stops the ill-behaved process and drops
it off. As the first step in governing asynchronous interactions with a session-based
approach, this thesis does not cover the issue of a failure recovery mechanism.
2.2 Ocean Observatories Initiative (OOI)
The Ocean Observatories Initiative (OOI), the model of a large-scale distributed system
that this thesis based on, is a major project funded by the US NSF. One of its goals is
to realise the cross-domain inter-networks and inter-cooperations. The OOI’s intention
is not to produce a private cloud, unlike Google (70) and Amazon (8), it aims to provide
a public cloud integrating more than one cloud to serve researchers and the public with
persistent and interactive capabilities for observing the oceans over a period of more
than 30 years (36, 129), and, at the same time, enjoys scalability and consistency.
It therefore presents a general architecture which has all the attributes a large-scale
distributed system should have. The governance theories in this thesis are mainly based
on OOI’s requirements and attributes.
With our ongoing cooperation, the governance theories proposed in this thesis are
going to be adopted as the theoretical foundation for OOI’s design. The key element is
a comprehensive cyberinfrastructure (i.e. CI), whose design is based on loosely-coupled
distributed services and agents throughout the OOI observatories, from seafloor in-
struments to on-shore research stations, communicating through a common messaging
infrastructure. Most of the use case scenarios focus on distributed and structured con-
versations among endpoints which may be a thousand miles apart.
In conclusion, for OOI’s system, OOI wishes to provide a communication and data
transformation platform for ocean science, connecting observation, data collection, and
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Figure 2.1: A Simplified Schematic Representation of Endpoints’ Interactions
modelling under a mechanism, that includes a suitable governance system to guarantee
stability and integrity. A traditional data-centric CI has a central data management
system that ingests data and serves it to users on a query basis. This however is not
sufficient to accomplish the range of tasks ocean scientists will engage in when the OOI
is implemented. Instead, a highly distributed set of capabilities is required.
Figure 2.1 describes possible relationships among OOI organizations (Orgs). Each
ellipse delineates an Org, corresponding informally to a community of participants. Orgs
may be nested within, be disjoint from, or partially overlap with other Orgs. Org OOI
is the root Org in that it defines the identities for the participants involving in and
provides the rules to monitor and enforce contracts among its participants (41).
2.3 Theory Foundations
In this section, we give a brief overview of the two fundamental theoretical bases of
this thesis: the asynchronous pi-calculus (24, 84) and session types (30, 69, 85, 86,
157), which structure communications. Since the asynchronous pi-calculus is built upon
the pi-calculus (117, 118), we start from introducing the pi-calculus to give readers an
13
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overview. The pi-calculus is a process algebra for modeling communications. There
are many formalisms for describing concurrent communications besides the pi-calculus.
They include the actor model (76), CSP (communicating sequential processes) (79, 80),
CCS (communication and concurrency system) (115), and the Ambient Calculus (33).
This thesis is based on the asynchronous pi-calculus for two main reasons:
1. Like the pi-calculus, it has the virtue providing a neat and sufficient expressive
model for identifying and formalising interactive behaviours among participants in
distributed systems. This virtue is elegantly captured in its syntax and semantics,
which will be reviewed below.
2. It identifies concurrent and asynchronous behaviours, and mobility of processes
through message passing with a simple but expressive syntax and semantics.
We also make substantial use of the theory of session types (22, 30, 31, 57, 69, 86, 89).
Session types, the types typing conversations, are simple and expressive formal lan-
guages for describing protocols. When we use a session type to define a session, although
the interactive behaviours in an individual session may be sequential, different sessions
can interleave, which makes the overall interactions behave concurrently. Thus the at-
tribute of concurrency of processes in distributed systems is captured in our theory.
Since the focus of this thesis is to establish a foundation for governing processes’s inter-
actions in large-scale distributed systems, applying the ideas of protocols, which define
and specify the behaviours of session participants who agree on it, is thus practical,
expressive, and effective.
2.3.1 The pi-calculus
As noted by (134), the pi-calculus (117, 118) is a core calculus of message-based con-
currency. It was inspired by Nielsen and Engberg (59), and formulated and introduced
by Robin Milner, Joachim Parrow and David Walker (118). There are many studies
about the pi-calculus, including the works of (82, 116, 117, 124). The defining feature of
the pi-calculus is its ability to model interactive behaviours among participants by mes-
sage passing. As three main attributes of activities in large-scale distributed systems
are: (I) interactions, including sending-receiving pair-wise communications via passing
messages among processes, are the norm, and (II) the behaviours of those interactions
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are majorly concurrent, and (III) the processes can be mobile in the network. The
pi-calculus, with its conciseness and expressiveness for concurrency and name passing,
provides for this thesis an ideal basis.
2.3.1.1 The Syntax and Semantics
Here we briefly introduce the action labels and the grammar of the pi-calculus.
Action Prefixes
The action prefixes α of the pi-calculus includes both observable and internal (τ) ac-
tions. An action prefix represents either sending or receiving a message (a name), or
making a silent transition. The syntax is
α ::= x(y) receiving (input) of name y via channel x
| x〈y〉 sending (output) of name y via channel x
| τ internal (silent) action
Processes
The set of the pi-calculus processes, P , Q, ... , is defined by the grammar
Process P ::=
∑
i∈I αi.Pi | P1|P2 | νxP | !P ,
where I is any finite indexing set. The process
∑
i∈I αi.Pi is called summation or sum.
It represents guarded choice. Generally speaking, Pi is guarded by αi, since the action
represented by αi must occur before Pi becomes active. 0 (inactive) is used to represent
the empty sum, α.P (prefix) is used to represent sum on one element only, and P +Q is
for the binary sum. The symbols | and ! are respectively the parallel and the replication
operator. The restriction νx and the input y(x) both bind the name x, i.e. in the
processes νxP and y(x).P , the occurrences of x in P are considered bound with the
usual rules of scoping. On the other hand, x is free on the output y〈x〉 action. The
set of free names of P , i.e. those names which do not occur in the scope of any binder,
is denoted by fn(P ). The set of bound names is denoted by bn(P ), and n(P ) is used
to denote all the names which occur in P . The renaming (or substitution) P 〈y/x〉 is
defined as the result of replacing all free occurrences of x in P by y.
Process Contexts
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The set of process contexts C is given by the syntax:
C ::= [ ] | α.C +M | νxC | C|P | P |C | !C.
C[Q] denotes the result of filling the hole [ ] in the context C with the process Q. The
elementary contexts are α.[ ] +M , νx[ ], [ ] | P , P | [ ], and ![ ].
Process Congruence
Let ∼= be an equivalence relation over the set of all the pi processes. The ∼= is said to
be a process congruence if it is preserved by all elementary contexts; that is, if P ∼= Q,
then
α.P +M ∼= α.Q+M
νxP ∼= νxQ
P | R ∼= Q | R
R | P ∼= R | Q
!P ∼= !Q
Structural Congruence
Two process expressions P and Q in the pi-calculus are structurally congruent, written
P ≡ Q, if we can transform one into the other by using the following equations (in
either direction)
• Change of bound names (alpha-conversion)
• Reordering of terms in a summation
• P | 0 ≡ P , P | Q ≡ Q | P , P | (Q | R) ≡ (P | Q) | R
• νx(P | Q) ≡ P | νxQ if x 6∈ fn(P )
• νx0 ≡ 0, νxyP ≡ νyxP
• !P ≡ P |!P
Reduction
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The reduction rules are define below:
TAU : τ.P +M −→ P
REACT : (x(y).P +M) | (x〈z〉.Q+N) −→ P{z/y} | Q
PAR :
P −→ P ′
P |Q −→ P ′ |Q
RES :
P −→ P ′
νxP −→ νxP ′
STRUCT :
P −→ P ′
Q −→ Q′ if P ≡ Q and P
′ ≡ Q′
We use the following example to illustrate reduction rules. A reduction is a silent
action (τ action). This example is extracted from Robin Milner’s Communicating and
Mobile Systems : The pi-calculus (117). Let
P = νz((x〈y〉+ z(w).w〈y〉) | x(u).u〈v〉 | x〈z〉).
x, y, and v are the free names in P . A pair of positive and negative actions using the
same channel, such as x〈y〉 and x(u) are complementary. If both are unguarded and not
in the same summation (i.e. not alternatives to each other) then they constitute a redex :
this redex constitutes a reduction P −→ P ′ , which invokes a substitution-here {y/u}. In
the example, P has two redexes; the pair x〈y〉, x(u) and the pair x(u), x〈z〉. By the rule
REACT, there are two possible reductions P −→ P1, where P1 = νz(0 | y〈v〉 | x〈z〉), or
P −→ P2, where P2 = νz((x〈y〉 + z(w).w〈y〉) | z〈v〉 | 0). There is no further reduction
in P1, but by rule REACT there is one in P2:
P2 −→ P3, where P3 = νz(v〈y〉 | 0 | 0)
This example also shows the non-determinism of concurrent processes.
Labelled Transition System
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The labelled transition systme (LTS) is defined as follows:
Actions ` ::= x(y) | x〈y〉 | x(y)
I-SUM Σiαi.Pi
x(z)−−→ Pj{z/y} αj = x(y)
O/τ -SUM Σiαi.Pi
αj−→ Pj αj = x〈y〉 or αj = τ
OPEN P
x〈y〉−−→ P ′
(νy)P
x(y)−−→ P ′
RES P
`−→ P ′
(νy)P
`−→ (νy)P ′
y 6∈ n(`)
PAR P
`−→ P ′
P | Q `−→ P ′ | Q
fn(Q) ∩ bn(`) = ∅
COM P
x〈y〉−−→ P ′ Q x(y)−−→ Q′
P | Q τ−→ P ′ | Q′
CLOSE P
x(y)−−→ P ′ Q x(y)−−→ Q′
P | Q τ−→ (νy)(P ′ | Q′) y 6∈ fn(Q)
REP P |!P
`−→ P ′
!P
`−→ P ′
CONG P1 ≡ P2 P2
`−→ Q2 Q2 ≡ Q1
P1
`−→ Q1
Note that n(`) means the collection of free and bound names occuring in `. n(`) does
not include the channel name. For example, n(x〈y〉) = n(x(y)) = y. bn(`) means the
name bound by channel, e.g. bn(x(y)) = bn(x(y)) = y, but bn(x〈y〉) = bn(τ) = ∅. And,
on the contrary, fn(`) means the name free to channel, e.g. fn(x〈y〉) = y, fn(x(y)) =
fn(x(y)) = fn(τ) = ∅. Rules I-SUM and O/τ -SUM are straightforward: When the
action of an input (resp. output) process fires, the process executes the input (resp.
output) action; while τ action is for reduction of processes. The only action different
from the prefix (i.e. α) is x(y), which means a bound output. It is introduced to model
scope extrusion, which is corresponding to transition rule OPEN. Scope extrusion is
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outputting a secret, say a private name y (through bound output x(y)). If there is
no corresponding receiver to get this private name (see rule CLOSE), then this private
name becomes non-private. Rule RES says, when the action has nothing to do with
the private names possessing by process (νy)P , after the fire of this action, (νy)P ′
still has this name as private. If the channel of ` is exactly the private name y, it
means the message is delivered internally. Rule PAR says the action will not affect the
concurrent process Q if fn(Q) ∩ bn(`) = ∅, e.g. it will not result in a communication,
as rule COM defines. Rule COM corresponds to the reduction rule REACT: When
there synchronously exist an output x〈y〉 and an input x(y), a communication happens.
While rule CLOSE, which seems similar to COM, is a dual to rule OPEN. It says when
the sender sends a secret (by sending a private name via bound output x(y)) and at the
same time, there is a receiver ready to input this secret, then this secret is shared only
by the sender and the receiver, denoted by (νy)(P ′ | Q′), saying the name is private in
the scope of (P ′ | Q′).
2.3.1.2 Mobility
As Milner’s work (117) states, in the pi-calculus, link is used as the connectivity for
describing mobility. The movement of a process can be represented entirely by the
movement of its links, which is called as link mobility. According to Milner’s observation,
what distinguishes the pi-calculus from earlier process calculi, in particular to Calculus of
Communicating Systems (CCS) (115) and Tony Hoare’s similar work on Communicating
Sequential Processes (CSP) (79, 80), is the capability to change the links of a network
of processes.
In the pi-calculus, that is the name-passing makes mobility possible:
x〈y〉.P | x(z).z〈10〉.Q −→ P | y〈10〉.Q{y/z} the pi-calculus
x〈10〉.P | x(z).y〈z〉.Q −→ P | y〈z〉{10/z}.Q{10/z} = y〈10〉.Q{10/z} the CCSvp
In the pi-calculus, a name y is passed as a message, from process x〈y〉 via channel x
to another concurrent process x(z).z〈10〉.Q. As reduction happens (i.e. x(z).z〈10〉.Q
receives y), y becomes a channel, y〈10〉, for sending out value 10. While in the CCSvp
(i.e. value-passing CCS), a name cannot be passed, but only a value can be passed. Thus
in the pi-calculus, when a name is passed as a message, it can later become a channel.
This simple idea realises the mobility through the change of links, which dynamically
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change the computing configurations. Palamidessi in (133) analysed that link mobility
is a very powerful feature for coordination of distributed activities, since it allows two
remote processes, originally not directly connected, to establish a direct communication
link and to take decision together via synchronous exchange of information along that
link. Palamidessi proved that the link mobility makes the pi-calculus strictly more
powerful than CCSvp.
2.3.2 The Asynchronous pi-calculus
Asynchrony is inherent in distributed systems because it takes time for a message to
travel from one system component to another. The asynchronous pi, proposed by Honda
and Tokoro in 1991’s (84) and, independently by Boudol in 1992’s work (24), contains no
explicit operators for choice and output-prefixing. Due to the lack of output prefix, an
output action is non-blocking and can only be written "in parallel" with other activities.
With the pi-calculus introduced above, here we address the main different grammars for
the asynchronous pi-calculus.
Asynchronous Processes
The set of the asynchronous pi-calculus processes, P , Q, ... , is defined by
Process P ::= x〈y〉 | x(y).P | ∑i∈I Pi | P1|P2 | νxP | !P ,
The main difference is, in the asynchronous pi-calculus, there is no output-prefix guard-
ing a process. The output is unattached to the process producing it but exists in parallel
with it. This design allows the sender to output without waiting for the synchronisation
of the receiver side.
Labelled Transition Sytem
The main rules different from the LTS rules of the pi-calculus are listed below. Let
xy ::= x〈y〉 | x(y):
OUT xy xy−→ 0
COM xy, x(z).P τ−→ P{y/z}
Rule OUT states that xy is able to be outputted at anytime and is independent to other
processes at one location. In rule COM, “,” is used to separate two processes inside one
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location i.e. xy and x(z).P are both at one location. The calculus proposed in this
thesis uses different notation for “,” and “|”. We use | for “,” to denote that a local
process can consist of multi-threads in parallel; while use ‖ for “|” to represent that the
local processes existing in the network in parallel.
The attributes and benefits of the asynchronous pi-calculus can be observed as mak-
ing the communication between a sender and a receiver becomes asynchronous through
having the sender to be able to fire its output at every possible execution time.
2.3.2.1 Synchrony v.s. Asynchrony
In concurrent and distributed computations, communications are dominant. Commu-
nication is a process for delivering messages, exchanging opinions, negotiation, and
achieving agreements. There are many kinds of communication models, for exam-
ple, synchronous, asynchronous, one-to-one, or one-to-many communication models.
Two main models are discussed: The synchronous pi-calculus, denoted by pi, and the
asynchronous pi-calculus, denoted by pia. We study the distinction between the syn-
chronous and the asynchronous pi-calculus with Palamidessi’s work (133). Note that
the pi-calculus itself is a synchronous paradigm which contains an "asynchronous" frag-
ment (Boudol, 1992; Honda and Tokoro, 1991).
In the pi-calculus, we write P = x〈y〉.P ′ to represent a process P that performs
an output of name y on channel x and continues as P ′ , and we write Q = x(z).Q′ to
represent a process Q that performs an input on channel x and continues as Q′{y/z}
after replacing every z in Q′ with y. By using these operators, the synchronisation of
P and Q on x is enforced: Only when the communication along x takes place, these
two processes can proceed. On the contrary, in the asynchronous pi-calculus, we write a
process that performs an output in the form P = x〈y〉 | P ′ , where x〈y〉 is an output to
send y through channel x and | is the operator representing parallel composition. Since
they are in parallel, the output process does not have to wait until a reception with
corresponding primitive, say x(z), appears. In other words, the output action does not
suspend the continuous process, i.e. P ′, and there is no crucial notion of continuation
point. x〈y〉 | P ′ is a process which performs an output on x at some unspecified moment
and of the handshaking between x〈y〉 and x(z).Q′ as the moment in which the message
is received by a reception. The reception enables the continuation point Q′{y/z} in the
receiver, but it does not cause any resumption of activity in the sender.
21
2. BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
In conclusion, a synchronous communication is usually understood as the simulta-
neous exchange of information between the partners, for example, the telephone. In
contrast, in an asynchronous communication, the action of sending a message and the
action of receiving it usually take place at different times, for example, the e-mail.
(133) has proved that there does not exist any uniform, fully distributed translation
from the pi-calculus into the asynchronous pi-calculus, up to any "reasonable" notion of
equivalence. In other words, the asynchronous pi, pia, is not as expressive as the full
pi-calculus.
However, the communication model of pia is powerful enough to simulate output-
prefixing, as shown by Honda and Tokoro 1991 and by Boudol 1992, and input-guarded
choice, as shown by Nestmann and Pierce 2000’s work (128).
2.3.3 Session Types
A session type is a type for structuring a conversation, or called a “session”, which
consists of more than one related interaction and multiple participant. It forms and
specifies a unit of series of interactions which generally involve multiple participants,
called endpoints in this thesis. The interactions can be sequential interactions, parallel
interactions, or sub-interactions (which are formally called sub-sessions in (49)). A
session type is a protocol-like specification with formal shape.
Traditionally, viewing a computation as a sequence of actions gives a basis of the
principles for sequential programming. Based on this viewpoint, sessions are done by
RPC (remote procedure call). Every RPC is viewed as a single pair of interactions
that starts with a request from a client to a server and ends with the response from
the server to the client. The main difference between the concept of RPC and the
one of sessions is that a session describes a structured flow of interactions which may
include one or more, possibly an unbounded number of, interactions. For example,
creating a new bank account is naturally abstracted as a scenario involving a sequence
of interactions contacting with other services such as authentication components. From
the viewpoint of RPC, both at the programming level and at runtime, such a sequence of
interactions are not treated as forming a meaningful scenario as a whole since each call-
return constitutes a single, isolated session. Figure 2.2 shows these two concepts as they
both capture a common sequence of interactions but result in different representations
of the behaviours. For the 4 interactions among Alice and Bob, they can be viewed
22
2.3 Theory Foundations
Figure 2.2: The Difference between Sequential and Session-based Abstractions of Inter-
actions
as two independent RPCs (with two different RPC identities) or can be viewed as one
session. The advantage of viewing these 4 interactions as one session is that it makes
the relationships between endpoints trackable. For example, if some issue happens at
the second RPC interaction, which is however caused by the first RPC interaction,
without understanding that they are in fact related, the system cannot track through
these interactions and resolve the problem. Viewing a session as a unit of executions
makes it possible to clarify the patterns of interactive behaviours as a semantic entity.
2.3.3.1 Multi-party Session Types
The works of multi-party session types (MPSTs) (32, 86) present a formal approach to
the local validation of globally specified protocols, which assure that the session names
are used linearly (i.e. linearity) and the interactions are deadlock-free in a single session
(i.e. progress). Overall, session types ensure communication safety, protocol fidelity
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and progress. Here we introduce its grammars of global and local types, and use one
example in (86) to illustrate the use of session types.
The Syntax of Global and Local Types
In Figure 2.3, U is for value types which denote interaction message types. T@p is a
located type, representing a local type T assigned to participant p. S is for standard
value types, such as bool, int, string, etc., and the types for channels. G,G′, ..., range
over global types, T, T ′, ..., range over local types, and p1, p2, ... range over session
participants, and k is the variable for a channel. The rule of values for G says participant
p1 should send a message with type U to p2 through channel k, then both participants
should continue interactions guided by G′. From the local view point, participant p1
has a corresponding local type, k!〈U〉;T ′, to guide it to send a message of type U
through channel k, and continues the behaviour w.r.t. T ′; while participant p2 has a
corresponding local type, k?〈U〉;T ′, to guide it to receive a message of type U through
channel k, and continues the behaviour w.r.t. T ′. The rule of branching for G says
participants p1 and p2 should use channel k to interact through selecting a label from
the branching pool (i.e. label pool). From the local viewpoint, participant p1 has
a corresponding local rule, called selection, to guide it to select a label, say lj , and
continues the actions specified by Tj ; while participant p2 has a corresponding local
rule, called branching, to guide it to receive possible labels which may be chosen by
the sender, and continues the actions specified by Tk if the label k has been chosen.
The rule of recursion for global type, µt.G, is the type for defining a recursion, where
G is the recursion body. When we project it on the local endpoints, we have the
corresponding recursion rule, µt.T , where t is a type variable for either G or T . It is
used as a recursion point when it is involved in a recursion. end is the termination
of interactions. In summary, a global type G layouts the interactions among session
participants globally. When we project a global type to all session participants, a set
of local types are generated to guide the interactive behaviours of endpoints.
Classic Example
The following example shows a scenario that a session is established for three partic-
ipants, Buyer, Broker, and Seller, in which Buyer sends a request to Broker, and
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U ::= S | T@p Value
S ::= bool | ... | 〈G〉 Sort
G ::= p1 → p2 : k〈U〉.G′ values
| p1 → p2 : k{li : Gi}i∈I branching
| G | G′ parallel
| µt.G recursive
| t variable
| end end
T ::= k!〈U〉;T send
| k?〈U〉;T receive
| k ⊕ {li : Ti}i∈I selection
| k&{li : Ti}i∈I branching
| µt.T | t | end
Figure 2.3: The Grammar of Global (G) and Local (T ) Types
Broker classifies this request should belong to either catalog buy or service. Then
Broker informs Seller the catalog (i.e. branch label) she chooses. If label buy is cho-
sen, both Broker and Seller’s interactions should follow Gbuy’s guidance, otherwise
they should follow Gservice’s guidance.
We use global type G to formally represent this scenario:
G = Buyer → Broker : a〈string〉.
Broker → Seller : b{buy : Gbuy.end, service : Gservice.end}
Note that, G indicates that channel a is used for Buyer to communicate with Broker,
who is responsible for delivering the request of type string, from Buyer to Seller; while
the communication between Broker and Seller is done through channel b.
For the endpoints, they respectively have the following local types:
TBuyer = a!〈string〉; end
TBroker = a?〈string〉; b⊕ {buy : TBrokerbuy ; end, service : TBrokerservice ; end}
TSeller = b&{buy : TSellerbuy ; end, , service : TSellerservice ; end}
TBrokerbuy is the local type for participant Broker when label buy is selected, while T
Broker
service
is for this participant when label service is selected. Similary, TSellerbuy and T
Seller
service are
the local types for participant Seller when label buy and label service are selected,
respectively. This example shows that session types structure multiple interactions to
an organised interaction flow and guide endpoints to behave well as what global scenario
expects.
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L ::= {p, p′, ...} Location
S ::= bool | ... | 〈G〉 Sort
G ::= p1 → p2 : k〈v˜ : S˜〉{A}.G′ values
| p1 → p2 : k{{Ai}li : Gi}i∈I branching
| G | G′ parallel
| µt〈e˜〉(..., v˜i : S˜i@Li){A}.G recursive
| t〈e˜〉 variable
| end end
T ::= k!〈v˜ : S˜〉{A};T send
| k?〈v˜ : S˜〉{A};T receive
| k ⊕ {{Ai}li : Ti}i∈I selection
| k&{{Ai}li : Ti}i∈I branching
| µt〈e˜〉(v˜ : S˜){A}.T | t | end
Figure 2.4: The Syntax of Global (G) and Local (T ) Assertions
2.3.3.2 Multi-party Session Assertions
Multi-party session assertions (MPSAs) (22) further allow, by extending MPSTs with
logical formulae, fine-grained specifications of interactive behaviour including message
contents, runtime choices of conversation paths and recursion invariants. By projecting
a global assertion (i.e. global protocol specification) onto endpoints, we get endpoint
assertions (i.e. local protocol specifications), each of which specifies endpoint in the
protocol. Thus the local validations which automatically ensure global correctness are
obtained.
The Grammar of Global and Local Assertions
Figure 2.4 shows the syntax of MPSAs, which extend MPSTs with logical formulae. The
syntax of MPSAs is similar to the one of MPSTs, except that the interaction predicate
A is introduced at every interaction to guard interactions. Note that, T@p in MPSTs is
replaced by v : S@L (particularly defined in recursion for global types) with definition
of locations L ::= {p, p′, ...}. Also note that v˜ is defined in rule of values, send, receive,
and recursion because v˜ should be specified in interaction predicate A to bind A. As
for the type of global recursion, since it defines the recursion variables known by all
endpoints involving in the recursion, in (..., v˜i : S˜i@Li, ...), v˜i : S˜i@Li indicates the
types of contents for a particular location Li; while for the type of local recursion, since
it has been located, only v˜ : S˜ is enough.
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To represent our focus without confusion, here we only mention the most related works
having significant impact to the subjects that we are interested in. As a brief summary
of comparisons, the following two points are noted here:
1. In the literature, the works of dynamic monitoring mostly rely on inlined monitors.
In other words, in these works, they monitored the asynchronous interactions
among endpoints through embedding monitoring code besides the variables and
procedures which should be protected; however, as an external monitor is adopted
for economic and scalable settings, we shall consider the asynchronous interactions
between an endpoint and its corresponding monitor.
2. In the literature, most works of runtime monitoring do not provide the theoreti-
cal foundation to state and prove that their mechanisms enjoy the properties of
safety and transparency, which are necessary for governing large-scale distributed
systems. This thesis gives both. To cater for the asynchronous monitoring, we
provide the semantics and the permutation mechanism of specifications for moni-
toring, which determines the endpoint behaviours based on these specifications, to
capture the effects of actions whose order may not be preserved due to concurrency
and asynchrony.
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3.1 Specification and Verification for Concurrent Programs
Specifications are the rules for statically regulating endpoint programs and system struc-
tures or dynamically verifying runtime behaviours of processes and systems. In Alfred
V. Aho et al ’s book (5), a specification is as an articulation of the request of a compiler.
In Pierce’s book (135), a specification is defined by a type inference system. In general, a
specification is a concise description which formally specifies the intended computation
outcomes and makes verification of programming code or runtime processes possible. A
proper specification should make verification effective. When the verification follows the
semantics of a specification, it can at least judge an invalid code or process as incorrect,
and can at most judge a valid code or process as correct.
There are two aspects of formal verification: One is to statically inspect the structure
of programming code, the other is to dynamically check the behaviours of processes.
Leslie Lamport’s opening in (101) says “a large body of research on formal verifications
can be characterised as state-based or assertional”. A state-based verification is an
automata-like approach, where the “state” means the “status” of a program or a process.
An assertional verification is an approach with proof system and the construction of
invariants, which are logical formulae whose value never change (100, 131).
The following history of specification and verification for concurrent programs is
a summary from Lamport’s note (101), which reviewed the works having significant
contributions and advocates specifying programs with mathematics (e.g. the proposal of
TLA (temporal logic of actions)). In 1967, Floyd in (64) introduced the modern concept
of correctness for sequential programs. In every program, there are control points, called
annotations, attached with assertions, which are written in logical formulae. Partial
correctness is proved by verifying if the control point is annotated “true” whenever
control is at the point. A formula in Hoare’s logic, proposed in 1969’s work (77), has
the form {P}S{Q}, denoting that if the assertion P is true before initiation of program
S, then the assertion Q will be true upon S’s termination. The state-based approach
viewed a program as a state transformer, which can be verified by checking whether
every control point satisfies the attached assertions.
Ashcroft in 1975 (13) adopted the state-based approach to concurrent programs,
where concurrency is expressed by fork and join operations. In concurrent program-
ming, a control can be at multiple control points at the same time: At every moment,
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the annotation of a control is not unique, but rather as a collection of annotations of con-
trols representing that the assertions are true. This collection is viewed as invariance,
which should be true after every execution. The idea of invariance gives a fundamental
principle to specify concurrent programs: Instead of only considering what is true before
and after executing the program, one must consider what remains true throughout the
execution.
In 1976, Owicki and Gries (131) attempted to reason about concurrent programs by
generalising Hoare’s method with the following additional proof rule:
{P1}S1{Q1}, ..., {Pn}Sn{Qn}
{P1 ∩ ... ∩ Pn} cobegin S1 ‖ ... ‖ Sn coend {Q1 ∩ ... ∩Qn}
provided {P1}S1{Q1}, ..., {Pn}Sn{Qn} are interference-free.
Unlike Ashcroft’s method, the assertions in the Owicki-Gries method do not mention
the control state but only introduce auxiliary variables to capture the control informa-
tion. Ashcroft’s invariance is actually hidden inside the machinery of the Owicki-Gries
method: This proof rule is as a general summary of valid concurrent programs without
specifying how to share variables among concurrent programs to achieve invariance. To
achieve {P1 ∩ ... ∩ Pn} cobegin S1 ‖ ... ‖ Sn coend {Q1 ∩ ... ∩Qn}, Pi and Pj (i 6= j),
Pi and Qj (i 6= j) should have some hidden relationships which are not fully addressed.
Lamport in (99) indicates that a module in a concurrent program must be specified
in terms of its behaviour, rather than the values it returns because, in a concurrent
program, input and output actions are no more sequentially executed in one process
but could be called by different processes. With the reality of concurrency, temporal
logic is a useful tool to reason about the behaviour of concurrent programs (132, 137).
In (99), Lamport introduced temporal assertions to make the specifications simpler and
easier to understand. In (27), distributed temporal logic (DTL) was proposed for for-
malising properties of concurrent, communicating agents. It is a modal temporal logic
with modalities referring to events, which are mapped to corresponding actions. (27)
also introduced communication points to realise the asynchrony between a sender and a
receiver through two phases of synchronisations: Synchronising the sender and a shared
channel (i.e. sending a content to the communicating channel), and then synchronis-
ing the channel and the receiver (i.e. receiving the content from the communicating
channel).
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Figure 3.1: The Different Approaches of the Representation of the Relationships of Events
To compare the session-type-based approach and the temporal logic-based one, we
use Figure 3.1 to illusrate that the session-type-based approach gives a cleaner and
more uniform specification for verification. Assume there are three principals, Alice,
Bob, and Carly in the system. Each of them has a unique identity. Assume Alice has
a communication with Bob: Alice orders a book from Bob. Here Alice plays role client
and Bob plays role store. Also, assume Alice has another communication with Carly:
Carly sends a task request to Alice. Here Alice plays role server and Carly plays role
client. For simplicity, here we only show the one-way events (i.e. no corresponding
responses). In the figure, a horizontal solid line is the life time of a principal, and a
black spot is an event. These two interactions are concurrent. As we apply the temporal
logic-based approach, we have at least 6 different possible temporal assertions to describe
these two concurrent interactions. As we apply the session-type-based approach, since
unrelated sessions, e.g. the interaction of Alice and Bob and the one of Alice and Carly
are unrelated, can interleave, only two session types (i.e. Session 1 and Session 2)
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are needed. As one session starts, the corresponding session identity is generated for
the system to track and maintain the overall endpoint behaviours. The advantage of
session-type-based specifications is that session types concisely and uniformaly represent
all necessary information for concurrent interactions.
The session-type-based approach uses sessions to partition the interactions among
processes. Although interactions are concurrent, because a session has linked all related
interactions, there is no interference between different sessions. Thus, inside a session,
the interactions are executed step by step, to which the principles of Floyd and Hoare’s
works can be applied: Every interaction point attached with assertions (at the sender
and the receiver) is viewed as a control point. At the same time, since different sessions
concurrently exist in the network, we can focus on exploring and specifying the prop-
erties of invariance among sessions. For example, one invariance in our setting is the
property of coherence. One rule of coherence states that, in all monitors’ specifications,
there is one and only one shared channel with input mode, and, whenever there is a
sender, there is a receiver.
Other methods of algebraic approaches, like CCS (115), and functional approaches,
like the method of Broy (25), attempt to replace state-based reasoning with other proof
techniques. In an algebraic approach, verification is based on applying algebraic trans-
formations. In a functional approach, the rules of function applications are used.
Our approach is an algebraic one. We view a specification as a session-type-based
language through formally defining its syntax and semantics. We provide the labelled
transition system (LTS) of session-type-based specifications. As the operational spec-
ifications advocated by Lam and Shankar (97) and Lamport (99), the LTS makes the
specifications efficient to specify parts of concurrent processes.
3.2 Specification and Verification for Conversations
In the literature, the purpose of defining specifications for conversations is to coordinate
heterogeneous autonomous agents (95, 149). Many works related to this subject are
particularly for multi-agent systems (MASs). In general, protocols are specifications for
conversations.
There are two purposes of the exploration of conversation specifications: To define
policies for conversations and to inspect (statically or dynamically) conversations among
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multiple participants. To achieve them, one needs to firstly identify the relationships
among the multiple system components, which may possibly locate in different domains.
According to Singh’s work (149), to figure out distributed coordination of heterogeneous
agents, we need to know the skeletons of agents with compact descriptions of the given
agents in terms of their events for coordination, and the relationships among the events
occurring in these skeletons. They adopted a graphic-approach, Dooley graphs (109),
to generate the skeletons and the relationships required for coordination. The skeletons
here are specifications, while coordinations in multi-agent systems generally are meant
to be interactions among agents. With the use of Dooley graphs, the table recording the
histories of agents in conversation is generated and the skeletons of an agent involving
in coordination are produced. This work represented a methodology to produce a
specification from observations and given requirements.
Other related works are (95, 150) of Smith et al. (150) provided a comprehensive
semantics for the conversational policies through using joint intention theory (JI), which
prescribes a way to execute actions jointly by a team of agents. In (95), the most impor-
tant aspect of a conversation protocol is not the set of communicative actions involved
in that protocol but the effects or the states that these actions bring about. They
proposed a formal analysis of landmark-based approach to view a conversation protocol
as partially ordered landmarks. Each landmark defines a set of specifiable semantic
properties that must hold of the agents involved. Based on (150), they represented
and analysed families of protocols with JI theory. They expressed JI in terms of joint
commitment between two agents to bring about a certain state of affairs which results
in appropriate individual commitments.
Wooldridge’s work (158) examined the issue of developing semantics for ACL (agent
communication languages 1 ). It considered verification of conformance to the semantics
and had given the first precise definition of what it means for an agent communication
framework to be verifiable. Another work of his (159) argued that, for agents in large-
scale multi-agent systems to safely communicate to one another, it must be able to
determine whether any system that claims to conform to an ACL standard actually
does so when agents are possibly built by different organisations using different plat-
forms (136). Particularly, this conformance — the semantics of the language adopting
1ACL means either KQML or FIPA ACL, proposed by Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents
(FIPA) in 1997.
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by a system conforms to the standard ACL semantics — can be determined by an in-
dependent observer. Koning and Oudeyer in (93) proposed POS (Protocol Operational
Semantics), a unification and generalisation of interaction protocols, which allows the
design of dedicated ACLs together with policies or constraints of messages.
The motivation behind the issues they addressed are similar to ours. They explored
the semantic conformance for standard ACL, while we explored for the session-type-
based specification languages. ACL is to cater for the needs of agents to interact in a
shared language, hiding the details of their internals and to build communities of agents
that can tackle problems that no individual agent can. Session types share the same
interest. According to the investigation of (96), the existing semantic approaches for
verifying the conformance for ACL standard, however, rely on multi-modal logics that
are often non-computable and/or have no efficient implementation. Since session types
standardise the sequence of actions (including the permutation of actions to cater for
asynchronous environments) of a given protocol and the operational semantic system of
specifications is deterministic, the semantic approach for verification of communications
proposed in this thesis is decidable and computable.
Meng et al. in (113) explored the synthesis of Reo circuit scenario-based (i.e. session-
based) interaction specifications, where Reo is a channel-based coordination language.
Although their tool (i.e. Reo circuit) is different from ours, both of us aim to systemat-
ically generate runtime monitoring mechanism (i.e adaptors in their words) to inspect
the behaviour of interactions. They argued about session types are for coping with
heterogenous descriptions of component interfaces. By applying session types, an adap-
tor can be automatically generated from the adaptor specification (specified by session
types), which establishes a correspondence between messages in different components.
They also argued that the adaptor specification based on session types requires imple-
mentation details to achieve the correspondences among methods (and their parameters)
of different components. Our responses are: (I) We aim to specify interactions and the
contents of interaction messages among endpoints, but leave the private tasks, like how
to deal with information at different locations, to the local endpoints. (II) Session types
are thus useful to cope with runtime verification for the session-level interactions as
unexpected runtime endpoint values are generated by endpoints. Our approach focuses
on injecting specifications into external monitors, rather than automatically generat-
ing endpoint processes which obey specifications. Session-type-based specification gives
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the freedom for endpoint programmers to design their own interfaces. Through run-
time verification of an external monitor, which is unattached to endpoints, as long as
endpoints’ behaviours obey what the specifications specified, endpoints and the overall
system obey the given global scenario.
3.3 Rumtime Verification for Sharing Memory among Mul-
tiple Participants
How to specify specifications for multiple participants (e.g. multiple threads) to share
memory in one operation system or in one application, and how to verify the behaviours
of multiple participants to see if they obey the specifications, are important topics in
the area of specification and verification. In these topics, most works consider the
participants and their actions are in one common domain (e.g. one operation system),
which provides the ability for scheduling processes. Thus, when they consider runtime
verification for sharing memory, they are able to design synchronisation mechanism to
achieve data-race freedom. These works include (98, 138, 142), which aim to explore
and propose methods for synchronisation of asynchronous actions (e.g. multi-threads
in their cases). They are briefly described in the follows.
(98) proposed the algorithm for synchronising physical clocks, which should always
imply logical clocks. If one can resolve the problem of synchronising physical clocks at
different domains, then one can apply the similar idea to synchronise the events issued
by different local processes, which require, at least, the partial ordering. However, many
issues arise in practice as those discussed in (66, 91, 102, 114, 139). Even the physical
clocks at different domains can be practically synchronised, preserving the order of
messages (or the actions triggered by messages) costs the overall system unefficient
because the earlier-arrived but later-issued message needs to wait for the later-arrived
but earlier-issued message.
(142) proposed “Eraser” for detecting data races in lock-based synchronisation for
multi-threaded programs by checking that all shared-memory accesses follow a consis-
tent locking discipline. Eraser uses binary rewriting techniques to monitor every shared
memory reference and verify that consistent locking behaviour is observed. (138) fo-
cused on synchronisation for achieving linearisability and refinement to make the use of
sequential specifications for data structure operations.
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However, synchronisation is not practical in large-scale distributed systems because
no scheduler can schedule the events of processes in different independent/dependent
domains at the same time. Thus we adopt a different way: Directly cope with the issues
of asynchrony and concurrency in large-scale dsitributed systems, rather than designing
synchronisation mechamism.
In Chapter 8, we address the issue of sharing memory among multiple heterogeneous
parties and realisation of asynchronous monitoring in large-scale distributed systems.
Due to the nature of asynchrony, the order of floating messages is not preserved, which
implies that the order of actions, which are corresponding to these messages, is not
preserved. Although our governance framework focuses on the safety of the session-level
by regulating the interactions through runtime monitoring, we also consider the effects
when the states of endpoints are specified in the specifications of monitors, which may
make runtime monitoring ineffective due to the nature of asynchrony. When the states
of endpoints are specified, sharing memory in sessions is stipulated. The formal syntax
and semantics of stateful specifications and the theorems for asynchronous specifications
are introduced in Chapter 8.
3.4 Dynamic Monitoring Frameworks
Works (73, 107) gave a brief view of dynamic monitoring or runtime monitoring. Ac-
cording to Havelund and Goldberg’s work (73), specification-based runtime verification
consists of monitoring a program’s execution against a user-provided specification of
intended program behaviour. In (107), Leucker and Schallhart defined runtime verifi-
cation as the discipline of dealing with the detection of violations (or satisfactions) of
correctness properties. They pointed out the use of runtime verification for contract
enforcement.
Schneider in (143) introduced security automata for specifying exactly that class of
security policies. It is a runtime monitoring mechanism for enforcing safety properties.
(143) characterised that the set of executions for a security policy which is enforceable
by security automata is a safety property. This work provided a general picture for
runtime monitoring based on specifications or policies. As Deniélou and Yoshida in
(51) addressed, every well-formed global session type can be represented by a multi-
party session automata (MSA), i.e. it implies that session types are enforceable.
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The earliest mechanism of monitors are introduced in the 1972 U.S. Air Force report
(11), which was based on the works of Lampson (104). Hoare in (78) invented the name
monitor based on Brinch-Hansen and Dijkstra’s concept (58, 72) and defined it as a
collection of local administrative data, together with some procedures and functions
which are called by programs wishing to acquire and release resources. It targeted to
avoid data races by using lock to realise monitor’s mutual exclusion, which means at
each time, at most one thread may occupy a monitor.
The monitoring check proposed in (78) is for static-checking: Detecting data races
during compile time through reasoning about the semantics of programs. (106) pointed
out the limitations when people want to dynamically allocate shared variables. Dynamic
monitoring is able to monitor such an environment where (I) a process (e.g. an object,
which may allocate new variables) can be created; and (II) there is a monitor for every
instance of an object. Each of these monitors shares the same code but has its own lock
for process.
In summary, dynamic checking, compared to static checking, enjoys (I) dynamic
verification making the whole system becomes scalable with the assurance of correctness
even when untrusted components exist, and (II) the floating messages delivered during
runtime have no chance to pollute local source code because evil messages have been
blocked by a corresponding monitor.
3.4.1 Inlined Monitoring
In inlined monitoring, monitors run during runtime and exactly keep the status of mon-
itored process and make the communication overhead significantly reduced. However,
since the monitoring code is written in the code which should be protected by replac-
ing the annotations containing specifications at every control point, an inlined monitor
cannot detect the unexpected interruptions.
Since an inlined monitor positions at every local process, the interactions between an
endpoint and its corresponding inlined monitor are synchronous; therefore, formalising
the interactive behaviours among endpoint processes and the corresponding monitors
and the external is not a challenge. The works for inlined monitors, such as (6, 71,
151), aimed to provide a policy specification language for policy written in monitors
and certify the specifications generated by inlined monitors satisfy the original policy.
However, inlined monitors may suffer from the code pollution of malicious endpoints and
36
3.4 Dynamic Monitoring Frameworks
become expensive especially when thousands of new and possibly untrusted participants
are joining a large-scale distributed system every hour.
(6, 44) introduced a formalisation of monitoring and monitor inlining for the Java
Virtual Machine. They specified monitor inlining correctness using annotations, which
are based on Floyd’s work. Their monitors are security automata, as the one of Schnei-
der’s. The monitoring code is embeded into the local code which need protection. They
also analysed and specified the synchronisation check point.
Falcone et al. in (61) introduced a generic formalism for runtime enforcement based
on the concepts of Hoare’s monitor and Schneider’s security automata for analysing
properties. They studied the problem of enforcement relatively to the so-called Safety-
Progress hierarchy of regular properties, which provides a finer-grained classification of
enforceable properties. They showed how to generate an enforcement monitor in a sys-
tematic way. Although their goal is different from ours, they provided a good summary
and explored the composition, synthesis, and enforcement abilities of monitors.
3.4.2 Outline Monitoring
Another spectrum of monitoring framework is outline (or oﬄine) monitoring (37, 38,
107), in which monitors are external to application code. Outline monitoring imple-
mentation, which may work on a finite set of recorded executions, is decoupled from
application code or execution. It represents a desirable feature in untrusted environ-
ments, and is commonly used for distributed infrastructures. Outline monitoring better
supports decentralised monitor configuration.
Chen and Rosu in (37) introduced monitoring-oriented programming (MoP), a
paradigm for combining formal specification with implementation. It provided an out-
line monitoring framework and light-weighted formal method to check conformance of
implementation to specification at runtime. The monitoring code using the same target
language for the implementation is automatically generated during a pre-compilation
stage. The generated code has the same effect as a logical checking of requirements. In
outline monitoring, the monitoring code is executed within a different process, poten-
tially on an independent component (e.g. external monitor). This kind of monitoring
allows one monitor to guard multiple endpoint processes. In (38), Chen and Rosu ex-
tended their previous work to allow the specifications have parameter, together with
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an implementation of JavaMOP that supports parameters. With this extension, it can
state and monitor safety properties referring to two or more related objects.
In the above works, since they are not designed to monitor interactive behaviours
among endpoints, their formal syntax and semantics of specifications are directly writ-
ten in past time linear temporal logic, thus logic experts, domain experts, requirement
analysers, software designers and programmers are needed to cooperate for generating
the monitoring code. On the contrary, session types represent the causal relations, the
timing, the steps of taking actions of sending, receiving, and passing messages in a
straightforward way, and at the same time, elegantly express the scenario which may be
very difficult to be described in temporal logic. Our session-type based specifications
can thus be used for generating monitoring code more easily and directly. As an imple-
mentation of our formal specifications, Scribble (145), a completely session-type-based
description language, is developed to give program developers a clear and easy-to-read
endpoint behaviour guidance.
Against to the shortage of inlined monitoring mentioned above, outline monitor-
ing, positioning externally against to endpoint processes, can ideally provide economic
and robust monitoring solutions. However, since this setting results in asynchronous
interactions among local processes and external monitors, it is rather hard to capture
and formalise the interactive behaviour, which is the key for designing effective spec-
ifications for monitors. One main contribution of this thesis is that we capture and
formalise the asynchronous interactive behaviour for dynamic monitoring based on the
outline monitoring setting.
3.4.3 Monitoring for Conversations
The main related works include (10, 148). The runtime monitoring of (148) is based on
MSCs (message sequence charts). They adopted MSCs as their specification language
to represent the global scenario, and transformed these diagrams to automata to enable
conformance checking of finite execution traces against the specifications. Because their
monitoring is based on MSCs, every action at endpoints is strictly ordered (i.e. total
order), which means, when one endpoint, say p, is waiting for inputs from q1 and q2
which are specified as p should firstly input q1’s message then q2’s even though the
messages from q1 and q2 have no any causal relation, when q2’s message arrives at p
earlier than q1’s due to asynchrony, the monitor at p needs to refuse q2’s message. Our
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monitoring is more advanced by having permutation mechanism to make p’s monitor
to accept q2’s message if these two messages have no causality. One main contribution
of their monitoring is that it ensures liveness for finitely terminating behaviours. But,
note that, liveness property generally is not monitorable because interactive behaviours
may not terminate.
(10) proposed dynamic monitoring framework based on MPSTs for MASs (multi-
agent systems) to guard interactions between local agents and the environments. They
gave a procedure for automatically deriving a self-monitoring MAS by the Jason agent
oriented programming language to verify that a MAS implementation is compliant with
a given global session type, which can naturally be represented as cyclic Prolog terms.
Another work of theirs (9) proposed global types, which are very similar to global session
types for multi-party interactions for dynamic checking without projections.
Compared to ours, the similarity is for guarding interactions during runtime based
on session types. But their monitoring is centralised and inlined while ours is completely
distributed and outline; and therefore, their monitoring can only realise synchronous
monitoring rather than asynchronous one. Most important, (10) focused on implemen-
tation of monitors, while we aim to establish a theoretical foundation for dynamic mon-
itoring. The implementation of dynamic monitoring based on the theorems proposed
in this thesis can be found in (39), contributed by Pierre-Malo Deniélou. Although
(9) investigated the theorems for their framework, they do not have the theorems of
local and global safety, local and global transparency, and session fidelity, which are
contained and thoroughly proved in this thesis.
3.5 Governance
3.5.1 Service-oriented Architecture (SOA) Governance
Service-oriented Architecture (SOA) (92, 94) is a method of designing and managing
systems which are characterised by coarse-grained services and service consumers. SOA
governance is however too limited compared to large-scale distributed systems, such as
OOI, because its ultimate governance goal is to deliver agility and objectives to busi-
nesses (4, 111), and it is the governance mechanism particularly for an enterprise. In
other words, it is for regulating processes in one single domain, which has consistent
policies, typing rules, and governance goals: This domain may contain many sub-units,
39
3. RELATED WORKS AND COMPARISONS
e.g. an enterprise can have many departments, but all these sub-units follow com-
mon policies. Our current governance mechanism is general enough for formalising the
automatic goveranance parts of SOA governance.
3.5.2 Law-governed Interactions
The series of works (119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 163), for law-governed interaction mech-
anism, which regards control/policy mechanism in distributed systems, gave a general
picture and concept for governing interactions.
However, these works may not be able to capture the properties and theorems hidden
behind the complex facts of interactions. Their formal model, called LGI (law-governed
interaction), represented the static relations between laws and interactions: Defining
law-governed interactions as those local interactions obeying global law. Their model
did not deepen into the effects of concurrency and asynchrony of interactive behaviours
which are the norm in distributed systems. They did not provide formalism based on
process algebra to represent the dynamics of interactions among the local endpoints,
their corresponding monitors, and the network.
Compared to these works, we represent the dynamic relations among endpoints,
system monitors, and the network for runtime monitoring, and the formalisation of
the dynamics of monitor’s specifications. We also explore the issues that, for some
intuitive sensible specifications, asynchronous interactions will result them in becoming
insensible, and we characterise the specfications which are proper for asynchronous
environments.
3.6 Endpoint Access Control
The access of users to shared objects at endpoint is a basic operation in distributed
systems. Though certainly many of the works are worth mentioning, one of the early
clear statements on access control mechanisms and policies is found in Lampson’s (105),
which introduced two notions, Protection Domain and Access Control Matrix (ACM).
Protection Domain is the environment defining a set of objects (e.g. processes) and the
types of operations that can be invoked on each object. An ACM is a matrix saying
who can access which with what operations.
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We do not provide formalism for detailed access control mechanism for the local,
but we formalise a session-level endpoint capability control: We specify the capability of
a role involving in a session, which is specified under a particular protocol defining the
behaviours of session-roles (the roles in a specific session). Only the endpoint playing a
particular session-role can output (resp. input) messages to (resp. from) other particular
session-roles. The related works in this catagory include Lampson et al. (103) and Abadi
et al. (2), safeDpi (75), typing system for a higher-order pi calculus (160), and the series
of works of Klaim (46, 47, 48). The frameworks of (103) and (2), are based on logical
approach, in which they introduced the logics in access control and the famous “say”
authentication logic; while others are based on process algebraic approach as which
this thesis adopts. Others provided formalism for access control by assigning types,
i.e. capabilities, to located processes (according to (48, 160)) in distributed systems to
express and enforce policies that control access to resources and data. In work (160),
they proposed a typing system for a higher-order pi-calculus. The typing system is used
as an access control for an endpoint to judge the accessibility of processes for protecting
local resources.
safeDpi (75), proposed by Hennessy et al., modelled filtering for migrating processes
with channel dependent types. With the similar concept of processes migration, Ferrari
et al. (63) proposed an ambient-based runtime monitoring formalism, called guardians,
which aims for the rights of access control of network processes.
The series works of Klaim (46, 47, 48) advocated a hybrid (dynamic and static)
approach to access-control against capabilities including resources and data: The aim is
to provide a static checking that is integrated within a dynamic access-control procedure
controlling data communication and processes migration. These works (46, 47, 48, 63,
75) also addressed access-control for mobility.
Other related works such as those of Dezani-Ciancaglini et al. (55, 56) provided a
type system for the Xdpi calculus (67), proposed by Gardner and Maffeis, which is a
calculus for describing a network of locations, each of which consists of data tree and
processes. For a well-typed Xdpi-network, every process properly controls its data (e.g.
update or copy) and it can access the data at other locations only when whose security
level is equal to or less than its security level.
Our work realises an endpoint capability control in every session by passing a session-
role, denoted by s[p], viewed as a capability, to every process participanting in session
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s to identify (i.e. a session identity plus a role) the endpoint process, and embed asser-
tions (22) into monitors. This embeddedness of assertions enables external monitors to
not only verify the interaction messages, but also check if the access requester has the
capability (e.g. authority) to access the resource. In our governance framework, inter-
actions in distributed systems are partitioned into sessions, thus is called session-based
governance. Viewing inter-related interactions as one session unit enjoys governance
benefits: (I) It reduces the tasks for endpoint access control. Originally an endpoint
inlined monitor needs to check and authenticate thousands of input or output access per-
missions, with session-based outline monitoring, the session-level (i.e. interaction level)
check firstly filters most ill-behaved input or output actions, then leaves those obeying
global protocol but critical tasks, e.g. request to access confidential data, to endpoint
static checking system. (II) Through passing capabilities, delegation and migration can
be realised in our calculus.
In summary, compared to these works, our contributions are the formally founded
enforcement of global invariants, such as global safety and session fidelity, and the pro-
posal of decentralised session-level runtime monitoring for interactive behaviours among
components written in possibly different programming languages. By incorporating
protocols and conversations as two formally founded abstractions for programming and
runtime, our framework offers formal assurance of clearly articulated properties for dis-
tributed applications.
3.7 The Related Calculi
3.7.1 The Spi-calculus
Abadi and Gordon in 1997 (3) introduced the Spi-calculus, an extension of the pi-calculus
designed for the description and analysis of cryptographic protocols by embedding en-
cription libraries into the pi-calculus. They represented protocols as processes in the
Spi-calculus: When all the processes are combined, a protocol is represented. They also
stated the security properties in terms of coarse-grained notions of protocol equivalence.
We adopt the pi-calculus and session types rather than the Spi-calculus is because
we want to focus on governing conversations but leave the authentication tasks to each
endpoint in different domains. Since in large-scale distributed systems, every domain
may have their own authentication systems which are different from one to another,
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applying the Spi-calculus would however hinder the flexibility we want to give to the
endpoints, and may make our formalism and analysis become complicated. For example,
when two endpoints in different domains interact, different domains may have different
encryption libraries or different keys. Using the calculus with encryption and decryption
primitives make us hard to describe and analyse the critical interactive behaviours
among multiple participants.
Another reason is, to explore fundamental theories for governing conversations, the
best way is to start from the original theories with the clearest form (e.g. the pi-calculus
and session types). This reason also applied for the following related calculus.
3.7.2 Policy for Sessions in the Ambient Calculus
The ambient calculus (33), introduced by Cardelli and Gordon in 1998, is a calculus for
describing the mobility of concurrent processes. It introduced a paradigm of mobility
where computational ambients are hierarchically structured. It describes where agents
are connected to ambients and where ambients move under the control of agents. As a
note in (110), the ambient calculus is a useful tool to construct mathematical models
for security problems because of its facilities in expressing hierarchies of locations and
their mobility.
Garralda et al. in (68) introduced BACI (Boxed Ambients with Communication
Interfaces), an ambient calculus with flexible communication policies. BACI makes
different communication policies with different parents during computation possible.
Moreover, BACI makes communication and mobility become explicit by separating the
channels of communication between ambients. Our work, to BACI, is for its session-
level’s governance. It is a promising future work to integrate our session-based gover-
nance for conversations into BACI.
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4Assumptions and Terminologies
As the bases for the later chapters, the assumptions and terminologies of system partici-
pants and the communicating instances are introduced, and their relations are explained.
4.1 Principals, Processes, and Endpoints in Systems
Since the term “system participant” can be for any entity involving in systems, it is
vague for representing entities with particular tasks. Therefore, more specific terms like
principals, processes, endpoints are distinctly used here, and each of them is explained
as follows:
1. Principals: A system consists of principals, which are system components involv-
ing in the system. The activities of principals include having interactions with
other principals: With system’ agents, e.g. accessing data storage through a sys-
tem agent, or dealing with system-level operations, e.g. scheduling, monitoring,
updating policies for systems. In summary, a principal can be a user (e.g. a ser-
vice contributor, a server, or a client, etc.), a system agent (e.g. a monitor or a
database agent, etc.), or an electronic device, etc.
Since interactions among principals are the norm in large-scale distributed sys-
tems, principals should be abstracted to realise communications. A principal may
have many names for different activities, but is identified with a unique identity
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such that (I) it has its own data storage, which may be positioned at the end-
point or at a shared database in the network; (II) it has pre-defined capability of
executing particular activities and communications; (III) it is viewed as local in
distributed systems. All of them can be referred to a unique principal with its
identity.
2. Processes: With standard definition of processes, a process is an instance of a
program of an application that is being executed. A process may interact with
other processes and have multiple threads for executing multiple tasks. A principal
can have more than one process running applications for it, while a process can
concurrently include more than one endpoint by having multiple threads. Since
we focus on the conversations (sessions) among applications, we generally assume
a process involving in sessions have interactions with other processes.
3. Endpoints: An endpoint process is for a local process, and an endpoint is for a
session participant, which is represented by a shared channel (name) linking con-
nections to it. Although many works use “endpoints” for “endpoint applications”,
in distributed systems, an application may concurrently run more than one system
component. In this thesis, an endpoint is abstractly represented by a shared name
with the assumption that a unique input-mode shared channel connects commu-
nications to it. A process can have more than one endpoint by having distinct
shared names. Thus, a process can execute more than one activity simultaneously
through different session endpoints.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the relationships between principals, processes, and endpoints,
which are connected by shared channels a, b, c, d, e and f .
(i) There are Principals A and B. A principal can have more than one process. In the
figure, Principal A has an Application Aa, which has two processes Process A1 and
A2 running concurrently. Principal B has two applications, which are Application
Ba and Bb. Each of them has one process. Application Ba has Process B1, and
Application Bb has Process B2.
(ii) A process can have more than one endpoint. In the figure, Process A1 uses three
endpoints, connected by shared names a, b and c. These shared names represent
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Figure 4.1: The Relationships between Principals, Processes, and Endpoints
47
4. ASSUMPTIONS AND TERMINOLOGIES
the endpoints. Process A2 also uses these three endpoints but running separately
in three concurrent threads. Process B1 uses three endpoints d, e and f separately
for running in three concurrent threads. Similarly, Process B2 uses endpoints e
and d separately for running two concurrent threads. Note that Process A2 and
B1 are in one session where interactions are linked by endpoints a, b, c of Process
A2, and d, e, f of Process B1.
(iii) An endpoint is represented by a shared name which realises a connection for this
endpoint and represents the usage of this endpoint. For example, Principal A has
endpoints represented by names a, b, and c for different activities in two different
processes. a in Process A1 is used for running an activity, while a in Process
A2 is used for participating in a session (to interact with Process B1). Similarly,
Principal B has endpoints represented by names d, e and f .
In summary, a system principal may run several network applications (executed by
processes) concurrently, where each application can possibly have more than one proxy
endpoint for communications. Those applications belong to the same principal identity.
4.2 Communications and Interactions
1. Communications: A “communication” is a piece of interactive behaviours in a
session, which can be realised by a system component’s one-way activity to another
system component, e.g. sending a message with particular content(s) to another
system component, or receiving a message from another system component.
2. Interactions: An “interaction” is a pair of communications. It at least consists
of two activities which are dual to each other among two system components
communicating to each other. In other words, while a system component (as a
sender) sends a message to another system component (as a receiver), the recipient
always receives it (synchronously) or is going to receive it (asynchronously). Note
that system components are local processes with multiple (session) endpoints.
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4.3 Names, Sessions, Shared Channels, and Session-roles
1. Names: We use a name for a communication channel. In this thesis, we classify
channels to two kinds: A session name and a shared name. Generally a session
name is for identifying a session, but widely speaking, a session-role is also a kind
of name for representing a session endpoint’s communication capability. A shared
name is for a shared point. An input-mode shared name (introduced later) links
connections to an endpoints.
2. Sessions: A session, also called a conversation, is a sequence of interactions. In our
system, it is identified by a session name, and specified under a particular protocol,
which can be represented by a session-type-based specification. A session links
related interactions from pieces to a whole. One virtue of using session as a
unit for formalising thousands of interactive behaviours among endpoints is that
a session structures interactive behaviours and, based on this structure, provides
a basis for analysing and verifying runtime behaviours. When a session name is
created, a session with a new session identity is created in systems.
3. Shared names: A shared name denotes a shared channel, which is identified by a
particular name. It abstractly represents a communication endpoint. It has three
kinds: I is for input-mode, O is for output-mode, and IO is for both input- and
output-modes. With the explanation of the definition of endpoints, a shared name
with input-mode, a mode containing mode I, connects input communications to
a unique session endpoint, thus, in this thesis, such a shared channel abstracts an
endpoint. As a process has an endpoint connected by input-mode shared channel,
this process listens to incoming messages through this channel but does not send
out messages through it; as a process is connected by a shared name, say a, with
output-mode O, we say this process uses channel a to send out messages to the
process having common shared channel a but with mode I or IO. The relationship
between I-, O-, and IO-mode shared names is illustrated in Figure 4.2. Note that,
a shared name with mode I or IO represents an endpoint of a process; it locates
this process and makes others be able to send messages (i.e. output messages) to it
(i.e. input message from others). On the other hand, when a process has a shared
name with mode of O or IO, the shared name represents a knowledge about where
49
4. ASSUMPTIONS AND TERMINOLOGIES
Figure 4.2: The Relationship between Input- and Output-modes Shared Names
(i.e. to whom) it can output a message to the target receiver; this process itself is
driven by other endpoints represented by other input-mode shared names. Note
that, for flexibility, a shared name representing an endpoint can have both modes
I and O, called IO-mode, denoting that this endpoint is able to communicate
internally through itself. For example, the endpoint b : IO in Figure 4.2 can
output a message to itself. Also note that, an input-mode (i.e. I- or IO-mode)
shared name locates an endpoint at a particular locaton (e.g. at a principal) in
the network.
4. Session-roles: A session-role is played by an endpoint with the shared name that
abstractly represents this endpoint. A session generally includes more than one
endpoint, and a local process can participant in more than one session by having
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multiple endpoints in it. For exampe:
P = s1[buyer, seller]!〈10〉 | s2[trader, bank]?(x).P ′
process P plays role buyer in session s1 by an endpoint, say a, and concurrently,
plays role bank in session s2 by another endpoint, say b. Since a session is specified
by a particular protocol, which defines roles playing in this protocol and confines
the behaviours of roles for interactions, every role in a session is pre-defined. A role
in a session is generally called a session-role. As an endpoint driven by a process
involves (i.e. joins) in a session, it plays one particular session-role connected by
a shared channel.
4.4 More Illustrations for Shared Names
By the assumption, an I- or IO-mode shared name locates an endpoint and abstractly
represents the endpoint. More illusrations below concretely explain how an input-mode
shared name connects communications to an endpoint.
Figure 4.3 shows that a process can use an input-mode shared name to participate
different activities, but can not use an O-mode shared name for this purpose. An O-mode
shared name in a process is a knowledge telling the process where to output a message.
In Figure 4.3:
• Process A uses IO-mode shared name a to play role Bank specified under the
protocol G1 and has the knowledge of where to output to Bank specified under
protocol G2 by having c : O(G2[Bank]), and the knowledge about the Buyer
specified under protocol G3 by having b : O(G3[Buyer]). For convenience, we
say Process A’s endpoint is represented by a, or simply say its endpoint is a.
Note that, although shared names b and c also appear in Process A, they are
output-mode shared name and can not represent an endpoint process.
• Process B uses I-mode shared name b to play role Buyer specified under protocol
G3. As explained above, the O-mode shared name d for role Bank specified under
protocol G1 can not represent an endpoint in Process B. Since Process A has O-
mode shared name b with b : O(G3[Buyer]), Process B and A can communicate to
each other through channel b. Although Process A has IO-mode shared name a of
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Figure 4.3: Endpoints Represented by I-mode Shared Names in a Principal
playing role Bank specified under protocol G1 and Process B has O-mode shared
name d of role Bank specified under the same protocol, they cannot interact with
each other because they do not have a common shared name; in other words, they
cannot be in one session.
• Process C uses I-mode shared name c to play role Bank specified under protocol
G1. Process C also uses I-mode shared name d to play role Bank specified under
the same protocol. Thus Process C has two endpoints represented by c and d
respectively. Note that the same role specified under a common protocol can be
played by different I-mode shared names. Also note that, Processes C and B
have interactions through shared channel d, while Processes C and A cannot have
interactions through c because they are bound to different protocols.
The follows give the example of showing the relationships between an input-mode
and an output-mode shared name. Assume an email server providing mailing service
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b: I
Buyer sends Seller: 
“Want to book a room. Price?” b: I
b: I
b: I
c: O
a: O
SellerBuyer Buyer
b: O
Buyer sends Seller:
“Want to book an afternoon tea. Price?”
c: I
Seller sends Buyer:
“An afternoon tea is 30 GBP per person.”
a: I
Seller sends Buyer: 
“A room is 100 GBP per night.”
b: OBuyer sends Seller: “No, thanks.”
b: O
b: O
Buyer sends Seller: “I book it.”
c: O
a: Oa: I
Seller sends Buyer: “Confirmation. End.”
c: ISeller sends Buyer: “End.”
session 1 session 2
Figure 4.4: Using Shared Name to Represent Endpoints
can be abstracted by a : I(G[Server]), which denotes the server, playing role Server,
specified under protocol G, is using shared name a as an endpoint to input communi-
cations. When a client has a knowledge denoted by a : O(G[Server]), this client can
send a request (output) to this server via channel a. Assume clients C1, ..., Cn have
I-mode shared channels c1, ..., cn, e.g. c1 : I(G[Client]), ..., cn : I(G[Client]), playing
role Client with mode I, specified under the common protocol G, to receive the server’s
responses. A server can response to them because it knows “where the clients are” by
having knowledge of c1 : O(G[Client]), ..., cn : O(G[Client]), with mode O under the
matched protocol G.
Figure 4.4 illustrates another example where endpoint seller uses I-mode shared
name b to play role Seller in session 1 and session 2. For role Seller, channel b is
uni-direction, which is used for inputting messages from the outside. The role Buyer
in session 1 and the role Buyer in session 2 are run by different endpoints represented
by different shared names: One is run by I-mode shared name a, another is run by
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I-mode shared name c. Both of them have O-mode shared name b, which means they
both know where the Seller is. Similarly, in order to let the Seller know where they
are, they provide their O-mode shared names a and c when they established sessions.
In the network, an O-mode shared name can appear in more than one principal, but
an I- or IO-mode shared name can only appear in one principal. If we allow an I-mode
shared name to appear in more than one principal, it makes the routers hard to route
service requests to different principals who have common input-mode shared names but
are located in different domains. Also, the security issue arises because the principals
with common input-mode shared names are not specified and makes it hard to realise
who should take responsibility when something goes wrong with a cooperative common
task. If we want to describe that a common task can be done by more than one agent,
this scenario can be realised by delegating the task to agents with different shared names
(see Example 5.3.1). For simplicity, this thesis assumes that a shared name having mode
I or IO can only appear in one principal in the network. More discussions about the
design of I-, O-, or IO-mode shared name to cater for monitoring and routing purposes
can be found in Appendix A.2.
54
5The Capability-passing pi-calculus
Overview In this chapter, we introduce the formal syntax and semantics of the
capability-passing pi-calculus. It is a process calculus for dynamic governance for large-
scale distributed systems, where basic interaction steps are asynchronous message ex-
changes, and interactions are concurrent. With the primitive nature of operations, the
calculus leads to a clear monitoring mechanism, introduced in Chapter 7.
We start from Section 5.1 with a motivating example. In Section 5.2, we introduce
a real-life use case from OOI, an under-construction large-scale distributed system, to
show the expressiveness of the proposed calculus. The calculus is formally introduced in
Sections 5.3 and 5.4. Section 5.3 provides the syntax and semantics for local processes;
while Section 5.4 provides the syntax and semantics for the network. Local processes
and the network together compose large-scale distributed systems that we target.
5.1 Motivating Example
The capability-passing pi-calculus has fine-grained primitives for system entities to ac-
tivate or deliver capabilities via a session in which they involve.
This calculus has two main concepts. One is viewing a type of session as a template
so that participants can reuse it, e.g. participants can do tradings by establishing a
Buyer-Seller-Broker type session where roles Buyer, Seller and Broker are defined and
the interactions among those roles are described in such a session. A Buyer-Seller-Broker
type session can be realised as a session that follows Buyer-Seller-Broker protocol. A
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Figure 5.1: Delivering Information Through a Broker to Proper Targets.
session is a collection of structured interactions and the roles, generally called session-
roles, involving in those interactions. Another concept is viewing a role defined in a
session type as a capability. When a participant can play a session-role, he or she has
the capability to execute the series of behaviours defined in this session.
These concepts come from the observation of activities of system entities in large-
scale distributed systems, where the activities may be only available to some particular
participants, e.g., when a user only registers himself/herself as a role Buyer, in some
activities, he/she can only behave as a Buyer but not as a role Seller. As for an entity
identified by a particular system ID, it should always be able to flexibly communicate
with others through joining different session-roles concurrently, or delegating/delivering
its capabilities to others for playing these session-roles.
A session-role arises as a basic syntactic entity in this calculus. The mechanism for
playing different roles in different sessions concurrently makes system entities be able to
flexibly and simply represent various forms of multi-party session establishment. Before
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formally introducing the syntax and semantics of our calculus, we use Figure 5.1, a mes-
sage sequence chart, to show that the benefits as a session can be established through
asynchronously linking each session-role. Assume there are five system participants, who
join a conversation, which involves activities among session-roles InfoAdmin, Broker,
CollegeA, CollegeB and Institute. As Figure 5.1 illustrates, InfoAdmin is for in-
formation announcement, Broker is for delivering information from InfoAdmin to
proper colleges, which are classified into two levels: CollegeA is for a level-A college,
and CollegeB is for a level-B college. Broker will send InfoInstitute to InfoAdmin
once it receives the message from InfoAdmin. Then InfoAdmin will send a message
to Institute. The symbol ⊕ in the figure means alternative branches which are the
choices at Broker: if the information is for CollegeA, Broker sends to CollegeA by
selecting branch TypeA, and sends to CollegeB by selecting branch noTypeB with no
content.
Assume, participants playing roles InfoAdmin, Broker and Institute are ready
for interactions, but not participants of CollegeA and CollegeB, which means roles
CollegeA and CollegeB have not yet been played by any participant. If a conversation
can only be established through synchronously binding each session-role (34, 86), then
InfoAdmin, Broker and Institute cannot start their interactions (even if they are
ready) because they are linked in a session and can only start when this session exists;
however, this session does not exist if session-roles CollegeA and CollegeB are not
ready. It makes participants playing InfoAdmin, Broker and Institute become idle
and inefficient. On the contrary, if a session can be established through asynchronously
linking session-roles one by one, then the interactions among InfoAdmin, Broker and
Institute can set up to start interactions without waiting for participants of CollegeA
and CollegeB getting online. The next section will use a real-life example represented
by the formal syntax of the capability-passing pi-calculus.
5.2 Use Case: OOI Instrument Commands
Examining real-life examples is useful for clarifying the requirements and providing a
shape for the formalism. This section uses OOI instrument commands as a use case
and applies the formal syntax of the capability-passing-pi calculus (introduced in Section
5.3.1) to represent it.
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Figure 5.2: Illustration of the Global Protocol for OOI Instrument Commands
5.2.1 The Overview of OOI Instrument Commands
Consider a scientist, who registers in OOI, may wish to use a remote instrument, say a
seabed camera which is realised following a specific application level protocol (i.e. global
protocol). To simplify and generalise this scenario, assume the interactions are realised
following the protocol, instrument commands, which is illustrated by Figure 5.2 as a
message sequence chart. This protocol is specified as a global specification GIC , which
allows a user to perform operations on a remote instrument. GIC models a session
which involves roles User, Register, Agent and Instrument. The formal syntax of
global specification G will be introduced in Chapter 6. Note that, as explained in
Chapter 4, a session participant is a session endpoint, also called a session-role.
5.2.2 Specifying Protocols for Instrument Commands
In Figure 5.2, User performs one or more commands on a remote Instrument. Register
is used to retrieve information on the instrument’s usage, e.g., to determine the max-
imum number of commands allowed in the current session depending on the system
load. Agent interfaces the communications with the actual Instrument. Full arrows
represent interactions where one party sends a branch label and a message content (or
just one of the two) to another party. The labels carry information on the branch to
follow. Arrows linked by ⊕ represent alternative branches.
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The conversation proceeds as follows: (i) User sends Register a message xint of
type InterfaceId. (ii) Register replies with an integer xn which determines the number
of commands that User will be allowed to perform on the instrument. The predicate
annotating this interaction specifies an obligation for Register to send a value for xn
satisfying xn > 0; dually User can rely on this fact. (iii) User sends Agent a priority
xp (e.g., low, high), and xn that he or she received from Register. We assume that
there is a public key inserted in xn and Agent can verify if it is a correct value sent
from Register. (iv) Agent sends User a label which is either accept or reject. In
case of reject, Agent sends also an error message xe of type errData and the protocol
terminates. The predicate for this branch ensures that a request will not be rejected
due to the fact that the instrument is busy if the priority is high. In case of accept the
protocol continues with a recursion µt〈xn〉(y : Int) where y is a parameter initialised to
xn, y ≥ 0 is an invariant and y is used to enforce User to perform at most xn commands
on the instrument. (v) User selects either branch more and sends a new command
to Agent, or quit and terminates. The predicate y > 0 ∧ xcom 6= switch-off is a guard
to the branch more: a new command can be sent only if User has not performed xn
and anyway the command must not ask to switch off the instrument. Next, either the
command (vi) or the quit notification (vii) are forwarded by Agent to Instrument. In
the former case, Instrument responds to Agent (who forwards the message to User).
5.2.3 Asynchronous Session Creation for Instrument Commands
Based on the scenario described in Figure 5.2, an example of session creation of processes
is illustrated with formal syntax. The form s[p], called session-role, means role p in
session s. For example, s[User], s[Agent], s[Register] are the session-roles representing
roles User, Agent and Register in session s respectively.
Consider the following process P1 of Principal1, which creates a session s with
specification GIC and sends invitations to others:
P1 = PNEWS | PINV
PNEWS = a2(s[Register] : GIC).join(s[User]).Puser
PINV = a3〈s[Agent] : GIC〉; a4〈s[Instrument] : GIC〉
where a2(s[Register] : GIC).join(s[User]) represents that P1 creates session s which
obeys to global protocol GIC , and will later join the role User defined in GIC ; while
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s[Register] : GIC specifies that Register is defined in protocol GIC and obeys this
protocol. Similarly for s[Agent] : GIC and s[Instrument] : GIC . Their projections,
e.g. GIC  Register, GIC  Agent, and GIC  Instrument are viewed as capabilities
describing what activities and behaviours can/should have for these roles. The rules of
endpoint projection are defined in Definition 6.5.1, Chapter 6.
Since P1 is the initiator of session s, i.e. currently session s is known and only known
by P1, session s in PNEWS and PINV therefore appear. P1 sends a bound request (i.e.
bound invitation), a2(s[Register] : GIC), to endpoint (connected by) a2 for playing
session-role Register as the first session invitation, and joins the session as User by
join(s[User]); she concurrently sends invitations to others through doing
a3〈s[Agent] : GIC〉; a4〈s[Instrument] : GIC〉.
Note that, only the first session invitation is bound, denoted with the shape a(s[p] : G)
i.e. round bracket, because a session name, s, is newed simultaneously; the later invita-
tions for the same session are free, denoted with the shape a〈s[p] : G〉 i.e. angle bracket,
because the session name s has been introduced in a2(s[Register] : GIC). Also note
that, as a2(s[Register] : GIC) has been sent out (from P1) to the network,
a2(s[Register] : GIC).join(s[User]).Puser | PINV a2(s[Register]:GIC)−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(νs)(join(s[User]).Puser | PINV),
which means, as it informs the network that new session name s is created by doing
a2(s[Register]:GIC)−−−−−−−−−−−−→, s is no more only known by P1 but may be known globally; therefore,
for this runtime process, now (νs) is needed to hide session s for private usage (i.e. s is
only shared by those P1 wants to invite). Principal1 is inviting other four principals,
Principal2, P rincipal3 and Principal4. Shared channels, e.g. a2, a3, . . ., determine
which invitations each process is entitled to receive, e.g. only Principal4 and Principal5
below can accept (by any other process) an invitation s[Instrument], through a4 and
a5, respectively. Note that, Principal4, which receives the capability of s[Instrument],
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passes this capablity to Principal5 who joins this session to play role Instrument:
P2 = a2(y2[Register] : GIC).join(y2[Register]).Pregister
P3 = a3(y3[Agent] : GIC).join(y3[Agent]).Pagent
P4 = a4(y4[Instrument] : GIC).a5〈y4[Instrument] : GIC〉
P5 = a5(y5[Instrument] : GIC).join(y5[Instrument]).Pinstrument
With the design of the grammar, system can observe the exchange of capabilities be-
tween their endpoint and the network.
5.2.4 The Complete Formal Processes of Instrument Commands
We assume Principal1 uses some local functions needmore() (which determines if the
user needs to perform more commands) and next() (which returns a command). Notice-
ably 0, generally omitted, denotes termination. µX〈xn〉(y).P ′ is the recursion where X
is the recursion body defined in P ′, and xn is the initiation value and y is the parameter
acting as a binder over P ′. In P uacc, when xn is replaced by 10 received from Register,
y is replaced by the value of xn. If needmore() ∩ y > 0 is true, the process executes
to the recursion call X〈y − 1〉, then X leads the process go back to the beginning of
the recursion, where parameter xn should be replaced by v if y − 1 ↓ v. Otherwise, the
process executes s[User,Agent]!quit〈〉 then terminates.
new a1 : I(GIC [User]).P1
P1 = (a2(s[Register] : GIC).join(s[User]).Puser) | PINV
PINV = a2〈s[Register] : GIC〉; a3〈s[Agent] : GIC〉;
a4〈s[Instrument] : GIC〉;0
Puser = s[User,Register]!〈vint〉; s[Register, User]?(xn).
s[User,Agent]!〈High, xn〉; s[Agent, User]?{accept().P uacc, reject(xe).0}
P uacc = µX〈xn〉(y).if needmore() ∧ y > 0 then s[User,Agent]!more〈next()〉;
s[Agent, User]?(xr).X〈y − 1〉 else s[User,Agent]!quit〈〉;0
It follows the process of Principal2 who defines channel a2, receives an invitation
and joins the session as Register. Assume Principal2 returns always 10 allowing all
participants to perform at most 10 commands on the instrument.
new a2 : I(GIC [Register]).P2
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P2 = a2(y2[Register] : GIC).join(y2[Register]).Pregister
Pregister = y2[User,Register]?(xint).y2[Register, User]!〈10〉;0
Below, Principal3 defines channel a3, receives an invitation and joins the session as
Agent. Assume Principal3 relies on a local function error() returning an error data.
The agent simply forwards the command and the response between the user and the
instrument.
new a3 : I(GIC [Agent]).P3
P3 = a3(y3[Agent] : GIC).join(y3[Agent]).Pagent
Pagent = y3[User,Agent]?(xp, xn).if xp = High then y3[Agent, User]!accept〈〉;P aacc
else y3[Agent, User]!reject〈error()〉;0
P aacc = µX〈xn〉(y).y3[User,Agent]?{more(xcom).P acom,
quit().y3[Agent, Instrument]!quit〈〉;0}
P acom = y3[Agent, Instrument]!more〈xcom〉; y3[Instrument,Agent]?(yr).
y3[Agent, User]!〈yr〉;X〈y − 1〉
Below, Principal4 and Principal5 define shared channels through which they receive
an invitation for role Instrument. Principal4 forwards the invitation to Principal5
and terminates. Principal5 joins the session and recursively listening to the message
sent from agent. The recursion µX.P ′′ means there is no parameter or binder over the
recursion body X defined in P ′′, so noticeably there is no parameter of X. If branch
more is selected, the process (playing instrument) returns response(ycom) to Agent by
relying on a local function response, and then go back to the beginning of the recursion
body. Otherwise, it terminates.
new a4 : I(GIC [Instrument]).P4 new a5 : I(GIC [Instrument]).P5
P4 = a4(y4[Instrument] : GIC).a5〈y4[Instrument] : GIC〉;0
P5 = a5(y5[Instrument] : GIC).join(y5[Instrument]).Pinst
Pinst = µX.y5[Agent, Instrument]?{
more(ycom).y5[Instrument,Agent]!〈response(ycom)〉;X,
quit().0}
5.3 The Calculus of Local Processes
This section introduces the syntax and semantics of the capability-passing pi-calculus
for local processes with distributed session primitives. As shown in Section 5.2, the
fine-grained scheme calculus is expressive to represent real-world examples, including
62
5.3 The Calculus of Local Processes
those in (35). As synchronous process calculi can not fully identify the properties in
distributed systems because the assumptions of synchronous interactions are:
1. A message can be outputted only when its input side (a receiver is ready to receive
this outputted message) exists; and
2. An output can be immediately absorbed by the input side, which makes the order
of messages floating around networks preserved,
this thesis focuses on the processes in asynchronous environment, which reflects the
reality of distributed systems. Note that, considering the interactions between processes
are synchronous or asynchronous becomes critical as we consider stipulating states, i.e.
the current value of a specific field of an endpoint, in specifications. This issue will be
explored in Chapter 8.
5.3.1 The Syntax of Local Processes
The capability-passing pi-calculus is defined in Figure 5.3. Let (P,Q, . . .) denote pro-
cess variables. Session names are identified by (k, k′, . . .), which represent both session
instances and session variables. Shared names are identified by (u, u′, . . .), which rep-
resent both shared channels and shared channel variables. Let (p, q, . . .) range over
roles involving in a session, and (x, y, . . .) range over variables; (v, v′, . . .) range over
values, including shared name with I/O type, a boolean, or a constant c. A constant
can be a number, a name, an alphabet, or a string; (e, e′, . . .) are for expressions, while
(S ,S ′, . . .) are for sorts, representing data types of expressions. (U,U ′, . . .) is a kind of
sorts, particularly for representing how a local process is able to use a shared name.
Interaction variables are those variables that are exchanged in interactions. There are
three modes for shared name: I for input only, O for output only, and IO for both input
and output.
Rule [P−n creation] says a process, with primitive new a : im(G[p]), creates a fresh
input-mode shared name a in P . Through a, an endpoint can play role p specified under
global protocol G. When there are runtime monitors, the fresh name with input-mode
should be ensured to be new to the systems. A shared name with mode O can not be
created by a process but be propagated from one endpoint process having the common
shared name with input-mode to another process. For example, assume there exists
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a process having shared name a with type IO(G[p]). This process can propagate this
name by sending it to other processes; but as others receive it, it should be typed by
O(G[p]) at these processes. Again, this can be ensured when there are runtime monitors.
When a process creates a new shared name with mode I or IO, it is treated as a bound
(hidden) name with the scope including herself and other participants having a with
mode O.
The primitives u(s[p] : G) and u〈s[p] : G〉, u(y[p] : G) and u〈y[p] : G〉, embeding
specification G, make the control of session creation possible. The actions of bound
request and accept with round bracket introduces a new session to the local process.
For example, when P1 = a(s[p] : G).P ′1, P1 creates a fresh name s and simultaneously
invites endpoint a for playing role p. a(s[p] : G) introduces new session s to P ′1 and s
acts as a binder over P ′1. Similarly, when P2 = a(s[p] : G).P ′2, session s, which is new to
P ′2, is created and simultaneously P2 accepts the invitation for playing role p in session
s. The actions of free request and accept with angle bracket mean that s is not fresh to
the processes. As the example shown in Section 5.2, only the first request and accept
are bound.
s[p] is viewed as a capability of having behaviours of playing role p specified under
global specification G. Either u(y[p] : G).P or u〈y[p] : G〉;P shows an endpoint has
the capability of playing role p specified under G and then behaves as P . A special
message invitation, denoted by u〈k[p] : G〉 without “;” attached after it, is either with
a local process in parallel, e.g. P | a〈s[p] : G〉 or floating around the network in the
global queue (introduced in Section 5.4), e.g. H ·a〈s[p] : G〉. Note that, an invitation
is different from an interaction message, which queues in either local or global queue;
an invitation only queues in the global queue. Invitations are delivered by applying
rules [P−request b/f] or [P−accept b/f] along shared channels (u, u′, . . .). When an
invitation is sent out from a local process, it implies that the local process takes action
of free/bound request; while an invitation enters a local process, it implies the local
process takes action of free/bound accept.
As mentioned above, [P−accept b/f] do not mean a process has joined a session-
role. An endpoint uses [P−join] to claim to join a session-role in a particular session.
This syntax together with [P−request b/f] and [P−accept b/f] give the calculus the
flexibility for realising delegation.
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u ::= a, b | x, y [P−shared]
k ::= s, s′ | x, y [P−session]
v ::= a | true | false | c [P−value]
e ::= v | x | e+ e′ | e ∩ e′ | ¬e | · · · [P−expression]
S ::= int | string | bool | G | T | U [P−sort]
U ::= mode(T [p]) [P−Use]
im ::= I | IO [P−I-mode]
mode ::= im | O [P−I/O-mode]
P ::= new a : im(G[p]).P [P−n creation]
| u(k[p] : G).P [P−request b]
| u〈k[p] : G〉;P [P−request f]
| u(y[p] : G).P [P−accept b]
| u〈y[p] : G〉;P [P−accept f]
| join(s[p]).P [P−join]
| if e then P else Q [P−conditional]
| k[p, q]!l〈e〉;P [P−selection]
| k[p1, p2]?{li(xi).Pi}i∈I [P−branching]
| P | Q [P−parallel]
| 0 [P−inact]
| µX〈e〉(x).P | X〈e〉 [P−recursion]
| Prt [P−runtime]
Prt ::= (νs)P | (νa)P [P−hiding]
| s[p] : h [P−queue]
h ::= ∅ | m·h [P−local queue]
m ::= s〈p, q, l〈v〉〉 | a〈s[p] : G〉 [P−cm-message/invitation]
Figure 5.3: The Syntax of Local Processes
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Example 5.3.1 (accept, join, and delegation). Assume there is a web-service, who
is able to play role Server in session s guided by protocol G. Assume the server needs to
deal with many requests from clients concurrently, the server thus delegates these tasks
to the trusted agents, i.e. its deputies, who can as well play role Server in protocol G.
Assume process Pserver has a list of the shared names of the trusted agents. Let agent
be the variable of shared name of the trusted agent. Let Pserver be
P ′ | µX〈agent〉(u).if agent 6= ∅ then a(y[Server] : G).u〈y[Server] : G〉;X〈selectAgent()〉 else 0
recursively accepts a new session, say s, to replace y and then delegates session-role
s[Server] to agent agent, which is private to Pserver, by replacing u with agent. A
process P ′ may be in parallel with the recursion for assigning an initial value of agent
to the recursion. Also, function selectAgent() selects an agent from the list, then put
the selected one into the recursive body. We can specify the recursion ends when X〈∅〉.
Every process for an agent should have the shape
Pagent = agent(y′[Server] : G).join(y′[Server]).P ′′
which says that endpoint agent will join session-role Server specified under G, by ap-
plying join(y′[Server]), when such an invitation happens.
Definition 5.3.2 (the set of indexes). Define I as the set of indexes.
[P−selection] and [P−branching] are for session interactions, which are communica-
tions through an established session k. We make the sender p1 and receiver p2 in session
k explicit by the notation k[p1, p2]. [P−selection] defines a process involving in session
k for sending value v with chosen label l from p1 to p2. Dually, [P−branching] defines
a process ready to receive whatever label li, i ∈ I = {1, ..., n} has been chosen and be-
haves as Pj{v/xj} after replacing every xj in Pj with v if label lj has been chosen. For
brevity, write k[p1, p2]?l(x).P or k[p1, p2]?(x).P for a single branch, and omit trailing 0.
Conditional, parallel composition and inaction are standard. The recursion µX〈e〉(x).P
defines a recursion where X is the recursion body defined in P with parameter x which
is initiated to e. X〈e〉 is the corresponding recursion call.
Some arguments arise from the necessity of embedding protocol G in the process
calculus. The reasons are as follows: (I) Ensuring deadlock-free of processes in a session
since behaviours are safely guided by the specifications, and (II) providing system the
information about the structure that a session obeys. Without knowing to which pro-
tocol a session obeys, system can hardly guard/monitor the interactions in this session.
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Once a session is created, the runtime syntax Prt (not accessible to programmers) is
used. To model the asynchronous interactions between a local process and its external
monitor during runtime, a local queue, s[p] : h, created when join(s[p]) takes place
and designed particularly for the endpoint playing session-role s[p], is used as a bridge
between them to buffer incoming (resp. outgoing) messages for which the endpoint is
going to receive from (resp. send to) the network. Although the global queue (defined in
Section 5.4) can realise the asynchronous interactions among processes, it is not enough
for realising the ones between a process and its external monitor. Through buffering,
a monitor can efficiently guard the incoming (to the local processes) and outgoing (to
the network) messages for more than one endpoint.
The set of bound names in P is denoted by bn(P ), the set of free names in P is
denoted by fn(P ), and the set of names in P is denoted by n(P ). We view a session-role,
say k[p], as a composite of a session name and a role. Note that, a role p, specified under
a global protocol, represents a pre-defined capability of an endpoint; therefore, it is not
a name but is there for pattern-matching of capability. Below we illustrate the set of
names, bound names, and free names of each process:
Definition 5.3.3 (the set of names, free/bound names of a process). ∪ is stan-
dard union set operation in set theory.
1. For P = a(k[p] : G);P ′, n(P ) = {a, k}∪n(P ′), fn(P ) = {a}∪ fn(P ′), and bn(P ) =
{k} ∪ bn(P ′).
2. For P = a〈k[p] : G〉;P ′, n(P ) = {a, k} ∪ n(P ′), fn(P ) = {a, k} ∪ fn(P ′), and
bn(P ) = bn(P ′).
3. For P = a(k[p] : G).P ′, n(P ) = {a, k}∪ n(P ′), fn(P ) = {a}∪ fn(P ′), and bn(P ) =
{k} ∪ bn(P ′).
4. For P = a〈k[p] : G〉.P ′, n(P ) = {a, k} ∪ n(P ′), fn(P ) = {a, k} ∪ fn(P ′), and
bn(P ) = bn(P ′).
5. For P = k[p, q]!l〈e〉;P ′, n(P ) = {k} ∪ n(e) ∪ n(P ′), fn(P ) = {k} ∪ n(e) ∪ fn(P ′),
and bn(P ) = bn(P ′).
6. For P = k[p, q]?l(x).P ′, n(P ) = {k, x}∪n(P ′), fn(P ) = {k}∪ fn(P ′), and bn(P ) =
n(x) ∪ bn(P ′).
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7. For P = new a : im(G[p]).P ′, n(P ) = {a} ∪ n(P ′), fn(P ) = fn(P ′), and bn(P ) =
{a} ∪ bn(P ′).
8. For P = join(k[p]).P ′, n(P ) = {k} ∪ n(P ′), fn(P ) = fn(P ′), and bn(P ) = {k} ∪
bn(P ′).
9. For other processes, the names and free/bound names of them are standard.
Convention 5.3.4 (Barendregt convention). In every process (and in every se-
quence of actions), bound names are different from each other and different from free
names.
Convention 5.3.5. We call a process initial when a process does not contain any free
variable and a runtime syntax. An initial process is thus always closed because it has
no free variables.
5.3.2 The Structural Congruence of Local Processes
For convenience, we define the prefix of a process as two kinds:
Definition 5.3.6. Define two kinds of prefixes as follows:
α1 ::= u(k[p] : G) | u(k[p] : G) | k[p1, p2]?l(x) | join(s[p]) | new a : im(G[p])
α2 ::= u〈k[p] : G〉 | u〈k[p] : G〉 | k[p1, p2]!l〈e〉
Definition 5.3.7 (the laws of congruence). Let R be an equivalence relation over
process. Then R is said to be a congruence relation
• if it is preserved by all elementary contexts over open process; that is, if P1 R P2,
then
α1.P1 R α1.P2
α2;P1 R α2;P2
P1 | Q R P2 | Q
Q | P1 R Q | P2
(νn)P1 R (νn)P2
• and, if P R Q, then ∀x, v, P{v/x} R Q{v/x}.
Definition 5.3.8 (processes structural congruence). The structural congruence is
the smallest binary relation ≡, which
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1. is a congruence, i.e. abides to the law defined in Definition 5.3.7, and
2. satifies the following axioms
1 P ≡ Q whenever P is an alpha-conversion of Q.
2 P | 0 ≡ P , P1 | P2 ≡ P2 | P1, P1 | (P2 | P3) ≡ (P1 | P2) | P3.
3 (νn)(P1 | P2) ≡ P1 | (νn)P2 if n 6∈ fn(P1), (νn)P1 | (νn)P2 ≡ (νn)(P1 | P2).
4 (νn)0 ≡ 0.
5 s[p] : h·s〈p1, p, l〈v〉〉·s〈p2, p, l′〈v′〉〉·h′ ≡ s[p] : h·s〈p2, p, l′〈v′〉〉·s〈p1, p, l〈v〉〉·h′
if p1 6= p2.
6 s[p] : h·s〈p, p1, l〈v〉〉·s〈p, p2, l′〈v′〉〉·h′ ≡ s[p] : h·s〈p, p2, l′〈v′〉〉·s〈p, p1, l〈v〉〉·h′
if p1 6= p2.
In the definition of structural congruence, besides the standard rules defined in (117),
Rules 5 and 6 are the rules for rearranging messages. Rule 5 says that, when two
messages are received from different senders, these two messages can be permuted;
while rule 6 says that, when two messages are going to send to different receivers, these
two messages can be permuted.
5.3.3 The Semantics of Local Processes
In this section, we introduced the labelled transition system (LTS) and reductions rules
(the τ rules in LTS) of local asynchronous processes. Equation 5.1 is the full version
of action labels. The LTS includes the following action labels, which are also used
in Chapters 7 and 8. Labels consist of τ -action (i.e. τ), session bound/free request
and accept (i.e. a(s[p] : G)/a〈s[p] : G〉, a(s[p] : G)/a〈s[p] : G〉), shared channel creation
new a : im(G[p]), join session-role s[p] and two actions for session interactions: selection
and branching (i.e. s[p1, p2]!l〈v〉, s[p1, p2]?l(x)). Request and selection (resp. accept
and branching) are often collectively called output (resp. input). Note, when a process
announces to join a session-role s[p] through a join label, only at this moment, the
session-role becomes active and the local queue s[p] : ∅ is generated.
In Chapters 8, the action labels will be simplified by taking off join(s[p]) and
new a : im(G[p]) to only focus on session interaction actions.
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` ::= τ | a(s[p] : G) | a〈s[p] : G〉 | a(s[p] : G) | a〈s[p] : G〉 | new a : im(G[p])
| join(s[p]) | s[p1, p2]!l〈v〉 | s[p1, p2]?l(v) (5.1)
Below we illustrate the set of names, bound names, and free names of each action:
Definition 5.3.9 (the set of names, free/bound names of an action). ∪ is stan-
dard union set operation in set theory.
1. For ` = a(k[p] : G), n(`) = {a, k}, fn(`) = {a}, and bn(`) = {k}.
2. For ` = a〈k[p] : G〉, n(`) = {a, k}, fn(`) = {a, k}, and bn(`) = ∅.
3. For ` = a(k[p] : G), n(`) = {a, k}, fn(`) = {a}, and bn(`) = {k}.
4. For ` = a〈k[p] : G〉, n(`) = {a, k}, fn(`) = {a, k}, and bn(`) = ∅.
5. For ` = k[p, q]!l〈e〉′, n(`) = {k} ∪ n(e), fn(`) = {k} ∪ n(e), and bn(`) = ∅.
6. For ` = k[p, q]?l(x), n(`) = {k, x}, fn(`) = {k}, and bn(`) = n(x).
7. For ` = new a : im(G[p]), n(`) = {a}, fn(`) = ∅, and bn(`) = {a}.
8. For ` = join(k[p]), n(`) = {k}, fn(`) = ∅, and bn(`) = {k}.
Note that, according to Convention 5.3.4 (i.e. Barendregt convention), in every
sequence of actions, bound names are different from each other and different from free
names.
Example 5.3.10. Consider a sequence of actions:
`1 ·`2 ·`3 ·`4 = a(k[p] : G)·k[p, q]!l〈v〉·a(k[q] : G)·k[q, r]!l′〈v′〉
It is wrong because it does not follow Barendregt convention as a(k[p] : G) and a(k[q] : G)
have common bound name k. It should be revised to:
`1 ·`2 ·`3 ·`4 = a(k[p] : G)·k[p, q]!l〈v〉·a(k′[q] : G)·k′[q, r]!l′〈v′〉
Then we have `1 binds `2 and `3 binds `4.
Definition 5.3.11 (subject of an action). Define sbj(`) as the subject of `:
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1. If it is an action for session interaction, its subject is the endpoint, represented
by a session-role, who fires the action. For example, sbj(s[p, q]!l〈v〉) = s[p] and
sbj(s[p, q]?l(v)) = s[q].
2. If it is an action for request or accept, its subject is the initial shared name. For ex-
ample, sbj(a〈s[p] : G〉) = sbj(a(s[p] : G)) = a and sbj(a〈s[p] : G〉) = sbj(a(s[p] : G)) =
a.
3. sbj(τ) = ∅.
4. Others are not defined.
The definition of subject of actions for session interaction is an abstraction of the
viewpoint of a local process who takes the action. Thus, for action s[p, q]!l〈v〉, the
endpoint that takes this action is the process playing the session-role s[p]; similarly, for
action s[p, q]?l(v), the endpoint takes this action is the process playing the session-role
s[q]. For request and accept actions, a, as a shared point, fires the action; while s[p] in
a request or an accept is not counted as a subject because it is for pattern-matching of
capability, and this pattern-matching check is only done when the content is delivered
to the endpoint.
Definition 5.3.12. The evaluation of an expression, denoted by e ↓ v, is always pos-
sible whenever the initial process is closed and the logic of the boolean expressions is
decidable.
Figure 5.4 lists the LTS rules of local processes, including the τ action. Each output is
performed in two steps: (I) a local action spawns the message (i.e. invitations remain
local and interaction messages are inserted in a local queue, say s[p]) and (II) a visible
action sends out the message. Inputs are dual. For the first five rules, the output
and input at local endpoints are globally invisible: bArq f, Aac b/fc respectively spawn
and receive an invitation along a shared name. bSelc puts a message in a local queue,
after evaluating v from expression e; dually, bBrac gets a message from a local queue
with label lj , so that the j-th process Pj receives value v and becomes Pj{v/xj} after
replacing every xj in P with v. bIfc is standard. The rest models actions which can be
observed globally: bNewc is for shared name creation. Through this action, the monitor
learns this freshly created shared name is able to play role p with behaviour defined in
protocol G. Note that, there are two ways for a process to get a shared name: (I) One
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is when it creates a new name by applying rule bNewc. This process always hides the
shared name and makes it private. (II) Another is, without loss of generality, a process
announces the shared name it knows to the public so that other processes can access
this name by having the O-mode common shared name.
bJoinc is for an endpoint to join a session by activating capability s[p] and creating the
corresponding local queue. breq-out b/fc sends out an invitation, its duality bacc-in b/fc
receives an invitation from the outside. Note that breq-out bc (resp. bacc-in bc) simul-
taneously creates the session s and requests (resp. accepts) the session role s[pj ] at
the endpoint represented by the shared name a. bsel-outc (resp. bbra-inc) sends (resp.
receives) a message from (resp. into) its local queue. Rules bresc, bparc, and bstrc are
standard according to (117).
5.4 The Calculus of the Network
In this section, this thesis introduces the formalism, including syntax and semantics,
for the network, which can be an un-monitored, monitored, or a mixed network, where
processes asynchronously interact with each other. The calculus considers both the
aspects of the marginal and the global of the network.
5.4.1 The Syntax of the Network
The syntax of the network is given in Figure 5.5, where every notation, representing a
network component, is separated by “|”.
A process may have more than one endpoint. During runtime, these endpoints are
driven by this process. A process P , residing locally, is a part of the network. “ ‖′′ is
used to represent that each network component exists in parallel. Let Ns denote the
static network, which does not include the global queue; and let N denote the dynamic
network which contains all components (including local processes and the global queue
with messages).
Definition 5.4.1. Let ep(N) be the set of endpoints residing in N. As N = P , ep(P )
is the set of endpoints in process P .
Definition 5.4.2 (network composability). Two networks N1
def
= Ns1 ‖ H1 and
N2
def
= Ns2 ‖ H2 are composable if and only if
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a〈s[p] : G〉;P τ−→ a〈s[p] : G〉 | P bArq fc
a〈s[p] : G〉 | a(y[p] : G).Q τ−→ Q{s/y} bAac bc
a〈s[p] : G〉 | a〈s[p] : G〉;Q τ−→ Q bAac fc
s[p, q]!l〈e〉;P | s[p1]:h τ−→ P | s[p1]:h · s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉 (e ↓ v) bselc
s[p1, p2]?{li(xi).Pi}i∈I | s[p2]:s〈p1, p2, lj〈v〉〉 · h τ−→ Pj{v/xj} | s[p2]:h bbrac
if b then Ptrue else Pfalse
τ−→ Pb (b ∈ {true, false}) bifc
new a : im(G[p]).P
new a:im(G[p])−−−−−−−−−→ (νa)(P ) bnewc
join(s[p]).P
join(s[p])−−−−−→ P | s[p]:∅ bjoinc
a(s[p] : G).P
a(s[p]:G)−−−−−→ (νs)(P ) breq-out bc
a〈s[p] : G〉 a〈s[p]:G〉−−−−−→ 0 breq-out fc
0 | P a(s[p]:G)−−−−−→ (νs)(a〈s[p] : G〉 | P ) bacc-in bc
0 | P a〈s[p]:G〉−−−−−→ a〈s[p] : G〉 | P bacc-in fc
s[p1]:s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉 · h
s[p1,p2]!l〈v〉−−−−−−−→ s[p1]:h (p1 6= p2) bsel-outc
s[p2]:h
s[p1,p2]?l(v)−−−−−−−→ s[p2]:h · s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉 (p1 6= p2) bbra-inc
P
`−→ P ′ fn(Q) ∩ bn(`) = ∅
P | Q `−→ P ′ | Q
P
`−→ P ′ n(`) 6∈ n˜
(νn˜)P
`−→ (νn˜)P ′
P ≡ Q Q `−→ Q′ Q′ ≡ P ′
P
`−→ P ′
bpar,res,strc
Figure 5.4: The Labelled Transition System of Asynchronous Local Processes
Ns ::= P | Ns1 ‖ Ns2 | 0 | (νn)Ns n ∈ {u, k} static network
N ::= Ns | H | N1 ‖ N2 | (νn)N n ∈ {u, k} dynamic network
H ::= ∅ | m·H global queue
m ::= s〈p, q, l〈v〉〉 | a〈s[p] : G〉 message
Figure 5.5: The Syntax for the Network
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1. ep(Ns1) ∩ ep(Ns2) = ∅.
2. There is no common message existing in H1 and H2.
Note that, we define the composabilty of monitored network as same as the above.
Definition 5.4.3 (composition of global queues). For any H1 = m1·m2 . . .mn and
H2 = m
′
1 ·m′2 . . .m′m, the composition of two global queues is denoted by H1 ·H2 =
m1 ·m2 . . .mn ·m′1 ·m′2 . . .m′m.
Definition 5.4.4 (parallel composition of N1 ‖ N2). Assume N1 def= Ns1 ‖ H1
and N2
def
= Ns2 ‖ H2. When N1 and N2 are composable, write the parallel composition
of N1 and N2 as N1 ‖ N2 = Ns1 ‖ Ns2 ‖ H1 ·H2.
The global queue H is an abstract global transport among all network participants
i.e. all endpoints share one common global queue. H consists of a sequence of messages
m1 . . .mn, where a message has the shape of either a〈s[p] : G〉 or s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉, ranged
over m, which represents an in-transit-message, i.e. the message which has been sent
from some sender but has not yet been received by its corresponding receiver. Abstract-
ing a global queue is important, especially for asynchronous interactions, because
1. it captures the dynamics of the network by carrying floating messages from one
endpoint to another, and
2. it illustrates that floating messages are interleaving in different sessions.
Consider, during runtime, in a session, a sender sends a message to a receiver. As the
message enters the network, under the asynchronous environment, the receiver may not
get the message immediately due to asynchrony. Because some local processes may be
untrusted, the receiver is expecting an input but does not know if the corresponding
sender has sent out a message to her. Since the message has been sent out, there is
no message left at the sender side, the only place that a global observer (if there is
any) can check is the global queue. Under the asynchronous environment, a message
for session-interaction purpose should always be at three places: the sender’s local
queue, the global queue, or the receiver’s local queue. The global queue abstracts
the asynchronous interactive behaviours. Note that, for asynchronous interactions, the
order of messages in the network is generally not preserved, except the messages from
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a common session or two common session-roles, e.g. s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉·s〈p1, p2, l′〈v′〉〉 (as in
a TCP connection).
For synchronous environments, a message can only be outputted when its receiver
is ready to receive it; while the receiver is ready, the outputting and inputting of a
message are done synchronously. Thus there is no need to have a global queue in the
network.
5.4.2 The Structural Congruence of the Network
Definition 5.4.5 (the laws of the network congruence). Let ∼=N be an equivalence
relation over N. Then ∼=N is said to be a network congruence if it is preserved by all
elementary contexts; that is, if N1 ∼=N N2, then
N1 ‖ N ∼=N N2 ‖ N
N ‖ N1 ∼=N N ‖ N2
(νn)N1 ∼=N (νn)N2
Definition 5.4.6 (network structural congruence). The structural congruence
over networks is the smallest binary relation ≡N, which
1. is a ∼=N, i.e. abides to the law defined in Definition 5.4.5, and
2. satifies the following axioms
1 N1 ≡N N2 if N1 is an alpha-conversion of N2.
2 N ‖ 0 ≡N N, N1 ‖ N2 ≡N N2 ‖ N1, N1 ‖ (N2 ‖ N3) ≡N (N1 ‖ N2) ‖ N3.
3 (νn)(N1 ‖ N2) ≡N N1 ‖ (νn)N2 if n 6∈ fn(N1).
4 (νn)0 ≡N 0.
5 H·s〈p, q, l〈v〉〉·s′〈p′, q′, l′〈v′〉〉·H ′ ≡N H·s′〈p′, q′, l′〈v′〉〉·s〈p, q, l〈v〉〉·H ′ if s 6= s′
or p 6= p′ or q 6= q′.
In the definition of structural congruence of the network, rule 5 is the rule for rearranging
messages. It says, globally, as long as two adjacent messages belong to different sessions,
or they have different senders or receivers, they can be permuted.
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5.4.3 The Semantics of the Network
Based on the labels defined in Equation 5.1, let `O be the output action labels, `I be
the input action labels.
`O ::= a(s[p] : G) | a〈s[p] : G〉 | s[p1, p2]!l〈v〉
`I ::= a(s[p] : G) | a〈s[p] : G〉 | s[p1, p2]?l(v)
(5.2)
To have a general definition of network reduction rules, several mapping functions are
defined below to make the description of reduction rules simple. Definemsg as a function
mapping an action to the message which it has outputted or is going to input:
msg ::= a(s[p] : G) 7→ a〈s[p] : G〉 | a〈s[p] : G〉 7→ a〈s[p] : G〉
| a(s[p] : G) 7→ a〈s[p] : G〉 | a〈s[p] : G〉 7→ a〈s[p] : G〉
| s[p1, p2]!l〈v〉 7→ s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉 | s[p1, p2]?l(v) 7→ s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉 (5.3)
other actions are not defined. Note that as a〈s[p] : G〉 is viewed as a message, it is
an invitation. Also, define dest as a function mapping an action, if it is for input and
output, to this action’s destination as:
dest ::= a(s[p] : G) 7→ a | a〈s[p] : G〉 7→ a
| a(s[p] : G) 7→ a | a〈s[p] : G〉 7→ a
| s[p1, p2]!l〈v〉 7→ s[p2] | s[p1, p2]?l(v) 7→ s[p2] (5.4)
other actions are not defined.
The operational semantics of the network is a duality of the semantics of local
processes. The actions happening at local processes are marginal actions to the network.
From the global viewpoint, those marginal actions are invisible, and are treated as silent
actions (τ), which can be viewed as reductions happening in the network. On the other
hand, the messages sent across network can be globally observed. For example, as a
message is sent from one local endpoint, say Alice, to another, say Bob, for whom are in
different local domains, this message is outputted from Alice to the global queue, then
absorbed (inputted) by Bob from the global queue. When a message is outputted into
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P
`O−→ P ′
P ‖ H −→ P ′ ‖ H ·msg(`O) bN-outc
P
`I−→ P ′ dest(`I) ∈ ep(P )
P ‖ msg(`I) ·H −→ P ′ ‖ H bN-inc
P
new a:im(G[p])−−−−−−−−−→ (νa)(P ′)
P ‖ H −→ (νa)(P ′) ‖ H bN-newc
join(s[p]).P
join(s[p])−−−−−→ P | s[p]:∅
join(s[p]).P ‖ H −→ P | s[p]:∅ ‖ H bN-joinc
N1 −→ N′1
N1 ‖ N2 −→ N′1 ‖ N2
bN-parc
N −→ N′
(νn˜)N −→ (νn˜)N′ bN-resc
N ≡N N0 N0 −→ N′0 N′0 ≡N N′
N −→ N′ bN-strc
Figure 5.6: The Reduction Rules of the Network
the global queue, we say this message, from the global viewpoint, enters the network;
then this message can be observed through watching the global queue. Conversely, when
a message is inputted by an endpoint, we say this message leaves the network.
Figure 5.6 shows the reduction (τ actions) rules for the network. Remember, the
rules are based on the global viewpoint. Rule bN-outc says, when a local process P
outputs a message with action label `O, globally it is a marginal invisible action putting
the message (corresponding to `O) into global queue H. Rule bN-inc is the duality
of bN-outc. A local process P inputs a message with action label `I, which can be
finally absorbed by P since dest(`I) is in ep(P ). Globally, it is a marginal invisible
action absorbing the message (corresponding to `I) from global queue H. Rule bN-newc
represents that newing a shared name happens locally. Since we restrict that an im-
mode shared name is unique in the network, to satisfy this restriction, in practice and
in monitoring, one can assume that there are distributed routing tables in the global
queue, H, for recording every created name. Rule bN-joinc says joining a session-role is
locally decided and it will inform the routing mechanism if there is any. Rule bN-parc
says a reduction of a part of the network does not affect other parts in the network.
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Rule bN-resc says that if a network N can be reduced to N′, the bound network (νn)N
can be reduced to (νn)N′. Rule bN-strc is standard.
Figure 5.7 illustrates the rules of LTS of the network, represented by the observable
global transport. Note that, `−→g is particularly used to denote the transitions which are
globally observable through observing the global queue. N `−→g N′ represents the global
observability of the network. By watching the transitions happening in the global queue,
where actions are visible via inputting and outputting messages, the rules are as the dual
of the reduction rules, which generalise the LTS of local processes. Rules {Req-b/f} and
{Sel} are summarised as the general output rule {Out}, which is the dual of reduction
rule bN-inc; while rules {Acc-b/f} and {Bra} are summarised as the general input rule
{In}, which is the dual of reduction rule bN-outc. Note that, H/msg(`) means taking
off message msg(`) from the set of messages in H. Rule {Req-b} says that, as action
a(s[p] : G) takes place, it implies that there exists a local process in the network taking
this action for newing a session, and rule breq-out bc defined in Figure 5.4 is applied.
As a message leaves the global queue, there should be exist local process receiving it as
an input. Rule {Out} means there is a local process in Ns outputting a message to the
global queue, thus the destination of action ` should not be inside Ns but outside it.
Rule {In} means local process P is going to receive a message from the global queue,
thus Ns does not change its configuration. Rule {tau} summarise the reduction rules
defined in Figure 5.6. Rule {res} and {str} are standard according to (117). Rule {par}
says that, the bound names of action ` should not be any free name appearig in network
N2, and it should not be absorbed by any process in network N2 (i.e. its destination
is not in N2). The global transport in the network is used to abstract the network
dynamics. The LTS of the network (Figure 5.7), which describes the observable actions
via the LTS of global transport, and the LTS of local processes (Figure 5.4) together
illustrate that the actions happening in the global queue and those happening in the
endpoints are dual.
Remark 5.4.7. The actions happening in local processes are the dualities of those
happening in the network, and vice versa.
5.4.4 Well-formedness
A network N which satisfies the following conditions is called well-formed: (I) it contains
at most one global queue. (II) Two local processes never have the same shared name
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{Req-b} H a(s[p]:G)−−−−−→g H ·a〈s[p] : G〉
{Req-f} H a〈s[p]:G〉−−−−−→g H ·a〈s[p] : G〉
{Acc-b} a〈s[p] : G〉·H a(s[p]:G)−−−−−→g H
{Acc-f} a〈s[p] : G〉·H a〈s[p]:G〉−−−−−→g H
{Sel} H s[p1,p2]!l〈v〉−−−−−−−→g H · s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉
{Bra} s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉·H
s[p1,p2]?l(v)−−−−−−−→g H
{Out} H
`−→g H ·msg(`) ` is output P `−→ P ′ dest(`) 6∈ ep(Ns)
P ‖ Ns ‖ H `−→g P ′ ‖ Ns ‖ H ·msg(`)
{In} H
`−→g H/msg(`) ` is input P `−→ P ′
P ‖ Ns ‖ H `−→g P ′ ‖ Ns ‖ H/msg(`)
{tau, res} Ns = P ‖ Ns0 Ns
′ = P ′ ‖ Ns0 P `−→ P ′
Ns
τ−→g Ns′
N `−→g N′ n(`) 6∈ n˜
(νn˜)N `−→g (νn˜)N′
{str} N ≡ N0
`−→g N′0 ≡ N′
N `−→g N′
{par}N1
`−→g N′1 bn(`) ∩ fn(N2) = ∅ dest(`) 6∈ ep(N2)
N1 ‖ N2 `−→g N′1 ‖ N2
Figure 5.7: The Labelled Transition System of the Global Transport
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with input mode (i.e. I or IO). We write
∏
i Pi to denote P1 ‖ P2 · · · ‖ Pn. Note that
well-formedness is preserved by reduction.
As for (II), it means that, let mode be a function mapping a shared name to its
I/O mode whenever a ∈ n(P ) and a ∈ n(Q) where P 6= Q, if a ∈ n(P ), mode(a)=I
or mode(a)=IO, then for any a ∈ n(Q), its mode should be O (for output only). This
restriction comes from the setting that there is only one input mode for a common
shared channel in the network; a shared channel can be used by several endpoints as an
output channel to communicate to one and only one target, who has the same shared
channel with input mode. If N does not contain a global queue and has no hiding, then
N is static, i.e. Ns, because it has no dynamic. A network is called initial if the local
processes do not contain operator for new name hiding and if the message queue H is
empty.
5.4.5 Global Queue v.s. Local Queue
A “queue”, which is in between processes, is there for abstracting asynchronous be-
haviours through buffering messages which cannot be immediately absorbed by an ex-
pected receiver. In the proposed calculus, we design both global queue, which is unique
in the network, and local queues, which belong to specific endpoints, to realise asyn-
chronous interactions. If the purpose is only for realising asynchronous processes, we
only need one of them. But for asynchronous monitoring, we need both of them: Use
the global queue to represent asynchronous interactions among concurrent processes,
and use local queues to capture asynchronous interactions between an external monitor
and its, more than one, corresponding local processes. Having local queues in the mon-
itoring framework also makes our model closer to the reality: in real-life systems, local
processes generally use buffers to manage interaction messages. When we have local
queues, having a global queue is to make interleaving messages, which corresponding to
interleaving actions in different sessions, become explicit and observable globally.
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5.5 The Functionalities of the Capability-passing pi-Calculus
5.5.1 Mobility
As this thesis claims that the capability-passing pi-calculus is based on the asynchronous
pi-calculus, thus it should be able to represent not only concurrent interactions but also
mobility. Note that, in the pi-calculus,
x〈y〉 | x(z).z〈10〉 −→ y〈10〉,
the mobility is realised by name passing shown above; although the capability-passing
pi-calculus has the similar name-passing mechanism shown below, the mobility is not
done by replacing variable u by the received name a, but is done by passing capability
s[q2] to a through a〈s[q2] : G〉:
s[p, q1]!〈a〉;Q′ ‖ s[p, q1]?(u).u〈s[q2] : G〉;P ′
in which a process playing session-role s[q1] receives the knowledge about where shared
point a is, and then passes the endpoint represented by a the capability for playing
session-role s[q2] specified under G.
The mobility will be explained by using the scenario of “mobile phones” example for
explaining how the pi-calculus is powerful enough to realise mobility.
The follows illustrate some key points which make the representation of mobility of
the capability-passing pi-calculus different from the original asynchronous pi-calculus:
1. Every shared channel at every endpoint is specifically I/O typed with mode I, IO,
or O to declare their I/O capability.
2. When a name, say a, is transmitted by a session interaction action, say s[p, q]!l〈a〉,
from endpoint playing s[p] to endpoint playing s[q], it is viewed as a propagation
rather than name passing (introduced in (117)) such that the endpoint playing
s[p] still knows a through either of the following ways:
(a) If a is with input mode, I or IO, at the endpoint playing s[p], then this
endpoint still binds a with mode I or IO. a with mode I or IO is alive since
it is created by a process (i.e. an endpoint), and it will die until this process
terminates.
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(b) If a is with output mode, O or IO, then this endpoint still has the knowledge
about a with mode O or IO, which means the endpoint knows where to
communicate with a.
And, the endpoint playing s[q] has the knowledge about a with mode O because
action s[p, q]!〈a〉 passes a to the endpoint playing s[q].
3. By applying [P−request b/f], an endpoint loses a session-role s[p] by delegating it
to another endpoint, i.e. by requesting another endpoint to play this session-role.
If the endpoint is represented by a specific shared name b, then the delegation is
b〈s[p] : G〉
which means giving up for playing s[p] and requesting shared chanel b to bind s[p]
for playing this role.
Although it seems some restrictions are attached to this calculus, this session-based
calculus can realise mobility with a high-level language. The following section with a
whole example illustrates this point.
In (117), it uses example “mobile phones” to demostrate the mobility that the pi-
calculus provides. Its scenario is described as follows: Assume a user uses mobile phone
in a car. When the car runs from one area to another, say from area A to area B, the
mobile phone transmitter of area A will be correspondingly changed to the one of area
B. This is controlled by a control center, which is responsible for switching the mobile
phone’s connection of the transmitter in area A to the connection of the transmitter in
area B.
From this example, we learn that the mobility is represented by the ability of pos-
sessing a channel. When a process possesses or knows a channel, it has the ability to
use it for sending or receiving messages. Recall that, based on our assumptions (see
Chapter 4), there are two kinds of names (or channels), which are session channel and
shared channel. A session channel is designed for interactions, while a shared channel
is viewed as a shared point linking connections to a specific endpoint. Particularly, a
session-role inside a session channel is as important because it is a kind of name, which
represents the capability of interactive behaviours. With the similar idea, but different
representation, the capability-passing pi-calculus mainly applies session-roles passing
82
5.5 The Functionalities of the Capability-passing pi-Calculus
to show the change of possessing a capability from one process to another process to
represent the mobility.
Here we use the capability-passing pi-calculus to represent the mobility of example
“mobile phones”. In the session-based calculus, every process is viewed as a session-role
involving in a session. In this example, there are three session-roles: Role car as a
car, role trans as a transmitter, and role control as a control center. Once a session
is established, the interactions are done by passing messages among the session-roles.
Even though the car will move from one area, covered by a transmitter, to another area,
covered by another transmitter, only the shared channel of the transmitter will change,
but the session-role trans is still the same.
Let Ptransi be the process for a transmitter i, using shared name ai for playing role
trans, specified under protocol G, in session yi, which is a session variable for Ptransi :
Ptransi = ai(yi[trans] : G).µX.yi[control, trans]?{talk().Ptalkcar.X, lose(tn).PIdtrans}
where i = {1, 2}, and tn is the variable of name for a transimitter. A transmitter
is recursively waiting for the command from control. If the command from control
is “talk” i.e. branch “talk” has been chosen, then it executes Ptalkcar and then keeps
listening. If the command from control is “lose(tn)”, then it executes PIdtrans. PIdtrans is
a process to idle the transmitter Ptransi by removing the capability of Ptransi of playing
role s[trans], and, at the same time, requests shared channel tn, informed from control,
to play session-role s[trans].
PIdtrans = tn〈yi[trans] : G〉;Ptransj −→ tn〈yi[trans] : G〉 | Ptransj
where j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j. There can be many Ptransj , other transmitters, positioning
in parallel after the request tn〈yi[trans] : G〉. If the control assigns the shared channel
tn correctly, there must exist some Ptransj having a shared channel that matches tn, i.e.
tn = aj so that it can accept this request.
Note that, with the capability-passing pi-calculus, there is no need to inform the
process who plays role car, as what the “mobile phones” example in (117) did. It is
because the process playing car only needs to know how to communicate with other
session-roles. Every session-role is bound to some shared channel during communica-
tions, and these bindings are decided by the actions of request and accept. When action
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tn〈s[trans] : G〉 in Ptransi takes place, it means the shared channel ai in Ptransi for bind-
ing sesion-role s[trans] has given up the capability of playing role s[trans]; when some
Ptransj accepts this request, its shared name aj will take this capability by binding to
the session-role s[trans].
If there is a routing table for routing messages among session-roles, the routing table
will change the record from s[trans] 7→ ai to s[trans] 7→ aj . It implies that, the session-
role s[car] will not feel there is a change because its communications with s[trans] are
still there even though the shared name of s[trans] is changed from ai to aj .
To complete this example, let process Ptalkcar be the process to communicate with
process Pcar, which plays role car in the session:
Ptalkcar = if info = true then yi[trans, car]!info〈info〉 else yi[trans, car]!error〈errMsg〉
Pcar = c(ycar[car] : G).µX.ycar[trans, car]?
{info(x).ycar[car, trans]]!reply〈message1〉,
error(y).ycar[car, trans]!report〈message2〉}
Ptalkcar is a process to communicate with role car. It can be any kind of interactions
with car. Here it assumes that when there is a new information, which is denoted by
info = true, role trans sends car the coming information. Similarly, when there is an
error happening, role trans sends car the error message. As for Pcar, it firstly accepts
to join a session to play role car, specified under protocol G. Then it recursively waits
for messages from trans. If it is for “info”, it replies trans with message1. If it is for
‘error”, it reports to trans with message2.
The process of control center, playing role s[control], is described below:
Pcontrol = if sig > bottle then s[control, trans]!talk〈〉 else s[control, trans]!lose〈tn〉
It assumes that when the signal, denoted by sig, is strong enough, represented by
sig > bottle, control asks role trans to continue using the same channel to communicate
with car by selecting branch “talk”; otherwise, it selects branch “lose” to ask it to lose
the current channel and to grab another channel, tn, to continue playing role trans for
communicating with car.
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5.5.2 Pattern-matching
Primitives u(k[p] : G) (or u〈k[p] : G〉) and u(y[p] : G) (or u〈y[p] : G〉) compose a pair
for pattern-matching. Pattern-matching mechanism is a kind of access control through
identifying endpoints for playing each session-role asynchronously and linearly one by
one. When a session is created through linear invitations, linearity is automatically
satisfied, which means there is no conflict (racing) at session-roles. When an invitation
comes from session k, which is fresh to the recipient, primitive u(y[p] : G).P is used
to match this request with u, p, and G. If it is matched, this request is accepted by
replacing variable y with session k. When k is not fresh to the recipient, the primitive
u〈y[p] : G〉.P is used for pattern-matching. Note that, since y should has been replaced
by some session, say s, the invitation should match not only u, p, and G, but also s.
Example 5.5.1 (access control through pattern-matching). Assume a process
P , defined as below,
P = a(s[p1] : G) | c〈s[p2] : G〉
wants to invite endpoints a and c for playing roles p1 and p2 in session s, specified under
G. Assume there are two processes Prev1 and Prev2,
Prev1 = a(y[p1] : G).P
′
rev1
Prev2 = c(y[p3] : G).P
′
rev2
then only Prev1 can accept P ’s invitation for playing role p1 specified under G because
Prev2 is only eligible for playing role p3 but not p2.
Another example is, assume, for the same P , there are two processes Prev3 and Prev4,
Prev3 = a(y[p1] : G).b〈y[q] : G〉
Prev4 = a(y[p1] : G
′).b〈y[q] : G′〉
both of them can play role p1 but defined under different protocols G and G′. Then
only Prev3 matches the pattern to accept the invitation from P . Note that, in Prev3,
when invitation a〈s[p1] : G〉 matches a(y[p1] : G), the process of recipient becomes
b〈y[q] : G〉{s/y} = b〈s[q] : G〉
so that the next invitation for endpoint b should match b, q, G and s.
85
5. THE CAPABILITY-PASSING pi-CALCULUS
Access control is also realised through runtime monitoring where monitors have
specifications with logical predicate.
Example 5.5.2 (pattern-matching for preventing information leakage). As-
sume a network has the following local processes in parallel:
(νs)(a〈s[p] : G〉;P ) ‖ H ‖ a(y[p] : G).Q ‖ b(y′[p] : G).Q′
where a(y[p] : G).Q and b(y′[p] : G).Q′ are two local processes in the network. As a 6= b,
the process of b(y′[p] : G).Q′ cannot match the invitation a〈s[p] : G〉 to get it. Moreover,
when monitoring is on, a = b is not allowed because, in the network, there is one and
only one endpoint having a with input mode (based on the assumptions defined in
Chapter 4).
5.5.3 Propagation
As a shared name, say a, is passed from one endpoint to another, the endpoint (driven
by a process) who sends it will not lose a and the endpoint who receives it will only get
a with output mode, which means it only has the knowledge about a but cannot use
a to play any session-role. The modes of input and output distinguish the capability
of a shared channel, and therefore distinguish the capability of a process who has the
channel. When a process has a shared channel with input mode, it can use it to bind
a session-role for playing this role because it can listen (i.e. input) the requests from
the outside; while a process has the same shared channel but with O-mode (i.e. not
including IO-mode), it can only send (i.e. output) messages through this channel with
her knowledge about this channel.
Thus passing a shared name in our calculus is different from the standard name-
passing mechanism in which, when a process passes a name to another, the sender loses
the name, while the receiver gains it. For this difference, we say passing a shared name
as a propagation: to propagate the knowledge about a shared name.
The propagation is realised by the following mechanism, which is controlled by the
change of configurations of specifications (introduced in Chapter 6):
1. When a process creates a new name, say a, the specification guarding this process
will add a with input mode. It means that whenever a process creates a new
name, the process has this name for input.
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2. When a specification guarding a process (i.e. an endpoint) has a shared name,
say a, this process can send out name a.
3. When a process receives a name, say a, from another process, the specification for
this process will add a with output mode.
As it comes to the calculus of monitoring, every system monitor possesses local
specifications, which are projected from the global ones, of the endpoints which she
monitors.
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6Specifications for Governance
Overview This chapter, as a preparation for Chapter 7, formally introduces the spec-
ifications for session-based dynamic monitoring. These specifications are built upon
standard MPST and MPSA technologies which bring essential mechanisms such as the
global specifications for network-wise interactions, the local specifications for endpoint
processes’s behaviours, and endpoint projection from a global specification. Section 6.1
gives two motivating examples. One motivates the effectiveness of session-based specifi-
cations, another motivates the desire of permutation mechanism of specifications. Sec-
tion 6.2 introduces the grammar of global session-based specifications, and Section 6.3
states the consistency principles, together with well-formedness and well-assertedness
properties, to validate global specifications. Section 6.4 gives the grammar of local
session-based specifications, and Section 6.5 introduces projection mechanism for pro-
jecting a global specification to endpoint roles with local specifications. The permuta-
tion mechanism is introduced in Section 6.6, which is designed to support a monitor for
determining messages passing in asynchronous monitoring environment.
6.1 Motivating Example
This section provides two motivating examples. One gives an illustration that a session-
type based specification enjoys conciseness and expressiveness for regulating concurrent
interactions. Another shows that, since asynchrony leads to non-deterministic results,
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permutation mechanism, introduced in Section 6.6, is designed for specifying asyn-
chronous interactions.
6.1.1 The Effectiveness of a Session-based Specification
Assume an external monitor, guarding the local process representing Principal A, has
the following concurrent tasks:
(I) Principal A sends Principal B a request for buying a book with a content “buy
War and Peace”. Finish.
(II) Principal A sends Principal C a request for booking a book with a content “book
Harry Potter”. Finish.
(III) Principal A gets a feedback as “231342”. Finish.
(IV) Principal A gets a feedback as “B231342”. Finish.
Note that (I) and (II) (resp. (III) and (IV)) may happen concurrently. When the
structure of sessions is not applied, at the conversation-level, the monitor watching
conversations can not realise if content of “231342” is coming from Principal B or C,
neither can she ensure the content of “B231342”. Note that, as we say it is at the
conversation-level, or the session-level, we mean that the messages have not yet entered
the domain of the receiver’s location. If a message arrives at the endpoint, the endpoint
may ask a key from the message to check if the message is valid. The session-type-based
specifications are for the conversation-level messages when those messages have not yet
arrived at the receivers. Even if Principal A is informed that “B231342” is a feedback
from Principal B because the message claims so, she does not know whether the format
of the content is correct. In practice, before an interaction starts, they firstly establish
a commitment through negotiation to specify the format of transimitted data. It can
be done by a negotiation protocol, which in fact can apply the structure of sessions.
With the structure of sessions, a protocol can be easily done with session-based
specifications which have specified every step of interactions. The following protocols
are represented by session types:
Buy Protocol Gbuy = A→ B : (string).B → A : (formatB).end
Book Protocol Gbook = A→ C : (string).C → A : (formatC).end
90
6.1 Motivating Example
where the formatB is composed by one alphabet plus 6 natural numbers, while formatC
is composed by 6 natural numbers. Protocols Buy and Book specify the sequence of
interactions and the individual formats for transmitted data. A monitor can clearly
realise that case (III) or (IV) coming from which principals and whether their contents
are in right format.
6.1.2 Verifying Non-deterministic Results
Historically, most well-known process calculi, like CCS (115), CSP (79, 80), and the pi-
calculus (117, 118) assume the interactions happening among processes are synchronous.
In comparison, the assumption that interactions are asynchronous makes analysis more
challenging because (I) communications are hard to harness and (II) asynchronous in-
teractions result in non-determinism. The following example shows the permutation
mechanism, defined in Section 6.6, is useful for a monitor to verify non-deterministic
results.
Example 6.1.1. Assume there are three processes in the network (introduced in Sec-
tion 5.4) in parallel, each of which is separated by notation ‖:
s[p, q]!〈1〉 ‖ s[q, r]!〈2〉; s[p, q]?(x) ‖ s[q, r]?(x)
Let P1 = s[p, q]!〈1〉, P2 = s[q, r]!〈2〉; s[p, q]?(x), and P3 = s[q, r]?(x). As the inter-
actions are synchronous, the result of variable x is deterministic, which is 1. P1 with
action s[p, q]!〈1〉 can not take place until action s[q, r]!〈2〉 in P2 takes place because its
corresponding input s[p, q]?(x) should wait until s[q, r]!〈2〉 fires, which is able to fire
immediately because P3 with action s[q, r]?(x) is ready for it. Therefore, the sequence
of actions is
s[q, r]!〈2〉·s[q, r]?(x)·s[p, q]!〈1〉·s[p, q]?(x)
which is deterministic. When the interactions are asynchronous, P1 and P2 can take
actions in any order or even concurrently. The sequence of actions can be
s[q, r]!〈2〉·s[q, r]?(x)·s[p, q]!〈1〉·s[p, q]?(x) or s[p, q]!〈1〉·s[p, q]?(x)·s[q, r]!〈2〉·s[q, r]?(x)
Thus the result of x may be 1 or 2 depending on P2 with action s[p, q]?(x) firstly receive
the message from P1 or P3 with action s[q, r]?(x) firstly receive the message from P2.
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Synchronous interactions, however, make the overall systems inefficient and do not
reflect the facts of large-scale distributed systems.
As we focus on asynchronous interactions, to make an external monitor relying on
specifications sensible to judge local processes’ runtime behaviours, the permutation
mechanism is proposed. The permutation mechanism can verify that both traces
s[q, r]!〈2〉·s[q, r]?(x)·s[p, q]!〈1〉·s[p, q]?(x) or s[p, q]!〈1〉·s[p, q]?(x)·s[q, r]!〈2〉·s[q, r]?(x)
are correct behaviours under asynchronous environment.
6.2 Global Specifications
Before introducing global specification with assertions, firstly the logical language for
predicates (i.e. assertions) is defined below:
Definition 6.2.1 (logical language). The grammar for logical formulae (i.e. predi-
cate) is:
A ::= true | false | e1 = e2 | e1 > e2 | φ(e1, ..., en) | A1 ∩A2 | ¬A | ∃x(A)
where e1, ... are expressions, and φ, ... range over a pre-defined set of predicates with
fixed arities and types. ∃x(A) returns true if there exists x in A; otherwise it returns
false. Write var(A) for the set of free variables occuring in A, similarly for var(e).
Convention 6.2.2. Assume a fixed model for logical formulae satisfying: (I) validity of
each closed atomic formula including equality and inequality is polynomially decidable;
and (II) validity of closed formulae is decidable.
The syntax of global types, or called global specifications, is defined in Figure 6.1.
It is based on (22), in which rule “interaction” is divided into the rules of “value” and
“branching”. In other words, the syntax in Figure 6.1 is not original but with some
minor revision of the syntax of (22).
In Figure 6.1, sessions are described in terms of global specifications, which are called
types in (86), and are called assertions in (22). Because, later in Chapter 8, we extend
global/local assertions to embed endpoint states for specifying endpoints’ behaviours
through observing traces, for generality, from now on, a session type or a session asser-
tion is uniformly called a session specification (i.e. global/local specifications).
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S ::= nat | bool | mode(G[p]) sorts
mode ::= I | O | IO modes
G ::= p→ q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gi}i∈I interaction
| µt〈e˜〉(x˜ : S˜ )〈〈A〉〉.G | t〈e〉 | end rec/var/end
| G1 | G2 parallel
Figure 6.1: Global Specifications: G
Definition 6.2.3 (the set of roles in G). Define role(G) as the set of roles occuring
in global specification G. Whenever p, q ∈ role(G), p 6= q.
The global specification G describes a session as a protocol signature among multiple
roles with logical formulae. It is an abstract global scenario description which structures
multi-party interactions and indicates the steps taken by the roles in the session. The
main construct is a labelled message exchange, where p sends q a label li (I is a finite
set of integers) and a message xi with sort Si. Sorts include base types and shared name
type mode(G[p]). In mode(G[p]), G defines the behaviour of role p. Gi describes the
continuation of the session for the selected branch i, and Ai is a predicate on interaction
variables specifying what p must guarantee and dually what q can rely on. Ai expresses
a constraint on the choice of branch i (e.g., a guard that must hold when selecting label
li) and on the value of the exchanged message xi, which we call interaction variable.
We do not fix a specific logic for A, we only assume it is decidable. Interactions bind
each xi in Ai and in Gi.
A recursive specification is guarded by an invariant A, and defines a recursion pa-
rameter with its initialisation. e˜ = e1, ..., en, x˜ = x1, ..., xn and S˜ = S1, ...,Sn. and
every xi, xj , i 6= j are pairwise disjoint. x˜ is the binder of predicate A. Note that, the
variable of recursion parameter is known by every participant involved in the recursion.
For example, in recursion
µt〈e〉(x : S )〈〈A〉〉.p→ q : (y : int)〈〈y > x〉〉.t,
x is not an interaction variable sent from p to q but a parameter of this recursion,
both p and q know x because they are all involved in the recursion. t is a variable for
specifications. Its formal form is t〈e〉 because it may be a specification for a recursion
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which has parameters. Branching and recursion describe potential choices and repeated
interactions. Each message exchange/branching is annotated with a predicate specifying
a constraint on the message value or the choice of a branch. end ends the session. Parallel
composition is written as G1 | G2 in rule parallel. When a session follows G1 | G2, there
are multi-threads running concurrently in this session. Note that whenever G1 | G2,
role(G1) ∩ role(G2) = ∅ holds. This structure provides the language flexibility, and
benefits programers to write tasks in a readable structure.
Example 6.2.4 (OOI Instrument Commands - global specification). The fol-
lowing specification is the global specification for the example introduced in Chapter 5
(see Figure 5.2). A branch without predicate means its accompanying predicate is true.
We sometimes omit labels when there is a single branch.
GIC = User → Register : (xint : InterfaceId).
Register → User : (xn : Int)〈〈xn > 0〉〉.User → Agent : (xp : Priority).
Agent→ User : {accept().Gacc, reject(xE : ErrData)〈〈xP = high ⊃ xe 6= busy〉〉.end}
Gacc = µt〈xn〉(y)〈〈y ≥ 0〉〉.
User → Agent : {more(xcom : Command)〈〈y > 0 ∧ xcom 6= switch-off〉〉.Gcom,
quit().Agent→ Instrument : quit().end}
Gcom = Agent→ Instrument : (ycom : Command).
Instrument→ Agent : (yr : Response).Agent→ User : (xr : Response). t〈y − 1〉
The scenario modelled by GIC has already been described informally in Section 5.2,
Chapter 5.
6.3 Consistency Principles
Based on (22, 86), this thesis addresses the consistency principles, well-formedness and
well-assertedness for global specifications. For detailed theories and proofs, please see
(22, 86).
The consistency principles of global specifications for ensuring the consistency of
overall network behaviours are introduced in (22). This thesis, for completion reason,
also mentions these principles which are defined on the basis of (22). The principles
addressed are history sensitivity and temporal satisfiability. The well-formedness and
well-assertedness of global specifications which are also very similar to those in (22),
except the minor changes of the syntax of global specifications, are reviewed. Note, when
we go to stateful specifications, Chapter 8, the revised stateful well-formedness for global
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specifications will be introduced, while the well-assertedness for global specifications is
still the same. Also note that the principle of locality, which is discussed in (22),
is not addressed in this thesis because this thesis combines actions “interaction” and
“branching” to be one action; which means, every action of “interaction” is one kind of
action of “branching”. Moreover, the principle of temporal satisfiability directly implies
locality according to (22)’s Proposition B.10.
History sensitivity says, for every interaction,
1. the sender must know the variables/names he or she is going to send,
and knows the variables/names deciding the result of the interaction
predicate;
2. the receiver must know the variables/names, except those variables
carried through the interaction (which are new to the receiver), deciding
the result of the interaction predicate.
In other words, the interaction predicate of a participant must be defined only on those
interaction variables introduced in the preceding interactions in which the participant
is involved. Note that, according to the syntax of global specification shown in Figure
6.1, an interaction predicate is for both the sender and the receiver involved in this
interaction. The variables carried through this interaction, which should be known by
the sender, may be new to the receiver. The receiver knows these variables when he
receives them.
Example 6.3.1 (history sensitivity). The following global specification violates his-
tory sensitivity
p→ q : (x : int)〈〈x > 5〉〉.
r → q : (y : int)〈〈y > x〉〉
because r does not know variable x, which is only shared by roles p and q.
It can be easily revised to the global specification below
p→ q : (x : int)〈〈x > 10〉〉.
q → r : (x : int)〈〈true〉〉.
r → q : (y : int)〈〈y > x〉〉
to respect history sensitivity.
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Well-formedness conditions for global specifications introduced later (Section 6.3.1) en-
sures a global specification satisfies history sensitivity.
As for temporal satisfiability, this principle says
Every participant involved in an interaction should always find a valid path
to proceed (in that interaction) unless he or she meets end.
Note, when interaction predicates do not attach to global specifications, like the ones
in (86), a global specification always satisfies temporal satisfiability. When predicates
are attached to interactions, they restrict the paths for interaction participants to go
forward: Only the valid paths, according to the predicate, can forward the process.
The following example illustrates how a global specification violates temporal satis-
fiability principle, and how it can be revised to satisfy this principle.
Example 6.3.2 (temporal satisfiability). The global specification below violates
temporal satisfiability
p→ q : len(x : int)〈〈x > 5〉〉.
q → p : {walk(y : int)〈〈x < y < 10〉〉,
run(y : int)〈〈x < y < 50〉〉}
because, when x is bigger than 50, which is actually possible since the predicate at role
p only ensures x > 5, neither branch "walk" nor "run" can be selected for sending a
proper y from role q to role p to satisfy the predicates specified at role q and p.
A revised one that respects temporal satisfiability can be
p→ q : len(x : int)〈〈49 > x > 5〉〉.
q → p : {walk(y : int)〈〈x < y < 10〉〉,
run(y : int)〈〈x < y < 50〉〉}
where x : int and 49 > x > 5 ensures the possible values of x are from 6 to 48. Even
when a value in the range of 8 to 48 is sent from role p to role q, q can select branch
"run" to send y in the range of 9 to 49 to satify the predicate x < y < 50.
When the local endpoint states are embeded into specifications, the consistency
principles are revised, which are discussed in Section 8.2.2, Chapter 8.
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6.3.1 Well-formedness
The well-formedness of global specifications stipulates the principle of history sensitivity,
which can be ensured linearly through a syntactic checker (for details, please see (22)).
Before introducing well-formedness, a convention and definitions are stated as follows.
Convention 6.3.3. This thesis assumes the standard bound name convention for all
syntactic entities with bindings.
I(G) is defined as the one in (22):
Definition 6.3.4. Define I(G) as the set of interaction variables occurring in G. p ∈
role(G) knows an interaction variable u ∈ I(G) when p sends u or receives u, or when
u is a parameter of a recursion where p involves.
Definition 6.3.5 (projection of interaction variables, I(G)  p). Define I(G)  p,
where p ∈ role(G), as the set of variables that role p knows.
Definition 6.3.6. Let S˜ = S1, ...,Si, ...,Sn. Define t : S˜ for representing that the sort
of ith parameter of t is Si.
Definition 6.3.7 (shared environments). Let Γ be the shared environments, defined
by the following grammar:
Γ ::= ∅ | Γ, x : S | Γ, u : mode(G[p]) | Γ, t : S˜
where x is a variable for integer, string, and boolean, etc., while u is a variable for
shared name, and t is for specification variable, When it is used to handle a recursive
specification, it has the corresponding parameters to the recursion specification. Note
that, Γ ` e if for every x ∈ var(e), Γ ` x.
As the one defined in (22), the well-formedness for global specifications is defined in
Figure 6.2 with some revisions to cater for the syntax of our global specifications.
The key rule [WF-interaction] requires that interaction participants must know all
the variables appearing in predicate A.
∀x.((x ∈ ∪i∈Ivar(Ai) ∩ x 6∈ {xi}i∈I) ⊃ x ∈ (I(G)  p ∩ I(G)  q))
means that for any x which is in the assertions {Ai}i∈I but not as an interaction
variable, it should be known by both roles p and q. In rule [WF-rec], t : S1, ...,Sn
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∀i ∈ I,Γ, xi : Si ` Gi
∀x.((x ∈ ∪i∈Ivar(Ai) ∩ x 6∈ {xi}i∈I) ⊃ x ∈ (I(G)  p ∩ I(G)  q))
Γ ` p→ q : {li(xi :Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gi}i∈I [WF-interaction]
Γ ` G Γ ` G′
Γ ` G | G′ [WF-par]
Γ ` end [WF-end]
Γ ` e1 : S1, ...,Γ ` en : Sn
Γ, t : S1, ...,Sn ` t〈e1, ..., en〉 [WF-rec]
Γ′ = Γ, t : S1, ...,Sn Γ′ ` G dom(Γ′) ⊇ var(A) ∀i.Γ ` xi : Si, ei : Si
Γ ` µt〈e1, ..., en〉(x1 : S1, ..., xn : Sn)〈〈A〉〉.G [WF-def]
Figure 6.2: Well-formedness for Global Specifications
means the parameters of recursive variable t has types S1, ...,Sn. This knowledge is
known by the participants involved in the recursion. [WF-def] says that, if the shared
environment can prove the value of each parameter follows the specified type, i.e. ∀i.Γ `
xi : Si, ei : Si, and prove the recursion body G, i.e. Γ′ ` G where Γ′ = Γ, t : S1, ...,Sn,
which implies that the invariant A is true, then it can prove the recursive specification
µt〈e1, ..., en〉(x1 : S1, ..., xn : Sn)〈〈A〉〉.G. Other rules are straightforward. According to
(22), the rules are purely syntactic, and the validation of G is a linear time problem.
6.3.2 Well-assertedness
Well-assertedness is defined in terms of principle of temporal satisfiability. Temporal
satisfiability requires that for every possible value sent and branch selected in the past,
it is always possible to make a choice that satisfies the current predicate. The most
trivial violation of temporal satisfiability is an interaction with one single branch and
predicate false. The intuition for realising temporal satisfiability is to ensure that, for
every interaction predicate A, there exists an interaction predicate A′ just appearing
after A such that A implies A′, i.e. A ⊃ A′. Below the checker for temporal satisfiability,
a boolean function GSat , is defined based on (22).
Definition 6.3.8 (well-assertedness for global specifications). Assume at the be-
ginning A = true. We define a recursively boolean function GSat(G,A) as follows:
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(i) If G = p1 → p2 : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gi}i∈I , I = {1, ..., n} then GSat(G,A) returnsGSat(G1, A ∩A1) ∩ ... ∩GSat(Gn, A ∩An) if A ⊃
⋃
i∈I(∃xi(Ai))
false otherwise
(ii) G = G1 | G2 then GSat(G,A) returns GSat(G1, A) ∩GSat(G2, A).
(iii) G = µt〈e˜〉(x˜ : S˜ )〈〈A′〉〉.G′ then GSat(G,A) returnsGSat(G′, A ∩A′) if A ⊃ A′{e˜/x˜}false otherwise
(iv) G = t(x˜,A′)〈e˜〉 then GSat(G,A) returns true if A ⊃ A′{e˜/x˜} and false otherwise.
(v) G = end then GSat(G,A) returns true.
Write an annotation of type variable t as t(x˜,A′)〈e˜〉 to represent that type variable t
has a predicate A′ (i.e. recursion invariant) associated to this recursion and parameters
x˜. This annotation is always possible if t is bound in a whole global specification, i.e.
if the whole global specification is closed.
In (i), it requires that there exists at least one branch, say label j, that can be chosen
such that ∃xj(Aj) is true whenever A is true. For example,
p→ q : {(x : int)〈〈x < 10〉〉.G′1, (x : int)〈〈x ≥ 10〉〉.G′2}
is well-asserted because if the first branch fails, the second branch can be chosen, and
vice versa. Also,
p→ q : {(x : int)〈〈x > 10〉〉.G′1, (y : int)〈〈y > 10〉〉.G′2}
is well-asserted when it starts from A = true because p is able to send valid values
for variables x and y. In (ii), a parallel composition is satisfiable if both of them are
satisfiable. (iii) and (iv) require A to imply the predicate A′ of the recursion after
replacing variables x˜ with e˜ in the recursion body (i.e. initiation parameters). (v) says
a session termination end always returns true.
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T ::= p!{li(xi :Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I selection
| p?{li(xi :Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I branch
| µt〈e〉(x : S )〈〈A〉〉.T | t〈e〉 | end rec/var/end
Figure 6.3: Local Specifications: T
6.4 Local Specifications
For runtime monitoring, every local process is associated a dedicated monitor that man-
ages its interactions with the network (hence with other peers) by inspecting outgoing
and incoming messages.
The endpoint specifications, T , are defined in Figure 6.3. They are local specification
used by monitors to represent which interactions are acceptable for an endpoint. A local
specification describes a session from the perspective of a role.
Rule selection expresses the transmission to role p of a label li taken from a label
pool {li}i∈I , where I is a set of indexes, together with an interaction variable xi of sort
Si and that the remaining interaction in the session is Ti. Branching is its dual. Others
are similar to the global version.
Based on Example 6.2.4, Example 6.4.1 shows the endpoint specifications (which
can be automatically projected from GIC . The projection algorithm is introduced in
Section 6.5.).
Example 6.4.1 (OOI Instrument Commands - the user endpoint).
Tuser = Register!(xint : InterfaceId).Register?(xn : Int)〈〈xn > 0〉〉.Agent!(xp : Priority).
Agent?{accept().Tuacc, reject(xe : ErrData)〈〈xp = high ⊃ xe 6= busy〉〉.end}
Tuacc = µt〈xn〉(y)〈〈y ≥ 0〉〉.
Agent!{more(xcom : Command)〈〈y > 0 ∧ xcom 6= switch-off〉〉.Tucom, quit().end}
Tucom = Agent?(xr : Response).t〈y − 1〉
Well-assertedness for endpoint specifications is defined in the same way as the one
for global specifications:
Definition 6.4.2 (well-assertedness for local specifications). Assume at the be-
ginning A = true. We define a recursively boolean function GSat(T,A) as follows:
(i) If T = p!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I or T = p?{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I where I =
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{1, ..., n}, then GSat(T,A) returnsGSat(T1, A ∩A1) ∩ ... ∩GSat(Tn, A ∩An) if A ⊃
⋃
i∈I(∃xi(Ai))
false otherwise
(ii) T = µt〈e˜〉(x˜ : S˜ )〈〈A′〉〉.T ′ then GSat(T,A) returnsGSat(T ′, A ∩A′) if A ⊃ A′{e˜/x˜}false otherwise
(iii) T = t(x˜,A′)〈e˜〉 then GSat(T,A) returns true if A ⊃ A′{e˜/x˜} and false otherwise.
(iv) T = end then GSat(T,A) returns true.
In (i), it is required that, either for sending or receiving, there exists at least one branch,
say label j, that can be chosen such that ∃xj(Aj) is true whenever A is true. Other
definitions for well-assertedness for local specifications are for same reasons as the ones
defined for the case of global specifications.
Together with the calculus defined in Chapter 5, a monitor with T can specify the
behaviours of local processes. Once a process joins a session, the corresponding monitor
is activated and enforces conformance to the scenario of the subsequent interactions
prescribed for the process to follow.
6.5 Projection from the Global to the Local
In this section we define the projection from a global specification to endpoint specifi-
cations. Projectability is a structural property from the underlying type (86) and well-
assertedness is a property on predicates ensuring it is always possible for an endpoint to
satisfy its own obligations (22). This thesis assumes these properties for specifications.
Figure 6.4 illustrates the relationships between global specifications and local specifi-
cations linked by projection. A local specifications is projected to a role specified in a
global specification. It is either used for runtime monitoring or for static type checking.
An endpoint projection or often simply projection, denoted by G  p, projects G onto
p returning an endpoint specification. The projection in this thesis is defined similarly
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Figure 6.4: The Relationships between the Global Specifications, Local Specificaitons,
and the Projection
to the one proposed in (22). Some rules are revised according to the combination of
actions of “interaction” and “branching”.
With Definition 6.3.4, I(G) is the set of interaction variables exchanged and recursion
parameters in G. We let I(G)  p be the set of variables known by p which are either:
(I) the variables that p sends or receives in G, or (II) the parameter of recursions e.g.,
µt〈e〉(y)〈〈A〉〉.P , where p knows all the variables in the expression e and p knows all
variables in e′ for all t〈e′〉 in P . We define the projection of a predicate on a participant
as A  p = ∃Vext.A with Vext = var(A)/(I(G)  p) (i.e., closing with the existential
quantifier the free variables of A that p does not know).
Based on (22), the projection of a global specification onto each role with an end-
point specification is defined as a recursive function Proj. It is also extended to the
mergeability studied in (50). We use annotation tx for recursive call where x is the
recursion parameter for t (i.e., in µt〈e〉(x : S)〈〈A〉〉.G).
Definition 6.5.1 (Projection). Assume p ∈ G, p1 6= p2. Let A ↓ true. The projection
of G on p, written Proj(G,A, p) = G  p, is defined as follows.
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1. Proj(p1 → p2 : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gi}, Aproj , p) =
p2!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Giproj}i∈I if p = p1 6= p2,
p1?{li(xi : Si)〈〈(Ai ∩Aproj)  p〉〉.Giproj}i∈I if p = p2 6= p1,
unionsqi∈IGiproj if p 6= p1, p 6= p2
with Giproj = Proj(Gi, Ai ∩Aproj , p).
2. Proj((G1 | G2), Aproj , p) =Proj(Gi, Aproj , p) if p ∈ Gi and p 6∈ Gj , i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}end if p 6∈ G1 and p 6∈ G2.
3. Proj(µt〈v〉(x :S)〈〈A〉〉.G,Aproj , p) =
µt〈v〉(x :S)〈〈A  p〉〉.P roj(G,A ∩Aproj , p) if x ∈ I(G)  p
µt〈〈A  p〉〉.P roj(G,A ∩Aproj , p) if x 6∈ I(G)  p and p ∈ role(G)
end if p 6∈ role(G)
4. Proj(tx〈v〉, Aproj , p) = tx〈v〉 if x ∈ I(G)  ptx otherwise
5. Proj(end, Aproj , p) = end.
where unionsqi∈IGiproj = G1proj unionsqG2proj ... unionsqGnproj if I = {1, ..., n}. The mergeability, T1 unionsq T2,
is defined by T unionsq T = T and the following axiom based on (50). Let † ∈ {!, ?}.
q † {li(xi :Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I unionsq q † {l′j(x′j :S ′j)〈〈A′j〉〉.T ′j}j∈J =
q † {lk(xk :Sk)〈〈Ak〉〉.Tk}k∈I\J ∪ q † {l′k(x′k :S ′k)〈〈A′k〉〉.T ′k}k∈J\I ∪
q † {lk(xk :Sk)〈〈Ak ∩A′k〉〉.Tk unionsq T ′k}k∈I∩J
when ∀k ∈ I ∩ J,Sk = S ′k. Then we close the local specification context, defined in
Definition 6.6.7, T[T1] unionsq T[T1] = T[T1 unionsq T2].
In rule 1 for an output the projection of a predicate A consists of A itself. Note that
if G is well-formed then p1 knows all variables in A. For a receiver, it is not sufficient
to verify the non-violation of the current predicate only. Consider the following global
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specification:
Seller → Buyer : (cost : Int)〈〈cost > 10〉〉.Buyer → Bank : (pay : Int)〈〈pay ≥ cost〉〉
The predicate pay ≥ cost is meaningless to Bank since Bank does not know cost; rather
the projection on Bank should be Buyer?(pay : Int)〈〈∃cost(cost > 10 ∧ pay ≥ cost)〉〉,
which incorporates the constraint between Buyer and Seller. Thus rule 1 projects all
the past predicates while hiding incorporating the constraints on interactions p2 does
not participate through existential quantification.
In rule 3, the case when p 6∈ role(G), then it returns end for ending this session.
For example, as we project µt.p → q : (x : int).t to role r, and r 6= p and r 6= q, the
recursion should terminate by denoting with end. Other rules are straightforward.
According to (22), the projections of a well-formed global assertion are also well-
asserted. In Example 6.2.4, global specification GIC is well-formed and well-asserted,
then it is projectable and the endpoint specifications projected from GIC are all well-
asserted. The lemma proposed and proved in (22) is mentioned below:
Lemma 6.5.2. If G is well-formed then, for all predicates AG, AT such that AT ⊃ AG
and all p ∈ role(G),
GSat(G,AG) ⊃ GSat(G  p,AT )
6.6 Permutation of Specifications
The permutation mechanism is introduced for runtime monitoring, which needs to verify
a non-deterministic sequence of actions due to the asynchronous interactions among
processes and monitors.
In this section, we formalise the notion of minimum permutations for monitors. The
key idea is to “permute up” an action which is in effect not suppressed by another action
to the top, without affecting other actions. Such an action which eventually moves to
the top can originally occur in many places in an assertion: These occurrences are
merged into one when a sequence of permutations are applied. Here firstly introduces
several preliminary notions.
Definition 6.6.1 (global specification context). A global specification context G[ ]
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is a global specification with a hole, whose grammar is defined as:
G[ ] ::= [ ] | G[ ]|G′ | G′|G[ ]
| p1→p2 : {l1(x1 :S1)〈〈A1〉〉.G1, .., li(xi :Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.G[ ], .., ln(xn :Sn)〈〈An〉〉.Gn}
Then G[G] denotes the result of filling the hole in the global specification context G with
global specification G. Whenever write G[G], G[G] is assumed well-formed. Note that
[ ] defines the identity function, i.e. [G] = G.
Note that there is no need for having µt.G[ ] because such a recursion can always be
unfolded into each component.
Definition 6.6.2. Define a closed global specification G is prime if G 6= end and G =
G1|G2 implies one of Gi, i = {1, 2} is end. If G is a prime specification, then the initial
action of G is the action at the top of G. For a non-prime G, its initial actions are those
of its prime components. The initial action of a closed local specification T is defined
similarly.
Example 6.6.3. Let
G = p1 → q1 : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.p2 → q2 : {l′j(x′j : S′j)〈〈A′j〉〉.G′j}j∈I}i∈I .
The initial action of G is p1 → q1 : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉}i∈I . Another example is, let
G = G1 | G2, G1 = p1 → q1 : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gi}i∈I , and G2 = p2 → q2 : {l′j(x′j :
S′j)〈〈A′j〉〉.G′j}j∈I . The initial actions of G are p1 → q1 : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉}i∈I and
p2 → q2 : {l′j(x′j : S′j)〈〈A′j〉〉}j∈I .
The idea of marking actions in global/local specifications is introduced, so that the
effect of each permutation can be tracked. Hereafter, the specification context also
includes the marked actions.
Definition 6.6.4 (specifications with marked actions).
1. A global specification with marked actions or for brevity, a marked global specifi-
cation, is a global specification some of whose action occurrences are underlined
actions, denoted by underlining the initial part of the action. Write (G, . . .) for
marked global specifications. The underlined actions in G are called permuta-
tion candidates of G, e.g. G[p→ q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gi}i∈I ] is a marked global
specification, and p→ q is its permutation candidate.
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2. Similarly, define marked local specifications (T , . . .) as e.g.
T[p!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I ],
where p is its permutation candidate.
First define a unit permutation, which is a permutation of two nested branchings
defined only when they are independent, i.e. there is no causal order between two
interactions (no causality through either ordered actions from the same sender to the
same receiver, or ordered actions linked by a receiver becoming a sender in the second
action).
Definition 6.6.5 (global unit permutation). A unit permutation of marked global
specifications is defined by the axiom below:
G[p1 → p2 : {li(xi :Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.p3 → p4 : {l′j(x′j :S′j)〈〈A′j〉〉.Gij}j∈J}i∈I ]
y1 G[p3 → p4 : {l′j(x′j :S′j)〈〈A′j〉〉.p1 → p2 : {li(xi :Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gij}i∈I}j∈J ]
with the following conditions: if (p2 = p4) then (p1 6= p3); if (p1 = p4) then (p2 6= p3);
if (p1 = p3) then (p2 6= p4); or pi pairwise distinct.
Remark 6.6.6 (unit permutation of global specifications).
1. Definition 6.6.5 demands each specification under permutation candidate, Gij , to
be unmarked specifications (note the symbol Gij is for an unmarked specification).
2. In the same definition, the inner actions to be permuted up, should have precisely
the same branching labels. This condition is automatically ensured by projectabil-
ity.
The second point above is significant in that, whenever there is no causality among
actions, they automatically enable a unit permutation: An inner, nested but causally
unsuppressed action can automatically be permuted up over another action which hap-
pens to be above it.
Definition 6.6.7 (local specification context). A local specification context T[ ] is
a local specification with a hole, whose grammar is defined as:
T[ ] ::= [ ] | p?{l1(x1 :S1)〈〈A1〉〉.T1, .., li(xi :Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.T[ ], .., ln(xn :Sn)〈〈An〉〉.Tn}
| p!{l1(x1 :S1)〈〈A1〉〉.T1, .., li(xi :Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.T[ ], .., ln(xn :Sn)〈〈An〉〉.Tn}
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Then T[T ] denotes the result of filling the hole in the local specification context T with
global specification T . Note that [ ] defines the identity function, i.e. [T ] = T .
In the same way as for global specifications, define the unit permutations for local
specifications. In this case, the causal order only occurs when there are two consecutive
sending actions with the same target, or when there is an input action followed by
an output action. These conditions precisely correspond to permutability in global
specifications through projections.
Definition 6.6.8 (local unit permutation). The unit permutation of local (end-
point) specifications by the axioms below, assuming p1 6= p2:
T[p1!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.p2!{l′j(x′j : S′j)〈〈A′j〉〉.Tij}j∈I}i∈I ]
y1 T[p2!{l′j(x′j : S′j)〈〈A′j〉〉.p1!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Tij}i∈I}j∈I ]
T[p1?{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.p2?{l′j(x′j : S′j)〈〈A′j〉〉.Tij}j∈I}i∈I ]
y1 T[p2?{l′j(x′j : S′j)〈〈A′j〉〉.p1?{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Tij}i∈I}j∈I ]
T[p1!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.p2?{l′j(x′j : S′j)〈〈A′j〉〉.Tij}j∈I}i∈I ]
y1 T[p2?{l′j(x′j : S′j)〈〈A′j〉〉.p1!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Tij}i∈I}j∈I ]
Remark 6.6.9 (unit permutation of local specifications).
1. As before, demand each specification under permutation candidate to be un-
marked.
2. The inner (lower) actions have precisely the same branching labels, automatically
ensured among projected local specifications.
We introduce the minimum permutation relation in the follows. Below write unmark(G)
for the result of taking off marks from the actions in G, similarly for unmark(T ).
Definition 6.6.10 (minimum permutation). Let G and G′ be marked. Then define
the minimum permutation from G to G′, denoted Gy G′, by the following induction.
all and only marked action in G is one of its initial actions.
Gy G
Gy1 G′′ G′′ y G′
Gy G′
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Then define Gy G′ by:
G = unmark(G) Gy G′ G′ = unmark(G′)
Gy G′
Similarly define T y T ′ by:
all and only marked action in T is its initial action.
T y T
T y1 T ′′ T ′′ y T ′
T y T ′
As before, define T y T ′ by unmarking.
Basic properties of the minimum permutations follow. In brief, these results say that
marking does not determine minimum permutations.
Proposition 6.6.11 (minimum permutation to the top).
1. The minimum permutation to permute a marked action in G to the top is induc-
tively applying Definition 6.6.10 until the marked action is at the top of G.
2. Whenever G y G′ and G′ y G′, there is always a unique marked action in G′,
which is one of its initial actions. Similarly whenever T y T ′, there is always a
unique marked action in T ′, which is its initial action.
3. If Gy G′1, Gy G′2, G′1 y G′1 and G′2 y G′2, then G1 = G2. Similarly if T y T ′1
and T y T ′2, then T 1 = T 2.
4. If Gy G′ and unmark(G) = G, then there is a unique G′ such that Gy G′ and
unmark(G′) = G′. Similarly, if T y T ′ and unmark(T ) = T , then there is a unique
T ′ such that T y T ′ and unmark(T ′) = T ′.
By Proposition 6.6.11, write Gy p→ q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gi}i∈I ] to indicate a unique
permutation from G: Just identifying the resulting top action is enough to determine
the minimum permutation.
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Overview Based on the calculus proposed in Chapters 5 and the specification lan-
guage introduced in Chapter 6, this chapter introduces a realistic yet formal model
of the monitored network in which strong safety properties result from local runtime
verification and enforcement of possibly untrusted endpoints, rather than from static
checking. The monitoring model proposed here is proven to guarantee the satisfaction
of global specifications, focusing on the following properties: The dynamic local and
global safety through stating local and global communication safety (Theorems 7.4.3
and 7.4.16); the external local and global monitoring transparency (Theorems 7.4.5 and
7.4.17); and session fidelity (Theorem 7.4.28) in the presence of possibly ill-behaved
processes.
We start from Section 7.1, in which motivating examples and a general framework
for monitoring are introduced. Section 7.2 is one main part of this chapter: It introduces
the syntax and semantics of external monitors and provides viable and efficient reference
semantics for monitor implementers. Then it introduces the syntax and semantics of
monitor-off, which can be viewed as a gateway. It finally introduces the syntax and
semantics of monitored network, which consists of local monitored processes and the
global transport. Section 7.3 provides two use cases to illustrate how monitoring works.
As another main part of this chapter, Section 7.4 states and proves (the full proofs are in
Appendix B) the theorems of local and global safety, local and global transparency, and
session fidelity. Section 7.5 introduces a global observer, denoted by E, which formalises
the global observable interactions from the global point of view. We can also apply E
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to ensure global safety and session-fidelity through observing the global transport and
the collection of network monitors.
7.1 Motivating Example and the Framework of Monitoring
Many non-trivial safety properties of distributed applications can only be guaranteed
when the endpoints are reciprocally assured of their cooperation (i.e. after static check-
ing). For example, by the adherence to an application-level protocol (“message choreog-
raphy” (35, 156)), they need to satisfy global invariants over the behaviour of multiple
peers. Many global invariants can only be effectively assured through runtime local ver-
ification since a centralised verification is unfeasible in large-scale distributed systems,
due to e.g. latency.
7.1.1 Motivating Example
In this section, two examples are introduced to show the effectiveness of runtime local
verification. One example shows that, based on the specifications defined in Chapter
6, during runtime, a monitor can easily detect a possible malicious sequence of actions,
which can not be statically checked. Another example shows that centralised runtime
verfication can not ensure a sequence of actions meet the intended requirements of local
processes due to the latency of routing.
Assume the global specification satisfying the consistency principles is given below:
G1 = p→ p1 : (x : int)〈〈x > 0〉〉.p1 → p2 : (x : int)〈〈true〉〉.
p→ p2 : (y : int)〈〈y > x > 0〉〉.end
applying the projection rules defined in Definition 6.5.1, the local specification of the
process playing role p in session s is:
s[p] : p1!(x : int)〈〈x > 0〉〉.p2!(y : int)〈〈y > x > 0〉〉.end
The global invariants of this local specification are (I) the possible sequence of ac-
tions of the local process playing s[p] is either s[p, p1]!〈v1〉·s[p, p2]!〈v2〉 or s[p, p2]!〈v2〉·
s[p, p1]!〈v1〉, and (II) the content of message sending to role p2 should be bigger than
the one to role p1. Although this specification is statically valid according to well-
formedness and well-assertedness, and it can be statically realised that there are two
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such possible sequences of actions, it is not enough for safety assurance. When un-
trusted components may exist in the network, during runtime, as a monitor observes
the trace s[p, p2]!〈v2〉·s[p, p1]!〈v1〉 sent from s[p], according to Definition 7.2.2 (defined
later in Section 7.2.1.2), it is not valid because v2 > x > 0 ↓ false since x is empty when
the monitor observes this action. A monitor should reject it or buffer the content of y,
which is v2, sent to p2 and wait for the content of x to decide if the first coming interac-
tion s[p, p1]!〈v2〉 is valid. Otherwise, if this sequence of actions is sent from a malicious
process and monitor does not take off it, it may cause damages to the processes playing
role p1 and p2 due to the contents do not meet the agreed conditions.
The following example says that the process playing role p is feeding the process
playing role q with numbers:
G2 = p→ q : (x : int)〈〈x > 0〉〉.p→ q : (y : int)〈〈true〉〉.
p→ q : (z : int)〈〈z > max(x, y)〉〉.end
The local specification projected from G2 on the endpoint playing role q, with the
assumption that it joins session s′, is
s′[q] : p?(x : int)〈〈x > 0〉〉.p?(y : int)〈〈true〉〉.p?(z : int)〈〈z > max(x, y)〉〉.end
Since the order of inputted numbers may affect the computation at the process playing
role q, e.g. role q inputs data for real-time experiment, this scenario restricts the
sequence of actions, each of which can not be permuted. A centralised verification is
powerless in this case because even it approves a sequence of actions, e.g. which is
s′[p, q]?(3).s′[p, q]?(2).s′[p, q]?(5)
when these actions arrive at process playing role q, due to the possible routing latency,
the sequence of actions may become
s′[p, q]?(5).s′[p, q]?(3).s′[p, q]?(2)
which should be rejected by the local monitor guarding the process playing role q. This
example shows that, in distributed systems, centralised monitor is not reliable because
some tasks can only be ensured at local monitors.
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Figure 7.1: Monitoring Architecture
7.1.2 Monitoring Framework
We propose a monitoring framework as shown in Figure 7.1, which is motivated from
the understanding of distributed infrastructures such as those for E-Science (129) and
the infrastructure behind large-scale web portals. In this framework, each endpoint is
linked to the network through an external monitor, which acts as a unique entry point
to the infrastructure. In Figure 7.1, a monitor can guard more than one principal, who
may have more than one process or endpoint. As a new comer joins the distributed
systems, a monitor is generated by the system to guard it. When principals establish a
session, e.g. Principals A1, B, and D generate session s and play roles as Buyer, Seller
and Broker, corresponding local monitors guarding each domain inform this session
creation information to distributed routers, which are responsible for global transport.
In this thesis, the routers are not abstracted and formalised because our focus is on
specifying specifications to verify interactions.
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Figure 7.2: Monitoring for One Session s with the Specification: OO Instrument Com-
mands
Figure 7.2 illustrates how global and local specifications are used by monitors to
ensure the interactions of the use case of OOI Instrument Command (129) introduced
in Chapter 5. In this scenario, there are five principals, each of which runs a process,
involving in the network. To ensure global safety, monitors use projected endpoint spec-
ifications to detect whether or not asynchronously incoming and outgoing messages obey
the stipulated specification, taking appropriate actions as necessary such as dropping
illegal messages.
7.2 The Calculus of Monitoring
This section introduces a calculus for distributed monitoring, where every endpoint
process is guarded by a corresponding system monitor. The syntax is divided into two
parts: Section 7.2.1 for local monitors M which check the correctness of endpoints’
behaviours through checking the incoming and outgoing messages (w.r.t. a set of end-
point specifications) and drop the wrong ones; and Section 7.2.4 for the distributed
network N which consists of one or more monitored local processes M[P ] and global
queue containing pending messages sent by one monitored process but not yet received
by another.
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M ::= Γ,∆ monitor
∆ ::= ∅ | ∆, s[p] : T | ∆, s[p]• : T session environment
Γ ::= ∅ | Γ, a : mode(G[p]) shared environment
mode ::= I | O | IO I/O mode
Figure 7.3: Monitors (M)
7.2.1 The Syntax and Semantics of Local External Monitors
Every process is associated with a corresponding external monitor that manages its
interactions with the network (hence with other peers) by inspecting outgoing and
incoming messages. In the following sections, we define the contents and the dynamic
configurations of a monitor. A monitor uses these contents, which are specifications of
local processes, as knowledge and follows the semantics of specifications to dynamically
judge the behaviours of local processes.
7.2.1.1 The Syntax of Monitors
The syntax of monitors is defined in Figure 7.3. Γ is the same one defined in Definition
6.3.7. A monitor M checks two kinds of messages: (I) Capability exchanges at shared
channels through invitations, and (II) session messages transmitted through session
channels. The specification for a monitor consists of two specifying environments, one
for shared channels (Γ) and one for sessions (∆). In ∆, let s[p] : T represent a capability
which is owned by the local process but is not active yet (i.e., capability s[p] : T can
be sent to invite another process); while s[p]• : T represents an active capability after
the monitored process has joined the session with role p (i.e. playing session-role s[p]).
Note that, as a process joins a session-role, say s[p]• : T , it can no more delegate this
capability of playing s[p] to another endpoint. ∆ associates each capability, represented
by s[p], to an endpoint specification T which specifies the behaviour of a particular role
in a session.
For a monitorM = Γ,∆, to extract the elements governed by it, theoretically we can
use dom(Γ) to extract all shared names a, b, ... and use dom(∆) to extract all session-
role s[p], s′[q], ... which are governed byM. They give us sufficient information for what
endpoints that M governs: Shared names a, b, ... with input mode I, which represent
endpoint’s input communication channel, give us the positions of the endpoints; while
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s[p], s′[q], ... as session-roles give us which session participants are communicating to
each other.
To runtime monitor non-deterministic sequences of actions, define the initial state
of variables in a monitor as below:
Definition 7.2.1. AssumeM = Γ,∆. As an element of Γ or ∆ is initiated in a monitor,
the value of any variable, say x, occuring in this element is empty, denoted by x 7→ ∅.
Note that, the elements of a monitor can be ∅, can have input mode shared names,
e.g. a : im(G[p]), or can have public session-roles, e.g. s[p] : T . When an endpoint
process creates a session instance by doing a(s[p] : G) (see Section 5.3.1 in Chapter 5),
its corresponding monitor learns that a new session is obeying global specification G.
At the same time, it also learns the specification of s[p] from the projection of G at role
p.
The asynchronous transport between a process (as a session role s[p]) and its monitor
is formalised by (local) queue, denoted by s[p] : h. The global transport among monitors
for a session is formalised by global queue, denoted simply by H.
7.2.1.2 The Semantics of Monitors
The semantics of monitors show the dynamic configurations of monitors. It is given
as a labelled transition system (LTS) following the standard interpretation of types in
process calculi. This system is used to control behaviours of processes. M `−→ M′ only
if ` is a legal action (i.e., that a process should be allowed to perform by monitor M).
The following definition is proposed for a monitor to correctly evaluate an assertion A.
Definition 7.2.2 (evaluable assertion).
Define A is evaluable whenever ∀x ∈ var(A), x is not empty. When A is not
evaluable, A ↓ false.
Figure 7.4 defines the LTS of monitors. Action labels are as same as those defined
in Equation 5.1 in Chapter 5. Rule [New] approves an input-mode (i.e. mode of im)
shared name creation with specification a : im(G[p]), im ∈ {I, IO} whenever name a is
fresh to the monitor. Note that, as a : im(G[p]) is fresh to a local monitor, this name is
new to the network. The reason is explained in Convention 7.4.15.
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[Tau] M
τ−→M
[New]
im ∈ {I, IO}, a 6∈ dom(M)
M
new a:im(G[p])−−−−−−−−−→M, a : im(G[p])
[req-b]
s 6∈ dom(M), om = {O, IO},
∀i ∈ I, pi ∈ role(G), G is well-formed
M, a : om(G[pj ])
a(s[pj ]:G)−−−−−−→M, a : om(G[pj ]), {s[pi] : (G  pi)}i∈I\{j}
[req-f]
T = G  pj , om = {O, IO}
M, a : om(G[pj ]), s[pj ] : T
a〈s[pj ]:G〉−−−−−−→M, a : om(G[pj ])
[Acc-b]
s 6∈ dom(M), im ∈ {I, IO}
M, a : im(G[p])
a(s[p]:G)−−−−−−→M, a : im(G[p]), s[p] : T
[Acc-f]
s ∈ dom(M), im ∈ {I, IO}
M, a : im(G[p])
a〈s[p]:G〉−−−−−−→M, a : im(G[p]), s[p] : T
[Join] M, s[p] :T
join(s[p])−−−−−→M, s[p]• : T
[Sel]
M ` v : Sj , Aj{v/xj} ↓ true, j ∈ I, T y p2!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I
M, s[p1]
• : T
s[p1,p2]!lj〈v〉−−−−−−−−→M, s[p1]• : Tj{v/xj}
[SelN]
M ` a : Sj , Aj ↓ true, j ∈ I, T y p2!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I
M, s[p1]
• : T
s[p1,p2]!lj〈a〉−−−−−−−−→M, s[p1]• : Tj{a/xj}
[Bra]
M ` v : Sj , Aj{v/xj} ↓ true, j ∈ I, T y p1?{li(xi :Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I
M, s[p2]
• : T
s[p1,p2]?lj(v)−−−−−−−−→M, s[p2]• :Tj{v/xj}
[BraN]
Sj = mode(G
′[p]), Aj ↓ true, j ∈ I, T y p1?{li(xi :Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I
M, s[p2]
• : T
s[p1,p2]?lj(a)−−−−−−−−→M, a : O(G′[p]), s[p2]• : Tj{a/xj}
[Par]
M1
`−→M′1
M1 ‖M2 `−→M′1 ‖M2
Figure 7.4: The Labelled Transition System of Monitors
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Rule [Req-b] is for newing session s, which is specified under specification G, and at
the same time inviting the endpoint represented by shared channel a to play session-role
s[pj ] specified under the local specification G  pj . It proves the action a(s[pj ] : G) when
s is fresh to the monitor M and M has the knowledge of a : om(G[p]), om = {O, IO}.
Again, the local monitor can ensure this session name is globally new with the same
reason explained for rule [New]. As the action is approved, it adds the projections from
G on each role pi ∈ role(G), endowing the local process with the capability s[pi] : G  pi
of having behaviours of the role in G, and remove the capability of session-role s[pj ] : T ,
where T = G  pj . Rule [Req-f] is for a free request at a. As a monitor has the knowledge
of a : om(G[p]) and the capability of s[pj ] : T , the monitor approves this invitation and,
since this capability has been sent out, relinquishes the capability of s[pj ] : T ; rule
[Acc-f] is its dual by asking the capability of a : im(G[p]), im ∈ {I, IO}. Rule [Acc-b] is
very similar to rule [Acc-f] except that [Acc-b] requires that session s is fresh toM. Rule
[Join] activates the capability of s[p], denoted by s[p]•. Only as a capability is denoted
by s[p]•, it fires and executes actions. In [Sel], [SelN], [Bra] and [BraN], permutation
mechanism is applied, denoted by T y T ′. A sound permutation changes the order of
actions to capture the semantics of asynchronously arriving messages without affecting
causally related actions. Consider a well-formed global specification
p2 → p1 : (x :S)〈〈A〉〉.p3 → p1 : (x′ :S′)〈〈A′〉〉.G, p1 6= p2 6= p3
In an asynchronous environment, the message carrying x′ may arrive at p1 earlier than
the message carrying x. Naturally, if A and A′ have no causal relations in x and x′, p1’s
monitor should be able to accept the messages from p2 and p3 in any order. T y T ′ is
therefore useful for helping a monitor to evaluate message passing.
With the mechanism of permutations, [Sel] says that, if the local specification of
s[p1]
• can be permuted to p2!{li(xi :Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I , the outgoing message with label lj
sent from p1 to p2, as far as it satisfies formula Aj{v/xj}, is approved by the monitor
which prepares the next (incoming or outgoing) message with local specification Tj .
[SelN] is similar to [Sel] except that it is particularly for sending a shared name a. Note
that Aj should be always true since a name can not be evaluated in a predicate. Rule
[Bra] is the symmetric (input) counterpart to [Sel], while [BraN] is the rule for receiving
a shared name a. It is dual to the rule [SelN].
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Note that, in [BraN], a is added into a monitor with O-mode no matter what the
original mode of a is, i.e. it is never added with I-mode or IO-mode. Together with
the rule [SelN], they imply that, when a shared name is passed from a sender to a
receiver through session interactions, the sender does not lose the capability/knowledge
of the shared name with its original I/O mode. Therefore, passing a name in session
interactions is a propagation of the knowledge of the name. As Section 5.5.1 explained,
the mobility is realised by passing session-roles but not by passing input-mode shared
names.
Rule [Par] says that, when a monitor, say M1, approves an action and becomes M′1,
this action is network-wise unique such that no other monitors observe this action at
the same time because the session contained in this action is unique to the network.
The next section follows the illustration of the LTS of monitor-off M◦, which can
be viewed as gateways. Its formalism helps us to deepen the understanding about
how floating messages can be routed from one endpoint to another. Compared with the
semantics of monitor-off, we can realise the effects of monitors for guarding interactions.
7.2.2 The Syntax and Semantics of Monitor-off Gateway
Unmonitored networks are given by erasing the co-domain (sorts and specifications)
from each monitor in a monitored network. The result of such erasure, the monitor
which ‘switches-off’ the monitoring activity, acts simply as a gateway with informa-
tion on local addresses, including a session endpoint, say s[p]. Write erase(M) for the
monitor-off obtained through this erasure ofM. Hereafter denote erase(M) asM◦. This
stripped-off M is called a monitor-off gateway (M◦,M◦1, . . .). The syntax of monitor-off
gateways is defined as follows:
M◦ ::= ∅ |M◦, a |M◦, s[p] |M◦, s[p]•
A gateway M◦ is simply defined as removing the typing area from a M.
The LTS ofM◦ is obtained by erasing the co-domain from each monitor in each rule
in Figure 7.4. Below M◦, a indicates a 6∈M◦, similarly for M◦, s[p]. The illustrations of
each rules are as followings:
[M◦-tau] M◦ does nothing to a silent action τ .
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M◦ τ−→M◦ M◦ new a:mode(G[p])−−−−−−−−−−→M◦, a [M◦-tau,M◦-new a]
M◦
a(s[pj ]:G)−−−−−−→M◦, {s[pi]}i∈I\{j} M◦, a, s[pj ]
a〈s[pj ]:G〉−−−−−−→M◦, a [M◦-request b/f]
M◦, a
a(s[p]:G)−−−−−→M◦, a, s[p] M◦, a a〈s[p]:G〉−−−−−→M◦, a, s[p] [M◦-acc b/f]
M◦, s[p]
join(s[p])−−−−−→M◦, s[p]• [M◦-join]
M◦, s[p1]•
s[p1,p2]!l〈v〉−−−−−−−→M◦, s[p1]• M◦, s[p1]•
s[p1,p2]!l〈a〉−−−−−−−→M◦, s[p1]• [M◦-sel,M◦-selN]
M◦, s[p2]•
s[p1,p2]?l(v)−−−−−−−→M◦, s[p2]• [M◦-bra]
M◦, s[p2]•
s[p1,p2]?l(a)−−−−−−−→ (M◦, s[p2]•), a [M◦-braN]
Figure 7.5: The Labelled Transition System of Monitor-off
[M◦-new a] M◦ unions a name a no matter it is “new ” to M◦ or not. Because there
is no monitor to specify the newed shared name is input-mode, even the mode is
an output mode, M◦ also accepts the action. Thus mode is used here instead of
using im.
[M◦-req b/f] By rule [M◦-req b],M◦ adds all session-roles of session s whether session
s is new to M◦ or not. M◦ does not know any specification of capability of the
roles in {s[pi]}i∈I\{j}. Rule [M◦-req f] says s[pj ] is removed from M◦ via channel
a when request happens.
[M◦-acc b/f] These two rules have same effects for two different actions a(s[p] : G)
and a〈s[p] : G〉. s[p] is added into M◦ through channel a with no conditions.
[M◦-join] M◦ activates the capability of role p in session s. M◦ announces it to the
network that role p in session s is ready to start session interactions.
[M◦-sel, -selN] Rule [M◦-sel] and [M◦-selN] both sayM◦ allows s[p1, p2]!l〈v〉 or s[p1, p2]!l〈a〉
when its endpoint is the sender p1 in s.
[M◦-bra] As v is not a name, and M◦’s endpoint is the receiver p2 in s, it approves.
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[M◦-braN] AsM◦’s endpoint is the receiver p2 in s, it approves it and adds a intoM◦.
Example 7.2.3 (M v.s. M◦). Let M1
def
= s[p1]
• : p2!(x : Int)〈〈x > 0〉〉.T and
` = s[p1, p2]!〈−10〉. Then M◦1 `−→ but M1 6 `−→ since the value −10 does not satisfy the
predicate x > 0 attached to the endpoint specification for the session monitored by
M1. Similarly, for specification violations, if M2
def
= s[p1]
• : p2!(x :String)〈〈true〉〉.T and
` = s[p1, p2]!〈10〉 then M◦2 `−→ but M2 6 `−→.
7.2.3 The Syntax and Semantics of Monitored Processes
WriteM[P ] for P monitored byM, called monitored process. The syntax of a monitored
process is defined as a local process guarded by an external monitor.
Definition 7.2.4. Define M[P ] as a monitored local process.
Definition 7.2.5. M[0] ≡ 0.
The semantics of monitored processes is simply defined based on the semantics of
local processes and monitors:
Definition 7.2.6 (LTS of monitored process). Let ` be an action label. Then we
define M1[P1]
`−→M2[P2] as the conjunction of P1 `−→ P2 and M1 `−→M2:
M1
`−→M2, P1 `−→ P2
M1[P1]
`−→M2[P2]
The LTS of P and M are respectively defined in Figure 5.4 (Chapter 5) and Fig-
ure 7.4. A local queue of a local process is abstracted for asynchronous monitoring
purpose. During runtime, a local queue is part of a runtime process. Formally, we write
M[Prt] = M[P | si1 [pj ] : hi1 | . . . | sin [pk] : hin ]
where si1 [pj ] : hi1 | . . . | sin [pk] : hin are the local queues generated from participating
sessions si1 , ..., sin respectively for playing roles pj , ..., pk.
Example 7.2.7. When a process, say P , involves in a session s for playing role p,
during runtime, its runtime monitored process is
M[Prt] = M[P | s[p] : h]
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Ns ::= M | M[P ] | Ns1 ‖ Ns2 | 0 | (νn)Ns n ∈ {a, s} monitored static network
N ::= Ns | N1 ‖ N2 | H | (νn)N n ∈ {a, s} monitored dynamic network
H ::= ∅ | m·H global queue
m ::= s〈p, q, l〈v〉〉 | a〈s[p] : G〉 message
Figure 7.6: The Syntax of the Monitored Network
where M should contain the local specification of s[p] such that M = Γ,∆, s[p] : T .
Example 7.2.8. Let P = s[p1, p2]!〈100〉;P ′ | s[p1] : ∅ be a process with an empty
queue playing role p1 in s. Also let M1 = s[p1]• : p2!(x : Int)〈〈x > 0〉〉.T be its local
monitor. The communication happens in two steps. First, the message is spawn into
the local queue as P τ−→ P2 with P2 = P ′ | s[p1] : s〈p1, p2, 〈100〉〉 hence, since M1 τ−→
M1, then M1[P ]
τ−→ M1[P2]. Second, the message is forwarded to the global queue
as P2
`−→ P ′ | s[p1] : ∅ with ` = s[p1, p2]!〈100〉; hence since M1 `−→ s[p1]• : T then
M1[P ]
`−→ (s[p1]• : T )[P ′ | s[p1] : ∅].
7.2.4 The Syntax and Semantics of the Monitored Network
Based on the syntax and semantics of the network and monitors introduced in Chapter
5 and Section 7.2.1, this section introduces the calculus of the monitored network.
7.2.4.1 The Syntax of the Monitored Network
The syntax of the monitored network is similar to the one of the un-monitored network
but with notation N rather than N (i.e. un-monitored network), which is defined in
Figure 5.5, Chapter 5. The syntax of the monitored network (N,N ′, . . .) is defined in
Figure 7.6. The following definitions are for illustrating the syntax of the monitored
network defined in Figure 7.6.
Definition 7.2.9 (Monitored Network). Assume a full (dynamic) network N is
given. We say N is a monitored network coming from N if and only if ∀P ∈ N, P
is guarded by a monitor M ∈ N such that M[P ] ∈ N .
Based on Definition 7.2.9, we define a monitored process more precisely:
Definition 7.2.10. Assume N is a monitored network coming from N. M[P ] ∈ N if
and only if N ≡N (νn˜)(M [P ] ‖ N′) for some names n˜.
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The structural congruency over the monitored network is defined as same as the one
of the network (see Definition 5.4.2).
The composability and the parallel composition of two monitored networks are de-
fined as same as those defined in Definitions 5.4.2 and 5.4.4. A monitored network
represents a network of processes and their monitors, together with messages in transit:
They are interaction message, i.e. s〈p, q, l〈v〉〉, and invitation, i.e. a〈s[p] : G〉. Both
s〈p, q, l〈v〉〉 and a〈s[p] : G〉 are introduced in Figure 5.5, Chapter 5. Note that, with-
out loss of generality, the global queue is shared by all processes participating in the
network.
7.2.4.2 The Reduction Rules of the Monitored Network
Before introducing the reduction rules of the monitored network, one observation is
noted:
Remark 7.2.11. The labelled transition systems (LTS) of local monitored processes,
which are parts of the monitored network, from the global viewpoint, are reductions
rules of the monitored network.
Globally, the actions happening at local processes are marginal, which are network-wise
invisible; the visible actions can be and can only be observed by the global transport.
Therefore, the actions happening in Figure 7.4 are globally invisible: they are reductions
of the network. This observation corresponds to Remark 5.4.7 in Chapter 5.
The reduction rules of the monitored network is defined in Figure 7.7. In each rule
except bProcc, the (else) case is when the monitor detects a violation w.r.t. specifications
by the current action; for this case,M simply drops such message. Each rule corresponds
to a rule of monitor semantics defined in Figure 7.4. Rule bNewc creates a fresh (bound)
input-mode shared name, where im ∈ {I, IO}. In rules bReq-b/f -out, Acc-b/f -inc,
monitorM checks outgoing and incoming invitations. bReq-b/f -outc forwards outgoing
invitations, which are still local to a process, to the external environment (dually for
bAcc-b/f -inc with incoming invitations). Particularly, rules bReq-b-outc and bAcc-b-inc
also check if session s is new to the endpoint process. Note that bReq-b-outc defines
that, as error happens, the process following the bound request a(s[p] : G) is completely
taken off:
M[a(s[p] : G).P ] ‖ H −→M[0] ‖ H
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bProcc M[P ] −→ M[P ′] (P τ−→ P ′)
bNew-ac M[new a : im(G[p]).P ] −→
{
(νa)(M′[P ])
M[0]
(M
new a:im(G[p])−−−−−−−−−−→ M′)
(else)
bReq-b-outc M[a(s[p] : G).P ] ‖ H −→
{
(νs)(M′[P ] ‖ H ·a〈s[p] : G〉)
M[0] ‖ H
(M
a(s[p]:G)−−−−−−→ M′)
(else)
bReq-f-outc M[a〈s[p] : G〉] ‖ H −→
{
M′[0] ‖ H ·a〈s[p] : G〉
M[0] ‖ H
(M
a〈s[p]:G〉−−−−−−→ M′)
(else)
bAcc-b-inc M[0] ‖ a〈s[p] : G〉·H −→
{
M′[a〈s[p] : G〉] ‖ H
M[0] ‖ H
(M
a(s[p]:G)−−−−−−→ M′)
(else)
bAcc-f-inc M[0] ‖ a〈s[p] : G〉·H −→
{
M′[a〈s[p] : G〉] ‖ H
M[0] ‖ H
(M
a〈s[p]:G〉−−−−−−→ M′)
(else)
bJoinc M[join(s[p]).P ] −→
{
M′[P | s[p]:∅]
M[P ]
(M
join(s[p])−−−−−−→ M′)
(else)
bSel-outc M[s[p1] : s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉 · h] ‖ H −→
{
M′[s[p1] : h] ‖ H ·s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉
M[s[p1] : h] ‖ H
(M
s[p1,p2]!l〈v〉−−−−−−−−→ M′)
(else)
bBra-inc M[s[p2] : h] ‖ s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉·H −→
{
M′[s[p2] : h·s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉] ‖ H
M[s[p2] : h] ‖ H
(M
s[p1,p2]?l〈v〉−−−−−−−−−→ M′)
(else)
bpar, res, strc N1 −→ N
′
1
N1 ‖ N2 −→ N ′1 ‖ N2
N −→ N ′
(νn˜)N −→ (νn˜)N ′
N ≡N N0 N0 −→ N ′0 N ′0 ≡N N ′
N −→ N ′
Figure 7.7: The Reduction Rules of the Monitored Network
It is because the following process may contain session s which is going to be created by
a(s[p] : G) (refer to the exmple in Section 5.2.3 in Chapter 5). Rule bJoinc creates a local
queue particularly for session-role s[p]. In bSel-outc,M forwards a session message from
a local queue s[p] to the global queue (dually for bBra-inc). Other rules are standard.
7.2.4.3 The Labelled Tansition System of the Monitored Network
As `−→g is particularly defined for the LTS of the global transport (see Figure 5.7)
to indicate that these actions are globally observable actions, it is also used for the
LTS of the monitored network in Figure 7.8 for representing that the transitions are
globally observable up to monitoring. Thus we use `−→g to describe the actions which can
be observed by monitors and can affect the overall network. N `−→g N ′ represents the
global observability of the network. Although, as mentioned before, the local actions are
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invisible to the network, we can apply monitors’s knowledge to describe these invisible
actions (w.r.t the network) as visible ones by using `−→g because these actions actually
have been observed by monitors.
Remark 7.2.12. A monitor, which positions between local processes and the network,
is a bridge in between.
Therefore, global observability is the aggregate of what all monitors observe.
Definition 7.2.13 (global observable transition). Assume N is a monitored net-
work. N `−→g N ′ if and only there exists M ∈ N s.t. M `−→M′, M′ ∈ N ′.
Each rule in Figure 7.7 comes from the rule of LTS of monitored processes, in which
a corresponding local monitor approves an action. The actions of monitored processes
are globally invisible since they are marginal actions to the network. The dynamics of
the monitored network, in particular how messages travel from an endpoint through
the network to another, is formalised by the LTS defined in Figure 7.8. In all rules, we
assume processes and the network obey the standard binding convention.
The rules in Figure 7.8 are dual to those in Figure 5.7 for the LTS of the global
transport. In other words, the action which can be observed through the global trans-
port is the duality of the observable action in the monitored network. Figure 7.8 lists
the rules when the actions are valid, i.e. those have been approved by monitors. As the
actions are invalid, as those shown in Figure 7.9, if they are output actions, they should
be intercepted as they are still at the local; if they are input actions, they should be
intercepted as they are still in the global queue. In other words, the reduction rules in
Figure 7.7 have concluded every case.
All action rules defined in reduction rules of the monitored network are known by
the monitors, and therefore are informed to the network by using `−→g. The illustrations
of the LTS of the monitored network are as followings.
1. Rules bMG-req-fc, bMG-acc-bc, bMG-acc-fc, bMG-selc, bMG-brac, and bMG-if-T/Fc
just re-state the invisible action occuring at the local process. Here we particularly
explain rule bMG-acc-fc: When a〈s[p] : G〉 enters the local process and is with the
process in parallel, it must have been approved by the monitor; in other words, we
should have a : im(G[p]) ∈M, im ∈ {I, IO}, where a is able to play role p specified
under G. Therefore, a〈s[p] : G〉 | a〈s[p] : G〉;P is a pattern-matching, which has
already been checked by rule bMG-acc-f-inc and will not affect process P .
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im ∈ {I, IO},M new a:im(G[p])−−−−−−−−−→M′
M[new a : im(G[p]).P ] ‖ H new a:im(G[p])−−−−−−−−−→g (νa)(M′[P ]) ‖ H
bMG-new-ac
M
join(s[p])−−−−−→M′
M[join(s[p]).P ]
join(s[p])−−−−−→g M′[P | s[p]:∅]
bMG-joinc
M[a〈s[p] : G〉;P ] τ−→g M[a〈s[p] : G〉 | P ] bMG-req-fc
M
a(s[p]:G)−−−−−−→M′
M[a(s[p] : G).P ] ‖ H a(s[p]:G)−−−−−−→g (νs)(M′[P ] ‖ H ·a〈s[p] : G〉)
bMG-req-b-outc
M
a〈s[p]:G〉−−−−−−→M′
M[a〈s[p] : G〉] ‖ H a〈s[p]:G〉−−−−−−→g M′[0] ‖ H ·a〈s[p] : G〉
bMG-req-f-outc
M[a〈s[p] : G〉 | a(y[p] : G).P ] τ−→g M[P{s/y}] bMG-acc-bc
M[a〈s[p] : G〉 | a〈s[p] : G〉;P ] τ−→g M[P ] bMG-acc-fc
M
a(s[p]:G)−−−−−−→M′
M[P ] ‖ a〈s[p] : G〉·H a(s[p]:G)−−−−−−→g M′[P | a〈s[p] : G〉] ‖ H
bMG-acc-b-inc
M
a〈s[p]:G〉−−−−−−→M′
M[P ] ‖ a〈s[p] : G〉·H a〈s[p]:G〉−−−−−−→g M′[P | a〈s[p] : G〉] ‖ H
bMG-acc-f-inc
M[s[p1, p2]!lj〈v〉;P | s[p1]:h] τ−→g M[P | s[p1]:h·s〈p1, p2, lj〈v〉〉] bMG-selc
M[s[p1, p2]?{li(xi).Pi}i∈I | s[p2]:s〈p1, p2, lj〈v〉〉·h] τ−→g M[Pj{v/xj} | s[p2]:h] bMG-brac
M
s[p1,p2]!l〈v〉−−−−−−−−→M′
M[P | s[p1]:s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉·h] ‖ H
s[p1,p2]!l〈v〉−−−−−−−−→g M′[P | s[p1]:h] ‖ H ·s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉
bMG-sel-outc
M
s[p1,p2]?l(v)−−−−−−−−→M′
M[P | s[p2]:h] | s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉·H
s[p1,p2]?l(v)−−−−−−−−→g M′[P | s[p2]:h·s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉] ‖ H
bMG-bra-inc
M[if true then P else Q] τ−→g M[P ] M[if false then P else Q] τ−→g M[Q] bMG-if-T/Fc
N1
`−→g N ′1 bn(`) ∩ fn(N2) = ∅ dest(`) 6∈ ep(N2)
N1 ‖ N2 `−→g N ′1 ‖ N2
bMG-parc
N
`−→g N ′ n(`) 6∈ n˜
(νn˜)N
`−→g (νn˜)N ′
N1 ≡N N2 `−→g N ′2 ≡N N ′1
N1
`−→g N ′1
bMG-res,strc
Figure 7.8: The Labelled Transition System of the Monitored Network as Actions are
Valid
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im ∈ {I, IO},M 6new a:im(G[p])−−−−−−−−−→
M[new a : im(G[p]).P ] τ−→g M[P ]
bMG-new-a-errc
M 6a(s[p]:G)−−−−−−→
M[a(s[p] : G).P ]
τ−→g M[0]
bMG-req-b-out-errc
M 6a〈s[p]:G〉−−−−−−→
M[a〈s[p] : G〉] τ−→g M[0]
bMG-req-f-out-errc
M 6a(s[p]:G)−−−−−−→
M[P ] ‖ a〈s[p] : G〉·H τ−→g M[P ] ‖ H
bMG-acc-b-in-errc
M 6a〈s[p]:G〉−−−−−−→
M[P ] ‖ a〈s[p] : G〉·H τ−→g M[P ] ‖ H
bMG-acc-f-in-errc
M 6s[p1,p2]!l〈v〉−−−−−−−→
M[P | s[p1]:s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉·h] ‖ H τ−→g M[P | s[p1]:h] ‖ H
bMG-sel-out-errc
M 6s[p1,p2]?l(v)−−−−−−−−→
M[P | s[p2]:h] ‖ s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉·H τ−→g M[P | s[p2]:h] | H
bMG-bra-in-errc
Figure 7.9: The Labelled Transition System of the Monitored Network as Actions are
Invalid
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2. Rules bMG-new-ac and bMG-joinc say that actions new a : im(G[p]) and join(s[p])
are approved/known by the local monitor, and they are the information that the
monitor can inform the network.
3. Rule bMG-req-b-outc says when the action is a bound request approved by the
monitor, the session s is newed and an invitation a〈s[p] : G〉 is outputted to the
network.
4. Rule bMG-req-f-outc says when the action is a free request approved by the moni-
tor, then the invitation a〈s[p] : G〉 positioning inside the local process is permitted
to output to the network.
5. Rules bMG-acc-b-inc and bMG-acc-f-inc are similar. They say that when the accept
action is approved by the monitor, the invitation enters the endpoint process and
is in parallel with the process.
6. Rule bMG-sel-outc says when the monitor approves the interaction message, which
is inside the local queue of s[p1], this message is permitted to output to the
network.
7. Rule bMG-bra-inc is dual to rule bMG-sel-outc.
8. Rule bMG-parc says that, based on Definition 5.4.4 for network parallel composi-
tion, the action happening in one network will not affect another network.
9. Rule bMG-resc says if an action is valid for a network N and it results in N ′, and
if the name of the action does not occur in the bound names of (νn˜)N , then this
action is also valid for (νn˜)N and results in (νn˜)N ′.
10. Rule bMG-strc says if an action is valid for a network N2, then, if N1 is structural
congruent to N2, this action is also valid for N2. Once this action fires thus makes
N2 become N ′2, as the action fires in N1, it makes N1 become N ′1, which should
be structural congruent to N ′2.
For invalid actions, Figure 7.9 shows that a monitor deals with the exceptions by
simply removing the invalid primitives or messages from a local process or the global
transport. Here we have one important assumption particularly for bMG-sel-out-errc :
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We assume there is a timeout mechanism for bMG-sel-out-errc. As a pro-
cess continue producing wrong outputs up to a default timeout, the mon-
itor will broadcast to all session-roles in the session with error message
session-failure.
The timeoutmechanism can ensure the property of progress of local monitored processes.
It is specially for output session interaction actions, i.e. s[p, q]!l〈v〉, but not for input
actions because, as a monitor approves an input for a local process, an asynchronous
local process can always take an input action to get message in even if the process
itself is not ready to (or will never) take it: an asynchronous local process can always
gets an input by putting it into the local buffer. However, as a local process does not
take an output session interaction action obeying to the specification defined in the
monitor, the output message will be taken off and the action will be stopped. If there is
a corresponding receiver waiting for an input coming from this sender, it may need to
wait forever if there is no mechanism of timeout or message-enforcement. The timeout
mechanism will inform all the session participants that there is a participant failed
since it produces errors up to a default time limit. Then the session will finish and will
be closed. The message-enforcement mechanism is to revise the output message to the
default right format obeying the specification. For example, revise the wrong receiver to
the right destination, or revise the content to the right type or to satisfy the assertions.
Both are not in the scope of this thesis but are topics that we should continue to work
on.
Also note that, corresponding the error case of rule bReq-b-outc defined in Figure
7.7, bMG-req-b-out-errc also defines that the process following bound request a(s[p] : G)
should be cleared out.
An unmonitored network is obtained by substituting monitored processesM[P ] with
monitor-off processes M◦[P ] where a gateway M◦ is used instead of the corresponding
monitor M. The semantics for M◦1[P ]
`−→ M◦2[P ′] is precisely as the one for M1[P ] `−→
M2[P
′], except that we use M◦1
`−→M◦2 instead of M1 `−→M2.
7.3 Use Case: Monitoring OOI Instrument Commands
Since the endpoints reside in diverse administrative entities, each endpoint needs to
expect the use of unsafe codes at (other) endpoints, while protocols need be executed
128
7.3 Use Case: Monitoring OOI Instrument Commands
assuring their global correctness. Given that two interacting endpoints may be a thou-
sand miles apart, its architectural design stipulates that this assurance is to be done
through the collection of dynamic local verifications. The model is based on these
principles. Each principal in the OOI (see Section 2.2 in Chapter 2) is modelled as a
local authority executing a local process, where incoming and outgoing messages are
controlled by a monitor. As depicted in Figure 7.2, monitors are external to endpoints,
since generally they are not located under local authorities: rather monitors are part of
the distributed infrastructure, protecting the integrity of global interactions which take
place there.
7.3.1 Invitations of the OOI Instrument Commands
Monitors dynamically learn about which protocols to enforce during session establish-
ment. Local verification of incoming/outgoing messages to/from an endpoint are done
by a dedicated (external and trusted) monitor. The aim is to ensure the correctness of
global interactions, while protecting the endpoint so that it sends/receives only proper
messages.
Below we illustrate monitored processes of session creation and invitation (assum-
ing shared names have already been created). Mi is the monitor corresponding to
Principali, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and Mki is the status of monitor Mi after the kth transition
from Mki .
Let PINV be a3〈s[Agent] : GIC〉; a4〈s[Instrument] : GIC〉
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[step0]
M01[a2(s[Register] : GIC).join(s[User]).(Puser | PINV )] ‖ H ‖
M02[a2(y2[Register] : GIC).join(y2[Register]).Pregister] ‖
M03[a3(y3[Agent] : GIC).join(y3[Agent]).Pagent] ‖
M04[a4(y4[Instrument] : GIC).a5〈y4[Instrument] : GIC〉] ‖
M05[a5(y5[Instrument] : GIC).join(y5[Instrument]).Pinst]
[step1]
a2(s[Register]:GIC)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→g
(νs)(M11[join(s[User]).Puser | PINV ] ‖ H ·a2〈s[Register] : GIC〉) ‖
M02[a2(y2[Register] : GIC).join(y2[Register]).Pregister] ‖
M03[a3(y3[Agent] : GIC).join(y3[Agent]).Pagent] ‖
M04[a4(y4[Instrument] : GIC).a5〈y4[Instrument] : GIC〉] ‖
M05[a5(y5[Instrument] : GIC).join(y5[Instrument]).Pinst]
[step2]
join(s[User])·a2(s[Register]:GIC)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→g
(νs)(M21[Puser | s[User] : ∅ | PINV ] ‖ H ‖
M12[join(s[Register]).Pregister{s/y2}]) ‖
M03[a3(y3[Agent] : GIC).join(y3[Agent]).Pagent] ‖
M04[a4(y4[Instrument] : GIC).a5〈y4[Instrument] : GIC〉] ‖
M05[a5(y5[Instrument] : GIC).join(y5[Instrument]).Pinst]
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[step3]
join(s[Register])·a3〈s[Agent]:GIC〉·a4〈s[Instrument]:GIC〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→g
(νs)(M31[Puser | s[User] : ∅] ‖
H ·a3〈s[Agent] : GIC〉·a4〈s[Instrument] : GIC〉 ‖
M22[Pregister{s/y2} | s[Register] : ∅]) ‖
M03[a3(y3[Agent] : GIC).join(y3[Agent]).Pagent] ‖
M04[a4(y4[Instrument] : GIC).a5〈y4[Instrument] : GIC〉] ‖
M05[a5(y5[Instrument] : GIC).join(y5[Instrument]).Pinst]
[step4]
a3(s[Agent]:GIC)·a4(s[Instrument]:GIC)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→g
(νs)(M31[Puser | s[User] : ∅] ‖ H ‖M22[Pregister{s/y2} | s[Register] : ∅] ‖
M13[join(s[Agent]).Pagent{s/y3}] ‖M14[a5〈s[Instrument] : GIC〉]) ‖
M05[a5(y5[Instrument] : GIC).join(y5[Instrument]).Pinst]
[step5]
join(s[Agent])−−−−−−−−→g
(νs)(M31[Puser | s[User] : ∅] ‖ H ‖
M22[Pregister{s/y2} | s[Register] : ∅] ‖M23[Pagent{s/y3} | s[Agent] : ∅] ‖M14[a5〈s[Instrument] : GIC〉]) ‖
M05[a5(y5[Instrument] : GIC).join(y5[Instrument]).Pinst]
[step6]
a5(s[Instrument]:GIC)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→g
(νs)(M31[Puser | s[User] : ∅] ‖ H ·a5〈s[Instrument] : GIC〉 ‖
M22[Pregister{s/y2} | s[Register] : ∅] ‖M23[Pagent{s/y3} | s[Register] : ∅]) ‖
M05[a5(y5[Instrument] : GIC).join(y5[Instrument]).Pinst] ‖M24[0]
[step7]
a5(s[Instrument]:GIC)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→g
(νs)(M31[Puser | s[User] : ∅] ‖ H ‖M22[Pregister{s/y2} | s[Register] : ∅] ‖
M23[Pagent{s/y3} | s[Register] : ∅] ‖M15[join(s[Instrument]).Pinst{s/y5}]) ‖M24[0]
[step8]
join(s[Instrument])−−−−−−−−−−−−→g
(νs : GIC)(M
3
1[Puser | s[User] : ∅] ‖ H ‖M22[Pregister{s/y2} | s[Register] : ∅] ‖
M23[Pagent{s/y3} | s[Register] : ∅] ‖M25[Pinst{s/y5} | s[Instrument] : ∅]) ‖M24[0]
In step 0, the process a2(s[Register] : GIC).join(s[User]).(Puser | PINV ) creates a
fresh session s by primitive a2(s[Register] : GIC), which creates session s obeying to
protocol GIC and, at the same time, requests endpoint a2 to play role Register in
s. Then this process concurrently joins session s for playing role User and continues
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Puser and invites other endpoints to join session s through PINV . Monitored process
M02[a2(y2[Register] : GIC).join(y2[Register]).Pregister] is ready to receive invitation for
playing role Register obeying to protocol GIC by replacing variable y2 with the session
names. As it accepts the invitation, it joins the session as a Register. Monitored
process M03[a3(y3[Agent] : GIC).join(y3[Agent]).Pagent] is similar to the one for playing
Register. The monitored process
M04[a4(y4[Instrument] : GIC).a5〈y4[Instrument] : GIC〉]
does not join the session when it accepts the invitation but delegates the capability of
playing role Instrument to endpoint a5. The monitored process
M05[a5(y5[Instrument] : GIC).join(y5[Instrument]).Pinst]
is similar to those for playing roles Register and Agent. It will accept the invitation
and join the session for playing role Instrument.
Note that, actions in
join(s[User])·a2(s[Register]:GIC)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→g are permutable to each other,
for example, it can be permuted to
a2(s[Register]:GIC)·join(s[User])−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→g because they have no
causal relation. Similarly, actions in
join(s[Register])·a3〈s[Agent]:GIC〉·a4〈s[Instrument]:GIC〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→g
are permutable to each other. According to the structural congruence of the network
defined in Definition 5.4.6, since s is newly created, in H, there is no message belong-
ing to session s, thus the message queue H ·a2〈s[Register] : GIC〉 can be rearranged
to a2〈s[Register] : GIC〉·H. Then invitation a2〈s[Register] : GIC〉 can be absorbed by
the monitored process M02[a2(y2[Register] : GIC).join(y2[Register]).Pregister] immedi-
ately because there is a process ready to input this invitation. The causal relation of
input/output messages, which represent actions, are decided by the endpoint monitors.
The transition actions in other steps are permutable for the same reason.
Also note that, after name s is created, from step 1 to step 2 the scope of name
s is changed from (νs)(M11[join(s[User]).Puser | PINV ] | H ·a2〈s[Register] : GIC〉) to
(νs)(M21[Puser | s[User] : ∅ | PINV ] | H | M12[join(s[Register]).Pregister{s/y2}]) since
endpoint a2 accepts the invitation coming from session s. The scope of a session ranges
over those processes who currently participate in s. Note, as for monitored processes,
the scope of s can be controlled by M through checking whether s ∈M.
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In step 2, the monitored process M11[join(s[User]).Puser | PINV ] joins session s
for playing role User and becomes M21[Puser | s[User] : ∅ | PINV ] in which local
queue specifically for session-role s[User] is created. Also, the monitored process
M02[a2(y2[Register] : GIC).join(y2[Register]).Pregister] accepts the invitation for playing
role Register in session s and becomes M12[join(s[Register]).Pregister{s/y2}] in which
every variable y2 is replaced by s.
We denote GIC  User as Tuser, GIC  Register as Tregister, GIC  Agent as Tagent,
and GIC  Instrument as Tinst. We show the configurations of monitors of the above
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monitored processes in the follows:
[step0]
M01 = a1 : I(GIC [User]), a2 : O(GIC [Register]), a3 : O(GIC [Agent]), a4 : O(GIC [Instrument])
M02 = a2 : I(GIC [Register])
M03 = a3 : I(GIC [Agent])
M04 = a4 : I(GIC [Instrument]), a5 : O(GIC [Instrument])
M05 = a5 : I(GIC [Instrument])
[step1]
M11 = a1 : I(GIC [User]), a2 : O(GIC [Register]), a3 : O(GIC [Agent]), a4 : O(GIC [Instrument])
s[User] : Tuser, s[Agent] : Tagent, s[Instrument] : Tinst
[step2]
M21 = a1 : I(GIC [User]), a2 : O(GIC [Register]), a3 : O(GIC [Agent]), a4 : O(GIC [Instrument])
s[User]• : Tuser, s[Agent] : Tagent, s[Instrument] : Tinst
M12 = a2 : I(GIC [Register]), s[Register] : Tregister
[step3]
M31 = a1 : I(GIC [User]), a2 : O(GIC [Register]), a3 : O(GIC [Agent]), a4 : O(GIC [Instrument])
s[User]• : Tuser
M22 = a2 : I(GIC [Register]), s[Register]
• : Tregister
[step4]
M13 = a3 : I(GIC [Agent]), s[Agent] : Tagent
M14 = a4 : I(GIC [Instrument]), a5 : O(GIC [Instrument]), s[Instrument] : Tinst
[step5]
M23 = a3 : I(GIC [Agent]), s[Agent]
• : Tagent
[step6]
M24 = a4 : I(GIC [Instrument]), a5 : O(GIC [Instrument])
[step7]
M15 = a5 : I(GIC [Instrument], s[Instrument] : Tinst
[step8]
M25 = a5 : I(GIC [Instrument], s[Instrument]
• : Tinst
As for the configurations of monitors, step 0 shows that each monitor should have knowl-
edge about the endpoints who they are going to request. For example, M01 knows a1 :
I(GIC [User]), a2 : O(GIC [Register]), a3 : O(GIC [Agent]) and a4 : O(GIC [Instrument])
so that she can request a2, a3, and a4 for playing roles defined in protocol GIC , but she
can not request endpoint a5 since she does not have the knowledge about it. Among
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these monitors, only M04 with the knowledge a5 : O(GIC [Instrument]) can request a5
for playing role instrument specified under GIC .
In step 1, since bound request a2(s[Register] : GIC) creates a fresh name s and
requests a2 for playing role Register, the capabilities of playing roles User, Agent, and
Instrument are created and denoted by s[User] : Tuser, s[Agent] : Tagent, s[Instrument] :
Tinst, while the capability of playing role Register is not there because it has been sent
out to endpoint a2. In step 2, the capability of playing role User becomes active as
s[User]• : Tuser when the process joins session s to play role User. And capabil-
ity of s[Register] : Tregister is added to monitor M12 when it accepts the invitation
for playing role Register. In step 3, since the capabilities of s[Agent] : Tagent and
s[Instrument] : Tinst have been sent out as requests, they are removed from the moni-
tor. And, as explained above, the monitored process joins role Register in s so that it
is active as s[Register]• : Tregister. Other operations of the configurations of monitors
can be similarly explained.
7.3.2 Interactions of the OOI Instrument Commands
It follows an illustration of some actions of the session instrument command. For sim-
plicity, we use P krole to represent the status after the kth action of process Prole.
[step0]
(νs)(H ‖M31[Puser | s[User] : ∅] ‖M22[Pregister | s[Register] : ∅] ‖
M23[Pagent | s[Agent] : ∅] ‖M25[Pinst | s[Instrument] : ∅])
[step1]
τ−→g
(νs)(H ‖M31[P 1user | s[User] : s〈User,Register, 〈vint〉〉] ‖
M22[Pregister | s[Register] : ∅] ‖M23[Pagent | s[Agent] : ∅] ‖M25[Pinst | s[Instrument] : ∅])
[step2]
s[User,Register]!〈vint〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→g
(νs)(H ·s〈User,Register, 〈vint〉〉 ‖M41[P 1user | s[User] : ∅] ‖
M22[Pregister | s[Register] : ∅] ‖M23[Pagent | s[Agent] : ∅] ‖M25[Pinst | s[Instrument] : ∅])
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[step3]
s[User,Register]?(vint)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→g
(νs)(H ‖M41[P 1user | s[User] : ∅] ‖M32[Pregister | s[Register] : s〈User,Register, 〈vint〉〉] ‖
M23[Pagent | s[Agent] : ∅] ‖M25[Pinst | s[Instrument] : ∅])
[step4]
τ−→g
(νs)(H ‖M41[P 1user | s[User] : ∅] ‖
M32[P
1
register | s[Register] : ∅] ‖M23[Pagent | s[Agent] : ∅] ‖M25[Pinst | s[Instrument] : ∅])
[step5]
τ−→g
(νs)(H ‖M41[P 1user | s[User] : ∅] ‖
M32[P
2
register | s[Register] : s〈Register, User, 〈10〉〉] ‖
M23[Pagent | s[Agent] : ∅] ‖M25[Pinst | s[Instrument] : ∅])
[step6]
s[Register,User]!〈10〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→g
(νs)(H ·s〈Register, User, 〈10〉〉 ‖
M41[P
1
user | s[User] : ∅] ‖M42[P 2register | s[Register] : ∅] ‖M23[Pagent | s[Agent] : ∅] ‖
M25[Pinst | s[Instrument] : ∅])
[step7]
s[Register,User]?(10)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→g
(νs)(H ‖M51[P 1user | s[User] : s〈Register, User, 〈10〉〉] ‖
M42[P
2
register | s[Register] : ∅] ‖
M23[Pagent | s[Agent] : ∅] ‖M25[Pinst | s[Instrument] : ∅])
[step8]
τ−→g
(νs)(H ‖M51[P 2user | s[User] : ∅] ‖
M42[P
2
register | s[Register] : ∅] ‖
M23[Pagent | s[Agent] : ∅] ‖M25[Pinst | s[Instrument] : ∅])
In step 0, since it continues with the operations of invitation, M24[0] ≡ 0 (based on
Definition 7.2.5), M24 is neglected. In step 1, Puser internally sends an output message
s〈User,Register, 〈vint〉〉 and puts it in its local queue as
s[User] : s〈User,Register, 〈vint〉〉.
Since this internal output action is invisible globally, it is a silent action, i.e. τ action,
of the LTS of the monitored network. Then in step 2, the message is sent out from
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the monitored process, thus the visible action s[User,Register]!〈vint〉 happens, and the
local queue becomes empty as s[User] : ∅, and the message is put in the global queue
as H ·s〈User,Register, 〈vint〉〉. In step 3, since visible action s[User,Register]?(vint)
happens, the messasge s〈User,Register, 〈vint〉〉 is removed from the global queue, which
becomes H, and enters the local process Pregister, thus the monitored process of playing
role Register becomes M32[Pregister | s[Register] : s〈User,Register, 〈vint〉〉]. In step
4, message s〈User,Register, 〈vint〉〉 is absorbed by process Pregister. Thus Pregister
becomes P 1register and its local queue becomes empty as s[Register] : ∅. Other operations
of the following steps are similar.
Up to now, User and Register finish their first interaction: User sends vint to
Register, then Register returns 10 back to User. Other value-passing and branch-
ing interactions afterwards are similar. Recall that we denote GIC  User as Tuser,
GIC  Register as Tregister, GIC  Agent as Tagent, and GIC  Instrument as Tinst.
For convenience we let T krole to represent the kth action of endpoint assertion Trole.
[step0]
M31 = a1 : I(GIC [User]), a2 : O(GIC [Register]), a3 : O(GIC [Agent]), a4 : O(GIC [Instrument]),
s[User]• : Tuser = Register!(xint : InterfaceId).T 1user
M22 = a2 : I(GIC [Register]),
s[Register]• : Tregister = User?(xint : InterfaceId).T 1register
[step1]
M41 = a1 : I(GIC [User]), a2 : O(GIC [Register]), a3 : O(GIC [Agent]), a4 : O(GIC [Instrument]),
s[User]• : T 1user{vint/xint} = Register?(xn : Int)〈〈xn > 0〉〉.T 2user{vint/xint}
[step2]
M32 = a2 : I(GIC [Register]),
s[Register]• : T 1register{vint/xint} = User!(xn : Int)〈〈xn > 0〉〉.T 2register{vint/xint}
[step3]
M42 = a2 : I(GIC [Register]),
s[Register]• : T 2register{vint/xint}{10/xn} = end{vint/xint}{10/xn} = end
[step4]
M51 = a1 : I(GIC [User]), a2 : O(GIC [Register]), a3 : O(GIC [Agent]), a4 : O(GIC [Instrument]),
s[User]• : T 2user{vint/xint}{10/xn}
In step 0, monitorM31 has active capability s[User]•, which is able to send a message to
role Register with content of type InterfaceId, then local specification T 1user is ready for
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the next action. Similarly, monitor M22 has active capability s[Register]•, which is able
to receive message of type of InterfaceId from role User, then local specification T 1register
is ready for the next action. Step 1 describes when action s[User,Register]!〈vint〉 takes
place, then Register!(xint : InterfaceId) is removed, and T 1user becomes T 1user{vint/xint},
which becomes Register?(xn : Int)〈〈xn > 0〉〉.T 2user{vint/xint} for the next input action
from role Register. Other operations of configurations of monitors above are similar
and they all obey the LTS of the monitors, defined in Figure 7.4.
7.4 Safety, Transparency, and Session Fidelity
This section states and proves the key theorems, including the receivability and coher-
ence of the network, properties of local and global safety, local and global transparency,
and session fidelity. They are the properties that our monitoring mechanism can enforce.
7.4.1 Local Safety and Transparency
We first list the properties that monitors guarantee for local configurations. Hereafter,
we write L, a located process, for either a monitored process M[P ] or a monitor-off
process M◦[P ].
Definition 7.4.1. Define L `−→ as L approves the action ` and it implies ∃L′ such that
L
`−→ L′. Similarly, define M `−→ as M approves the action ` and it implies ∃M′ such
that M `−→M′.
Definition 7.4.2 (conformance). A relation R between a located process L and its
monitor M is a conformance if whenever L R M, we have
1. Given an output `, if L `−→ then M `−→.
2. Given an input `, if M `−→ then L `−→.
3. For any `, if L `−→ L′ and M `−→M′ then L′ R M′.
If M R L for a conformance R, we write M |= L, and say L conforms to M.
Conformance says that a located process is a process that only sends “good” messages
and can at least receive “good” messages (which have been approved by its own monitor).
The following theorem says every monitored process conforms to the specification given
by its own monitor.
138
7.4 Safety, Transparency, and Session Fidelity
Theorem 7.4.3 (local safety (local conformance)). M |= M[P ] for all M and P .
Proof. The proof and auxiliary theorems are in Appendix B.1.
Definition 7.4.4. Let R be a relation between a monitor and a pair of located pro-
cesses. Then R is a monitored strong bisimulation if the following holds for each M, L1
and L2 related by R. Below we assume i 6= j, with i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
1. If Li
`−→ L′i s.t. ` is an output/τ then M `−→M′, Lj `−→ L′j and (M′,L′i,L′j)∈R.
2. If Li
`−→ L′i, M `−→M′ s.t. ` is an input then Lj `−→ L′j and. (M′,L′i,L′j) ∈ R.
If M, L1 and L2 are in a monitored strong bisimulation then L1 and L2 are bisimilar
under M, denoted M |= L1 ∼ L2.
The following states that a monitored-process and a monitor-off process behave precisely
in the same way if the latter already conforms to the monitor’s specification.
Theorem 7.4.5 (local transparency). If M |= M◦[P ], then M |= M◦[P ] ∼M[P ].
Proof. The proof and auxiliary theorems are in Appendix B.1.
Note that a process P that can be validated by Γ ` P . ∆ (in the sense of (22)) is
guaranteed to behave correctly and thus satisfies M |= M◦[P ] for M = Γ,∆.
7.4.2 Global Safety, Transparency and Session Fidelity
This section shows that global message flows inside the monitored network are safe in
spite of untrusted endpoints. To make exact the notion of global correctness, `−→g is
used for describing N `−→gN ′ by following the transitions for the monitored network in
Figure 7.8. Note that both N and N ′ are the monitored network.
Definition 7.4.6 (receivable network). We say N is receivable if there exist a se-
quence of actions `1 . . . `k consisting of all the inputs corresponding to the pending
messages in N and joins, such that N `1...`k−−−−→g N ′.
Lemma 7.4.7 (receivability). Let N be a monitored network and ` be an input
action. If N is receivable and N `−→g N ′, then N ′ is receivable.
Proof. It is proved in Appendix B.2.
Definition 7.4.8. Define s[p]◦ stand for either s[p] or s[p]•.
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Definition 7.4.9 (T ′ ⊆ T w.r.t a session-role). We say T ′ ⊆ T w.r.t s[p] if, for
some M containing s[p], we have either (I) s[p]◦ : T `1...`n−−−−→ s[p]◦ : T ′ for some sequence
of actions `1...`n or (II) T y T ′.
Note that, when T, T ′ are clearly for the same session-role, we simply write T ′ ⊆ T .
Here we define a group of monitors which are parts of the network as follows:
Definition 7.4.10 (a group of monitors). Define a group of monitors as
M =
∏
i∈I
Mi = M1 ‖ . . . ‖Mk, I = {1, . . . , k}
the monitors existing in parallel in the network.
Remark 7.4.11. Since every monitor contains specifications Γ,∆,M can also be viewed
as a set of specifications.
Definition 7.4.12 (consistency of a group of monitors). Let M be a group of
monitors. Let ∀Mi ∈M, Mi = Γi,∆i. If all of the following conditions hold,
1. (a) ∀Mi ∈ M, if a : im(G[p]) ∈ Mi, then there is no other a : I(G[p]) ∈ Mj or
a : IO(G[p]) ∈Mj , Mj ∈M.
(b) ∀Mi ∈M, if ∀s, s[p]◦ : T ∈Mi, then s[p]◦ 6∈Mj , j 6= i, Mj ∈M.
2. If a : O(G[p]) ∈Mi, then there exists Mj such that a : im(G[p]) ∈Mj .
3. Assume p1 6= p2. As ∆i(s[p1]◦) = T and
p2!{lk(xk :Sk)〈〈Ak〉〉.Gk  p2}k∈I ⊆ T,
there exists j such that ∆j(s[p2]◦) = T ′ and
p1?{lk(xk :Sk)〈〈A′k〉〉.Gk  p1}k∈I ⊆ T ′
with Ak{v/xk} ↓ true iff A′k{v/xk} ↓ true for some v.
4.
⋃
i ∆i =
⋃
1≤j≤n{sj [pj1] : Tj1, .., sj [pjk] : Tjk, .., sj [pjmj ] : Tjmj} where, for each
sj , there is Gj such that Gj  pjk = Tjk for 1 ≤ k ≤ mj .
then the group of monitors, M, is consistent.
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Note that for rule 3, we only ask that, whenever there is an output, there is a cor-
responding input because the monitors should at least ensure that the outputs from
local processes will not output unexpected messages to the network. By considering the
following global specification,
G = p1 → p2 : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.p2 → p3 : {l′j(x′j : S ′j)〈〈Bj〉〉.G′ij}j∈I}i∈I
assume s follows G. After applying projection rules defined in Definition 6.5.1, we have
s[p1] : p2!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.G′ij  p1}i∈I
s[p2] : p1?{li(xi : Si)〈〈A′i〉〉.p3!{l′j(x′j : S ′j)〈〈Bj〉〉.G′ij  p2}j∈I}i∈I
s[p3] : p2?{l′j(x′j : S ′j)〈〈B′j〉〉.G′ij  p3}j∈I
where sending to p3! at s[p2] is not permutable to receiving from p1?. Since the consis-
tency of monitors requires that an output should correspond to an input, rule 3 requires
that, when a sending action is in a monitor’s specification, a corresponding receiving
action is in some monitor’s specification. Moreover, when a sending action is ready to
send a message, there exists a corresponding receiving action at some monitor to input
this message.
Definition 7.4.13 (monitored network coherence). N is coherent if all of its
pending messages are receivable up to permutation of actionsy and, after these messages
have been received, the resulting group of monitors which guard all local processes in
N , say M, is consistent.
The coherence above states that, after all messages are cleared out of the network,
the monitors of the network satisfy the following rules: rule 1: An input mode shared
name with particular specification is unique to the network (see Lemma 7.4.15), and
similarly, a session-role is unique to the network such that no two different locations
share a common role in a common session; rule 2: As long as an O-mode shared name
exists, its dual mode (i.e. I/IO-mode) shared name co-exists; rule 3: Each output action
in a specification has its corresponding input action in some other specification; rule
4: For each session name, the local specifications for the roles of its participants is the
result of projecting a common global specification on their roles.
Convention 7.4.14. We say an element is unique to the network N wheneverMi ∈ N ,
Mi has one and only one of this element, and ∀Mj ∈ N , j 6= i, Mj does not have this
element.
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Compared to Definition 5.4.2 of composability, the composable network, sayN1 ‖ N2
may not be coherent when they are composed in parallel. The rule 1 of Definition 7.4.12
implies that the a : im(G[p]) is unique to the network, which is proved by the following
Lemma:
Lemma 7.4.15 (global uniqueness of names). Assume every local domain has a
network-wise unique identity, which will be attached to a local name when the name
is created. If a : im(G[p]) is unique to a local monitor guarding a local domain, which
means there is no more a : I(G[p]) or a : IO(G[p]) in that monitor, then it is unique to
the network. Similarly, if s is unique to a local monitor, it is unique to the network.
Proof. As Figure 7.1 shows, there is a routing mechanism in the network. Distributed
routers are responsible for both routing and registering individual components in differ-
ent domains. As long as a local monitor approves name n, which is either a shared name
or a session name, it is fresh to the local domain, say A. When this name is announced
to the network (with rules bMG-new-ac and bMG-req-b-outc in Figure 7.8), theoretically
we can assume the identity of the domain is attached to this name, e.g. n.A, where
A is unique in the network. Therefore, this name (i.e. n.A) is unique globally. With
the same reasoning above, s is unique to the network as long as it is unique to a local
monitor.
Since we want to abstract the actions as simple as possible, we neglect the details of
routing mechanism in this thesis.
The property of global safety says that, as, at the very beginning, the network is
protected by consistent monitors, the coherence of the monitored network is preserved
by the interactions that can happen in a monitored network. In brief, it states that a
fully monitored network behaves well with respect to the given global specification.
Theorem 7.4.16 (global safety). Let N be coherent. Then N `−→g N ′ implies N ′ is
coherent.
Proof. It is proved in Appendix B.2.
N is locally conformant if, for each monitored process Mi[Pi] in N , we have Mi |=
erase(Mi)[Pi]. If N is coherent and locally conformant and such that N
`1−→g · · · `n−→g N ′
then N ′ is also coherent and locally conformant. This property is formally defined and
proved in Appendix B.3. Let ∼ be the standard strong bisimilarity defined by `−→g.
Then we have:
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Theorem 7.4.17 (global transparency). Suppose N is coherent and locally confor-
mant. Then N ∼ erase(N).
Proof. It is proved in Appendix B.3.
The property of global transparency states that a monitored network and an unmoni-
tored network have equivalent behaviour when the latter is well-behaved with respect to
the same (collection of) specifications. When a new session is generated, it is associated
with a global protocol G. In a monitored network, we expect all message flows for this
session always follow G. This notion is called session fidelity (86).
Note as Remark 5.4.7 says, the viewpoints of local and global are dual. Define the
processes that guarded by M as:
Definition 7.4.18. Write P(M) for the set of processes governed by monitor M, and
write P(M) to denote the set of processes governed by the group of monitors M.
Definition 7.4.19 (labelled transition of M). M `−→ M′ if and only if there exists
M ∈M s.t. M `−→M′ and M′ ∈M′.
Before introducing the theorem of sesssion fidelity, to simplify and clarify the rela-
tionships between local monitored processes and the global transport, configuration is
introduced. It is the pair of M and H, to illustrate the idea of session fidelity.
Definition 7.4.20 (configuration). A configuration is denoted by Φ = M;H, in
which the group of monitors correspond to H. In other words, all messages correspond-
ing to the actions guarded by M are in H.
A Φ thus guides and captures the behaviours in the network.
Definition 7.4.21. For any M1 and M2, we write M1,M2 as a standard union of M1
and M2.
Lemma 7.4.22. Assume M1 corresponds to H1 and M2 corresponds to H2. As long
as P(M1) ∩ P(M2) = ∅, there is no common message existing in H1 and H2.
Proof. Based on Definition 7.4.20, for i ∈ {1, 2}, if the interactions, including outputs
and their corresponding inputs, are approved by one Mi, all messages corresponding to
these actions are in one Hi. For i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, as an output action is approved
by Mi so that its corresponding message is put into Hi, and its input, the duality of
the output, if it is approved by Mj , then this message will leave Hi and enter Hj and
will be absorbed by some monitored process guarded by a monitor in Mj . Thus overall
there is no common message existing in H1 and H2. 
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With the definitions and lemma above, we define the parallel composition of configura-
tions:
Definition 7.4.23 (parallel composition of configurations). Assume Φ1 =M1 ; H1
and Φ2 = M2 ; H2 are given, we say Φ1 and Φ2 are composable whenever P(M1) ∩
P(M2) = ∅. If Φ1 and Φ2 are composable, define the composition of Φ1 and Φ2 as:
Φ1  Φ2 =M1,M2 ; H1 ·H2.
H1 ·H2 is defined in Definition 5.4.3. The behaviour of each endpoint in a network
is guided by M (specifications), and is observed by H (global transport). We define
the LTS of configurations in Figure 7.10. All rules are straightforward from the LTS
of monitors (Figure 7.4, Chapter 7) and the one of the dynamic network (Figure 5.7,
Chapter 5). The global observable transition `−→g for some action ` has been introduced
in the LTS for the monitored network, defined in Figure 7.8.
• Rule New informs the global transport that a fresh name a is created.
• Rules [Req-b/f] indicates that when some endpoint monitor approves a bound
or free request to go to the network, the configuration inputs this request as an
invitation to the global queue. Note that [Req-b] also creates and hides a fresh
session s.
• Rules [Acc-b/f] indicates that, when the invitation has been accepted by an end-
point in the network, the invitation is taken off from the global queue (externally).
Note that, we can only observe the invitation leaves the global queue but do not
know who accepts it: only M can tell which endpoint accepts this invitation.
• The concepts of rules [Sel, Bra] are similar to the concepts of rules [Req-b/f, Acc-b/f].
• The concepts of rules [SelN, BraN] are similar to rule [Sel, Bra], except that they
are carrying names.
• Rule Par says if Φ1 and Φ3 are composable (see Definition 7.4.23), after Φ1 be-
comes as Φ2, they are still composable.
Definition 7.4.24 (configurational consistency). A configuration Φ = M;H is
configurationally consistent whenever
1. H is empty and M is consistent, or
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[New] im ∈ {I, IO}, M
new a:im(G[p])−−−−−−−−−→M′
M ;H new a:im(G[p])−−−−−−−−−→g M′ ; (νa)(H)
[Req-b] M
a(s[p]:G)−−−−−−→ M′
M ;H a(s[p]:G)−−−−−−→g M′ ;H ·a〈s[p] : G〉
[Req-f] M
a〈s[p]:G〉−−−−−−→ M′
M ;H a〈s[p]:G〉−−−−−−→g M′ ;H ·a〈s[p] : G〉
[Acc-b] M
a(s[p]:G)−−−−−−→ M′
M ; a〈s[p] : G〉·H a(s[p]:G)−−−−−−→g M′ ;H
[Acc-f] M
a〈s[p]:G〉−−−−−−→ M′
M ; a〈s[p] : G〉·H a〈s[p]:G〉−−−−−−→g M′ ;H
[Sel] M
s[p1,p2]!l〈v〉−−−−−−−→ M′
M ;H s[p1,p2]!l〈v〉−−−−−−−→g M′ ;H ·s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉
[SelN] M
s[p1,p2]!l〈a〉−−−−−−−→ M′
M ;H s[p1,p2]!l〈a〉−−−−−−−→g M′ ;H ·s〈p1, p2, l〈a〉〉
[Bra] M
s[p1,p2]?l(v)−−−−−−−−→ M′
M ; s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉·H
s[p1,p2]?l(v)−−−−−−−−→g M′ ;H
[BraN] M
s[p1,p2]?l(a)−−−−−−−−→ M′
M ; s〈p1, p2, l〈a〉〉·H
s[p1,p2]?l(a)−−−−−−−−→g M′ ;H
[Par] Φ1
`−→g Φ2
Φ1  Φ3 `−→g Φ2  Φ3
[Tau] M
τ−→M
M;H τ−→g M;H
Figure 7.10: The Labelled Transition System of Configurations
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2. H is not empty, the sequence of messages in H are receivable to M, and after
receiving all messages in H with M `1·...·` n−−−→ M′, where `i, i = {1, ..., n} are inputs
and, ∀m ∈ H, ∃` ∈ `1·...·` n such that ` corresponds to m, we haveM′ is consistent.
In other words, M;H is configurationally consistent if, in each of its derivatives, all
messages in the transport can be “received” by some monitors inM and, after absorbing
all these messages, the resulting M′ is still consistent.
As for the satisfaction relation of the partial network (Ns,Ns′...) 1, if Ns is a partial
network, |= Ns : M means that monitors inM allow all outputs from the local processes
in Ns, and all the local processes in Ns are ready to receive the inputs which monitors
in M indicate. The output and intput satisfactions described above are preserved by
transition.
Definition 7.4.25 (partial satisfaction). A relation R from partial networks to spec-
ifications of monitors in M is a satisfaction when NsR M implies:
1. If M `−→ M′ for an input ` and ∃Pj ∈ Ns has an input at sbj(`), then Pj `−→ P ′j ,
which makes Ns = Pj ‖
∏
i 6=j Pi becomes Ns
′ = P ′j ‖
∏
i 6=j Pi such that Ns
′R M′.
2. If ∃Pj ∈ Ns and Pj `−→ P ′j for an output `, which makes Ns = Pj ‖
∏
i 6=j Pi becomes
Ns′ = P ′j ‖
∏
i 6=j Pi, then M
`−→M′ such that Ns′R M′.
3. If ∃Pj ∈ Ns and Pj τ−→ P ′j , which makes Ns = Pj ‖
∏
i 6=j Pi becomes Ns
′ = P ′j ‖∏
i 6=j Pi, then M
τ−→M′ such that Ns′R M′ (i.e. Ns′R M since M τ−→M).
When NsR M for a partial satisfaction R, we say Ns satisfies M, writing |= Ns : M.
Note that, the transitions in the partial network are defined in Figure 5.4, which are
invisible globally because a partial network does not include the global queue, which
makes the transitions globally visible. Thus we use `−→ for representing that there is a
local process taking action ` in Ns instead of using
`−→g. Remember, the visible actions
can be and can only be observed in the global transport.
Definition 7.4.26 (conformance to a configuration). Assume a network N ≡ Ns ‖
H is given. Define N conforms to M;H when:
1The key ideas and concepts of satisfaction for the partial network come from Dr. Kohei Honda.
The current version is the result after many discussions and revisions from our works. They also belong
to the paper (20) which has been accepted and is going to be published.
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1. H is empty, |= Ns : M and M is consistent, or
2. H is not empty, and the following conditions hold
(a) |= Ns : M,
(b) all messages in H are receivable to Ns, and
(c) as M;H `1·...·` n−−−→g M′; ∅ so that Ns ‖ H `1·...·` n−−−→g Ns′ ‖ ∅ where each `i, i =
{1, ..., n} is an input, M′ is consistent.
Compared to the definition of global observable transition in Definition 7.2.13, which
is for the monitored network, here define the global network transition for the un-
monitored network.
Definition 7.4.27 (global network transition). Assume N is an un-monitored net-
work and N conforms to M;H. M;H `−→g M′;H ′ if and only if N `−→g N′.
This definition corresponds to the illustration of global observability `−→g in Section
7.2.4.3. When N, although it is not monitored, conforms to the specifications specified
in monitors, they have the same behaviour: When N takes actions, M;H takes actions,
and vise versa.
Theorem 7.4.28 (session fidelity). Assume configuration M;H is configurationally
consistent and N ≡ Ns ‖ H conforms to configuration M;H. We say N satisfies session
fidelity, if for any `, we have N `−→g N′ such that M;H `−→g M′;H ′, it holds that M′;H ′
is configurationally consistent and that N′ conforms to M′;H ′.
Proof. The proof and auxiliary theorems are in Appendix B.4.
7.5 Global Environment E
The introduction of global observables offers a formal framework to semantically link
local behaviour of processes to their global behaviour and to global invariants. Since,
in distributed processes, the sending events and the receiving events are decoupled, and
because external monitors can only observe asynchronously exchanged messages, the
semantic account of global invariants (hence correctness of runtime verification) should
take into account temporary discrepancies of the global view. When a sender sends a
message correctly, its local view is updated; however, as the receiver has not yet received
the message, we cannot update neither the global view nor the receiver’s local view. To
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prove the correctness of distributed runtime verification, we here propose to take into
account the time lag between the sending and receiving events. Asynchrony also poses
a challenge in the treatment of out-of-order asynchronous message monitoring, which
we capture through specification-level permutations of actions.
7.5.1 Motivating Example
As Figure 7.7 shows, from the perspective of the global network, all global behaviours of
monitored processes become unobservable. To analyse and state properties of monitored
networks, we propose to observe the global behaviours through linking global specifi-
cations to global interactions among monitored networks, neglecting local interactions
inside endpoints. We propose a notion of global observables and define it through two
labelled transitions systems: One is for the network and another is for environments
(which represent the abstraction of global specifications and message flows).
As for the network, the notation of global observable transition `−→g is applied to
N
`−→gN ′ for N without hiding, if there exists a monitor in N having transition ` (by
the LTS defined in Figure 7.4). We state the global observables, the actions which can
be globally observed, is the aggregation of what all monitors observe and what one can
observe from the global queue. As for environments, we formalise global observable
environments, ranged over by E,E′, . . ., in order to witness the legality of all messages
in transit. A global observable environment includes pending messages together with
global specifications (for ease of defining its LTS, we also include local specifications).
The use of pending messages is motivated as follows.
In the monitored network, we expect that all endpoint processes follow exactly what
global specifications G define. This is the reason that we state that: For all sending and
receiving actions, they are dual in the sending-side and receiving-side monitors when
the collection of monitors (i.e. the collection of specifications) is consistent (Definition
7.4.12). However, while there are messages in transit, the consistency of monitors
may fail: If a message has been sent from a local monitored process, there is no more
monitor holds this sending action; but, since this message is in transit, the monitor
at the receiver-side still holds the receiving action waiting for the message. Then the
sender-side and the receiver-side monitors are not consistent. Here we propose that, the
monitor at the receiver-side needs to be compensated not by other monitor specifications
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but by the message in transit in the global queue. The following example illustrates the
situation we consider.
Example 7.5.1. Assume a simple global protocol specifies that:
p1 → p2 : (x : int)〈〈x > 5〉〉.G2
At the beginning, the specification of the sender-side monitor is
s[p1]
• : p2!(x : int)〈〈x > 5〉〉.G2  p1
and the one of the receiver-side is
s[p2]
• : p1?(x : int)〈〈x > 5〉〉.G2  p2
When the sender-side monitor permits an outgoing message s〈p1, p2, 10〉, (i.e., a legal
sending action), its specification immediately changes to s[p1]• : G2  p1 for the next
action; however, the specification of receiver-side monitor may not change because it is
waiting for the message travelling in the global queue H · s〈p1, p2, 10〉; as long as the
message does not arrive, the receiver-side monitor cannot change its specification. In
this case, the receiver-side monitor knows the messages will certainly come by looking
at the global queue.
7.5.2 The Syntax of E
In this section, we formalise the notion of the global observable which can witness the
legality of all messages in transit. We call E a global environment, its syntax is defined
as follows:
E ::= Γ,∆,Θ
Γ ::= ∅ | Γ, a : mode(G[p])
∆ ::= ∅ | ∆, s[p] : T | ∆, s[p]• : T | ∆, s : m˜v
Θ ::= ∅ | Θ, s : G
mv ::= s〈p, q, l〈v〉〉
where mode = {I, O, IO}, Γ is for shared environment, ∆ is for session environment as the
one in Figure 7.3, to which we add messages belonging to session s as s : m˜v, to specify
runtime pending messages carrying the information, and Θ is a global environment
associating sessions to global specifications. All messages of different sessions model a
global queue environment where each assignment is of the form mv1 . . .mvn, n ≥ 0.
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mvi is a message of shape s〈p, p′, l〈v〉〉. m˜v is a sequence of pending messages, such as
si〈p1, p2, l1〈10〉〉 · sj〈p3, p5, l2〈“hello′′〉〉 · sk〈p1, p3, l3〈true〉〉. Thus the global observable
E is composed by the standard shared and session environments, global specifications,
and global messages in the global queue.
7.5.3 The Semantics of E
Before introducing the LTS of E, define the projection of a sequence of messages to a
particular role. The projection results in a sequence of projected messages sent from
the role and indicates their destinations. The projected message is in the form p!l(v),
denoted by pm.
Definition 7.5.2 (projection of messages). The projection of m˜v onto p, written
m˜v  p, is defined as:
m˜v  p =

p2!l(v) · m˜v′  p if m˜v = s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉 · m˜v′ and p = p1
m˜v′  p if m˜v = s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉 · m˜v′ and p 6= p1
ε if m˜v = ε
m˜v  p is defined as above because the messages in transit are the source to indicate
(so that the receiver-side monitor can refer to) that the corresponding sending actions
have taken place.
Definition 7.5.3 (retrieving a sub-T ). Let pm, pm′, .. range over projected pending
messages. Assume T and pm are given. We set:
T − pm =

Tj{v/xj} − pm′ if T y p!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I
and pm = p!lj(v) · pm′, j ∈ I
T if pm = ε
undefined otherwise
where I is the set of indexes.
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In Definition 7.5.3, pm indicates the floating messages which are sent from the endpoint
whose monitor has specification T . In other words, pm and T are specified at the same
endpoint.
Define E `−→g E′ when the session environment in E allows ` and, after the configu-
ration of some specification or the global queue in E changes, results in E′. Figure 7.11
defines the labelled transition system for E.
In [E-bch], s : G means that session s obeying global specification G. Note that, T
is not simply the projection from G (i.e. T may not be G  p2) but
T = G  p2 − (s〈p1, p2, lj〈v〉〉·m˜v)  p2
= G  p2 − m˜v  p2,
which is obtained by removing all outputted actions produced by p2 (e.g., s〈p2, p, l〈v〉〉
for some p) from all actions of p2 (i.e., G  p2). Tj is similarly represented as:
Tj = (Gj  p2){v/xj} − m˜v  p2
obtained by removing outputted actions of p2 from all actions in Gj of p2 and replacing
xj by v in Gj  p2. [E-bchN] is similar to the rule [BraN] defined in Figure 7.4, when a
name a is received by s[p1, p2]?l(a), a : O(G′[p]) is added into the environment.
The reason of adopting a more complex method instead of simply applying G  p2,
is to obtain the appropriate endpoint specification considering the asynchrony nature
of interactions while messages may not be received by recipients immediately due to
routing delays. We use the following example to show this situation.
Example 7.5.4. Assume a global specification
p1 → q1 : (x1 : int)〈〈x1 > 0〉〉.p1 → q2 : (x2 : int)〈〈x2 > 1〉〉. (7.1)
q3 → p1 : (x3 : int)〈〈x3 > 2〉〉.end
Obviously, as p1 is active, the local specification of monitor at p1 is
s[p1]
• : q1!(x1 : int)〈〈x1 > 0〉〉.q2!(x2 : int)〈〈x2 > 1〉〉.q3?(x3 : int)〈〈x3 > 2〉〉.end (7.2)
It is possible that participants interact in the following order: (I) q3 firstly sends message
s〈q3, p1, 〈3〉〉 to p1, (II) then p1 sends messages to q1 and q2 with s〈p1, q1, 〈1〉〉 and
s〈p1, q2, 〈2〉〉 respectively. Note that, as the first interaction happens, p1 may not receive
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E
τ−→g E [E-tau]
E ` v : Sj Aj{v/xj} ↓ true Gy p1 → p2 : {li(xi :Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gi}i∈I
E, s : G, s[p2]
• : T, s : s〈p1, p2, lj〈v〉〉·m˜v
s[p1,p2]?lj(v)−−−−−−−−→g
E, s : Gj{v/xj}, s[p2]• : Tj , s : m˜v
[E-bch]
Sj = mode(G
′[p]), a 6∈ Aj ,
Aj ↓ true Gy p1 → p2 : {li(xi :Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gi}i∈I
E, s : G, s[p2]
• : T, s : s〈p1, p2, lj〈a〉〉·m˜v
s[p1,p2]?lj(a)−−−−−−−−→g
E, s : Gj{a/xj}, a : O(G′[p]), s[p2]• : Tj , s : m˜v
[E-bchN]
E ` v :Sj Aj{v/xj} ↓ true T y p2!{li(xi : Sj)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I
E, s[p1]
• :T, s :m˜v
s[p1,p2]!lj〈v〉−−−−−−−−→g E, s[p1]• :Tj{v/xj}, s :m˜v ·s〈p1, p2, lj〈v〉〉
[E-sel]
E ` a :Sj , a 6∈ Aj , Aj ↓ true T y p2!{li(xi : Sj)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I
E, s[p1]
• :T, s :m˜v
s[p1,p2]!lj〈a〉−−−−−−−−→g E, s[p1]• :Tj{a/xj}, s :m˜v ·s〈p1, p2, lj〈a〉〉
[E-selN]
im ∈ {I, IO}, a 6∈ dom(E)
E
new a:im(G[p])−−−−−−−−−→g E, a :im(G[p])
[E-new a]
E, s[p] :T
join(s[p])−−−−−→g E, s[p]• :T [E-join]
s 6∈ dom(E), om ∈ {O, IO},
pi ∈ role(G), G is well-formed, ∀k, j ∈ I, pk 6= pj (k 6= j)
E, a :om(G[p])
a(s[p]:G)−−−−−→g E, a :om(G[p]), s :G, {s[pi] : (G  pi)}pi∈role(G), s : ∅
[E-req-b]
s ∈ E, G  p = T, om ∈ {O, IO}, im ∈ {I, IO}
E, a :om(G[p]), a :im(G[p]), s[p] :T
a〈s[p]:G〉−−−−−→g E, a :om(G[p]), a :im(G[p]), s[p] :T
[E-req-f]
s ∈ E, G  p = T, im ∈ {I, IO}
E, a :im(G[p]), s[p] :T
a(s[p]:G)−−−−−→g E, a :im(G[p]), s[p] :T
[E-acc-b]
s ∈ E, G  p = T, im ∈ {I, IO}
E, a :im(G[p]), s[p] :T
a〈s[p]:G〉−−−−−→g E, a :im(G[p]), s[p] :T
[E-acc-f]
Figure 7.11: The Labelled Transition System of E
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this message immediately. Assume before this message arrives, p1 has sent out messages
s〈p1, q1, 〈1〉〉 and s〈p1, q2, 〈2〉〉. Therefore, the global queue has
s〈q3, p1, 〈3〉〉 · s〈p1, q1, 〈1〉〉 · s〈p1, q2, 〈2〉〉
and the global specification maintains as Equation (7.1) because no message has been
received yet. Note that, the current specification of monitor at p1 is s[p1]• : q3?(x3 :
int)〈〈x3 > 2〉〉.end since it has done two output actions. In such case, G  p1, which is
still in Equation (7.2) (because G does not change), cannot reflect the reality of p1 due
to the asynchrony nature.
Continue with rule [E-bch]. It says that, if a value is typed with Sj and satisfies Aj ,
and G has a corresponding interaction up to permutations, it allows s〈p1, p2, lj〈v〉〉 to
be received, resulting in new local/global specifications.
Gy G′ and T y T ′ are defined in Definitions 6.6.5 and 6.6.8. The relation Gy G′
says specification G can be permuted to G′, so that what is not apparently an active
action in G becomes active in G′ modulo permutation. For example, if both Buyer and
Broker are sending a message to Seller:
G = Buyer → Seller : (x : int).Broker → Seller :: (x : string).end
then Broker’s message may as well arrive at Seller first, hence we permute this to
G′ = Broker → Seller : (x : string).Buyer → Seller : (x : int).end
where Gy G′ and G′ is ready to check an appropriate message from Broker to Seller.
Rule [E-sel] states that when E approves an output, its global specification is un-
changed but put a message to the global queue, indicating that an interaction has
partially happened by an output, but the whole interaction is not completed. And,
since T y p2!{li(xi : Sj)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I , after output action s[p1, p2]!lj〈v〉 takes place, the
chosen label lj leads configuration of local specification to be Tj{v/xj} as v replaces
xj for the next interaction. Rule [E-selN] is defined similarly to the rule [SelN] defined
in Figure 7.4. [E-new a] says if a shared name a is new to E, then E adds this new
shared channel. [E-join] makes a specified session-role s[p] become active. [E-req-b] says
if a session s is new to E, E adds the global queue belonging to session s as s : ∅, the
global specification of s as s : G, and the session environment which is generated by
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the projections of G to all roles in G, write {s[pi] : (G  pi)}pi∈role(G), every pi of which
involves in s. Since E watches the global environment containing the information of all
local processes, as free request or bound/free accept happens at an endpoint, it does
not affect the global environment. [E-req-f] and [E-acc-b/f] state this fact. Note that,
for [E-req-f] (or [E-acc-b/f]), if the left-hand side environment violates the rule, the rule
[E-tau] is applied.
7.5.4 The Typing Rules of E
In the following rules, we define E `g N as a network N is proved under the global
observable system, i.e. `g, by environment E.
M = Γ′,∆ Γ′ ⊂ Γ
Γ,∆,E `g M[P ] [E-M]
Γ `g a :im(G[p]), a :O(G[p])
Γ,E `g H ·a〈s[p] : G〉 [E-PM1]
H = ∅
Γ, s : H `g H [E-PM2]
Γ, s : m˜v `g H
Γ, s : m˜v ·s〈p, p′, l〈v〉〉 `g H ·s〈p, p′, l〈v〉〉 [E-PM3]
Γ,∆i,Θ `g Ni (i = 1, 2) dom(∆1) ∩ dom(∆2) = ∅
Γ,∆1,∆2,Θ `g N1 ‖ N2 [E-PAR]
E `g N E is coherent
E ` N [E-CO]
Every rule is explained as follows:
[E-M] As the information about monitor M is known by the global environment, the
global environment approves the monitored process M[P ].
[E-PM1] As the shared environment has a : im(G[p]), which indicates that a is capable
of playing role p under the specification G, the invitation message a〈s[p] : G〉,
produced by either bound request a(s[p] : G) or free request a〈s[p] : G〉, is proved
by the global environment Γ,E.
[E-PM2] As the global queue is empty, it is always valid under Γ, s : H, for any Γ.
[E-PM3] As the global environment Γ, s : m˜v proves the pending messages H, the addi-
tional message s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉 can be proved by Γ, s : m˜v ·s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉 where the
message environment contains the additional message.
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[E-PAR] As, for i = 1, 2, the global environment Γ,∆i,Θ proves the network Ni and ∆1
and ∆2 has no common session roles or common message environment, then the
global environment Γ,∆1,∆2,Θ proves the composed network N1 ‖ N2.
[E-CO] As the network N can be ensured (i.e. proved) under the system of the global
observable environment, we say the network conforms to the global observable E.
The coherence of a network to the global observable E is introduced in the next
section.
7.5.5 The Coherence of E
Definition 7.5.5. As long as s : end is reached, session s is finished and everything
related to s is deleted immediately from E. Whenever s : G where G = end, s : G 6∈ E.
Coherence of E is defined similarly to the one of the network, taking care of the
pending messages in the global queue.
Definition 7.5.6 (E coherence). Let E = Γ,∆,Θ. Then we say E is coherent when
all of the following conditions hold:
1. ∀a, a : om(G[p]) ∈ Γ implies that ∃Γ′, a : im(G[p]) ∈ Γ′.
2. If s[p] ∈ ∆, then s :G ∈ Θ and p ∈ role(G).
3. ∀ p ∈ role(G), if s :G ∈ Θ and s : m˜v ∈ ∆, then ∃ T such that G  p− m˜v  p = T
and ∆(s[p]◦)y T .
4. If s : G ∈ Θ and s : m˜v1 · s〈p, q, lj〈v〉〉 · m˜v2 ∈ ∆ and m˜v1 does not suppress
s〈p, q, lj(v)〉, then
Gy p→ q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.G′i}i∈I
where Aj{v/xj} ↓ true.
The first rule is standard. It says whenever there is an output mode for capability
of playing role p specified under G, there exists its corresponding input mode in some
shared environment Γ′.
The second rule of E-coherence says: Every session-role s[p] comes from a global
specification, which defines this session s and all roles, i.e. p, in this session.
In the third rule, G  p represents all interactions defined in G at p and the order of
actions that p should fire; similarly, m˜v  p indicates the targets (i.e. destinations) of
155
7. THE CALCULUS OF DYNAMIC ASYNCHRONOUS MONITORING
pending messages sent from p, and G  p− m˜v  p together is the left specification after
p outputs to targets in m˜v  p. This rule can be read as: For every role in a session, its
fully defined actions are exactly the summation of the “happened” actions, which are
currently recorded in the global queue, and the “going-to-happen” actions.
The forth rule states the relation between pending messages and its global specifi-
cation. The existence of a pending message means that the corresponding output has
happened, but input has not yet taken place. This rule says: The existence of a pending
message implies (I) its corresponding interaction should be defined in global specifica-
tion, and (II) this interaction can be permuted to the top of its global specification with
minimum number of unit permutations (i.e. it is not suppressed by any interaction
sequenced ahead of it).
Proposition 7.5.7 (conformance w.r.t. the global observables). If E is coherent
and E `−→g E′, then E′ is coherent.
Proof. The proof is in Appendix B.5.
Definition 7.5.8 (E ` N). We write E ` N to state that network N conforms to E as
long as
1. E is coherent, and
2. the shared and session environments in E come from the monitors in N , and
3. the message environment in E comes from the pending messages in the global
queue of N .
If E is coherent and E ` N , then N is coherent. Therefore, with the formalism of global
observer, another viewpoint of the property of session fidelity is:
Theorem 7.5.9 (session fidelity w.r.t. E). If E ` N and N `−→g N ′ then E `−→g E′
such that E′ ` N ′.
Proof. It is proved in Appendix B.5.
The global observable E maintains all specifications, including the global and the local
ones, and together with pending messages. Whenever N is coherent, we can construct
a (coherent) E such that E ` N . The version of session fidelity w.r.t E states that,
global interactions in a coherent network never violate the expected network-wise global
specifications: The former follows the latter step by step.
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Overview Chapter 8 is a full version of the published paper “Specifying Stateful
Asynchronous Properties for Distributed Programs" (40). In this chapter, the theorems
and properties of stateful specifications for dynamic observations among communicat-
ing processes are introduced. They are based on the condition that observations are
done asynchronously, where a semantic problem in specifications for distributed sys-
tems arises. Consider a general situation described as follows: When an observer (e.g.
a trusted monitor) is located at an observee, the order of the observee’s actions the
observer sees is exactly the same as what happens at the observee. However, when an
observer sits outside the observee, e.g. remotely from the observee, the order of actions
that she observes may not be as same as what happens at the observee. The former
kind of observation is synchronous, and the latter kind is asynchronous. Although the
synchronous observation precisely captures the behaviour of the observee, in real-life dis-
tributed systems, asynchronous observation is the norm and often a necessity. To make
a remote observer be able to properly verify behaviours of processes against a non-trivial
stateful specification, this chapter characterises and validates asynchronously verifiable
specifications, or simply called asynchronous specifications. We also propose and prove
the properties for them.
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8.1 Motivating Example
Before formally introducing the syntax and semantics of specifications, this section
motivates key ideas through simple examples. Our specification language is based on
multi-party session types (18, 86) with annotations by logical formulae, extending (22)
with endpoint (local) states. Our focus is on visible asynchronous interactions rather
than internal actions. We treat three examples. The first motivates the use of state in
protocol specifications through a typical business scenario. The second introduces the
semantic issue in specifications in the presence of asynchrony through a simplest possible
example. The third example illustrates the use of sets in specifications for asynchrony,
linking the specification to the corresponding traces, adumbrating our semantic analysis
later.
8.1.1 Using State in Specifications
The first example motivates the use of endpoint state in a stateful protocol, which is a
part of a specification. Consider the following purchase-invoice scenario:
(step 1) Buyer sends a product name (denoted by variable PName) to Seller, then
Seller replies with its price (denoted by variable Price), and Buyer decides
whether to purchase (then go to step 2) or not (then terminate). We assume
shipping is done independently.
(step 2) Seller sends Buyer an invoice for the purchased product.
This scenario can be realised as a single protocol (22, 39, 86) between Buyer and Seller,
consisting of a series of a few message exchanges. The scenario can also be realised using
two protocols, one for each step. This form has a merit in flexibility: For example, when
Buyer and Seller finish step 1, both can terminate that transaction. Then an invoice
can be issued any time later. Example 8.1.1 presents protocols with logical annotations
following the framework of representing one scenario with two separated protocols.
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Example 8.1.1 (SP for a cross-session Purchase-and-Invoice scenario).
Gpcs = B → S : Request(PName : string).
S → B : Confirm(PNameConf : string,Price : int)
〈〈PNameConf = PName ∩ Price ≥ 0; ε〉〉
〈〈true; ε〉〉.
B → S : {OK(UserID : int)〈〈UserID 6= 0; ε〉〉〈〈true; ε〉〉.
S → B : (PNo : int)
〈〈PNo 6∈ dom(PLog);
PLog := PLog ∪ {PNo 7→ (UserID ,PName,Price)}〉〉
〈〈true; ε〉〉.
end
KO().end}
Givc = S → B : (PNo : string, Invoice : int)
〈〈PNo ∈ dom(PLog) ∩ Invoice = PLog(PNo)〉〉〈〈true; ε〉〉.end
Above Gpcs and Givc denote the global stateful protocols, or SPs from now on for short,
corresponding to Steps 1 and 2. Each specifies the behaviour which the participants, S
(denoting seller) and B (denoting buyer), should realise at each session. 〈〈...; ...〉〉〈〈...; ...〉〉
are the obligations for sender (the former) and receiver (the latter), respectively. Note
that 〈〈true; ε〉〉 means no obligation and no state change. We will formally introduce
their syntax in Section 8.3. In this example, the state of S, represented by the field
PLog (the Purchase Log, which we consider to be a key-value store, mapping distinct
keys to values), links the two protocols. Both protocols can be read intuitively. First,
in Gpcs,
1. B firstly sends a request (Request is an operator name), with the message value
PName of type string, which is a product name.
2. S confirms by sending the same product name and its price, where the latter
should be a non-negative integer as annotated.
3. If B says OK by sending its identity, then (in practice, after authenticating the
identity) S sends back a fresh purchase number PNo which should be fresh, i.e.
it should not be in the domain of PLog. As a result, this new key and the
corresponding information is added to PLog. On the other hand, if B says KO
(not OK), then the conversation terminates.
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As may be seen from this example, our protocols use a local state to record an
abstraction of preceding interactions across sessions, and to constrain future behaviours
using this record. Its ultimate aim is to specify visible behaviours of a process: Thus
the stipulated state does not (have to) come from an actual state of a process, i.e. we
may call it a “ghost state” following JML (1).
8.1.2 Synchrony v.s. Asynchrony for Stateful Specifications
The next example illustrates the central topic of this chapter, asynchrony in specifica-
tions, showing how a specification can be “too synchronous” for asynchronous observa-
tions. We focus on a part of the previous example, and, as well use stateful protocols,
which compose specifications, to indicate the asynchrony issue. The purchase number
allocator S will, upon a request from a buyer B at each session, issue a booking num-
ber incrementing the previously issued one: S issues e.g. 1, 2, 3, . . . in a sequence of
sessions. Example 8.1.2 (a) shows a protocol Gsync for such interactions, specifying a
simple behaviour that the participants, S and B, should realise at each session. c is a
local state of S, denoting the next booking number.
Example 8.1.2 (Stateful Protocol of purchase number allocator: synchronous
v.s. asynchronous).
(a) synchronous spec
Gsync = B → S : req(ε).
S → B : ans(x : int)
〈〈x = c; c := c+ 1〉〉〈〈true; ε〉〉.
end
(b) asynchronous spec
Gasync = B → S : req(ε).
S → B : ans(x : int)
〈〈x 6∈ c; c := c ∪ {x}〉〉〈〈true; ε〉〉.
end
In the first line of Gsync, B (for buyer) requests S (for seller) a purchase number by
sending req(ε), where ε means there is no message value in this request. In the second
line, an integer x is sent from S to B, for which 〈〈x = c; c := c + 1〉〉 specifies the
obligation for S, while no obligation i.e. 〈〈true; ε〉〉 for B. The first part “x = c” says
that x should be equal to c. The second part “c := c + 1” says that, after sending, S
will increase c by 1, which constrains further behaviours of S in later sessions.
Gsync is an example of a SP which makes sense synchronously but not asynchronously.
It seems an intuitively sensible stateful protocol: However, if a remote observer is far
away, even if S actually sends the series of booking numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, . . . in this order,
they may arrive at the observer as e.g. 2, 4, 1, 3, . . ., under the assumption that the order
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of messages belonging to distinct sessions may not be preserved, which is a practical
assumption. In particular, note this remote observer will consider S as being ill-behaved
with respect to Gsync: The correctness for S (which is synchronous) and the correctness
for its observer (which is asynchronous) are not congruent.
As a remedy, we present Gasync in Example 8.1.2 (b), which is intended for asyn-
chronous observation. We use the set of booking numbers: c, whose type is a set of
integers, corresponds to PLog in Example 8.1.1. The new stateful protocol just says,
in brief, that “S always sends a fresh number”. If the behaviour of S satisfies this
condition at S, then even though messages from S may arrive out-of-order, the remote
observer can verify that they are correct w.r.t. Gasync, so that the actions of S and
their asynchronous observation by a remote observer coincide. We shall later verify this
statement formally.
8.1.3 Capturing Causality Using Sets in Stateful Specifications
While Gasync gives a reasonable stateful protocol, it is not the strongest possible one if
our target is the server who issues booking numbers incrementally based on the previous
number. For example, if the same buyer sequentially repeats a series of request-reply
sessions, that buyer (and an observer sitting in-between) will observe 1, 2, 3, 4, but this
point is not captured by Gasync.
Example 8.1.3 (a refinement of Gasync).
Gassign = B → S : req(ε)〈〈true; ε〉〉〈〈true; t := t+ 1, c := c ∪ {t}〉〉.
S → B : ans(x : int)〈〈x ∈ c; c := c \ {x}〉〉〈〈true; ε〉〉.
end
Gassign in Example 8.1.3 is a refinement of Gasync in Example8.1.2 so that, while still
being suitable for asynchronous observations, can capture a stronger causal constraint.
It uses two states: t, a counter, and c, a collection of valid numbers to be issued. t and
c are incremented when receiving a request, while the sent value is taken off from c.
Assume the server issues the booking numbers starting from 1. The intuition behind
the construction is as follows:
1. If S receives n requests, as a whole, the numbers which can be issued are among
{1, 2, .., n}.
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Traces of permitted actions with the corresponding state change.
cases 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
(I) actions s1[B,S]?req(ε) s2[B,S]?req(ε) s1[S,B]!ans(1) s2[S,B]!ans〈2〉
s2[B,S]?req(ε) s1[B,S]?req(ε) s1[S,B]!ans〈1〉 s2[S,B]!ans〈2〉
s1[B,S]?req(ε) s2[B,S]?req(ε) s2[S,B]!ans〈1〉 s1[S,B]!ans〈2〉
s2[B,S]?req(ε) s1[B,S]?req(ε) s2[S,B]!ans〈1〉 s1[S,B]!ans〈2〉
(I) states t 7→ 1, c 7→ {1} t 7→ 2, c 7→ {1, 2} t 7→ 2, c 7→ {2} t 7→ 2, c 7→ {}
(II) actions s1[B,S]?req(ε) s2[B,S]?req(ε) s1[S,B]!ans〈2〉 s2[S,B]!ans〈1〉
s2[B,S]?req(ε) s1[B,S]?req(ε) s1[S,B]!ans〈2〉 s2[S,B]!ans〈1〉
s1[B,S]?req(ε) s2[B,S]?req(ε) s2[S,B]!ans〈2〉 s1[S,B]!ans〈1〉
s2[B,S]?req(ε) s1[B,S]?req(ε) s2[S,B]!ans〈2〉 s1[S,B]!ans〈1〉
(II) states t 7→ 1, c 7→ {1} t 7→ 2, c 7→ {1, 2} t 7→ 2, c 7→ {1} t 7→ 2, c 7→ {}
(III) actions s1[B,S]?req(ε) s1[S,B]!ans〈1〉 s2[B,S]?req(ε) s2[S,B]!ans〈2〉
s2[B,S]?req(ε) s2[S,B]!ans〈1〉 s1[B,S]?req(ε) s1[S,B]!ans〈2〉
(III) states t 7→ 1, c 7→ {1} t 7→ 1, c 7→ {} t 7→ 2, c 7→ {2} t 7→ 2, c 7→ {}
Figure 8.1: The Valid Traces of Asynchronous and Synchronous Interactions w.r.t. Gassign
2. If S issues a number from this set, the remaining numbers are what it can issue
next.
As we shall see later, the stateful protocol has the property that, if S behaves well
w.r.t. Gassign, then a remote observer also finds it well-behaved.
To understand Gassign as a stateful protocol, consider two sessions following the
protocol, s1 and s2. Assume the initial states are t 7→ 0 and c 7→ {}. Then Gassign says
the traces in Figure 8.1 are valid ones. Figure 8.1 lists the traces together with step-
by-step state change: (I,II,III) are categories each stipulating how states will change.
Above, s1[B,S]?req(ε) denotes an input ? from B to S at session s1 carrying a
req-message without value; s1[S,B]!ans〈1〉 is an output ! from S to B at s1 carrying a
ans-message with value 1. (I) and (II) are the traces where a remote observer observes
that two consecutive inputs have arrived first. Note that, even if S may have indeed
outputted immediately after the first input, we can have these traces due to asynchrony.
Even then, unlike Gasync, the observer is always sure, by Gassign, that the returned values
should be no more than 2, i.e. it is either 1 or 2. In (III), the observer observes the
second request only after the answer to the first request. Note the request-answer order
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in each session is preserved because without the request, its answer cannot occur (which
is Lamport’s ordering (98)). Note that, the order of two messages inside each session is
preserved. Unlike Gasync, the observer can expect, based on Gassign, that the first answer
is surely 1, and the second is surely 2.
The above example shows how we can represent causality while still (intuitively)
keeping the asynchronous nature of specifications. It also shows how traces of actions
can be used to give extensional meaning of specifications. This observation is given a
formal account in Section 8.3 later.
8.1.4 Analysis of Capturing Causality: Gassign
Continue with section 8.1.3, from Gassign we have learnt that an observer can be more
insightful if she has more information (which are initially established by input actions).
Convention 8.1.4. An observer (remote/close) can expect and reasonably guess the
behaviours of her observees based on the messages she has observed. Without loss
of generality, we assume that the messages delivered by observees can represent the
behaviours of observees.
Based on Gassign, in which the assigned number to each session (established at each
request) is asked to be increased with the coming requests one by one, the following
properties say that a remote observer can expect the next outputted value based on
what she observes. Let a sequence of actions, called trace, denoted by s. Let I(s) be
the sequence of input actions of s, O(s) be the sequence of output actions of s, and V(s)
be the sequence of values carried in s. Let num(s) be the length of s, and prefix(s) be
the set of prefixes of s. Moreover, let v(`) be the value carried by action `, and ini(t)
be the initial value of state t ∈ Gassign. Because in the following cases we only discuss
one state of an endpoint, we write ini(t) simply as ini.
For every trace w.r.t role S (representing server) satisfying Gassign  S, it should
have the following properties:
rq0. binding conventions.
rq1. num(I(s)) ≥ num(O(s)).
rq2. ∀` ∈ s ∩ ` = s[S,B]!l〈v〉 ⊂ ∃ `′ ∈ s, `′ = s[B,S]?l(v).
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rq3. ∀`, `′ ∈ O(s), ` 6= `′, then v(`) 6= v(`′).
rq4. ∀` ∈ O(s′), s′ ∈ prefix(s), ini ≤ v(`) ≤ num(I(s′)) + ini.
The first 3 properties (rq0, rq1 and rq2) ensures the trace satisfies the interaction
structure defined in Gassign. In rq1, operation I(s) extracts the input actions from
trace s as a new trace, and num(I(s)) means the length of input actions in s. Similarly,
operation O(s) extracts the output actions from trace s as a new trace num(O(s)) means
the length of output actions in s. Overall it states that the number of inputs (i.e.
requests from the buyers) should be bigger than the number of outputs (i.e. assignments
from the server). rq2 states that only when a request takes place, an assignment takes
place. rq3 ensures that every assigned (outputted) value (i.e. ` ∈ O, (v(`)) is distinct.
The operation v(`) extracts the value carried by action `. In rq4, ini is a constant,
denoting the initial value of a particular state used for checking outputted values. Here it
is the initial value of state c defined inGassign. rq4 states that, an outputted value carried
by an output action should be smaller than or equal to the number of inputs which
positioning ahead of it. rq3 and rq4 together imply that, for a given trace s = `1...`n,
the next outputted value has a fixed range: This range can be measured by knowing
how many requests from buyers have occurred and how many assignments to buyers
have done.
For example, assume ini = 1; when an observer observes a trace s1[B,S]?req(ε) ·
s2[B,S]?req(ε)·s3[B,S]?req(ε), if the next action is s2[S,B]!ans〈v〉, then v ∈ {1, 2, 3};
assume v = 3. After action s2[S,B]!ans〈3〉, if the upcoming one is s1[S,B]!ans〈v′〉, then
v′ ∈ {1, 2} because 3 has been assigned; assume v′ = 1. When a new request comes,
says s4[B,S]?req(ε), currently the overall actions starting from the beginning is
s1[B,S]?req(ε)·s2[B,S]?req(ε)·s3[B,S]?req(ε)·s2[S,B]!ans〈3〉·s1[S,B]!ans〈1〉·s4[B,S]?req(ε)
the next output action of it can be sn[S,B]!ans〈v′′〉, n ∈ {3, 4} and v′′ ∈ {2, 4}.
These analyses are useful for verifying a trace step by step. For example, assume
the following trace is an initial trace: s1[B,S]?req(ε)·s1[S,B]!ans〈2〉·s2[B,S]?req(ε) is
not right immediately at s1[S,B]!ans〈2〉 because the only possible value at the moment
when it is assigned is 1.
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S ::= nat | bool | string
| S1 × S2 | set(S ) | map(S1,S2)
e ::= x | v | f | op(e1, ...., en)
A ::= true | false | e1 = e2 | e1 > e2
| e1 ∈ e2 | A1 ∩A2 | ¬A
E ::= ε | E, f := e
G ::= p→ q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai;Ei〉〉〈〈A′i;E′i〉〉.Gi}i∈I G-cm
| G1 | G2 G-par
| end G-end
T ::= p!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai;Ei〉〉.Ti}i∈I L-sel
| p?{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai;Ei〉〉.Ti}i∈I L-bra
| end L-end
Figure 8.2: The Grammar of Stateful Protocols
8.2 The Language of Stateful Specifications: SP
8.2.1 The Syntax of SP
Figure 8.2 summarises the grammar of global stateful protocols (G, . . .) for specifying
the interaction structure of a session from global viewpoints, and local stateful protocols
(T, . . .), projected from the global G, for specifying protocols for local endpoints. Note
that the “state” used here means the “fields of data storages”. For example, it can be a
field counter in a server for counting the number of visiters, or a field credit in a bank
user for indicating the user’s current savings, etc. This syntax enriches (22) with local
states update and rich operations on them: By adding simple data update E and data
type set, we obtain a rich class of stateful specifications (which consist of local SPs).
A state variable, denoted by f , consists of zero or more fields. A field gets read in
a predicate A and gets read and written in an update E. We call 〈〈A;E〉〉 obligation.
We use updates instead of post-conditions for usability in runtime verification. (S , . . .)
are sorts (data types), and (e, . . .) are expressions, where op(e1, ..., en) is the operation
op on parameters e1, ..., en. We use data types such as product S1 × S2, set set(S ) and
(finite) function map(S1,S2). Sets and functions play important roles in asynchronous
specifications. In expressions, x is a variable, v is a value, f is a (mutable) field. In E,
f := e stipulates that when e ↓ v, f is updated with value v, which makes the value
of f be v, denoted by f 7→ v. The grammars of G and T are simplified for distilled
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presentation. They are similar to the ones defined in Figures 6.1 and 6.3 in Chapter 6,
where G specifies the global interactions and T specifies the obligation for every action
coming from endpoints. The recursion of G and T can be omitted because, while a
recursion is finite, we can unfold the finitely-recursive obligations of the body to several
continuous obligations, each of which is defined by T . All results are preserved.
In G, p→ q describes the communication (interaction) from sender p to receiver q,
while p! and p? are endpoint actions for output (to p) and input (from p) respectively. In
li(xi : Si), li is the label for a branch, when lj is chosen, the interaction variable is xj , and
Sj is its type. In G-cm, the first obligation 〈〈A;E〉〉 is for the sender, indicating the sender
should guarantee that its message x satisfies A and as a result E is done; the second
obligation 〈〈A′;E′〉〉 is for the receiver, indicating it can expect a message x to satisfy A′
and as a result E′ is done. Rule G-par particularly asks that role(G1) ∩ role(G2) = ∅,
which means that no role is shared by G1 and G2, where role(G) denotes the set of roles
in G. Rule L-sel is for sender’s behaviour, while rule L-bra is for receiver’s behaviour.
Parallel composition specifies two interactions in parallel, while end denotes the end
of interactions. As a notational convention, if both obligations for the sender and the
receiver are trivial (i.e. the predicate is true and the update is ε) then they are omitted.
8.2.2 Consistency Principles and Well-formedness
Before introducing the conditions of well-formedness for stateful global specifications,
the set of states of a predicate or an update is defined as follows.
Definition 8.2.1 (the set of states). field(C) denotes the set of states (i.e. fields)
occurring in C. C can be a predicate (i.e. A) or an update (i.e. E).
Assume p → q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai;Ei〉〉〈〈A′i;E′i〉〉.Gi}i∈I is inside a context, with possibly
preceding interactions. The following conditions of well-formedness for stateful global
SPs, based on (22), stipulate the consistency principles of global stateful protocols:
1. (a) ∀i ∈ I, field(A′i) = ∅; and (b) ∀i ∈ I, Ai implies A′i.
2. (history sensitivity) Ai and Ei only refer to interaction variables which p, the
sender, has sent or received before, as well as xi; moreover, Ai and Ei only contain
the states of the sender. Similarly, A′i and E
′
i are for the receiver. Moreover, Ai
and Ei only contain the states of the sender p, while E′i only contains the states
of the receiver q.
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3. (temporal satisfiability) At each step, and for any state, there is always a branch
with label li and a value xi that satisfy Ai (hence A′i at each step).
Condition 1.(a) says that a predicate of a receiver is stateless. Two reasons for this
requirement: First, if a receiving-side predicate relies on its own local state, then the
sender may not be able to find a “proper” value to send; secondly, a sent message,
which has been verified by a trusted observer (e.g. a system monitor), should not be
judged invalid by the predicate at the receiver-side (or rejected by the receiver-side’s
system monitor), otherwise it is inconsistent because it implies that the judgement at the
sender-side is incorrect. Condition 1.(b) says that, in every interaction, the predicate at
sender always implies the predicate at the receiver: Together with 1.(a), it means that
if the sender sends a message that satisfies the sender’s predicate, then automatically
the receiver’s predicate is satisfied (the latter is however useful for the receiver to know
what to expect).
Example 8.2.2 (the sender’s predicate always implies the receiver’s). Let state
fq belong to role q. Assume fq = 5. Consider the following simple global SP which
violates condition 1.(a):
p→ q : (x : int)〈〈true ; ε〉〉〈〈fq < x ; fq := x〉〉.
When session participants apply this global SP for communication through a session,
say s, if session-role s[p] sends a message with value less than 5, this action will be
rejected and considered invalid by the receiver-side observer. However, it is a valid
action according to the sender-side observer who knows nothing about the predicate at
the receiver side. Condition 1.(a) prevents this situation because all system monitors
should be considered as having the same governance ability: Whenever the sender-side
monitor approves an action according to the protocol, the receiver-side monitor should
also approve it because the monitor at the sender side is trusted.
For the similar reason, condition 1.(b), which implies 1.(a), ensures that whenever
the sender-side observer approves an action, the receiver-side agrees with it. The fol-
lowing global SP violates condition 1.(b):
p→ q : (x : int)〈〈x > 10 ; ε〉〉〈〈x > 20 ; ε〉〉.
This SP is not reasonable because, if the sender sends a value of x in the range from 11
167
8. SPECIFYING STATEFUL ASYNCHRONOUS PROPERTIES FOR
DISTRIBUTED PROGRAMS
to 20, from the sender’s viewpoint, she obeys the protocol x > 10; however, she will be
rejected by the receiver because she does not know that the receiver asks a value more
than 20.
Conditions 2 and 3 are based on the consistency principles, history sensitivity and
temporal satisfiability, introduced in Section 6.3, which are based on (22). The following
examples illustrate the conditions 2 and 3, respectively.
Example 8.2.3 (history sensitivity). Let state fq belong to role q. The following
global SP satisfies history sensitivity with the similar reasoning of Example 6.3.1 in
Section 6.3,
p→ q : (x : int)〈〈x > 10 ; ε〉〉〈〈x > 5 ; fq := x〉〉.
q → r : (x : int).
r → q : (y : int)〈〈y > x ; ε〉〉〈〈y > x ; fq := y〉〉
because every participant p, q and r knows the variables deciding the predicates.
However, since the state fq is only known by role q, when the constraint of fq is
added to the predicate of p, it violates the principle of history sensitivity:
p→ q : (x : int)〈〈x > fq ; ε〉〉〈〈x > fq ; fq := x〉〉.
q → r : (x : int).
r → q : (y : int)〈〈y > x ; ε〉〉〈〈y > x ; fq := y〉〉
Example 8.2.4 (temporal satisfiability). Let state fq belong to role q. The global
SP below respects temporal satisfiability with the similar reasoning of Example 6.3.2
introduced in Section 6.3:
p→ q : len(x : int)〈〈49 > x > 5 ; ε〉〉〈〈49 > x > 0 ; fq := x+ 10〉〉.
q → r : {walk(y : int)〈〈x < y < 10 ; ε〉〉〈〈x < y < 30 ; ε〉〉,
run(y : int)〈〈x < y < fq ; ε〉〉〈〈x < y < 60 ; ε〉〉}
although the state fq is involved in the predicate at branch “run”, since there are always
integers between x and x + 10 = fq and the seller’s predicate 〈〈x < y < fq〉〉 always
implies the receiver’s predicate 〈〈x < y < 60〉〉 when x is confined between 5 to 49, and
fq is updated to x+ 10.
However, when the update of fq is changed to fq := x, the global SP violates temporal
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satisfiability because there is no path to go forward when the value of x is more than 9.
p→ q : len(x : int)〈〈49 > x > 5 ; ε〉〉〈〈49 > x > 0 ; fq := x〉〉.
q → r : {walk(y : int)〈〈x < y < 10 ; ε〉〉〈〈x < y < 30 ; ε〉〉,
run(y : int)〈〈x < y < fq ; ε〉〉〈〈x < y < 60 ; ε〉〉}
Note that in Example 8.2.4, in fact, for the update of fq := x + k, when k ≤ 2, the
global SP always violates temporal satisfiability (Condition 3); when k > 12, it always
voilates Condition 1.(b).
Note that, all examples treated in this chapter are well-formed. Henceforth we
assume all global SPs we treat are well-formed.
8.2.3 The Projection from a Global SP to Local SPs
Global SPs are useful to capture overall interaction scenarios, while local SPs specify
exactly what endpoints should do. They are linked by endpoint projection.
The projection rule defined in Definition 8.2.5 is similar to the one defined in Defini-
tion 6.5.1 in Chapter 6. Assume p, q, r ∈ G and p 6= q. var(G)  p is the set of variables
that p knows in G.
Definition 8.2.5. Assume G is well-formed. The stateful projection Proj(G, A, r) is
inductively defined as:
Proj(p→ q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai ; Ei〉〉〈〈A′i ; E′i〉〉.Gi}i∈I , Apj , r) =
q!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai ; Ei 〉〉.Gpji }i∈I if r = p 6= q,
p?{li(xi : Si)〈〈A′i ; E′i〉〉.Gpji }i∈I if r = q 6= p,
unionsqi∈IGpji if r 6= q 6= p
with Gpji = Proj(Gi, A
pj , r)
Proj(G1 | G2, Apj , r) =
Proj(Gi, Apj , r) if r ∈ Gi and r 6∈ Gj i, j ∈ {1, 2},end else
end  r = end
where unionsqi∈IGpji = Gpj1 unionsqGpj2 ...unionsqGpjn if I = {1, ..., n}. The mergeability, T1unionsqT2, is defined
in the end of Definition 6.5.1 in Chapter 6. The application of projection is illustrated
by the following example.
169
8. SPECIFYING STATEFUL ASYNCHRONOUS PROPERTIES FOR
DISTRIBUTED PROGRAMS
Example 8.2.6 (endpoint projection). The local SPs projected from Gassign on role
S and B respectively are:
Gassign  S = TS = B?req(ε)〈〈true; t := t+ 1 c := c ∪ {t}〉〉.
B!ans(x : int)〈〈x ∈ c ; c := c \ {x}〉〉.end
Gassign  B = TB = S!req(ε).S?ans(x : int).end
8.3 Specifications Composed by SP
8.3.1 The Syntax of Stateful Specifications
A specification is a triple Θ ::= 〈Γ; ∆;D〉 which gives a behavioural specification of a
local process (endpoint) as its interface. Γ, ∆ and D, separated by “;" in Θ, are given
by:
Γ ::= ∅ | Γ, a : mode(G[p]) | Γ, f : S
∆ ::= ∅ | ∆, s[p] :T
D ::= ∅ | D, f 7→ v
We here simplify the modes of shared names as mode ∈ {I, O}. Γ, shared environment,
describes several information: The permitted behaviour at each shared channel; and the
type of each field. When a process has a : I(G[p]), it can accept invitations via shared
channel a to play role p following what G specifies; while a : O(G[p]) is its dual. In ∆,
session environment, s[p] : T describes the session behaviour (T ) in a session s as p. D
is a set of (ghost) states of a local process (endpoint): The states in D ∈ Θ belong to
an endpoint participant in a session. Each D is a map from fields to values, storing a
range of data structure. In formulae, a field f itself represents its current value.
Example 8.3.1. Based on Gassign in Example 8.1.3 and its local SPs in Example 8.2.6,
we give a local specification Θass for server, playing role S, and ΘB1 and ΘB2 for two
buyers B1 and B2, each playing role B in Gassign, assuming there are two ongoing
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sessions s1 and s2.
Tass = B?req(ε)〈〈true; t := t+ 1 c := c ∪ {t}〉〉.T ′ass,
T ′ass = B!ans(x : int)〈〈x ∈ c ; c := c \ {x}〉〉.end
Θass = 〈Γ′ass, server : I(Gass[S]); ∆′ass, s1[S] : Tass, s2[S] : Tass; D′ass, t 7→ 0, c 7→ {}〉
TB = S!req(ε).T ′B,
T ′B = S?ans(x : int).end,
ΘB1 = 〈Γ′B1 , b1 : I(GB[B]), server : O(Gass[S]) ; ∆′B1 , s1[B] : TB; DB1〉
ΘB2 = 〈Γ′B2 , b2 : I(GB[B]), server : O(Gass[S]) ; ∆′B2 , s2[B] : TB; DB2〉
The data storage in Θass is D′ass, t, c. In this protocol, no state in D′ass is used. Similarly,
no state in DB1 or DB2 is used. Although we do not illustrate the whole procedures of
session establishment (by using rules [Acc] and [Req] defined in Figure 8.3), it shows
that buyers B1 and B2 are the session inviters requesting S to join session s1 and s2.
8.3.2 The Semantics of Stateful Specifications
Figure 8.3 represents the semantics of specifications as a deterministic labelled transition
system, of the form Θ `−→ Θ′, which intuitively means Θ as a specification allows a process
to do an action `, and demands the resulting process to conform to Θ′.
Definition 8.3.2.
Θ
`1−→ Θ1 `2−→ Θ2.... `k−→ Θk... def= Θ `1·` 2...`k−−−−−→ Θk...
For actions labels, here we adopt the simplified version of those defined in Equation
5.1. Because this chapter, for specifying asynchronous specification when endpoints’
states are also stipulated, focuses on the session interactions, actions new a : im(G[p])
and join(s[p]), which are control actions, are not discussed in the LTS defined in Figure
8.3. The rules of bound/free request and bound/free accept of the semanics are similar
to those of the LTS of monitors defined in Figure 7.4, Chapter 7. We do not use τ
since it is irrelevant in the present work (because, in brief, τ is always possible and
has no effects on specifications). The special rules for stateful specifications are rules
[Sel/SelN] and [Bra/BraN]. Rule [Sel] is for sending a message inside a session. The
premise says that, first, the type T should be a selection type; the passed value v has
type Sj from the jth branch of T under Γ (note that, when v is a name, Γ is necessary
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Actions ` ::= τ | a(s[p] : G) | a〈s[p] : G〉 | a(s[p] : G) | a〈s[p] : G〉 |s[p, q]!l〈v〉 | s[p, q]?l(v)
[Req-ini]
s 6∈ dom(∆), ∀i ∈ I, pi ∈ role(G), G is well-formed, ∀k, j ∈ I, pk 6= pj (k 6= j)
〈Γ, a : O(G[pj ]); ∆; D〉
a(s[pj ]:G)−−−−−−→ 〈Γ, a : O(G[pj ]); ∆, {s[pi] : G  pi}i∈I\{j}; D〉
[Req]
pj ∈ role(G)
〈Γ, a : O(G[pj ]); ∆, s[pj ] : G  pj ; D〉
a〈s[pj ]:G〉−−−−−−→ 〈Γ, a : O(G[pj ]); ∆; D〉
[Acc-b] s 6∈ dom(∆), T = G  q, field(T ) ∈ D
〈Γ, a : I(G[q]); ∆; D〉 a(s[q]:G)−−−−−−→ 〈Γ, a : I(G[q]); ∆, s[q] : T ; D〉
[Acc-f] s ∈ dom(∆), T = G  q, field(T ) ∈ D
〈Γ, a : I(G[q]); ∆; D〉 a〈s[q]:G〉−−−−−−→ 〈Γ, a : I(G[q]); ∆, s[q] : T ; D〉
[Sel] T y q!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai;Ei〉〉.Ti}i∈I , Γ `v : Sj , Γ |=Aj{v/xj},
〈Γ; ∆, s[p] : T ; D〉 s[p,q]!lj〈v〉−−−−−−−→ 〈Γ; ∆, s[p] : Tj{v/xj}; D afterEj{v/xj}〉
[SelN] T y q!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai;Ei〉〉.Ti}i∈I , Γ ` a : Sj , a 6∈ (Aj ∩ Ej), Aj ↓ true,
〈Γ; ∆, s[p] : T ; D〉 s[p,q]!lj〈a〉−−−−−−−→ 〈Γ; ∆, s[p] : Tj ; D afterEj〉
[Bra] T y p?{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai;Ei〉〉.Ti}i∈I , Γ ` v : Sj , Γ |=Aj{v/xj},
〈Γ; ∆, s[q] :T ; D〉 s[p,q]?lj(v)−−−−−−−→ 〈Γ; ∆, s[q] :Tj{v/xj}; D afterEj{v/xj}〉
[BraN] T y p?{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai;Ei〉〉.Ti}i∈I , Sj = mode(G
′[p′]), a 6∈ (Aj ∩ Ej), Aj ↓ true
〈Γ; ∆, s[q] :T ; D〉 s[p,q]?lj(a)−−−−−−−→ 〈Γ, a : O(G′[p′]); ∆, s[q] :Tj ; D afterEj〉
[Par] Θ1
`−→ Θ2,
Θ1,Θ3
`−→ Θ2,Θ3
Figure 8.3: The Labelled Transition System of Specifications
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to have the knowledge of its type, but it is not needed if v is a non-name value, like 3 or
”hello” because its type is automatically known without Γ); and Aj after substitution is
well-typed under Γ. In the conclusion, T ′j substitutes v for xj and prepares for the next
(incoming or outgoing) message, and the state is updated by D afterEj{v/xj}. To
illustrate the updating of D by Ej , assume Ej is defined as f := f ∪{xj}, and currently
f 7→ {10}. After substituting 5 for xj , D is updated to f 7→ {10, 5}. Rule [SelN] is
similar to rule [Sel] except that it is particularly for sending a name, which should not
be in Aj and Aj should be evaluated as true. Rule [Bra] is a symmetric rule of [Sel].
Rule [BraN] is for receiving shared channel a. It is dual to rule [SelN], and similar to
the rule defined in 7.4.
We define two specifications, say Θ and Θ′, are composable whenever P(Θ)∩P(Θ′) =
∅, and write Θ,Θ′ as a composition of specification Θ and specification Θ. It is defined
similarly as Definition 7.4.23, which defines the parallel composition of monitors. [Par]
says, If Θ1 and Θ3 are composable, after action happens and Θ1 becomes as Θ2, they
are still composable.
8.4 Traces of Local Actions
In this section, the trace of a local process is defined to describe a local process’s run-
time behaviour, and define the satisfaction criterion for formally describing a process
satisfies a given specification synchronously/asynchronously. Note that, hereafter, when
we say a trace, it always means a trace consisting of local actions inputting or outputting
from a local process.
Definition 8.4.1 (trace). A trace (s, s′, . . .) is a sequence of actions represented by
s = `1 ·`2...·`n...
in which each action is connected by “ · ′′.
Note that, for every s, we assume an accept/request action introducing a session, say
s, binds the later occurrences of s.
Definition 8.4.2 (valid trace according to Θ). A trace s is valid according to Θ if
there always exists Θ′ such that Θ s−→ Θ′.
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8.4.1 Permutation of Stateful Protocols
We formalise the notion of minimum permutations for local Θ, which is similar to the
permutation mechanism defined in Definition 6.6.8 in Chapter 6. Having permutation
rules for Θ (see Definition 8.4.4) makes an observer (i.e. system monitor), who observes
actions based on Θ, be able to capture the causality relation of actions when the order
of actions is not preserved due to asynchrony. For example, in one session, when an
endpoint, say s[p], waits for two input actions from different senders, say s[q1] and s[q2],
the local Θ at role s[p] is
q1?l1(x1)〈〈A1;E1〉〉·q2?l2(x2)〈〈A2;E2〉〉
then the order of actions may be s[q1, p]?l1(v1)·s[q2, p]?l2(v2) or s[q2, p]?l1(v2)·s[q1, p]?l1(v1)
because there is no way to restrict that the first action should firstly happen and arrive
earlier at s[p] than the second one.
The permutation rules for Θ have different purpose from the definition of commu-
tativity (see Definition 8.5.31). The permutation rules for Θ are the mechanisms (or
tools) that let an observer use them to properly observe actions, whose order is not
preserved; while the attribute of commutativity of a Θ is used to validate whether the
Θ is asynchronous verifiable or not.
Here we define stateful protocol context and local unit permutation. Assume that,
whenever we write T[T ], it always comes from a well-formed global stateful protocol (i.e.
G). Recall that the well-formedness principles of global stateful protocol is introduced
in section 8.2.2. If it is a local Θ containing the local SP projected from a non-well-
formed global SP, it is not meaningful to explore the permutation mechanism when the
original global stateful protocol is in a non-reasonable shape. For convenience, let an
obligation 〈〈A;E〉〉 for sender be 〈〈η!〉〉, and an obligation 〈〈A′;E′〉〉 for receiver be 〈〈η?〉〉.
Definition 8.4.3 (Local SP context). Let † ::= {?, !}. A local stateful-session type
context T[ ] is a local stateful protocol with a hole, whose grammar is defined as:
T[ ] ::= [ ] | p† : {l1(x1 :S1)〈〈η†1〉〉.T1, .., lk(xk :Sk)〈〈η†k〉〉.T[ ], .., ln(xn :Sn)〈〈η†n〉〉.Tn}
T[T ] denotes the result of filling the hole in the local SP context T with local SP T .
Note that [ ] defines the identity function, i.e. [T ] = T .
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The causal order occurs when there are two consecutive sending (or receiving) actions
with the same target (e.g. q!l(v).q!l′(v′) or p?l(x).p?l′(x′)), or there is an input action
followed by an output action.
Definition 8.4.4 (local unit permutation). The unit permutation of local SP is
defined by the axioms below, assuming p1 6= p2:
T[p1!{li(xi : Si)〈〈η!i〉〉.p2!{l′j(x′j : S′j)〈〈η′!j〉〉.Tij}j∈I}i∈I ]
y1 T[p2!{l′j(x′j : S′j)〈〈η′!j〉〉.p1!{li(xi : Si)〈〈η!i〉〉.Tij}i∈I}j∈I ]
T[p1?{li(xi : Si)〈〈η?i〉〉.p2?{l′j(x′j : S′j)〈〈η′?j〉〉.Tij}j∈I}i∈I ]
y1 T[p2?{l′j(x′j : S′j)〈〈η′?j〉〉.p1?{li(xi : Si)〈〈η?i〉〉.Tij}i∈I}j∈I ]
T[p1!{li(xi : Si)〈〈η!i〉〉.p2?{l′j(x′j : S′j)〈〈η′?j〉〉.Tij}j∈I}i∈I ]
y1 T[p2?{l′j(x′j : S′j)〈〈η′?j〉〉.p1!{li(xi : Si)〈〈η!i〉〉.Tij}i∈I}j∈I ]
8.4.2 Permutation of Local Actions
Since Θ is a specification for a local endpoint, the actions concerned here are all local
actions, which means that they are the actions happening at endpoints. Similarly, all
permutations of actions are the permutation of local actions. Example below shows the
relations between global actions and local actions.
Example 8.4.5 (global actions v.s. local actions). Assume a session s is given, in
which the roles involved in it are p1 and p2. Assume globally, there are actions among
session-roles s[p1] and s[p2]:
s[p1, p2]!〈"How are you?"〉 ·s[p1, p2]?("How are you?") ·
s[p2, p1]!〈"Fine. Thanks!"〉 ·s[p2, p1]?("Fine. Thanks!")
with the scenario: An endpoint playing role p1 in session s, denoted by s[p1], firstly
sends a regard "How are you" to an endpoint playing role p2 in session s, denoted by
s[p2]. After s[p2] receives this regards, she replies s[p1] with "Fine. Thanks!"; then
s[p1] receives this response. The sequence of actions can be observed by the following
messages
s〈p1, p2, 〈"How are you?"〉〉·s〈p2, p1, 〈"Fine. Thanks!"〉〉
This sequence of messages reflect the meaning of the sequence of actions.
Locally, the sequence of actions for session-role s[p1] is
s[p1, p2]!〈"How are you?"〉·s[p2, p1]?("Fine. Thanks!")
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while the sequence of actions for session-role s[p2] is
s[p1, p2]?("How are you?")·s[p2, p1]!〈"Fine. Thanks!"〉
A remote observer generally has more than one specifications (for different session-
roles). For each session-role, the specification only specifies the local behaviours of that
session-role.
To capture the causality among actions, below we define the relation of dependency:
Definition 8.4.6 (dependency). We define D, the dependency relation, such that
`1 D `2 whenever
(a) `1 is either a(k[p] : G) or a〈k[p] : G〉, and k[p] ∈ `2 or sbj(`2) = k[p].
(b) `1 is s[p1, p2]?l(x) and x ∈ `2.
We say that `2 depends on `1 if `1 D `2.
The following examples illustrate the cases of dependency relation over action labels.
Example 8.4.7. Assume a sequence of actions `1 ·`2, where
`1 = a〈k[p] : G〉, `2 = b〈k[p] : G〉.
Based on Definition 8.4.6.(a), `2 depends on `1.
Example 8.4.8. Assume a sequence of local actions of some local endpoint s = s0·` 1·` 2,
where
`1 = a(k[p] : G), `2 = k[p
′, p]!l〈v〉
`2 does not depend on `1 because, based on Definition 8.4.6.(a), sbj(`2) = k[p′] 6= k[p].
Example 8.4.9. Assume a sequence of local actions of some local endpoint s = s0·`1·
`2 ·`3 ·`4, where
`1 = a(k[p] : G), `2 = k[p, q]!l〈v〉, `3 = b〈k′[q] : G′〉, `4 = k′[p, q]?l′(v′)
`2 depends on `1 because, based on Definition 8.4.6.(a), sbj(`2) = k[p]. Similarly, `4
depends on `3.
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Definition 8.4.10 (suppress of local actions). For a sequence of local actions `1·`2
of an endpoint, we say `2 is suppressed by `1 if
1. `1 = s[p1, q]?l(v) and `2 = s[q, p2]!l′〈v′〉, or
2. `1 = s[p, q]!l〈v〉 and `2 = s[p, q]!l′〈v′〉, or
3. `1 = s[p, q]?l(v) and `1 = s[p, q]?l′(v′).
Definition 8.4.11 (causality). We say local actions `1 and `2 of an endpoint have
causality relation if one of them depends or suppresses the other.
Definition 8.4.12 (legal unit permutation of local actions). Let sequence of local
actions `1 ·`2 be a trace of an endpoint. A permutation from `1 ·`2 to `2 ·`1 is legal if `1
and `2 have no causality relation.
We write sy s′ when s′ is the result of applying zero or more legal unit permuta-
tions. In this case s′ is a permutation variant of s and this permutation is called a legal
permutation.
Definition 8.4.13 (valid unit permutation of actions according to Θ). We say
s1 is a permutation variant of s2 under Θ, written Θ ` s1 y s2, when s1 y s2, Θ ` s1
and Θ ` s2 hold.
Example 8.4.14 (legal permutations of actions). In Figure 8.1, all traces in (I)
and (II) are permutation variants to each other. The traces in (III) can legally permute
to any trace in (I) and (II), but not the converse.
Note that, it does not mean that a sequence of legally-permuted actions is always
valid to a Θ. The following example explains this point.
Example 8.4.15. Let `1 = s[p, q1]!ans〈ε〉 and `2 = s[p, q2]!ans〈ε〉. Then `1·`2 y `2·`1.
Assume that initial value of state c is 1, and that local SP for role p in session s is:
s[p] : q1!ans(ε)〈〈true; ε〉〉 . q2!ans(ε)〈〈c = 1; c := 0〉〉
Then Θ ` `1 ·`2, but Θ 6` `2 ·`1.
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8.5 Theory for Stateful Specifications
8.5.1 Satisfaction
The following simple definition of processes is enough for our purpose: We can readily
use the pi-calculus with session primitives and its weak (τ -abstracted) LTS to induce
this abstract notion of processes.
Definition 8.5.1 (process). A process (P,Q, ..) is a prefix-closed set of traces.
The following defines the notion of synchronous and asynchronous observables as the
set of traces observed by a synchronous observer (i.e. as it is) and by an asynchronous
observer (i.e. up to legal permutations).
Definition 8.5.2 (synchronous and asynchronous observable).
1. Obss(P )
def
= P .
2. Obsa(P ) is the set of all legal permutation variants of the traces in P .
Firstly, recall the LTS rule of SP defined in Figure 8.3: a valid ` against a Θ is an
action which can be verified by a LTS rule such that Θ `−→ Θ′. Intuitively, a valid trace
is a trace that Θ approves it.
Definition 8.5.3 (trace(Θ): the set of valid traces of Θ). Define trace(Θ) as the
set of valid traces of Θ:
trace(Θ) = {s | Θ s−→ Θ′}
i.e. trace(Θ) is the maximun set of traces such that ∀s ∈ trace(Θ),Θ ` s.
Definition 8.5.4 (satisfaction up to observables). A process Obss(P ) synchronously
satisfies Θ, denoted P |=sync Θ, when the following two conditions hold:
1. (output safety) Obss(P ) ⊂ trace(Θ).
2.a (input consistency) Whenever s ∈ Obss(P ) and s · ` ∈ trace(Θ) where ` =
s[p, q]?l(v) is an input, s · `′ ∈ Obss(P ) and `′ is an input with the shape `′ =
s[p, q]?l′(v′), then s · ` ∈ Obss(P ).
A process P asynchronously satisfies Θ, denoted P |=async Θ, if, after replacing each
Obss(P ) with Obsa(P ), it satisfies condition 1. above and the following condition:
178
8.5 Theory for Stateful Specifications
2.b (input consistency) Whenever s ∈ Obsa(P ) and s · ` ∈ trace(Θ) where ` is an
input, then s · ` ∈ Obsa(P ).
Note that, for synchronous process (2.a), it can accept a valid input only when it is
ready to receive it; while for asynchronous process (2.b), it can accept and should accept
a valid input. Intuitively, Definition 8.5.4 says that a process P synchronously (resp.
asynchronously) satisfies Θ if, w.r.t. synchronous (resp. asynchronous) observables, P
always does valid outputs as far as it receives valid inputs.
Example 8.5.5 (valid/invalid traces according to Gassign). We consider Θass from
Example 8.3.1 which uses the local SP, projected from Gassign (given in Section 8.1.3),
for the server side. Then, for example,
s2[B,S]?req(ε) · s2[S,B]!ans〈1〉 · s1[B,S]?req(ε)·s1[S,B]!ans〈2〉
is a valid trace of Θass, but
s2[B,S]?req(ε) · s2[S,B]!ans〈2〉 · s1[B,S]?req(ε) · s1[B,S]!ans〈1〉
is not its trace (violation is at the second step), because it is not permitted by a remote
observer with Θass when she observes it.
Lemma 8.5.6. s ∈ Obss(P ), P |=sync Θ implies s ∈ trace(Θ).
Proof. Directly from Definition 8.5.4. 
8.5.2 Asynchronously Verifiable Specifications
We say Θ is asynchronous if it is suitable for a remote observer to verify the behaviour of
a process. In this case, we do not want the conformance of a trace to change depending
on an accidental reordering due to asynchrony, i.e. we want its validity to be robust
w.r.t. legal permutations. In the follows, the protocols introduced in Section 8.1.2 are
used.
Definition 8.5.7 (asynchronously verifiable specification). We say Θ is asyn-
chronously verifiable or simply asynchronous when s ∈ trace(Θ) and s y s′ imply
s′ ∈ trace(Θ).
To check violation of asynchrony of a specification, we only have to find a single accept-
able trace whose permutation is not acceptable.
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Example 8.5.8. This example uses Gsync introduced in Example 8.1.2, Section 8.1.2.
Let Tsync be the local SP at server, projected from Gsync.
Θsync = 〈Γ′sync, a : I(Gsync[S]); ∆′sync, {si[S] : Tsync}i∈I ;D′sync, c〉
where I is the set of indexes for the sessions using Gsync. This specification is not
asynchronous because Θsync can accept trace
s1[C, S]?req(ε)·s1[S,C]!ans〈1〉·s2[C, S]?req(ε)s2[S,C]!ans〈2〉
but cannot accept the trace below which is permuted from the trace above
s1[C, S]?req(ε)·s2[C, S]?req(ε)·s2[S,C]!ans〈2〉·s1[S,C]!ans〈1〉
On the other hand, checking asynchrony by Definition 8.5.7 means we should verify this
property for all traces, which are usually infinitely many. Later we shall introduce the
decidable methods by which we can approve the asynchrony of, for example, Θass and
all the corresponding specifications that apply stateful protocols Gpcs/Givc and Gasync.
The following characterisation says that, if a synchronous observer recognises that
P conforms to Θ, i.e. if P conforms to Θ synchronously, then an asynchronous observer
will also do the same.
Proposition 8.5.9. Θ is asynchronous iff, for each P , P |=sync Θ implies P |=async Θ.
Proof. For (⇒), assume P |=sync Θ and Θ is asynchronous. By definition, P |=sync Θ
means Obss(P ) ⊂ trace(Θ). Since Θ is asynchronous, by Definition 8.5.7, all legal
permutation variants of trace(Θ) are in trace(Θ). This implies all legal permutation
variants of Obss(P ), which is Obsa(P ), are in trace(Θ). Thus P |=async Θ as required.
For (⇐), since ∀P, P |=sync Θ implies P |=async Θ, we know
∀P,∀s ∈ Obss(P ) ⊂ trace(Θ) and sy s′ implies s′ ∈ Obsa(P ) ⊂ trace(Θ).
By Definition 8.5.7, Θ is asynchronous. 
Let I(s) be the sequence of input actions of s, O(s) be the sequence of output actions of
s, and V(s) be the sequence of values carried in s. Let num(s) be the length of s, and
prefix(s) be the set of prefixes of s. Let ses(s) be the set of sessions occuring in trace
s, and, similarly, ses(Θ) be the set of sessions involving in Θ, i.e. those sessions obeying
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Θ. Note that, the size of set ses(s) is increasing when new sessions are created by a
local process; similarly, the size of set ses(Θ) is increasing when new sessions obeying
Θ are created. Moreover, let v(`) be the value carried by action `.
When a state is declared in a local specification, since a specification can dynamically
verify sequence of actions during runtime, the state may be changed with the incoming
or outgoing actions according to the update rules defined in the specification. Therefore,
the current value of a state in a specification should be defined with actions of a process
because these actions may make the value of state change.
Definition 8.5.10. Define field(Θ) as the set of states declared in Θ. If c ∈ field(Θ),
then c is a state declared in Θ.
Definition 8.5.11 (current value of a state with respect to Θ and actions).
Let f ∈ field(Θ) and val(f ,Θ′) be the value of state f when the configuration of
specification is Θ′. Define the current value of state f as
current(f ,Θ, s) = val(f ,Θ′) where Θ s−→ Θ′.
Based on this definition, current(f ,Θ, s) is the current value of state f according to Θ,
which specifies the initial value of f , when actions in s have happened.
Definition 8.5.12 (initial value of a state w.r.t. Θ). Define current(f ,Θ, ∅) be
the initial value of state f which is declared in Θ.
The initial value of a state should have been declared in Θ. For example, as f 7→ ini is
declared in Θ, we have current(f ,Θ, ∅) = ini.
Lemma 8.5.13. Assume c ∈ field(Θsync) and current(c,Θsync, ∅) = ini. Assume
every session si guided by Gsync has been established. Θsync is defined as below:
Θsync = 〈ser : I(Gsync[S]) ;
{si[S] : C?req(ε)〈〈true ; ε〉〉.C!ans(x : int)〈〈x = c ; c := c+ 1〉〉}i∈I ;
c 7→ ini〉
where I is the set of indexes of sessions. If s′ ∈ trace(Θsync), then for any s resulting
from permutations s′ y s, s satisfies the followings:
cond 1. If session s ∈ ses(s), then session s ∈ ses(Θsync).
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cond 2. ∀s′′ ∈ prefix(s), num(I(s′′)) ≥ num(O(s′′)).
cond 3. If s0 ·` ∈ s ∩ ` = s[S,B]!ans〈v〉, then ∃ `′ ∈ s0, `′ = s[B,S]?req(ε).
cond 4. ∀`, `′ ∈ O(s), ` 6= `′, implies v(`) 6= v(`′).
cond 5. ∀` ∈ O(s′′), s′′ ∈ prefix(s), ini ≤ v(`) < num(I(s′′)) + ini.
Proof. It is proved in Appendix C.1.
Proposition 8.5.14. Assume c′, log ∈ field(Θass) and current(c′,Θass, ∅) = ini′ =
ini−1, current(log,Θass, ∅) = { }. Assume every session si guided by Gassign has been
established. Θass is defined below:
Θass = 〈ser : I(Gassign[S]) ;
{si[S] : C?req(ε)〈〈true ; c′ := c′ + 1, log := log ∪ {c′}〉〉.
C!ans(x : int)〈〈x ∈ log ; log := log \ {x}〉〉}i∈I ;
c′ 7→ ini′, log 7→ { }〉
where I is the set of indexes of sessions. s satisfies all conditions listed in Lemma 8.5.13,
if and only if s ∈ trace(Θass).
Proof. It is proved in Appendix C.1.
Definition 8.5.15 (the strongest asynchronous specification). Let Θ1 be the
strongest asynchronous specificaiton w.r.t Θ2 if
1. Θ1 is asynchronous, and
2. ∀P.(s ∈ Obss(P ) ∩ P |=sync Θass) if and only if s ∈ trace(Θass).
Proposition 8.5.16. Θass is the strongest specification w.r.t Θsync.
Proof. Based on Definition 8.5.15, it is proved directly from Lemma 8.5.13 and Propo-
sition 8.5.14.
Lemma 8.5.17. If P |=sync Θsync, then ∀s ∈ Obsa(P ) implies s ∈ trace(Θass)
Proof. Firslty, P |=sync Θsync means that, for any s′ ∈ Obss(P ), we have s′ ∈ trace(Θsync),
and for any s ∈ Obsa(P ), s is the result of legal permutations from some s′ ∈ Obss(P ).
In other words, for any s ∈ Obsa(P ), there exists s′ such that s′ ∈ Obss(P ) and
s′ ∈ trace(Θsync), then s can be reached from s′ y s. Based on Lemma 8.5.13, s
satisfies conditions listed there. Since for any s satisfies these conditions, by Lemma
8.5.14, it implies s ∈ trace(Θass), thus s ∈ trace(Θass). 
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Definition 8.5.18 (input-output alternating sequence). Let `ini be the ith input
action and `outi be the ith output action. s is called an input-output alternating sequence
if it is of the shape
s = `in1 ·`out1 ·`in2 ·`out2 .....
where `in1 is the first action and the sequence of actions will end up with `ink or `
in
k ·`outk
for some k ≥ 1.
Proposition 8.5.19. If P |=sync Θass, then P |=async Θass.
Proof. It can be proved by proving that Θass is asynchronous through proving it is
commutative with the definitions and propositions introduced later. Another direct
proof without proving that Θass is asynchronous is provided in Appendix C.1.
Proposition 8.5.20. Assume s is an input-output alternating sequence. If s ∈ trace(Θass),
then s ∈ trace(Θsync).
Proof. Please see Appendix C.1.
The additional lemmas for proving Propositions 8.5.19 and 8.5.20 are in Appendix C.
Although Proposition 8.5.20 says that Gassign is an asynchronous verifiable specification
that can realise synchronous behaviours w.r.t Θsync, the other way round is not true.
The following example illustrates this point.
Example 8.5.21. Assume the initial value of state c ∈ Θass is empty set (i.e. c 7→ {})
and the initial value of state t is 1. Also, assume the initial value of c ∈ Θsync is 1.
Consider a trace s:
s1[C, S]?req(ε)·s2[C, S]?req(ε)·s1[S,C]!ans〈2〉
then s ∈ trace(Θass) but s 6∈ Obsa(P ) where P |=sync Θsync because there does not
exist s′ ∈ trace(Θsync) such that s′ y s.
The next result says that asynchronous verifiability is consistent with the asynchronous
trace equivalence. Below let P ≈async Q mean Obsa(P ) = Obsa(Q). In (88), we have
shown how ≈async (but not its synchronous counterpart) can be used for non-trivial
optimising transformation.
Proposition 8.5.22. If P ≈async Q and P |=async Θ then Q |=async Θ.
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Proof. Assume P ≈async Q and P |=async Θ. We first show Obsa(Q) ⊂ trace(Θ). By
assumption we have:
1. If s ∈ Obsa(Q), then s ∈ Obsa(P ) based on P ≈async Q .
2. If s ∈ Obsa(P ), then s ∈ trace(Θ) based on P |=async Θ.
Hence if s ∈ Obsa(Q), then s ∈ trace(Θ), as required.
We next show input consistency. Suppose s ∈ Obsa(Q) and s · ` ∈ trace(Θ) where
` is input. P ≈async Q implies s ∈ Obsa(P ), and P |=async Θ implies s · ` ∈ Obsa(P ).
Again by P ≈async Q, we obtain s ·` ∈ Obsa(Q) as required. This concludes the proof.
8.5.3 Commutativity
A basic issue in Definition 8.5.7 and its characterisation in Proposition 8.5.9 is that
they do not directly mention the (intensional) structure of specifications. Thus it does
not offer engineers insights as to how one may design her/his specifications. Extending
the usage of the term in (81), we may call a criteria for specifications which a designer
can use for ensuring robustness w.r.t. asynchrony, healthiness condition. The following
definition is a first step towards such a criteria.
Definition 8.5.23 (confluence). Θ is confluent if, whenever Θ s−→ Θ′, if Θ′ `1·` 2−−→ Θ′′
and `2`1 y `1`2, then Θ′
`2·` 1−−→ Θ′′ again.
I.e. the specification accepts the same sequence of values regardless of legal permutations
and the resulting states are the same. Immediately confluence means asynchrony.
Lemma 8.5.24. Θ is asynchronous iff s · `1 · `2 ∈ trace(Θ) and `1 · `2 y `2 · `1 imply
s · `2 · `1 ∈ trace(Θ) for each s, `1 and `2.
Proof. For (⇒), it is trivial by Definitions 8.5.7 and 8.5.23. For (⇐), we want to prove
that all cases should satisfy Definition 8.5.7, thus Θ is asynchronous. The reasonings
are as follows:
1. If s = ∅, which is not permutable, then ∀`1·` 2 ∈ trace(Θ), `1·` 2 y `2·` 1 ∈ trace(Θ)
satisfies Definition 8.5.7.
2. If s 6= ∅, several cases are analysed below:
(1) If s 6y, which means s is not permutable with any other sequence of actions,
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(a) when neither `1 nor `2 can permute with s, then the only permutable
actions in s·`1 ·`2 ∈ trace(Θ) is `1 ·`2 y `2 ·`1, and s·`2 ·`1 ∈ trace(Θ).
It satisfies Definition 8.5.7.
(b) when there exists `′1, .., `′j ∈ s such that `2 (or `1) is permutable with
`′1, .., `′j . Note that, since permutations are done one by one through
legal unit permutation, s should be of the following shape:
s = s0 ·`′1..`′j−1 ·`′j ,
where s0 is not permutable at all (i.e. it means that s0 is empty, or
actions in s0 are not permutable with each other and no action in s0 is
permutable with any action of `′1, .., `′j .) Assume that is `2 can permute
with `′1, .., `′j−1. Then
s0 ·`′1..`′j−1 ·`′j ·`1 ·`2 y
s0 ·`′1..`′j−1 ·`′j ·`2 ·`1 y
s0 ·`′1..`′j−1 ·`2 ·`′j ·`1
Let s0 ·`′1..`′j−1 ·`2 = s′ ·`2. It is either
(i) `2 can permute with some actions in `′1..`′j−1 then it is still under
the analysis of case 2.(1)(b), or
(ii) `2 has permuted to all permutable actions in s′ until s0, which is not
permutable at all. Then it is case 2.(1)(a) that satisfies Definition
8.5.7.
Similarly, if `2·`1 y `1·`2 and `1 can permute with some actions in s, it
is again under the analysis of case 2.(1)(b).
(2) If there exists s′ such that sy s′, s should be of the following shape:
s = s′1 ·`′′1 ·`′′2 ·s′2,
where `′′1 ·`′′2 y `′′2 ·`′′1 and actions in s′2 are not permutable with each other
and no action in s′2 is permutable with any action in s′1·`′′1·`′′2. Then consider
s′1 ·`′′1 ·`′′2 ·s′2`1 ·`2 y s′1 ·`′′1 ·`′′2 ·s′2`2 ·`1
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It is either
(a) `2 is not permutable with s′2, then we only consider the part s′1 ·`′′1 ·`′′2,
since s ·`1 ·`2 ∈ trace(Θ) implies s ∈ trace(Θ), which again implies
s′1 ·`′′1 ·`′′2 ∈ trace(Θ), so that s′1 ·`′′2 ·`′′1 ∈ trace(Θ), and this case (i.e.
s′1 ·`′′1 ·`′′2) is under the analysis of case 2.(1)(b).
(b) `2 is permutable with s′1 ·`′′1 ·`′′2 ·s′2. Then it is again in case 2.(1)(b).
Since all situations in 2.(1)(b) will finally go to 2.(1)(b)(ii), which means when the
permutation terminates, it satisfies Definition 8.5.7. Overall, all possible cases satisfy
Definition 8.5.7, thus Θ is asynchronous. 
Proposition 8.5.25. If Θ is confluent, then it is asynchronous.
Proof. Directly from Definition 8.5.23 and Lemma 8.5.24. 
Note that the other way round is not true. The example below illustrates this point.
Example 8.5.26. Assume the initial values of states c and t are both 0, and the local
SP for role p in session s is:
s[p] : q1!ans(ε)〈〈true; c = 50〉〉 . q2!ans(ε)〈〈true; t = c+ 10〉〉
Let `1 = s[p, q1]!ans〈ε〉 and `2 = s[p, q2]!ans〈ε〉. Then `1 ·`2 makes state t be 60, but
`2 ·`1 makes state t be 10.
One can easily find a specification which is not confluent (for example, if a specifi-
cation just does the same counting as the one defined with stateful protocol Gsync). To
check confluence, we still need to consider all possible transition derivatives of Θ. How-
ever we can observe that, in such a derivative, the obligations used to check confluence
are already present in Θ. This suggests us to only look at the obligations occurring in
Θ and check their commutativity w.r.t. their legal unit permutations. This method
demands designers to look only at Θ, so that it clearly helps her/his design process.
The method treats a predicate and an update in an obligation as functions (operations)
on state, as follows. Let † ∈ {?, !}.
Definition 8.5.27 (predicate/update functions). Let ξ def= r † l(x : S )〈〈A;E〉〉
with the associated state D whose domain is f1, ..., fn. W.l.o.g. we regard E to be a
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simultaneous substitution of the form f1 := e1, ..., fn := en. Then we define:
pred(ξ)
def
= λx, f1, ..., fn.A upd(ξ)
def
= λx, f1, ..., fn.〈e1, .., en〉
We call pred(ξ) (resp. upd(ξ)) the predicate function (resp. update function) of ξ.
Example 8.5.28. Below we project Gsync and Gassign (all from Section 8.1) to the
server. For simplicity we assume its local state only consists of those fields specified in
global SP.
Gsync  S = B?req(ε)〈〈true; ε〉〉 . B!ans(x : int)〈〈x = c ; c := c+ 1〉〉
Gassign  S = B?req(ε)〈〈true; t := t+ 1 c := c ∪ {t}〉〉 .
B!ans(x : int)〈〈x ∈ c ; c := c \ {x}〉〉
Then the following table gives the functions induced by obligations in these local types.
input output
Gsync  S ξ0 def= B?req(ε)〈〈true; ε〉〉 ξ1 def= B!ans(x : int)〈〈x = c; c := c+ 1〉〉
pred(ξ0)
def
= λε, c.(true) pred(ξ1)
def
= λx, c.(x = c)
upd(ξ0)
def
= λε, c.〈〈ε〉〉 upd(ξ1) def= λx, c.〈〈c+ 1〉〉
Gassign  S ξ2
def
= B?req(ε)〈〈true; t := t+ 1 c := c ∪ {t}〉〉 ξ3 def= B!ans(x : int)〈〈x ∈ c ; c := c \ {x}〉〉
pred(ξ2)
def
= λε, c.(true) pred(ξ3)
def
= λx, c.(x ∈ c)
upd(ξ2)
def
= λε, c.〈〈t+ 1 c ∪ {t}〉〉 upd(ξ3) def= λx, c.〈〈c \ {x}〉〉
Once we can treat obligations as operations on state, we can define their commutativity.
Since the commutativity we need is asymmetric (corresponding to asymmetric permu-
tations induced by asynchrony, cf. Definition 8.4.12), we define semi-commutativity,
which plays a key role in validating specifications later. A precursor of the following
construction in a different setting is found in (52) (see Chapter 9 for discussions).
Definition 8.5.29 (semi-commutativity). Assume w.l.o.g., ξi and ξj use f as the
field. Then we say ξi commutes over ξj if, for any message values vi and vj (for ξi and
ξj), and any initial state w (for f), the following conditions hold: If pred(ξi)(vi, w) and
pred(ξj)(vj , upd(ξi)(vi, w)) are both true, then
1. pred(ξj)(vj , w) and pred(ξi)(vi, upd(ξj)(vj , w)) are both true.
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2. upd(ξj)(vj , upd(ξi)(vi, w)) = upd(ξi)(vi, upd(ξj)(vj , w)).
If ξi commutes over ξj and vice versa, then we say ξi and ξj are commutative.
Note that the if statement says that it should satisfy the conditions above for any kind
of initial values. I will explain the reason with Example 8.5.36 after Definition 8.5.31
and Proposition 8.5.34 are introduced.
Example 8.5.30. We show ξ1 in Example 8.5.28 does not commute over itself. Let
f = c. Then pred(ξ1)(1, 1), pred(ξ1)(2, upd(ξ1)(1, 1)) and pred(ξ1)(2, 2) are all true,
however pred(ξ1)(2, 1) = false. Similarly, ξ0 does not commute over ξ1 (however ξ0, ξ0
are commutative).
Using this notion, the healthiness condition for asynchronous specification can be con-
cisely stated as follows. Below we say an obligation is usable in Θ if it occurs in a local
SPin Θ or in the projection of a global SPin Θ to its potentially local role, where by
“potentially local” we mean that the role has a potential to be played locally (e.g. for the
global SPcarried by an input shared channel type (i.e. a(s[p] : G)), only the specified
role is potentially local).
Definition 8.5.31 (commutativity). Given Θ, let ξ1, .., ξn be all the obligations us-
able in Θ. Then we say Θ is commutative if the following conditions hold:
1. For (possibly identical) ξ′1 and ξ′2 from {ξ1, .., ξn}, if both are inputs or both are
outputs, then ξ′1 and ξ′2 are commutative.
2. For distinct ξ′1 and ξ′2 from {ξ1, .., ξn}, if ξ′1 is an output and ξ′2 is an input then
ξ′1 commutes over ξ′2.
Possibly identical obligations means that it can be two obligations which are exactly
the same, e.g. analysing ξ, ξ. In particular when there is only one obligation in Θ, this
obligation, say ξ, should be analysed by itself ξ, ξ to know whether it commutes over
itself.
Note that, based on Definition 8.5.29, Definition 8.5.31 states that, Θ is commutative
if, for any kind of initial values in Θ, it satisfies the conditions given above. It is very
important that it is for any initial value. Even though, assume a specification Θ is
given with initial value w, Θ satisfies all conditions above with w but not with another
initial value, say w′ 6= w, then Θ is not commutative. I.e. Θ is action confluent when
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all obligations used in the specifications for the target process commute over each other
up to legal permutations.
Before proving “Θ is commutative implies Θ is confluent”, the following lemma is
introduced.
Lemma 8.5.32. Assume Θ s−→ Θ′ for some s. If Θ is commutative, then Θ′ is commu-
tative.
Proof. For (⇒), because Θ′ ⊂ Θ:
1. For any obligation ξ ∈ Θ′, ξ ∈ Θ′ implies ξ ∈ Θ, where Θ is commutative so that
ξ itself is commutative.
2. For any two obligations ξ, ξ′ ∈ Θ but ξ′ 6∈ Θ′ (an obligation may be finished
since the conversation is finished. See Figure 8.3, the LTS of specifications), since
ξ itself should be commutative due to ξ ∈ Θ and Θ is commutative, ξ is still
commutative in Θ′ even it is alone.
Thus Θ′ is commutative with new values of states resulting from Θ s−→ Θ′ if Θ is
commutative. 
Note that the other way round (i.e. ⇐) is not true because, while Θ′ is derived from Θ,
Θ can have more obligations than what Θ′ does. Θ′ is commutative cannot imply that
Θ is commutative.
Remark 8.5.33. Definitions 8.5.27 and 8.5.29 imply every obligation ξ corresponds to
a valid action, and vice versa.
We have soundness characterisation for asynchronously verifiable specifications:
Theorem 8.5.34 (soundness characterisation: commutativity). If Θ is commu-
tative then it is confluent (hence asynchronous).
Proof. Assume that Θ is commutative is given, let Θ s−→ Θ′ for some s. Assume Θ′ `1·` 2−−→
Θ′′ for some `1 and `2, and `1·`2 y `2·`1. We will show that Θ′ `2·` 1−−→ Θ′′′ and Θ′′ = Θ′′′.
Assume the value carried by `i is vi, i = {1, 2}. Since Θ′ is commutative based on
Lemma 8.5.32:
1. When both of `1 and `2 are for output (resp. for input), these actions correspond
to (possibly identical) obligations ξ1 and ξ2 from Θ′, which are both for outputs
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(resp. for inputs). Assume the vector of values of states f˜ ∈ ξ1 ∪ ξ2 is w˜, then
because Θ′ is commutative,
pred(ξ1)(v1, w˜) = pred(ξ2)(v2, upd(ξ1)(v1, w˜)) = true
implies
pred(ξ2)(v2, w˜) = pred(ξ1)(v1, upd(ξ2)(v2, w˜)) = true
which means Θ′ `2·` 1−−→ Θ′′′ for some Θ′′′, and moreover,
upd(ξ1)(v1, upd(ξ2)(v2, w˜)) = upd(ξ2)(v2, upd(ξ1)(v1, w˜)) = w˜′
which means `1 ·`2 and `2 ·`1 consume the same obligations and they reach the
same value of states w˜′, so that we have Θ′′ = Θ′′′.
2. When `1 is for output and `2 is for input, these actions correspond to distinct
obligations ξ1 and ξ2 from Θ′, which are separately for output and for input.
Assume the vector of values of states f˜ ∈ ξ1 ∪ ξ2 is w˜, then
pred(ξ1)(v1, w˜) = pred(ξ2)(v2, upd(ξ1)(v1, w˜)) = true
implies
pred(ξ2)(v2, w˜) = pred(ξ1)(v1, upd(ξ2)(v2, w˜)) = true
which means Θ′ `2·` 1−−→ Θ′′′ for some Θ′′′, and moreover,
upd(ξ1)(v1, upd(ξ2)(v2, w˜)) = upd(ξ2)(v2, upd(ξ1)(v1, w˜)) = w˜′.
which means `1 ·`2 and `2 ·`1 consume the same obligations and they reach the
same value of states w˜′, so that we have Θ′′ = Θ′′′.
Note that the other way round is not true. The completeness characterisation is
however more difficult because we need to know the invariants of initial value of the
state which is asserted by logical formula and stipulated by update rules. The following
examples explain the reasons.
Example 8.5.35. Assume Θ has the following local SP, called T . The initial value of
c ∈ Θ is 2, and c will only be updated by the actions defined in T . It shows that Θ is
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confluent but not commutative.
T = B!{ans1(ε)〈〈true ; c := c+ 1〉〉 ,
ans2(ε)〈〈c < 2 ; c := c+ c〉〉}.
end
It is confluent because based on Definition 8.5.23, we assume Θ starts from initial value
of c, which is 2. Whenever Θ s−→ Θ′ `1·` 2−−→ Θ′′ and `1·`2 y `2·`1, Θ s−→ Θ′ `2·` 1−−→ Θ′′ is true
because `1 or `2 never be with branch ans2; otherwise it becomes Θ′ 6 `1·` 2−−→, which is not
the case considered.
On the other hand, because Definition 8.5.31 asks that Θ is commutative if it satisfies
the commutativity conditions for any kind of initial value of c, we know that it does
not satisfy the conditions immediately when the initial value of c is smaller than 2 (i.e.,
1, 0, -1, -2, ...). Thus Θ is not commutative.
The main motivation to have property of commutativity for Θ is that commutativity
provides a soundness characterisation, and a more easily verifiable way to decide if Θ
is confluent, which automatically implies it is asynchronous-verifiable.
Comparing Definition 8.5.23 and Definition 8.5.31, readers may feel curious about
why commutativity should hold for any possible initial value of a state f . The reason is
because, generally, we do not know what the invariants of the initial values of the states
of a given Θ are. To ensure that a Θ is commutative, we need to know if it satisfies all
conditions for all possible initial values. The following example illustrates this point:
Example 8.5.36. Consider a specification, Θ, having a state c with initial value 8
and the following local SP, called T . Assume T is for endpoint s[q] and c will only be
updated by the actions defined in T .
T = p1!req1(ε)〈〈c < 10; ε〉〉.
p2!req2(ε)〈〈c < 10; c := c+ 1〉〉.
end
If commutativity is defined only for a particular initial value of c ∈ Θ, which is 8,
then Θ is commutative; however, Θ is not confluent. Let `1 = s[q, p1]!req1〈ε〉 and
`2 = s[q, p2]!req2〈ε〉, when several actions in trace s update c and c becomes 9, and
Θ
s−→ Θ′ `1·` 2−−→ Θ′′
is achieved, `1 ·`2 y `2 ·`1, but Θ′ 6 `2·` 1−−→.
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This is because the value of c is changing as actions happen. If Definition 8.5.31
only considers particular initial value of c, then
1. the checking of commutativity is, however, done by a snapshot for any possible
pair ξi, ξj ∈ Θ. It can not reflect the real situation of the changes of value of c;
2. or, we know exactly what the invariant of Θ is; e.g. the initial value of c should
be bigger than or equal to 10. With this invariant, Θ is confluent. But generally,
to find out the invariant(s) of a specification is difficult, which will be part of the
future works.
Thus, we generate the soundness characterisation with the following concept:
Remark 8.5.37. Whenever any possible snapshot is taken with any kind of initial
value of c, Θ satisfies the conditions defined in Definition 8.5.31 then Θ is commutative.
As mentioned in point 2 above, the method of checking commutativity can be
strengthened by adding an invariant (including correlation among states) in state and
checking that invariant continues to hold at each step. We can now show all our ex-
ample specifications with the stateful protocols except the one induced by Gsync is
asynchronous. Below, let Θasync’s shared environment contains server : I(Gasync[S]),
and let its data storage contains c 7→ {}.
Θasync = 〈ser : I(Gasync[S]));
{sj [S] : C?req(ε)〈〈true ; ε〉〉.C!ans(x : int)〈〈x 6∈ c; c := c ∪ {x}〉〉}j∈J ;
c 7→ { }〉
where J is the set of indexes of sessions obeying Gasync. Then we have the following
proposition:
Proposition 8.5.38. Θasync and Θass at server are both commutative, hence asyn-
chronous.
Proof. Commutativity of operations in Θasync is immediate. For Θass, we use ξ2 and ξ3
from Example 8.5.28. Then ξ3 easily commutes over itself, because if pred(ξ3)(v, c) =
true and pred(ξ3)(v′, upd(ξ3)(v, c)) = pred(ξ3)(v′, c \ {v}) = true, so that
pred(ξ3)(v
′, c) = true.
When v 6= v′, we clearly have
pred(ξ3)(v, upd(ξ3)(v
′, c)) = pred(ξ3)(v, c \ {v′}) = true.
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When v = v′, due to pred(ξ3)(v, c) = true and pred(ξ3)(v′, c \ {v}) which together
imply that c contains at least two elements whose values are v = v′, we clearly have
pred(ξ3)(v, c \ {v′}) = true. Similarly upd(ξ3)(v′, upd(ξ3)(v, c)) = upd(ξ3)(v′, c \ {v}) =
c \ {v} \ {v′} which is equal to upd(ξ3)(v, upd(ξ3)(v′, c)) = upd(ξ3)(v, c \ {v′})) =
c \ {v′} \ {v}. We can similarly check ξ2 is commutative over itself, and ξ3 commutes
over ξ2 (but not the converse), as required. 
We can similarly check specifications induced by Gpcs and Givc are commutative.
Compare the definition of commutativity and the permutation rules of Θ, as ex-
plained in the beginning of Section 8.4.1, they have different usage:
Remark 8.5.39. Attribute of commutativity is used for developers to know whether
a Θ is asynchronous, while the permutation rules (defined in Definition 8.4.4) are used
for an observer (e.g. system monitor) to have to observe the incoming and outgoing
non-order-preserved actions.
The valuation of commutativity is essentially satisfiability of a formula whose free
variables are universally quantified. Thus if the logic (for predicates) we use for our
specification language is decidable, commutativity is decidable. In particular:
Proposition 8.5.40. With the SP language given in Section8.2 restricting operations
on integers to be the constant, the addition and the subtraction, then the commutativity
of specifications is decidable.
Proof. By (161), a logic with sets, products and integers with additions is decidable,
which subsumes the formulae used in Definition 8.5.29. 
We discuss practical implications of these results in the conclusion of Section 9.1.3,
Chapter 9.
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9Conclusions and Future Topics
9.1 Conclusions and Discussions
This thesis provides fundamental theories for governing real-life large-scale distributed
systems from the process calculus to the monitoring mechanism, from session types to
stateful specifications. We summarise the main theory chapters, which are Chapter 5,
6, 7, and 8, with conclusions and discussions in the following sections.
9.1.1 The Capability-passing pi-calculus
The capability-passing pi-calculus proposed in Chapter 5, extends the asynchronous pi-
calculus by additional primitives of request and accept. These can be used to create
sessions linearly and enable the authentication of activities through pattern-matching
of the capabilities of proposed participants. The calculus enjoys race-freedom at ses-
sion roles (86) and reduces the tasks of endpoint access control by filtering unmatched
capabilities.
Recently dynamic joining mechanisms have been studied in the conversation-calculus
(26) (which uses conversation contexts) and (50) (which is based on roles). These for-
malisms enable the tracking of participants through roles, but do not enable their con-
trols through capabilities. This thesis formalises asynchronous session creation with
capability primitives through passing invitations at shared channels, while (26, 50) for-
malise joining to the existing session and maintain progress by advanced static type
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checking. The result is that this thesis focuses on runtime enforcement of global pro-
tocol properties rather than static type checking, and on enforcement of properties by
local runtime monitoring. Our framework also incorporates logical assertions, offering
more fine-grained logical specifications than the bare protocols representable by types.
The adequacy of this formalism is demonstrated by the properties we provide in our
discussions of the calculus of dynamic asynchronously monitoring.
9.1.2 The Calculus of Dynamic Asynchronously Monitoring
The session-based specification and monitoring framework in which external monitors
evaluate behaviours according to these specifications are respectively studied in Chap-
ters 6 and 7. Session-based specifications, introduced in Chapter 6, provide developers
with the ability to build up their own security protocols. System developers can program
their desired global protocols through an intuitive description language. As an endpoint
process starts a session, which generally involves multiple parties, she can select a well-
defined protocol from a system library or define a protocol by herself for this session to
obey. Then she, as an invitor, invites other parties, called invitees, to join this session
playing particular roles defined in the protocol. As an invitee agrees to join the session
to play a role, the invitor gives invitees corresponding external monitor guidance of
endpoint behaviours, which takes the form of a specification encapsulating a local pro-
jection. The endpoint monitor therefore gets the ability to guard invitees’ behaviours
against the guidance and determines whether their behaviours obey the protocol or not.
Chapter 7 contains a model of distributed monitoring featuring the following ele-
ments: (I) endpoint code is possibly ill-behaved; (II) global specifications enable concise
global specifications of application-level multi-party protocols; and (III) conformance
to global protocols is guaranteed at runtime through local monitoring. This monitoring
framework can be seen as a distributed variant of runtime verification in the sense of
(16, 60, 73). It is light-weight, concerned only with the observable executions, and does
not aim to give a conclusive analysis about all their possible behaviours. Hence it is
applicable to real-world systems, where off-line formal verification and static checking
are intractable or impossible due to incomplete information on system components or
the dynamic change in requirements.
There are two important principles of the theories of monitoring: soundness (safety),
which states that enforcement results in a correct behaviour, and transparency, which
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requires behaviour of a correct program not be modified (a principle studied for example
in an automata framework (43, 143)). Our monitor suppresses (108) the illegal actions
(as seen in (else) case of M `−→ M′) but neither immediately halts the process nor
inserts the correct actions. Incorporating more elaborate reactions, as in edit automata
(108, 143) is an interesting future topic. None of the above work can ensure the fidelity
to application-level multi-party global protocols for distributed applications with logical
properties.
9.1.3 Specifying Asynchronous Stateful Specifications
The characterisation results in Chapter 8 (see Section 8.5) offer not only a decision
procedure for a rich subset of specifications, but also a basic insight in the design
methodology for asynchronous specifications. In particular they shed light on the use
of operations on sets in our examples in Section 8.1. Because checking commutativity
relies solely on the obligations occurring in protocols, adding recursion to the syntax.
does not change the nature of commutativity checking nor the resulting guarantee.
If Θ is asynchronous and a process behaves properly w.r.t. Θ synchronously, an
asynchronous observer will also judge the induced (permuted) trace is proper w.r.t. Θ.
It is however easy to see that the converse is not true: for example, consider a server
that violates Θass by responding 2 to the first request, 1 to the second, but these are
delayed by asynchrony, leading to a valid trace when they arrive at the remote observer.
A key consistency property is that any further legal permutation of this valid trace is
again valid. For example, if a system monitor for Server is sitting between Buyer (i.e.
as a client) and Server, and if this monitor observes a valid trace of Server against the
specification she has, Buyer will observe no worse behaviour. This monotonic attribute
gives a basis for an application of the presented framework such as runtime monitoring.
The semantic differences between synchronous and asynchronous communications
have been studied for several decades: early works include (7, 45, 84, 90). The permuta-
tions associated with asynchronous communication used in Definition 8.4.12 are noted
in these works (and implicit in such work as (98)). Their more explicit presentation in
the categorical setting is found in (147). There is also a study in component validation
based on asynchronous histories such as (130). In spite of these precursors and close
technical connection, the existing works (except (21) which however focuses on syn-
chronous specifications and proof rules for their verifications) may not have pointed out
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the concrete semantic issues which stateful behavioural specifications and asynchronous
observables can induce, and how these issues can be resolved through the interplay
between synchronous and asynchronous semantics.
As observed in Section 8.5.3, a close analogue of the commutativity of operations
used for our characterisation result (Definition 8.5.29) appears in (52), where the authors
study a method for checking commutativity (called diamond connectivity) of operations
with pre-conditions in object-oriented programs, with a view to preventing the simul-
taneous issuance of these operations when they are not commutative. They do not
(aim to) determine a class of specifications suitable for asynchronously communicating
processes.
In contrast, we stipulate a general class of specifications for communicating pro-
cesses suitable for asynchronous observations, and identify its subclass amenable for
automatic verification. We use commutativity to capture asymmetry in asynchronous
communications. Moreover, we propose and prove the properties for asserting that an
asynchronously verifiable specification is the strongest while one wishes to transform a
synchronously verifiable specification to an asynchronously verifiable one .
9.1.4 Concluding Remarks
The achievements of this thesis include (I) establishing formal syntax and semantics
for the session-based dynamic monitoring with control capabilities, (II) proposing a
fine-grained process calculus for linear asynchronous session creation, (III) exploring
the differences between monitoring the behaviours of the local and the global, (IV)
enriching theories of session types by embedding endpoints’ states into specifications,
(V) exploring the differences of observable behaviours between stateful asynchronous
and stateful synchronous monitoring, and (VI) proving properties of local and global
safety (soundness), transparency, and session fidelity (completeness) for the monitoring,
and proposing and proving properties for validating asynchronous specifications. As a
cooperative project, the large-scale cyber-infrastructure of OOI (129) is adopting our
theories as a blueprint for designing their governance systems. Also, a session-based
description language, called Scribble (83, 145), is embedding our specifications into its
syntax to realise more controls during programming. For the future, we have important
directions as those discussed in our future works (introduced in Section 9.2 later) to
explore using this work as a basis. We aim at exploring more theoretical results in
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stateful specifications, the adaption of stateful specifications to stateful policy languages,
commitments, and the applications of Scribble.
9.2 Future Topics
9.2.1 The Development of Scribble and Monitoring
Scribble (145, 146) is a protocol description language where a protocol is an agreement
on how participants interact with each other. Developers can use it to easily code mean-
ingful interaction: the communications among participants become effective, since they
know when to expect the other parties to send their data, or whether the other party
is ready to receive data it is sending. Scribble makes dynamic distributed monitoring
straightforward through projecting the global description, written in Scribble, to every
local endpoint as a local specification, and then embedding the generated corresponding
monitor with this local specification. It also provides developers the ability and freedom
to design their desired protocols for governing the products.
As a session-based description language, Scribble is a good subject for us to study
the comparisons between it and other policy and protocol languages through discovering
the atttributes and the semantical behaviours, and the user feedback on using Scribble.
Also, embedding assertions (as annotations) and stateful specifications into Scribble to
develop a session-based asserted monitoring methodology of industrial strength is one
of our ongoing works.
9.2.2 Exploring Structures of Asynchronous Specifications
There are many interesting open questions in the area of verifying asynchronous speci-
fications. Here we outline the topics that we are currently investigating.
One topic is to explore approaches to automatically translating a synchronous proper
stateful specification to an asynchronous proper one. In Chapter 8, two asynchronous
transformed stateful specifications Θasync and Θass are proposed for translating Θsync.
However, they are proposed mostly by intuitions instead of formal understandings of
Θsync. More properties are needed to figure out the algorithm for automatic translation.
Also, identifying and formalising the elements of Θ which make Θ asynchronously
verifiable are important. If these elements can be identified, we can formally describe
the requirements to compose an asynchronously verifiable Θ, and we can compare the
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expressiveness of different asynchronously verifiable stateful specifications concretely.
Some fundamental understanding about the elements in a specification can help us to
analyse the relationships among Θsync, Θasync, and Θass.
As Chapter 8 proves the property of soundness characterisation (see Theorem 8.5.34),
which says a commutative specification is an asynchronously verifiable specification, we
plan to investigate completeness. The difficulty of completeness has been illustrated
in Example 8.5.36 of Chapter 8. Also, Example 8.5.35 in Chapter 8 points out that
the property of commutativity is stronger than completeness by asking the conditions
hold for any possible initial value of a state because we do not know the invariants
of a given specifications. To explore these invariants, the properties of structures of
asynchronously verifiable specifications should be explored and stated.
Currently we aim to explore and analyse concrete forms of asynchronously verifiable
specifications with different structures, informed by use cases from (129) as well as
our theory, with a view to their usage in monitoring. One challenge is to find a solid
asynchronously verifiable specification framework for inherently conflicting operations,
such as two consecutive and overwriting updates on the same datum.
9.2.3 Sharing Memory in Stateful Asynchronous Specifications
As we discussed in Chapter 8, when a state is asserted in a predicate and its updating
rules are stipulated in a specification, properly specifying the specification under asyn-
chronous environment becomes critical. As a first step of this issue, in this thesis, we
confine a state of an endpoint can only be accessed by session-roles who are obeying to
the same global specification. Moreover, the state is local, which means it can only be
accessed by multi-threads of the local process possessing it; it can not be shared across
different domains.
One topic here is to analyse and realise sharing a state, which can only be accessed
by a local process, among different sessions. In other words, although a state belongs
to a particular local process, this process can join different sessions for playing different
roles. With this setting, we want to investigate the structures of a specification which
ensure that a state can be properly shared.
When we understand the above more complete, we hope to extend the topic to
sharing memory in different sessions across different domains. For example, a state is
not local to a process, but is a shared memory in the network, which can be accessed by
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authenticated session-roles. This topic will explore the session-based memory sharing
in cloud computing.
9.2.4 Governance with Stateful Policies
When we adopt a session-based governance framework where dynamic monitoring is
based on stateful specifications, it is natural to explore the corresponding stateful policy
language for specifying policies and commitments for governance.
A policy should be simply stated by a policy language so that it is readable by
general users. With this principle, we are investigating expressive policy languages for
policies which can specify traces which imply the changes of an endpoint field, rather
than complicated stateful specifications. We have learned from Chapter 8 that it is not
easy to specify an asynchronously verifiable stateful specification.
We find that there are elements which compose a specification, and those elements
are the requirements should be stated in a policy. For example, if a policy rq asks
that “in a trace, every value carried by an output action should be unique”, then Θsync,
Θasync and Θass all satisfy rq so that rq is one of the elements which compose these
specifications.
But when a policy rq says “in a trace, every content carried by an output should be
one increment larger than the content carried by its previous output”, then only Θsync
can specify, synchronously, this requirement. We say this kind of policy implies the
changes of state of a local process, and it is not a proper policy under asynchronous
environments.
Currently we are applying temporal logics to formalise the policy language, and wish
to further analyse the properties of stateful policies with the results in Chapter 8.
201
9. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE TOPICS
202
APPENDIXA
Appendix for Capability-passing Calculus
A.1 Notes for the Syntax with or without Session Creation
Rule
As the syntax defined in Figure 5.3 Chapter 5, we do not have a single rule for new-
ing a session; instead, we use bound request to combine session creation and the first
invitation. In (39), the rule for session creation, new s : G.P , is used. The advantages
of using new s : G.P are (I) clearly stating a process creates a fresh session s specified
under G, (II) enjoying flexibility for representing actions. A process is able to pass a
partial capability to another process with this design of primitives. However, this prim-
itive also makes the representation of interleaving actions too cumbersome to analyse.
For example, if the corresponding action of process new s : G.P is new s : G, and T is
projected from G as well as T ′ is projected from G′, then the sequence of actions has
the following six equivalent sequences of actions (represented by action labels):
new s : G·new s′ : G′ ·a〈s[p] : T 〉·b〈s′[p′] : T ′〉 ≡
new s′ : G′ ·new s : G·a〈s[p] : T 〉·b〈s′[p′] : T ′〉 ≡
new s : G·new s′ : G′ ·b〈s′[p′] : T ′〉·a〈s[p] : T 〉 ≡
new s′ : G′ ·new s : G·b〈s′[p′] : T ′〉·a〈s[p] : T 〉 ≡
new s : G·a〈s[p] : T 〉·new s′ : G′ ·b〈s′[p′] : T ′〉 ≡
new s′ : G′ ·b〈s′[p′] : T ′〉·new s : G·a〈s[p] : T 〉
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On the contrary, if a(s[p] : G), as an action label, is used to stand for the sequence of
actions new s : G · a〈s[p] : T 〉, there are only two equivalent sequences of actions:
a(s[p] : G)·b(s′[p′] : G′) ≡ b(s′[p′] : G′)·a(s[p] : G)
Therefore, using bound request a(s[p] : G) and free request a〈s[p] : G〉 separately can
reduce the complexity of the analysis of the sequences of actions.
Another reason is action new s : G, which corresponds to process new s : G.Preq, is
always an action belonging to a requester, Preq, but never to an acceptor because the
command of new s : G becomes duplicated when an acceptor, say Pacc, also has process
new s : G.Pacc. Instead, adopting action notation a(s[p] : G) with consistent meaning
with a(s[p] : G) for declairing s is new to the process can straightforwardly prevent the
duplication illustrated above. Similarly, a free accept syntax can represent the following
process:
a(s[p] : G).b〈s[q] : G′〉
in which there are two endpoints, a and b, are running for this process. When the first
invitation from session s comes to endpoint a, it is new to the process so that a(s[p] : G)
is applied, while the second invitation from session s comes to endpoint b, it is not new
to the process anymore so that b〈s[p] : G′〉 is applied.
A.2 Notes for the Design of I- / O-mode Shared Names
The restrictions of creating a shared name and sending a name through interaction
actions are reasoned below.
The existence of input-mode shared name is unique. Network coherence asks input-
mode shared name exists whenever there is an output-mode shared name. It is de-
fined in Definition 7.4.13 for network coherence. If we do not require this, then, as
an invitor invites other parties to join a session with the knowledge of output-mode
shared name, say a : O(G[p]), which guides the invitor who is capable of playing
role p specified under specification G, and guides it where the target is by a. If
there is no corresponding input-mode shared name, say a : im(G[p]), im ∈ {I, IO},
because the monitor of an invitor is local, the monitor can not detect that there is
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no receiver in the network as it approves this request, and may make the invitor
wait forever for non-existent response.
Creating output-mode shared name is not allowed. As we require that when-
ever there is an output-mode shared name, say a : O(G[p]), there exists its corre-
sponding input-mode shared name a : im(G[p]), im ∈ {I, IO}, if we allow a process
to create a new shared name with O-mode, then this requirement can be easily
broken because it is possible that, when output-mode shared name is created, its
corresponding input-mode shared name has not existed.
A passed shared name can only be typed with output-mode as it is received.
This restriction corresponds to those above. Refer to Figure 7.4, in which the LTS
of monitors is defined, the following example illustrates the issue. Assume there
is a process, playing sesssion-role s[p], sends a name a with specification I(G[p])
to another process playing session-role s[q]. For the sender-side, a monitor can
ensure whether the sender sends an input-mode shared name with specific speci-
fications, like s[p, q]!lj〈a〉, a monitor can check if I(G[p]) = Sj ,Γ ` Sj by refering
to
s[p] : q!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I .
For the receiver-side, as label lj is chosen with an input action, for example,
s[p, q]?lj(b),
s[q] : p?{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I
we can specify Sj at the label pool above as Sj = I(G[p]); but, the receiver-side
monitor cannot detect if a = b because it is local, and we do not wish it takes the
tasks of asking all monitors in the network one by one. If a 6= b, then, since a
is with input-mode and it has been sent out from its original owner, there is no
a with input-mode for those a with output-mode. Thus we type every received
shared name with output-mode to ensure the network coherence.
205
A. APPENDIX FOR CAPABILITY-PASSING CALCULUS
206
APPENDIXB
Appendix for Dynamic Asynchronously Monitoring
B.1 Proofs for Local Safety and Transparency
For proving Theorem 7.4.3 Local Conformance and Theorem 7.4.5 Local Transparency,
auxiliary definitions and lemmas are stated.
Lemma B.1.1. Let ` be an input action label and M `−→ as M approves label `. M `−→
implies M[P ] `−→.
Proof. By the definitions of LTS ofM andM[P ] locally, for any input action `, ifM `−→,
M[P ]
`−→. 
Theorem 7.4.3 (local safety). For each monitor M and local process P , we have
M |= M[P ].
Proof. Let
R = {(Mi[Pi],Mi) | Pi and Mi are arbitrary} (B.1)
We show that R is a conformance relation as we defined in Definition 7.4.2.
1. When ` is an output action, based on Definition 7.2.6, by deduction, M0[P0]
`−→
implies M0
`−→.
2. When ` is an input action, M0
`−→ implies M0[P0] `−→ by Lemma B.1.1.
3. If M0[P0]
`−→M′0[P ′0] and M0 `−→M′0, since the relation (B.1) asks that P ′0 and M′0
are arbitrary, we have M′0[P ′0] R M′0 hence done.
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Thus R is a conformance relation. 
Definition B.1.2 (LTS of monitor-off processes (addressed processes)). We
define M◦1[P ]
`−→M◦2[P ′] as the conjunction of M◦1 `−→M◦2 and P l−→ P ′:
M◦1
`−→M◦2, P `−→ P ′
M◦1[P ]
`−→M◦2[P ′]
Lemma B.1.3 (determinacy of gateway transitions). If M `−→ M1 and M `−→ M2
then M1 = M2. If M◦
`−→M◦1 and M◦ `−→M◦2 then M◦1 = M◦2.
Proof. By the definition of LTS of monitors, M is deterministic. Similarly, by the
definition of LTS of M◦, M◦ is deterministic, thus done. 
Definition B.1.4. We write erase(M) = M◦ a monitor-off address obtained by erasing
types, predicates and variables in M.
Lemma B.1.5.
1. If M `−→M′, then erase(M) `−→ erase(M′).
2. Given M◦ = erase(M), if M `−→M2 and erase(M) `−→M◦2, then M◦2 = erase(M2).
Proof.
1. Since M is deterministic, by the definition of erase(M), erase(M) is deterministic
corresponding to M. Thus if M `−→M2, erase(M) `−→ erase(M2).
2. Since M◦ and erase(M) are deterministic, if M◦ = erase(M) `−→ M◦2, and together
with 1. above, M `−→M2 implies erase(M) `−→ erase(M2), thus M◦2 = erase(M2).
Theorem 7.4.5 (local transparency). Let M◦ = erase(M). If M |= M◦[P ] then
M |= M◦[P ] ∼M[P ].
Proof. By assumption, we have M |= M◦[P ]. We also have M |= M[P ] by Theorem
7.4.3. Let M◦[P ] = L1 and M[P ] = L2. Let R be the minimum conformance relation
which witnesses M |= L, i.e. (L,M) ∈ R. Define R′ as:
R′ = {(M,Li,Lj) | (Li,M) ∈ R, (Lj ,M) ∈ R} (B.2)
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We show R′ is a monitored strong bisimulation for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j.
1. Suppose (M,L1,L2) ∈ R′, i.e. (M,M◦[P ],M[P ]) ∈ R′ and (M◦[P ],M) ∈ R and
(M[P ],M) ∈ R.
I. When ` is an τ or an output action, we want to prove thatM◦[P ] `−→M′◦[P ′]
implies M `−→M′ and M[P ] `−→M′[P ′]. Suppose M◦[P ] `−→M′◦[P ′]:
(a) Since M |= M◦[P ] is given, M◦[P ] `−→ implies M `−→ by Definition 7.4.2.
Assume there existsM′ such thatM `−→M′. Also assume that there exsits
M′′◦ such thatM◦[P ] `−→M′′◦[P ′], which impliesM◦ `−→M′′◦ and P `−→ P ′
by deduction. Since M◦ = erase(M) is given, by Lemma B.1.5, if M `−→
M′, we have M◦ = erase(M) `−→ erase(M′). Since the labelled transition
system of M◦ is deterministic, we should have M′′◦ = erase(M′) = M′◦.
(b) With (a) above and Definition 7.2.6, P `−→ P ′ and M `−→ M′ together
induce M[P ] `−→M′[P ′].
(c) By Definition 7.4.2, we have (M′◦[P ′],M′) ∈ R due to (M◦[P ],M) ∈
R, and by Theorem 7.4.3, we have (M′[P ],M′) ∈ R, so that we have
(M′,M′◦[P ′],M′[P ′]) ∈ R′.
II. When ` is an input action, suppose M◦[P ] `−→M′◦[P ′] as well as M `−→M′:
(a) With Definition B.1.2, M◦[P ] `−→ M′◦[P ′] implies P `−→ P ′ and M◦ `−→
M′◦. P `−→ P ′ and M `−→M′ together implies M[P ] `−→M′[P ′].
(b) Since M |= M◦[P ] is given, with Definition 7.4.2, whenever M `−→ M′
and M◦[P ] `−→ M′◦[P ′], we have (M′◦[P ′],M′) ∈ R. Together with
(M′[P ′],M′) ∈ R by Theorem 7.4.3, we have (M′,M′◦[P ′],M′[P ′]) ∈ R′.
2. For the symmetric case, suppose (M,L2,L1) ∈ R′, i.e. (M,M[P ],M◦[P ]) ∈ R′
and (M[P ],M) ∈ R and (M◦[P ],M) ∈ R.
I. When ` is an τ or an output action, we want to proveM[P ] `−→M′[P ′] implies
M
`−→M′ and M◦[P ] `−→M′◦[P ′]. Suppose M[P ] `−→M′[P ′]:
(a) M[P ] `−→M′[P ′] implies M `−→M′ as well as P `−→ P ′.
(b) Since M◦ = erase(M) is given, by Lemma B.1.5 and M `−→M′ in (a), we
have M◦ `−→ M′◦ = erase(M′). Together with P `−→ P ′ in (a), we have
M◦[P ] `−→M′◦[P ′].
(c) Since we have (M′◦[P ′],M′) ∈ R by Definition 7.4.2 and (M′[P ′],M′) ∈ R
by Theorem 7.4.3, we have (M′,M′[P ′],M′◦[P ′]) ∈ R′.
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II. When ` is an input action, suppose M[P ] `−→ M′[P ′] as well as M `−→ M′.
Note that the former implies P `−→ P ′.
(a) Since M◦ = erase(M) is given, by Lemma B.1.5, M `−→ M′ implies
erase(M)
`−→ erase(M′) and M◦ `−→M′′◦ so that M′◦ = erase(M′).
(b) M◦ `−→M′◦ and P `−→ P ′ imply M◦[P ] `−→M′◦[P ′]. Since (M′◦[P ′],M′) ∈
R by Definition 7.4.2, and (M′[P ′],M′) ∈ R by Theorem 7.4.3, we have
(M′,M′[P ′],M′◦[P ′]) ∈ R′.
Thus R′ is a monitored strong bisimulation. 
B.2 Proofs for Global Safety
Before proving global safety (Theorem 7.4.16) and global transparency (Theorem 7.4.17),
we introduce the following definitions and lemmas.
Define the set of monitored processes similarly as the one for the set of monitors
defined in Definition 7.4.10.
Definition B.2.1 (a set of monitored processes). Define a set of monitored pro-
cesses as ∏
i∈I
Mi[Pi] = M1[P1] ‖ . . . ‖Mk[Pk], I = {1, . . . , k}
Definition B.2.2 (action chain). Globally, for a sequence of actions `i·` j , we say that
`i and `j are in one action chain if a group of monitored processes
∏
iMi[Pi] approves
`i ·`j , denoted as ∏
i
Mi[Pi]
`i·` j−−→g,
then ∏
i
Mi[Pi] 6`j·` i−−→g
which means `i and `j are not permutable.
Actions in one action chain are not permutable, but actions in different action chains
are permutable. There could be several action chains in a sequence of actions. We use
two examples to illustrate how an action chain works.
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Example B.2.3. Assume a sequence of actions is given below
s′[p1, p2]!〈4〉·join(s[p3])·s′[p1, p2]?(4)·s[p1, p3]!〈hi〉·s[p1, p3]?(hi)
actions join(s[p3]), s[p1, p3]!〈hi〉 and s[p1, p3]?(hi) are in one action chain, we mark
them as (join(s[p3]))c1 , (s[p1, p3]!〈hi〉)c1 and (s[p1, p3]?(hi))c1 to denote that they are
in an action chain called c1; actions s′[p1, p2]!〈4〉, s′[p1, p2]?(4) are in another action
chain, we mark them as (s′[p1, p2]!〈4〉)c2 , (s′[p1, p2]?(4))c2 to denote that they are in an
action chain called c2. The sequence of actions can be permuted as
(join(s[p3]))
c1 ·(s′[p1, p2]!〈4〉)c2 ·(s[p1, p3]!〈hi〉)c1 ·(s′[p1, p2]?(4))c2 ·(s[p1, p3]?(hi))c1
but cannot be permuted as
(s′[p1, p2]?(4))
c2 ·(s′[p1, p2]!〈4〉)c2 ·(s[p1, p3]!〈hi〉)c1 ·(join(s[p3]))c1 ·(s[p1, p3]?(hi))c1
because (s′[p1, p2]?(4))c2 cannot happen before (s′[p1, p2]!〈4〉)c2 , and (s[p1, p3]!〈hi〉)c1
cannot happen before (join(s[p3]))c1 .
In the above example, there are two sessions s and s′ involved. The following example
shows the action chains in one session.
Example B.2.4. Given a sequence of actions
s[p1, p2]!〈4〉·s[p1, p2]?(4)·s[p1, p3]!〈hi〉·s[p1, p3]?(hi)
actions s[p1, p2]!〈4〉 and s[p1, p2]?(4) are in one action chain, we mark them as (s[p1, p2]!〈4〉)c1 ,
(s[p1, p2]?(4))
c1 to denote that they are in an action chain called c1; actions s[p1, p3]!〈hi〉
and s[p1, p3]?(hi) are in another action chain, we mark them as (s[p1, p3]!〈hi〉)c2 , (s[p1, p3]?(hi))c2
to denote that they are in an action chain called c2. The sequence of actions can be
permuted as
(s[p1, p2]!〈4〉)c1 ·(s[p1, p3]!〈hi〉)c2 ·(s[p1, p2]?(4))c1 ·(s[p1, p3]?(hi))c2
but cannot be permuted as
(s[p1, p2]?(4))
c1 ·(s[p1, p3]!〈hi〉)c2 ·(s[p1, p3]?(hi))c2 ·(s[p1, p2]!〈4〉)c1
because (s[p1, p2]?(4))c1 cannot happen before (s[p1, p2]!〈4〉)c1 .
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Definition B.2.5 (input action chain). An input action chain is a subset of an
action chain. We denote an action `, which is either s[p1, p2]?l(v), or a(s[p] : G), or
join(s[p]), in an input action chain c as (`)cin .
Lemma B.2.6. Let N be a monitored network and
∏
iMi[Pi] ∈ N . Assume an input
action chain c = (`0)cin ·(`1)cin ·. . .·(`n)cin is given and∏
i
Mi[Pi]
(`0)cin·(`1)cin·...·(`n)cin−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→g
if
∏
iMi[Pi]
(`0)cin−−−−→g
∏
iM
′
i[P
′
i ], then
∏
iM
′
i[P
′
i ]
(`1)cin·(`2)cin·...·(`n)cin−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→g.
Proof. Let c = (`0)cin ·(`1)cin ·. . .·(`n)cin be an input action chain.∏
i
Mi[Pi]
(`0)cin·(`1)cin·...·(`n)cin−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→g
means that the pending messages corresponding to (`0)cin · (`1)cin · . . . · (`n)cin can be
received by the group of monitored processes
∏
iMi[Pi]:∏
i
Mi[Pi]
(`0)cin−−−−→g
∏
i
M′i[P
′
i ]
(`1)cin−−−−→g
∏
i
M
′′
i [P
′′
i ]
(`2)cin−−−−→g ......
∏
i
M∗i [P
∗
i ]
If
∏
iMi[Pi]
(`0)cin−−−−→g
∏
iM
′
i[P
′
i ], the input action chain becomes c
′ = (`1)cin , .., (`n)cin ,
where (`0)cin is received, and (`1)cin becomes the first action in c′:∏
i
M′i[P
′
i ]
(`1)cin−−−−→g
∏
i
M
′′
i [P
′′
i ]
(`2)cin−−−−→g ......
∏
i
M∗i [P
∗
i ]
Thus
∏
iM
′
i[P
′
i ]
(`1)cin·...·(`n)cin−−−−−−−−−→g. 
Lemma 7.4.7 (receivability). Let N be a monitored network and ` be an input
action. If N is receivable and N `−→g N ′, then N ′ is receivable.
Proof. Assume {Mi[Pi]}i∈I ∈ N . That N is receivable means every pending message
floating in the global queue can be absorbed by some monitored process in N . Thus,
as N is receivable, there exists a sequence of actions, say ~`, consisting of join and those
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input actions corresponding to all pending messages in the network N , such that
∏
i
Mi[Pi]
~`−→g
∏
i
M∗i [P
∗
i ],
all the messages are absorbed by some processes in
∏
iMi[Pi]. Assume the corresponding
set of input action chains of ~` is {cinj}j∈J , which means that the actions in ~` can be
partitioned into several input action chains. We mark each action ` ∈ ~` as (`)cinj to
denote that action ` belongs to input action chain cinj .
We rewrite the sequence of actions in (B.2) as
~`≡ (L)cin0 . . . (L)cinj . . . (L)cinJ
by marking each action and collecting actions belonging to the same input action chain
together, where (L)cinj = (`j0)cinj ·(`j1)cinj . . . (`jn)cinj .
If ∏
i
Mi[Pi]
`−→g
∏
i
M′i[P
′
i ] ∈ N ′,
there exists an input action chain cink such that ` ∈ (L)cink = (`k0)cink·(`k1)cink . . . (`km)cink ;
we thus mark ` as (`)cink . By Definition B.2.5, no action in the action chain is per-
mutable, action (`)cink should be the first action in chain cink, thus (`)cink = (`k0)cink .
By (B.2), that action (`k0)cink is removed from (L)cin0 . . . (L)
cinj . . . (L)cink . . . (L)cinJ
in (B.2), which becomes (L)cin0 . . . (L)cinj . . . (L)cink′ . . . (L)cinJ . Note that (L)cink′ =
(`k1)
cink(`k2)
cink . . . (`km)
cink .
By Lemma B.2.6,
∏
i
M′i[P
′
i ]
(L)cin0 ...(L)
cinj ...(L)cink′ ...(L)cinJ−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→g .
By Definition 7.4.6, N ′ is receivable. 
The definitions of consisteny of group of monitors and monitored network coherence
are reminded below:
Definition 7.4.12 (consistency of a group of monitors). Let M be a group of
monitors, and s[p]◦ stand for either s[p] or s[p]•. Let ∀Mi ∈ M, Mi = Γi,∆i. If all of
the following conditions hold,
213
B. APPENDIX FOR DYNAMIC ASYNCHRONOUSLY MONITORING
1. (a) ∀Mi ∈ M, if a : im(G[p]) ∈ Mi, then there is no other a : I(G[p]) ∈ Mj or
a : IO(G[p]) ∈Mj , Mj ∈M.
(b) ∀Mi ∈M, if ∀s, s[p]◦ : T ∈Mi, then s[p]◦ 6∈Mj , j 6= i, Mj ∈M.
2. If a : O(G[p]) ∈Mi, then there exists Mj such that a : im(G[p]) ∈Mj .
3. Assume p1 6= p2. As ∆i(s[p1]◦) = T and
p2!{lk(xk :Sk)〈〈Ak〉〉.Gk  p2}k∈I ⊆ T,
there exists j such that ∆j(s[p2]◦) = T ′ and
p1?{lk(xk :Sk)〈〈A′k〉〉.Gk  p1}k∈I ⊆ T ′
with Ak{v/xk} ↓ true iff A′k{v/xk} ↓ true.
4.
⋃
i ∆i =
⋃
1≤j≤n{sj [pj1] : Tj1, .., sj [pjk] : Tjk, .., sj [pjmj ] : Tjmj} where, for each
sj , there is Gj such that Gj  pjk = Tjk for 1 ≤ k ≤ mj .
then the group of monitors, M, is consistent.
Definition 7.4.13 (monitored network coherence). N is coherent if all of its
pending messages are receivable up to permutation of actionsy and, after these messages
have been received, the resulting group of monitors which guard all local process in N ,
say M, is consistent.
Before proving the theorem of global safety, we use the following lemma to show that
as a network is coherent and an output action is ready to fire, then its corresponding
input is ready for it.
Lemma B.2.7. Assume network N is coherent with its consistent group of monitors,
say
∏
iMi, where Mi = Γi,∆i, and ∃Ms ∈
∏
iMi such that ∆s(s[p]
•) y q!{lk(xk :
Sk)〈〈Ak〉〉.Tk}k∈I , then ∃Mr ∈
∏
iMi such that ∆r(s[q]
•)y p?{lk(xk : Sk)〈〈A′k〉〉.T ′k}k∈I
with Ak{v/xk} ↓ true iff A′k{v/xk} ↓ true.
Proof. We prove it by contradiction. Since ∆s(s[p]•) y q!{lk(xk : Sk)〈〈Ak〉〉.Tk}k∈I ,
we have q!{lk(xk : Sk)〈〈Ak〉〉.Tk}k∈I ⊆ ∆s(s[p]•). And since N is coherent, there exists
214
B.2 Proofs for Global Safety
some monitor, say Mr ∈
∏
iMi, such that p?{lk(xk : Sk)〈〈A′k〉〉.T ′′k }k∈I ⊆ ∆r(s[q]•) by
rule 3. in Definition 7.4.12. If
∆r(s[q]
•) 6y p?{lk(xk : Sk)〈〈A′k〉〉.T ′k}k∈I ,
(note that T ′k and T
′′
k ) based on Definition 6.6.8, it must be an action with the same
subject suppressing the permutation:
case (a) ∆r(s[q]•)y p?{l′j(x′j : S ′j)〈〈Bj〉〉.p?{lk(xk : Sk)〈〈A′k〉〉.T ′′k }k∈I}j∈J , or
case (b) ∆r(s[q]•)y p!{l′j(x′j : S ′j)〈〈Bj〉〉.p?{lk(xk : Sk)〈〈A′k〉〉.T ′′k }k∈I}j∈J
Case (a) implies that, for specification ∆s(s[p]•), there is another action q! positioning
before q! such that
∆s(s[p]
•)y q!{l′j(x′j : S ′j)〈〈B′j〉〉.q!{lk(xk : Sk)〈〈Ak〉〉.T ′′′k }k∈I}j∈J .
Similarly, case (b) implies that, for specification ∆s(s[p]•), there is an action q? posi-
tioning before q! such that
∆s(s[p]
•)y q?{l′j(x′j : S ′j)〈〈B′j〉〉.q!{lk(xk : Sk)〈〈Ak〉〉.T ′′′k }k∈I}j∈J .
Both cases lead to ∆s(s[p]•) 6y q!{lk(xk : Sk)〈〈Ak〉〉.Tk}k∈I . Therefore, by contradiction,
we prove the statement is true. 
Lemma B.2.8. Let s[p]◦ stand for either s[p] or s[p]•. Assume ∀Mi ∈ N, ∀s, s[p]◦ :
T ∈ Mi implies s[p]◦ 6∈ Mj , j 6= i, Mj ∈ N . If N `−→g N ′ and rule 1.(a) in Definition
7.4.12 holds for N and N ′, we have ∀M′k ∈ N ′,∀s, s[p]◦ : T ∈ M′k implies s[p]◦ 6∈ M′j ,
j 6= k, M′j ∈ N .
Proof. As explained in Lemma 7.4.15, as rule 1.(a) in Definition 7.4.12 holds, a :
im(G[p]) is unique to the network. Only three rules, [req-b] and [acc-b/f], may affect the
uniqueness of s[p]◦ : T as N `−→g N ′. When ` = a(s[pj ] : G), there exists Ms ∈ N such
that Ms
a(s[pj ]:G)−−−−−−→M′s implying s is new to Ms and {s[pk] : G  pk}k∈I\{j} ∈M′s, where
each s[pk] : G  pk only exists in M′s because s is unique to the network (by Lemma
7.4.15), and every role defined in a global specification is unique (Definition 6.2.3); while
s[pj ] : G  pj , which is sent as an invitation to the endpoint having a : im(G[pj ]), say
it is the endpoint guarded by monitor Mr. As Mr accepts this invitation by approving
action a(s[pj ] : G) or a〈s[pj ] : G〉, s[pj ] : G  pj is added into Mr, and it only exists
in Mr network-wise because a : im(G[pj ]) only exists in Mr: Only a monitor having
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a : im(G[pj ]) can accept the capability of s[pj ] : G  pj . With the same reasoning,
when ` = a(s[pj ] : G) or ` = a〈s[pj ] : G〉 is approved by some monitor, say Mk, then
s[pj ] : G  pj ∈ Mk, s[pj ] : G  pj only exists in Mk because only a monitor having
a : im(G[pj ]) can accept the capability of s[pj ] : G  pj . In conclusion, no action affects
the uniqueness of s[p]◦ : T to the network as N `−→g N ′, thus N ′ holds the statement.
Theorem 7.4.16 (global safety). Let N be coherent. Then N `−→g N ′ implies N ′ is
coherent.
Proof. Assume N is coherent so that the group of monitors, sayM, guarding every local
process in N is consistent. Assume
∏
iMi[Pi] ∈ N , where
∏
iMi[Pi] is the composition
of monitored processes in N . Let Mi = Γi,∆i and im ∈ {I, IO}. For convenience, we
use
∏
iMi to denote the group of monitors corresponding to the group of monitored
processes
∏
iMi[Pi], and use + to denote adding (or having) elements in Γi or ∆i. Note
that, by Lemma 7.4.7, if N is receivable and N `−→g N ′ where ` is an input, then N ′
is receivable. Also note that, by Lemma B.2.8, rule 1.(b) of Definition 7.4.12 is always
true when N is consistent and N `−→g N ′ for any `, thus we only need to prove rule 1.(a).
If N `−→g N ′, we want to prove the following cases of actions still make the resulting
group of monitors in N ′ consistent. Note that the rules 1.(a), 2., 3., and 4. are referring
to the rules defined in Definition 7.4.12.
case (shared name) - If ` is new a : im(T [p]), then rules 2., 3. and 4. of the consis-
tency of group of monitors guarding all local processes in N are not affected. We analyse
the effects for rule 1.(a). There is some Mj [P ] ∈
∏
iMi[Pi] and Mj [P ]
new a:im(G[p])−−−−−−−−−→
M′j [P
′] such that N
new a:im(G[p])−−−−−−−−−→g N ′; it implies that, when im = I, there is no
a : I(G[p]) nor a : IO(G[p]) inMj so thatMj allows this action; similarly, when im = IO,
there is no a : I(G[p]) nor a : IO(G[p]) in Mj . Therefore, for Γj ∈Mj and Γ′j ∈M′j , Γ′j
is the configuration resulting from Γj+a : im(G[p]), which induces Γ′j = Γj , a : im(G[p]),
a : im(G[p]) 6∈ Γj . Thus rule 1.(a) is satisfied.
case (bound request) - If ` is a(s[pk] : G), there is some Mj [Pj ] ∈
∏
iMi[Pi] and
Mj [Pj ]
a(s[pk]:G)−−−−−−→ M′j [P ′j ] such that N
a(s[pk]:G)−−−−−−→g N ′ = (νs)(N ′1 ‖ H ·a〈s[p] : G〉). This
action combines two parts: creating a fresh session and requesting through sending an
invitation. As for the part of newing a session, as a session is newed, {s[pi] : G 
pi}i∈I\{k} are added into ∆j , which becomes ∆′j = ∆j+ {s[pi] : G  pi}i∈I\{k}. No
other ∆i, i 6= j is affected by newing a session, thus rules 1.(a), 2., and 3. are hold for
newing a session. For rule 4., since N is coherent and G is approved by monitor Mj ,
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G is well-formed, thus the group of monitors guarding all local processes in N ′ satisfies
rule 4. immediately.
As for the part of requesting an invitation to endpoint a, the reasoning is as same
as that for case (free request) below.
case (free request) - If ` is a〈s[p] : G〉, for receivability, there is some Ms[Ps] ∈∏
iMi[Pi] and Ms[Ps]
a〈s[p]:G〉−−−−−→ M′s[P ′s] such that N1 ‖ H ≡ N
a〈s[p]:G〉−−−−−→g N ′ = N ′1 ‖
H ·a〈s[p] : G〉; it implies that, there exists Ms ∈ N , in which it has Γs(a) = O(G[p]).
Since N is coherent, according to rule 2., there must exist some Mr,Mr[Pr] ∈ N such
that it has Γr(a) = im(G[p]), implying Mr[Pr] is able to receive invitation a〈s[p] : G〉.
Since action a〈s[p] : G〉 does not affect the existence of a : im(G[p]) ∈ Γr, a : im(G[p])
still exists in the resulting network N ′ ≡ N ′1 ‖ H ·a〈s[p] : G〉. Thus N ′ is able to receive
the additional message a〈s[p] : G〉, and messages H ·a〈s[p] : G〉 are receivable to N ′.
Below we discuss if N ′ satisfies rules 1.(a), 2., 3. and 4. after receiving a〈s[p] : G〉.
N
a〈s[p]:G〉−−−−−→g N ′ and N ′ is receivable, by rules bMG-req-f-outc and bMG-acc-b/f-inc,
together imply ∃ Ms[Ps],Mr[Pr] ∈ N such that
N = N0 ‖Ms[Ps] ‖Mr[Pr] ‖ H a〈s[p]:G〉−−−−−→g N0 ‖M′s[P ′s] ‖Mr[Pr] ‖ H ·a〈s[p] : G〉 = N ′
where a : O(G[p]) ∈ Γs, and
N ′ = N0 ‖M′s[P ′s] ‖Mr[Pr] ‖ H ·a〈s[p] : G〉 `
′−→g N0 ‖M′s[P ′s] ‖M′r[P ′r] ‖ H
`′ is a(s[p] : G) or a〈s[p] : G〉, where a : im(G[p]) ∈ Γr. The invitation a〈s[p] : G〉 in
H ·a〈s[p] : G〉 can be absorbed to the receiver when its monitor approves it. By rules
[req-f] and [acc-b/f], no a is added into / deleted from Γs or Γr, and a : O(G[p]) ∈ Γs
and a : im(G[p]) ∈ Γr are respectively still in Γs and Γr, and their configurations do not
change, thus hold rules 1.(a) and 2.
Let † ∈ {!, ?} and when † =?, let † =!; when † =!, let † =?. Assume in Ms,
∆s(s[p]
◦) = T y q † {lk(xk : Sk)〈〈Ak〉〉.Gk  p}k∈I . Since N is coherent, by Lemma
B.2.7, there exists Mm[Pm] who has ∆m(s[q]◦) y p†{lk(xk :Sk)〈〈A′k〉〉.Gk  q}k∈I with
∀v,∃ k ∈ I, Ak{v/xk} ↓ true iff A′k{v/xk} ↓ true.
1. For rule 3., since N is coherent, s[p]◦ only exists in ∆s. When s[p]◦ is removed
from ∆s and added into ∆r, by Lemma B.2.8, s[p]◦ is still unique in N ′ and only
exists in ∆r. Moreover, there still exists Mm[Pm] whose ∆m(s[q]◦) y p†{lk(xk :
Sk)〈〈A′k〉〉.Gk  q}k∈I being ready for the counter action going to/coming from
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s[p]◦.
2. For rule 4., since N is coherent, s[p]◦ = G  p, which still holds when s[p]◦ is
removed from ∆s and added into ∆r by rules [req-f] and [acc-b/f]. Thus the
resulting monitors still satisfy rule 4.
case (output) - if ` is an output action s[p1, p2]!l〈v〉, assume N approves this action:
N ≡ N1 ‖ H s[p1,p2]!l〈v〉−−−−−−−→g N ′1 ‖ H ·s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉 ≡ N ′, (B.3)
where H can be empty. Equation (B.3) infers that 〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉 is the only additional
pending message to the original network N .
In the follows, we first prove that H ·s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉 is receivable to N ′. Equation
(B.3) indicates that ∃ Ms ∈ N , ∆s(s[p1]•) y p2!{lk(xk : Sk)〈〈Ak〉〉.Tk}k∈I approves
action ` = s[p1, p2]!l〈v〉, and, due to coherence and Lemma B.2.7, implies ∃Mr ∈ N
such that ∆r(s[p2]•) y p1?{lk(xk : Sk)〈〈A′k〉〉.T ′k}k∈I with ∀v,∃ k ∈ I, Ak{v/xk} ↓ true
iff A′k{v/xk} ↓ true. Assume
∏
iMi is the group of monitors of monitored processes∏
iMi[Pi] ∈ N , which approves to receive all pending messages in H.
1. If Ms 6∈
∏
iMi, any monitor in
∏
iMi remains the same after ` happens. For the
messages in H, they are receivable to N ′ (according to
∏
iMi). As for message
s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉, since action s[p1, p2]!l〈v〉 can fire in N :
(a) If Mr = Ms, since action s[p1, p2]!l〈v〉 does not affect the configuration of
∆s(s[p2]
•) = ∆r(s[p2]•), s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉 is receivable according to Mr.
(b) If Mr ∈
∏
iMi, by Lemma B.2.7, the receiving action p1? in ∆r(s[p2]
•) is
permutable to other receiving actions corresponding to messages in H, so
that Mr can receive messages in H and s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉 in any order.
(c) If Mr 6∈ (
∏
iMi ∪Ms), then it is trivial that s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉 is receivable to
Mr.
2. If Ms ∈
∏
iMi, let N ≡ N0 ‖
∏
iMi[Pi] ‖ H, N
s[p1,p2]!l〈v〉−−−−−−−→g N0 ‖
∏
i 6=sMi[Pi] ‖
M′s[P ′s] ‖ H ·s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉. As for those in H receivable to
∏
i 6=sMi, straight-
forwardly, they are still receivable to
∏
i 6=sMi after action s[p1, p2]!l〈v〉 fires.
As for those in H receivable to Ms but not received at ∆s(s[p1]•), because ac-
tion s[p1, p2]!l〈v〉 has no effect at the configurations of other session-roles, they
are still receivable to Ms at other session-roles. As for those in H but receiv-
able at ∆s(s[p1]•), the messages should be in the form: s〈p, p1, l′〈v′〉〉. Since
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∆s(s[p1]
•) y p2!{lk(xk : Sk)〈〈Ak〉〉.Tk}k∈I , by Definition 6.6.8, the configuration
of ∆s(s[p1]•) should be
∆s(s[p1]
•)y p2!{lk(xk : Sk)〈〈Ak〉〉.p?{l′j(x′j : S ′j)〈〈Bj〉〉.T ′j}j∈I}k∈I
which shows that those messages are still receivable at ∆s(s[p1]•) after action
s[p1, p2]!l〈v〉 fires. As for message s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉, the reasonings are as same as
those above.
Thus the messages in H ·s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉 are receivable to network N ′.
Then we show that, after receiving all messages in H ·s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉, the resulting
monitors in N ′ are consistent. Since rules of 1.(a) and 2. for the consistency of monitors
(see Definition 7.4.12) are not affected by action s[p1, p2]!〈v〉, only rules 3. and 4. need
discussions. With the analyses above, since N is consistent, ∃Ms,Mr ∈ N, ∃G is well-
formed and G = p1 → p2 : {lk(xk : Sk)〈〈Ak〉〉.Gk}k∈I such that
∆s(s[p1]
•) y G  p1 = p2!{lk(xk : Sk)〈〈Ak〉〉.Gk  p1}k∈I
∆r(s[p2]
•) y G  p2 = p1?{lk(xk : Sk)〈〈A′k〉〉.Gk  p2}k∈I
with ∀v,∃ k ∈ I, Ak{v/xk} ↓ true iff A′k{v/xk} ↓ true. Assume l = l0.
1. If Ms,Mr 6∈
∏
iMi, after receiving all messages in H ·s〈p1, p2, l0〈v〉〉, we have
∆s(s[p1]
•) y G0  p1
∆r(s[p2]
•) y G0  p2
2. If Ms ∈
∏
iMi, i.e. Ms approves receiving some messages in H, assume there is
a message s〈p, p1, l′n〈v′〉〉 ∈ H, then ∃Mr ∈ N ′ and ∃G is well-formed and
G = p1 → p2 : {lk(xk : Sk)〈〈Ak〉〉.Gk}k∈I
= p1 → p2 : {lk(xk : Sk)〈〈Ak〉〉.p→ p1 : {l′j(x′j : S ′j)〈〈Bj〉〉.G′kj}j∈I}k∈I
such that
∆s(s[p1]
•) y G  p1 = p2!{lk(xk : Sk)〈〈Ak〉〉.p?{l′j(x′j : S ′j)〈〈B′j〉〉.G′kj  p1}j∈I}k∈I
∆r(s[p2]
•) y G  p2 = p1?{lk(xk : Sk)〈〈A′k〉〉.G′km  p2}k∈I
where G′km  p2 = (p → p1 : {l′j(x′j : S ′j)〈〈Bj〉〉.G′kj}j∈I)  p2. After p? fires for
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receiving s〈p, p1, l′n〈v′〉〉 ∈ H, we have
G
s[p,p1]?l
′
n(v
′)−−−−−−−−→g G′ = p1 → p2 : {lk(xk : Sk)〈〈Ak〉〉.G′kn}k∈I
and
∆s(s[p1]
•)y p2!{lk(xk : Sk)〈〈Ak〉〉.G′kn  p1}k∈I
since G is well-formed, G′kn is well-formed. Note that G
′
kn, n is a constant, only k
is a variable, thus G′kn can be viewed as G
′′
k. Also note that, G
′
km  p2 = G′kn  p2
because, after receiving all messages in H, the monitors in N are consistent (by
Definition 7.4.12), there exists a global specification, i.e. G′, such that
∆s(s[p1]
•) y G′  p1 = p2!{lk(xk : Sk)〈〈Ak〉〉.G′kn  p1}k∈I
∆r(s[p2]
•) y G′  p2 = p1?{lk(xk : Sk)〈〈A′k〉〉.G′kn  p2}k∈I
If there are other messages inH which can be received at ∆s(s[p1]•), then permute
every such input action, say s[p′, p1]?l′′n′(v), until it positions after action p2! such
that
Gy p1 → p2 : {lk(xk : Sk)〈〈Ak〉〉.p′ → p1 : {l′′i (x′′j : S ′′i )〈〈B′i〉〉.G′′ki}i∈I}k∈I
∆s(s[p1]
•) y p2!{lk(xk : Sk)〈〈Ak〉〉.p′?{l′′i (x′j : S ′′i )〈〈B′′i 〉〉.G′′ki  p1}i∈I}k∈I
∆r(s[p2]
•) y p1?{lk(xk : Sk)〈〈A′k〉〉.G′′km  p2}k∈I
after input s[p′, p1]?l′′n′(v) takes place at ∆s(s[p1]
•), we have
∆s(s[p1]
•)y p2!{lk(xk : Sk)〈〈Ak〉〉.G′′kn′  p1}k∈I .
note that, again, G′′km  p2 = G′′kn′  p2 with the same reasonings above. For
every input action positioning after p2! at ∆s(s[p1]•), we have a general result
such that there exist Ms and Mr approving action s[p1, p2]!l〈v〉 to fire and to
receive the generated message, and, after receiving messages in H, the resulting
configurations of ∆s(s[p1]•) and ∆r(s[p2]•) should be projected from the same
global specification.
3. If Mr ∈
∏
iMi, ∃G is well-formed and
Gy p→ p2 : {l′j(x′j : S ′j)〈〈Bj〉〉.p1 → p2 : {lk(xk : Sk)〈〈Ak〉〉.G′kj}k∈I}j∈I
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such that
∆r(s[p2]
•)y G  p2 = p?{l′j(x′j : S ′j)〈〈B′j〉〉.p1?{lk(xk : Sk)〈〈A′k〉〉.G′kj  p2}k∈I}j∈I .
When messages in H have been received, action s[p, p2]?l′n(v) has happened, we
have
G
s[p,p2]?l
′
n(v)−−−−−−−→ G′ = p1 → p2 : {lk(xk : Sk)〈〈Ak〉〉.G′kn}k∈I
such that
∆r(s[p2]
•) y G′  p2 = p1?{lk(xk : Sk)〈〈A′k〉〉.G′kn  p2}k∈I
and since, after receiving messages in H, the monitors in N are consistent, we
have
∆s(s[p1]
•) y G′  p1 = p2!{lk(xk : Sk)〈〈Ak〉〉.G′kn  p1}k∈I
where n is a constant.
On the above, we show that, after receiving all messages in H, the configurations at
∆s(s[p1]
•) and ∆r(s[p2]•) in any case are in the form
∆s(s[p1]
•) y p2!{lk(xk : Sk)〈〈Ak〉〉.G′′′k  p1}k∈I
∆r(s[p2]
•) y p1?{lk(xk : Sk)〈〈A′k〉〉.G′′′k  p2}k∈I (B.4)
which imply, whenever action s[p1, p2]!l〈v〉 then action s[p1, p2]?l〈v〉 happen, i.e. when
messages in H·s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉 are received, there exist G′′′k satisfying rule 4. of Definition
7.4.12. As for rule 3. of consistency of resulting monitors, since Equation B.4 is con-
sistent, according to rule 3. of Definition 7.4.12, if there is an output in G′′′k  p2 or in
G′′′k  p1 for k ∈ I, there exists a corresponding input in other monitors, such that when
actions s[p1, p2]!l〈v〉 and s[p1, p2]?l〈v〉 fire, the left monitors are still consisent. Thus N ′
is coherent.
case (input) - if ` is s[p1, p2]?l(v), since N is receivable, by Lemma 7.4.7, N ′ is
receivable. For an input action s[p1, p2]?l(v), only when v is a shared name, say a, will
affect rules 1. and 2. Since a received name is always typed with output mode, rule
1.(a) holds. Since N is coherent, when the process who sends a has an output mode a,
say a : O(G[p]), there exists an input mode a, say a : im(G[p]) in some other monitor;
when the process who sends a has an input mode a, say a : im(G[p]), the sender itself
has a with input mode. For both cases, rule 2. holds as long as typing the received
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name with output mode. For rules 3. and 4. of Definition 7.4.12, the discussions are as
follows.
Suppose ` is s[p1, p2]?l(v), where v is either a value or a name, and N is coherent,
when N `−→g N ′:
1. If there is no pending message in N ′, N ′ is coherent because N is coherent and
after N receives s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉 by `, it is still coherent, which is N ′.
2. If there are pending messages in N ′, by Lemma of receivability, N ′ is receivable.
Let N =
∏
i 6=rMi[Pi] ‖ Mr[Pr] ‖ H · s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉, where Mr[Pr] will receive
message s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉.
(a) If all messages in H are received by the monitored processes in
∏
i 6=rMi[Pi]
and Mr[Pr]
s[p1,p2]?l(v)−−−−−−−→ M′r[P ′r], then N ′ =
∏
i 6=rMi[Pi] ‖ M′r[P ′r] ‖ H. The
conherence of N means that, after receiving all messages of H·s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉,
the network becomes
∏
i 6=rM
′
i[P
′
i ] ‖M′r[P ′r] ‖ ∅, where the group of monitors
is consistent; since, after N ′ receives all messages in H, the network also
becomes
∏
i 6=rM
′
i[P
′
i ] ‖ M′r[P ′r] ‖ ∅, where the group of monitors is thus
consistent, so that N ′ is coherent.
(b) If some messages in H are received by
∏
i 6=rMi[Pi] and some are received by
M′r[P ′r]
i. The configuration at ∆r(s[p2]•) before action s[p1, p2]?l(v) should be in
the following form:
∆r(s[p2]
•) y p1?{lk(xk : Sk)〈〈A′k〉〉.
p?{l′j(x′j : S ′j)〈〈B′j〉〉.
p′?{l′′i (x′′i : S ′′i )〈〈B′′i 〉〉.....}i∈I}j∈I}k∈I
Assume after Mr[Pr] receives messages inputting to it through
Mr[Pr]
`−→M′r[P ′r]
`′0...`
′
m−−−−→M′′r [P ′′r ],
it becomes M′′r [P ′′r ]. The conherence of N means that, after receiving
all messages of H · s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉, the network becomes
∏
i 6=rM
′
i[P
′
i ] ‖
M′′r [P ′′r ] ‖ ∅, where the group of monitors is consistent. Since we have
N ′ =
∏
i 6=rMi[Pi] ‖ M′r[P ′r] ‖ H, when N ′ receives all messages in H,
the network also becomes
∏
i 6=rM
′
i[P
′
i ] ‖M′′r [P ′′r ] ‖ ∅, where the group of
monitors is thus consistent, so that N ′ is coherent.
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ii. before Mr[Pr]
s[p1,p2]?l(v)−−−−−−−→ M′r[P ′r]. Since action s[p1, p2]?l(v) can fire
immediately, the action p1? at ∆r(s[p2]•) can be permuted to the head:
∆r(s[p2]
•) = p?{l′j(x′j : S ′j)〈〈B′j〉〉.p1?{lk(xk : Sk)〈〈A′k〉〉...}k∈I}j∈I
y p1?{lk(xk : Sk)〈〈A′k〉〉.p?{l′j(x′j : S ′j)〈〈B′j〉〉...}j∈I}k∈I
where p? indicates receiving a message sent from p. Then the configura-
tion goes back to the above case, so that N ′ is coherent.
case (acc-b/f-in) - If ` is a(s[p] : G) or a〈s[p] : G〉, by rule bMG-acc-b/f-inc, assume
N =
∏
i 6=rMi[Pi] ‖Mr[Pr] ‖ H ·a〈s[p] : G〉 and Mr[Pr] will receive message a〈s[p] : G〉,
such that
N
`−→g N ′ ≡
∏
i 6=r
Mi[Pi] ‖M′r[P ′r] ‖ H.
Since N is receivable, by Lemma 7.4.7, N ′ is receivable. The following reasonings are
similar to case (input).
1. If there is no pending message in N ′, i.e. H = ∅, N ′ is coherent because N is
coherent and after N receives s〈p1, p2, l〈v〉〉 by `, it is still coherent, which is N ′.
2. If there are pending messages in N ′ and some messages in H are received by∏
i 6=rMi[Pi], while some are received byMr[Pr], because receiving ` only depends
on the existence of a : im(G[p]) ∈Mr, this action does not affect any session input
actions, i.e. it does not change other configurations at session endpoints.
Thus, after N `−→g N ′, N ′ is coherent.
case (join) - If ` is a join(s[p]) action, since N is receivable, by Lemma 7.4.7, N ′
is receivable. Action join(s[p]) does not affect any rule of the consistency of group of
monitors guarding all local processes in N , thus N ′ is coherent.
case (tau) - if ` is a τ , it does not effect the receivability or any ∆i or Γi in N because
no monitor does checking. Thus N ′ is coherent.
Therefore for any action `, if N is coherent and N `−→g N ′, then N ′ is coherent. 
B.3 Proofs for Global Transparency
Definition B.3.1. Let N be a monitored network. Then N is locally conformant if,
for each monitored process Mi[Pi] in N , we have Mi |= erase(Mi)[Pi].
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Proposition B.3.2. If N is coherent and locally conformant and N `−→g N ′ then N ′ is
also coherent and locally conformant.
Proof. By Theorem 7.4.16, N ′ is coherent. Assume
∏
iMi[Pi] is the composition of
monitored processes in N . If N `−→g N ′, there existsMj [Pj ] ∈ N andMj [Pj ] `−→g M′j [P ′j ]
such that N = N0 ‖
∏
k 6=jMk[Pk] ‖ Mj [Pj ] `−→g N ′0 ‖
∏
k 6=jMk[Pk] ‖ M′j [P ′j ] = N ′.
Mj [Pj ]
`−→g M′j [P ′j ] also infers that Mj `−→ M′j and Pj `−→ P ′j . Since N is locally con-
formant, Mj |= erase(Mj)[Pj ]. By Lemma B.1.5, as Mj `−→ M′j and erase(Mj) `−→ L,
we have L = erase(M′j); thus we have erase(Mj)[Pj ]
`−→ erase(M′j)[P ′j ]. Together with
Definition 7.4.2 of conformance, we have M′j |= erase(M′j)[P ′j ]. Note that, except Mj ,
any other monitor in N does not change its configuration; the composition of moni-
tored processes in N ′ is
∏
k 6=jMk[Pk] ‖ M′j [P ′j ], and every Mk[Pk] ∈ N ′, k 6= j satisfies
Mk |= erase(Mk)[Pk]. Thus N ′ is locally conformant. 
Definition B.3.3 (network erasure). Assume N = N1 ‖ N2 is given. Then we have
erase(N) = erase(N1 ‖ N2) = erase(N1) ‖ erase(N2).
Theorem 7.4.17 (global transparency). Suppose N is coherent and locally con-
formant. Then N ∼ erase(N).
Proof. For a network N which is coherent and locally conformant, we define relation R
to be:
R = {(N, erase(N)) | N is coherent and locally conformant}
We prove that R is a standard strong bisimilar relation over `−→g. Since N is locally
conformant, ∀Mi ∈ N,Mi |= erase(Mi)[Pi], so that by Theorem 7.4.5 we have
∀Mi ∈ N,Mi |= erase(Mi)[Pi] ∼Mi[Pi].
1. As N `−→g N ′, it implies there is Mj [Pj ] ∈ N and Mj [Pj ] `−→ M′j [P ′j ] such that
N = N0 ‖ Mj [Pj ] `−→g N ′0 ‖ M′j [P ′j ] = N ′. Mj [Pj ] `−→ M′j [P ′j ] also infers Mj `−→ M′j
and Pj
`−→ P ′j . Note that N0 is changed to N ′0 because N0 contains the global
queue, the message corresponding to ` may enter or leave the global queue. All
monitored processes in N0 are not affected. By Definition 7.4.4, when ` is an input
action, Mj [Pj ]
`−→ M′j [P ′j ] and Mj `−→ M′j imply erase(Mj)[Pj ] `−→ erase(M′j)[P ′j ],
so that, based on Definition B.3.3, erase(N) ≡ erase(N0) ‖ erase(Mj)[Pj ] `−→g
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erase(N ′0) ‖ erase(M′j)[P ′] ≡ erase(N ′0 ‖ M′j [P ′]) = erase(N ′); similarly, when ` is
an output action, Mj [Pj ]
`−→ M′j [P ′j ] implies erase(Mj)[Pj ] `−→ L, Mj `−→ M′j and
Pj
`−→ P ′j ; by Lemma B.1.5, erase(Mj) `−→ erase(M′j), so that L = erase(M′j)[P ′j ].
Again, we have erase(N) `−→g erase(N ′). By proposition B.3.2, N ′ is coherent and
locally conformant, thus we have (N ′, erase(N ′)) ∈ R.
2. Assume N = N0 ‖
∏
kMk[Pk], erase(N)
`−→g N′ implies there is erase(Mj)[Pj ] ∈
erase(N) and erase(Mj)[Pj ]
`−→ L′ such that
erase(N) = erase(N0) ‖
∏
k 6=j erase(Mk)[Pk] ‖ erase(Mj)[Pj ] `−→g
erase(N ′0) ‖
∏
k 6=j erase(Mk)[Pk] ‖ L′ = N′
Note that, since erase(N0) contains the global queue, it changes to erase(N ′0) as ac-
tion ` happens. All located processes in erase(N0) are not affected. By Definition
7.4.4, when ` is an input action and Mj |= erase(Mj)[Pj ], erase(Mj)[Pj ] `−→ in-
fers Mj
`−→ and erase(Mj) `−→, which means Mj and erase(Mj) approve action
`. Without loss of generality, let Mj
`−→ M′j . By Lemmas B.1.3 and B.1.5,
Mj
`−→ M′j implies that, if erase(Mj) `−→, then erase(Mj) `−→ erase(M′j). To-
gether with erase(Mj)[Pj ]
`−→ L′, we have L′ = erase(M′j)[P ′] for some P ′. Since
Mj |= erase(Mj)[P ] ∼ Mj [Pj ], erase(Mj)[Pj ] `−→ erase(M′j)[P ′j ] and Mj `−→ M′j
imply Mj [Pj ]
`−→ M′j [P ′j ], so that N = N0 ‖
∏
k 6=jMk[Pk] ‖ Mj [Pj ] `−→g N ′0 ‖∏
k 6=jMk[Pk] ‖ M′j [P ′j ] = N ′; similarly, when ` is an output action and Mj |=
erase(Mj)[Pj ], erase(Mj)[Pj ]
`−→ implies Mj `−→ and Mj [Pj ] `−→. Without loss of
generality, let Mj
`−→M′j . By Lemmas B.1.3 and B.1.5, we have Mj [Pj ] `−→M′j [P ′j ]
for some P ′j , so that we have N = N0 ‖
∏
k 6=jMk[Pk] ‖ Mj [Pj ] `−→g N ′0 ‖∏
k 6=jMk[Pk] ‖ M′j [P ′j ] = N ′. Since L′ = erase(M′j)[P ′j ], by Definition B.3.3,
erase(N ′) = erase(N ′0 ‖
∏
k 6=jMk[Pk] ‖M′j [Pj ]) ≡ erase(N ′0) ‖
∏
k 6=j erase(Mk)[Pk] ‖
erase(M′j)[Pj ] = erase(N
′
0) ‖
∏
k 6=j erase(Mk)[Pk] ‖ L′ = N′. By proposition B.3.2,
N ′ is coherent and locally conformant, thus we have (N ′,N′) = (N ′, erase(N ′)) ∈
R. 
B.4 Proofs for Session Fidelity
The theorem of session fidelity states that, whenever a network conforms to specifica-
tions in monitors, i.e., its all local processes (partial network) which are in P(N) conform
to specifcations contained in M, all of its derivatives conform to the specifications of
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M. In the follows, we firstly formally define receivability, consistency and conformance
based on LTS of configurations. Recall that a configuration is the pair of M and H:
Definition 7.4.20 (configuration). A configuration is denoted by Φ = M;H, in
which the group of monitors correspond to H. In other words, all messages correspond-
ing to the actions guarded by M are in H.
Definition B.4.1 (receivable configuration). Define M;H is receivable by the fol-
lowing induction.
1. If H is empty then M;H is receivable.
2. If H ≡ m·H ′, then M;H is receivable when we have M;m·H ′ `−→g M′;H ′, where
` corresponding to m, and M′;H ′ is receivable.
A configuration M;H is configurationally consistent if all of its multi-step global
input transition derivatives are receivable and the resulting M is consistent. The con-
sistency of a group of monitors is defined in Definition 7.4.12.
Lemma B.4.2. Assume N ≡ Ns ‖ H and |= Ns : M. If N `−→g N′ ≡ Ns′ ‖ H ′ and
M `−→M′, then |= Ns′ : M′.
Proof. Directly from Definition 7.4.25.
Session fidelity says: assume a network N ≡ Ns ‖ ∅ is given, and suppose that Ns
satisfies M. If M is consistent, then we say N conforms to M. If this holds, then, with
the messages which N exchanges follow the specification containing in M, the dynamics
of the network witnesses the validity of M.
Theorem 7.4.28 (session fidelity). Assume configurationM;H is configurationally
consistent, and network N ≡ Ns ‖ H conforms to configurationM;H. We say N satisfies
session fidelity, if for any `, we have N `−→g N′ such that M;H `−→g M′;H ′, it holds that
M′;H ′ is configurationally consistent and that N′ conforms to M′;H ′.
Proof. Assume N ≡ Ns ‖ H and N conforms to M;H, which is configurationally con-
sistent. Prove the statement by the inspection of each case. (In most cases, the proofs
are similar to those for Theorem 7.4.16, proved in Appendix B.2).
(Sel) Let ` = s[p1, p2]!lj〈v〉, Ns ‖ H ≡ N `−→g N′ ≡ Ns′ ‖ H ·m and M;H `−→g M′;H ·m,
where m = s〈p1, p2, lj〈v〉〉. Since M allows ` and M is consistent, ∃Ms,Mr ∈ M,
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∃G is well-formed such that
G = p1 → p2{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gi}i∈I ,
and
∆s(s[p1]
•) y G  p1 = p2!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gi  p1}i∈I ,
∆r(s[p2]
•) y G  p2 = p1?{li(xi : Si)〈〈A′i〉〉.Gi  p2}i∈I . (B.5)
where lj ∈ {li}i∈I , I is the set indexing labels. Note that, the configuration of
∆r(s[p2]
•) is not changed by action `, thus ∆r(s[p2]•) remains the same in M′.
Consider (case 1: H is empty). SinceM′ has ∆r(s[p2]•)y p1?{li(xi : Si)〈〈A′i〉〉.Gi 
p2}i∈I , m is receivable to M′, and thus m is receivable to Ns′ due to |= Ns′ : M′,
according to Lemma B.4.2. After receiving m, say M′
s[p1,p2]?lj(v)−−−−−−−−→M′′, according
to Equation B.5, M′′ has ∆s(s[p1]•)y Gj  p1 and ∆r(s[p2]•)y Gj  p2, and ac-
tion s[p1, p2]?lj(v) does not affect any other configuration in M′, M′′ is consistent
by Definition 7.4.12. Therefore, N′ conforms to M′;m.
Consider (case 2: H is not empty). Since N ≡ Ns ‖ H conforms to M;H, all
messages in H are receivable to Ns. With the same reasonings of the proof
for output in Theorem 7.4.16 for global safety, whenever M;H
s[p1,p2]!lj〈v〉−−−−−−−−→g
M′;H ·s〈p1, p2, lj〈v〉〉, M′ is consistent and H ·s〈p1, p2, lj〈v〉〉 are receivable to M′
thus to N′. Therefore, N′ conforms to M′;H ·s〈p1, p2, lj〈v〉〉.
(SelN) When ` = s[p1, p2]!lj〈a〉, where a is a name, by the LTS of monitors defined in
Figure 7.4, this case is as same as the case of (Sel).
(Bra) Let ` = s[p1, p2]?lj(v). Consider (case 1: H is empty). Since M; ∅ 6 `−→g, this case
never happens.
Consider (case 2: H is not empty). When H is not empty. N `−→g N′ and
M;H `−→g M′;H/m,
where H/m means taking off message m from H, m = s〈p1, p2, lj〈v〉〉. By Defi-
nition 7.4.24, with the same reasonings of the proof for input in Theorem 7.4.16
for global safety, since M is consistent after receiving all messages H, M′ should
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be consistent after receiving messages H/m. Thus we have M′;H/m is configura-
tionally consistent, to which we can check N′ conforms.
(BraN) When ` = s[p1, p2]?lj(a), where a is a name, by the LTS of monitors defined
in Figure 7.4, this case is similar to the case of (Bra) except that the received a is
typed with O. Since this typing does not affect any consistency rule, it is proved
as case (Bra).
(Req-b) Let ` = a(s[pk] : G). N
`−→g N′ ≡ Ns′ ‖ H ·m as well as M;H `−→g M′;H ·m,
where m = a〈s[pk] : G〉. This action combines two parts: creating a fresh session
and requesting through sending an invitation. As for the part of creating a session,
the reasonings are as same as those of the proof for bound request in Theorem
7.4.16 for global safety.
As for the part of requesting an invitation to endpoint a and other parts of proving
that the resulting dynamic network conforms to the resulting configuration, the
reasonings are as same as that for (Req-f) below.
(Req-f) Let ` = a〈s[p] : G〉. N `−→g N′ ≡ Ns′ ‖ H ·m as well as M;H `−→g M′;H ·m,
where m = a〈s[p] : G〉. Since M allows ` and M is consistent, ∃Mj ∈M such that
a : O(G[p]) ∈ Γj or a : IO(G[p]) ∈ Γj , and ∃Mr ∈ M such that a : im(G[p]) ∈ Γr.
Thus, Mr is able to receive the message m = a〈s[p] : G〉 created by `, which
implies that m is receivable to M′ thus receivable to N′ because of |= Ns′ : M′.
After M `−→ M′ (generating m by requesting at Mj) and M′ `
′−→ M′′ (receiving
m by accepting at Mr), where `′ = a(s[p] : G) or `′ = a〈s[p] : G〉, according to
rules [Req-b] and [Acc-f/b] in Figure 7.4, a : O(G[p]) ∈ Γj or a : IO(G[p]) ∈ Γj ,
and a : im(G[p]) ∈ Γr all remain in M′ and M′′. Moreover, since the capability
s[p] : G  p is exchanged from Mj to Mr by removing it from Mj and adding
it to Mr, all rules about the capability of s[p] defined in Definition 7.4.12 still
hold for M′ and M′′. Thus M′ and M′′ are consistent. By Lemma B.4.2, we
have |= Ns′ : M′. Since all messages in H are receivable to M, and ` does not
affect any other configurations except those explained above, all messages in H
are receivable to Ns′. Because m is receivable to Ns′ as we proved above, H ·m is
receivable to Ns′. In conclusion, N′ conforms to M′;H ·m, where m = a〈s[p] : G〉.
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(Acc-b/f) Let ` = a(s[p] : G) or ` = a〈s[p] : G〉.
Consider (case 1: H is empty). Since M; ∅ 6 `−→g, this case never happens.
Consider (case 2: H is not empty). If Ns ·H ≡ N `−→g N′ ≡ Ns′ ‖ H/m and
M;H `−→g M′;H/m where m = a〈s[p] : G〉, they imply ∃Mr ∈ M and Mr `−→ M′r,
such that a : im(G[p]) ∈ Γr. Since all messages in H are receivable toM and ` only
receives m from H and added capability of s[p] into M′r ∈ M′ without affecting
the receivability of other messages in H, the left messages in H/m are receivable
to Ns′. By Lemma B.4.2, we have |= Ns′ : M′. In conclusion N′ conforms to
M′;H/m, where m = a〈s[p] : G〉.
The proof for other cases are trivial. 
B.5 Proofs for E Coherence
Before proving Poposition 7.5.7 for the property of E coherence, the following definitions
and lemmas are introduced. We define G′ ⊆ G w.r.t a particular session similarly as
the one for local specifications defined in Definition 7.4.9.
Definition B.5.1 (G′ ⊆ G w.r.t a session). We say G′ ⊆ G w.r.t s if, for some E
containing G, we have either (I) s : G `1...`n−−−−→ s : G′ for some sequence of actions `1...`n
or (II) Gy G′.
Note that, when G,G′ are clearly for the same session, we simply write G′ ⊆ G.
Define the result after kth valid unit permutation of a global specification:
Definition B.5.2. Assume p → q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gi}i∈I ⊆ G. Define p → q :
{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gki }i∈I is the result after kth valid unit permutation of p→ q : {li(xi :
Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gi}i∈I with its k previous interactions.
Similarly, define the result after kth valid unit permutation of a local specification:
Definition B.5.3. Assume q!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I ⊆ T . Define q!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.T ki }i∈I
is the result after kth valid unit permutation of q!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I with its k pre-
vious interactions. Similarly, for the case q?{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I ⊆ T , define q?{li(xi :
Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.T ki }i∈I is the result after kth valid unit permutation of q?{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I
with its k previous interactions.
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Example B.5.4. Assume an interaction
p→ q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gi}i∈I ⊆ G,
is the kth interaction in G, and let G be in the following shape:
G = pk → qk : {..... .p→ q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gi}i∈I}...}...}.
where the interaction with prefix pk → qk is the first interaction in G.
Gy p→ q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.G′i}i∈I
according to Definition 6.6.5, it means that we should be able to permute interaction
with prefix p→ q to the top of G after k valid unit permutations.
Assume the last interaction sequenced before p → q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gi}i∈I is
interaction with prefix p1 → q1 where q1 6= p or (p1 6= p) ∩ (q1 6= q):
p1 → q1 : {l′j′(x′j′ : S′j′)〈〈A′j′〉〉.G′j′}j′∈J =
p1 → q1 : {l′j′(x′j′ : S′j′)〈〈A′j′〉〉.p→ q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gj′i}i∈I}j′∈J
where G′j′ = p→ q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gj′i}i∈I and Gj′i = Gij′ . By Definition 6.6.5,
p1 → q1 : {l′j′(x′j′ : S′j′)〈〈A′j′〉〉.p→ q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gj′i}i∈I}j′∈J y
p→ q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.p1 → q1 : {l′j′(x′j′ : S′j′)〈〈A′j′〉〉.Gij′}j′∈J}i∈I =
p→ q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.G1i }i∈I ,
where for all i ∈ I, G1i = p1 → q1 : {l′j′(x′j′ : S′j′)〈〈A′j′〉〉.Gij′}j′∈I . Note that p → q :
{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.G1i }i∈I results the 1st permutation of p → q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gi}i∈I
with its 1st previous interactions.
Now we state that p → q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gk−1i }i∈I is the result after k − 1 valid
permutations from p → q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gi}i∈I . Then we can permute p → q :
{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gi}i∈I to the top after 1 unit valid permutations:
pk → qk : {l′′j (x′′j : S′′j )〈〈A′′j 〉〉.p→ q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gk−1ij }i∈I}j∈J y
p→ q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.pk → qk : {l′′j (x′′j : S′′j )〈〈A′′j 〉〉.Gk−1ji }j∈J}i∈I =
p→ q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gki }i∈I
where Gk−1ji = G
k−1
ij = G
k−1
i .
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Lemma B.5.5. Assume p → q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gi}i∈I ⊆ G. If G y p → q : {li(xi :
Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.G′i}i∈I , then there does not exist an interaction with prefix q′ → p or p → q
suppressing p→ q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gi}i∈I ⊆ G.
Proof. Assume an interaction
p→ q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gi}i∈I ⊆ G,
is the nth interaction in G, and let G be in the following form:
G = pn → qn : {..... .p→ q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gi}i∈I}...}...}.
where the interaction with prefix pn → qn is the first interaction in G.
If there is an interaction with prefix p′ → q′, where q′ = p or (p′ = p) ∩ (q′ =
q), sequenced before p → q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gki }i∈I , which is the result after kth
permutation of p→ q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gi}i∈I (according to Definition B.5.2), then by
Definition 6.6.5,
p′ → q′ : {l′j′(x′j′ : S′j′)〈〈A′j′〉〉.G′j′}j′∈J =
p′ → q′ : {l′j′(x′j′ : S′j′)〈〈A′j′〉〉.p→ q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gkj′i}i∈I}j′∈J
6y p→ q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.p′ → q′ : {l′j′(x′j′ : S′j′)〈〈A′j′〉〉.Gkij′}j′∈J}i∈I
This is a contradiction.
Lemma B.5.6. Assume there exists T0 ⊆ T .
1. Assume T0 = q!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I ⊆ T , if T y q!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.T ′i}i∈I ,
then there does not exist an action with prefix q′? or q! suppressing q!{li(xi :
Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I in T .
2. Similarly, assume T0 = p?{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I ⊆ T , if T y p?{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.T ′i}i∈I ,
then there does not exist an action with prefix p? or p suppressing p!{li(xi :
Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I in T .
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma B.5.5. Assume action
T0 = q!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I ⊆ T,
is the nth action in T and T is in the following shape
T = ...... .q!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I}...}...}.
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If there is some action with prefix q1 such that q1 = q′? or q1 = q! sequenced
before action q!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.T ki }i∈I , the result after kth valid unit permutation of
q!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I (according to Definition B.5.3), by Definition 6.6.8,
q1!{l′j′(x′j′ : S′j′)〈〈A′j′〉〉.T ′j′}j′∈I =
q1!{l′j′(x′j′ : S′j′)〈〈A′j′〉〉.q!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.T kj′i}i∈I}j′∈I
where T ′j′ = q!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.T kj′i}i∈I and T kj′i = T kij′ = T ki . This is a contradiction.
Similarly, we can prove that for the input case, it is a contradiction too.
Lemma B.5.7. Given E is coherent, s : G, s : m˜v ∈ E, p, q ∈ role(G) and there is no
〈p, q, l′′〈v′′〉〉 for some l′′ and v′′ in m˜v. If G  p − m˜v  p y q!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I ,
then
Gy p→ q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gi}i∈I , ∀ i ∈ I,Gi  p = Ti.
Proof. Note that s : m˜v means that there is only m˜v belonging to session s in the global
queue. We prove it by contradiction. Assume
G 6y p→ q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gi}i∈I , ∀ i ∈ I,Gi  p = Ti.
Then Lemma B.5.5 indicates
∃ p0 → q0 : {l′j(x′j : S′j)〈〈A′j〉〉.G′j}j∈J ⊆ G
where q0 = p or (p0 = p)∩(q0 = q) such that interaction p→ q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gi}i∈I
is suppressed; then Definition 6.5.1 implies that G  p should be
G  p = ......p0?{l′j(x′j : S′j)〈〈A′′j 〉〉.T ′j}j∈J}...}...}
or
G  p = ......q!{l′j(x′j : S′j)〈〈A′′j 〉〉.T ′j}j∈J}...}...}
if it is the kth action, where ∀ j ∈ J , A′′j {e/x′j} ↓ true iff A′j{e/x′j} ↓ true for some e.
For the case
G  p = ......p0?{l′j(x′j : S′j)〈〈A′′j 〉〉.T ′j}j∈J}...}...}
when we use G  p− m˜v  p to remove those happened output actions in G  p, we can
never get G  p− m˜v  py q!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I ,
(I) By Definition 7.5.2, m˜v  p only indicates messages sent from p, so m˜v  p cannot
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remove an input action in G  p;
(II) Moreover, in m˜v, there is no message of output actions which are sequenced behind
action p0? because, by Definition 6.6.8, such an output only happens after action
p0? fires.
(III) Together with (I), (II), we know that after doing G  p − m˜v  p, the action p0?
still suppresses the action q!{li(xi : Si)} for i ∈ I. This a contradiction.
For the case
G  p = ......q!{l′j(x′j : S ′j)〈〈A′′j 〉〉.T ′j}j∈J}...}...},
the reasoning is below:
(i) Since there is no 〈p, q, l′′〈v′′〉〉 for some l′′ and v′′ in m˜v, so that taking off m˜v  p
cannot remove action q!{l′j(x′j : S ′j)} for j ∈ J .
(ii) Based on (i), we know that after doing G  p− m˜v  p, the action q!{l′j(x′j : S ′j)}
for j ∈ J still suppresses the action q!{li(xi : Si)} for i ∈ I. This a contradiction.
Thus
Gy p→ q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gi}i∈I ,∀ i ∈ I,Gi  p = Ti
if
G  p− m˜v  p = q!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I . 
Poposition 7.5.7 If E is coherent and E `−→g E′, then E′ is coherent.
Proof. We illustrate the non-trivial cases of `. Note that, since the first rule of E
coherence: ∀a, a : om(G[p]) ∈ Γ implies that ∃Γ′, a : im(G[p]) ∈ Γ′, is trivially true in
the following cases, thus we ignore the proof of the first rule.
Case [E-sel/selN] Assume ` = s[p, q]!lj〈v〉, where v is either a value of a name. Since
E is coherent, and E `−→ E′, by rule [E-sel], let E = E0, s[p]• : T0, s : m˜v, where T0 y
q!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I , and thus E′ = E0, s[p]• : T ′0, s : m˜v ·〈p, q, lj〈v〉〉, where T ′0 y
Tj{v/xj}. Check if E′ satisfies the three other rules of E-coherence (Definition 7.5.6):
1. Since E is coherent, s[p]• ∈ ∆ implies s : G ∈ Θ and p ∈ role(G). Note that, by
Definition 7.5.5, whenever s : end (i.e. the session is finished), everything related
to session s will be deleted immediately from E. If s : G 6∈ E′, i.e. s : end, since
the configuration of s : G does not change by an output action, thus it implies
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s : G 6∈ E. Since E is coherent, it implies s[p]• 6∈ E, which is a contradiction. Thus
E′ satisfies the 2nd rule of E-coherence.
2. Since E is coherent, in E, ∃ T such that
G  p− m˜v  p = q!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I = T,
where ∆(s[p]•)y T .
By rule [E-sel], in E′, ∆(s[p]•) = T ′0 = Tj{v/xj}. Check if it satisfies G 
p− m˜v · 〈p, q, lj〈v〉〉  p = Tj{v/xj}.
(a) If m˜v  p = ε, then G  p − m˜v  p = G  p = T . By Definition 7.5.2, in E′
we have
G  p− m˜v′  p = G  p− m˜v  p·〈p, q, lj〈v〉〉  p
= G  p− ε · 〈p, q, lj〈v〉〉  p
= G  p− 〈p, q, lj〈v〉〉  p
= G  p− q!lj(v).
Since
G  p = T = q!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I ,
by Definition 7.5.3,
G  p− q!lj(v) = Tj{v/xj}
which satisfies the 4th rule of E-coherence.
(b) Since G  p − m˜v  p in E is defined (because E is coherent), if m˜v  p 6= ε,
by Definition 7.5.2, assume
m˜v  p = q1!l1(v1)·q2!l2(v2)· ... ·qn!ln(vn),
where i is the upper index to denote the labels and values may be different,
and ∀ k ∈ {1..n}, qk!lk(vk) 6= ε, is the kth output action of p.
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Let qk!{lkjk(xkjk : Skjk)〈〈Akjk〉〉.T kjk}jk∈I be the kth left endpoint specification
after the kth output action. Assume G  p = T 0, which is the endpoint
specification at the beginning. Since G  p−m˜v  p = T , by Definition 7.5.3,
we have
G  p− m˜v  p
= T 0 − q1!l1(v1)·q2!l2(v2)· ......... ·qn!ln(vn)
= T 1j1{v1/x1j1} − q2!l2(v2)· ..... ·qn!ln(vn)·
= T 2j2{v2/x2j2} − q3!l3(v3)· ... ·qn!ln(vn)
= ....................
= Tn−1jn−1{vn−1/xn−1jn−1} − qn!ln(vn)
= Tnjn{vn/xnjn} = T.
where lk = lkjk . Thus inductively use Definition 7.5.3, we get
G  p− (m˜v ·〈p, q, lj〈v〉〉)  p
= T 0 − q1!l1(v1)·q2!l2(v2)· ......... ·qn!ln(vn)·〈p, q, lj〈v〉〉  p
= T 1j1{v1/x1j1} − q2!l2(v2)· ..... ·qn!ln(vn)·〈p, q, lj〈v〉〉  p
= T 2j2{v2/x2j2} − q3!l3(v3)· ... ·qn!ln(vn)·〈p, q, lj〈v〉〉  p
= ....................
= Tn−1jn−1{vn−1/xn−1jn−1} − qn!ln(vn)·〈p, q, lj〈v〉〉  p
= Tnj1{vn/xnjn} − 〈p, q, lj〈v〉〉  p
= Tnjn{vn/xnjn} − q!lj(v).
Since Tnjn{vn/xnjn} = T = q!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I , by Definition 7.5.3,
Tnj1{vn/xnjn} − q!lj(v) = T − q!lj(v) = Tj{v/xj}, which satisfies the 4th rule
of E-coherence.
In conclusion, E′ satisfies the 3rd rule of E-coherence such that
G  p− m˜v · 〈p, q, lj〈v〉〉  p = Tj{v/xj},
Tj{v/xj}y Tj{v/xj}.
3. Assume E is coherent, in E, ∃ s : G, s : m˜v.
(a) Assume s : m˜v has no message sent from p to q. Since E is coherent, in E
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there exists T such that
∆(s[p]•)y q!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I = T,
and G  p− m˜v  p = T. Lemma B.5.7 implies that
Gy p→ q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.G′i}i∈I .
For the additional message s : m˜v · 〈p, q, lj〈v〉〉 in E′, since an output ac-
tion s[p, q]!l〈v〉 does not change the configuration of s : G (since the in-
teraction is not complete), it satisfies the 4th rule of E-coherence which
says if s : m˜v1 ·s〈p, q, l〈v〉〉 ·m˜v2, m˜v1 does not suppress s〈p, q, l〈v〉〉, then
∃ Gy p→ q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.G′i}i∈I .
(b) Assume s〈p, q, l′〈v′〉〉 ∈ m˜v and G y p → q : {l′i(x′i : S′i)〈〈A′i〉〉.G′i}i∈I . As
output s[p, q]!l〈v〉 takes place, the configuration of G does not change and
G 6y p → q : {lj(xj : Sj)〈〈Aj〉〉.G′j}j∈J because interaction p → q : {lj(xj :
Sj)}j∈J is suppressed by interaction p → q : {li(xi : Si)}i∈I . Thus it still
satisfies the 4th rule of E-coherence.
Case [E-bch/bchN] As ` = s[p, q]?lj(v), either v is a value or a name, according to
rule [E-bch], let
E = E0, s : G0, s[q]
• : T0, s : m˜v,
m˜v = s〈p, q, lj〈v〉〉·m˜v′,
G0 y p→ q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gi}i∈I = G,
T0 = G  q − m˜v  q.
By [E-bch], we get E′ = E0, s : G′0, s[q]• : T ′0, s : m˜v where G′0 = Gj{v/xj} and
T ′0 = (Gj  q){v/xj} − m˜v  q.
Similarly, we check if E′ satisfies three rules of E-coherence (Definition 7.5.6):
1. The only case that input action s[p, q]?lj(v) affects the existence of s : G0 is when
G0 = p → q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.end}, s : 〈p, q, lj〈v〉〉 ∈ E, thus G′0 6∈ E′ (because
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of G′0 = end and s : ∅). Since G0 = p → q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.end} can only
y p → q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.end} and E is coherent, ∆(s[q]•) = T0 = p?{li(xi :
Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.end} − 〈p, q, lj〈v〉〉  q = p?{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.end}, so that in E′, we have
G′0 = end, and ∆(s[q]•) = end, they finish all interactions and actions at the same
time, thus satisfies the 2nd rule: if there is no such a global specification, then
there is no corresponding endpoint specification.
2. For the 3rd rule of E-coherence, by rule [E-bch], in E′, s[q]• : T ′0, s : Gj{v/xj},
T ′0 = (Gj  q){v/xj} − m˜v  q = (Gj  q){v/xj} − m˜v′  q, which means
T ′0 y (Gj  q){v/xj} − m˜v′  q. Thus it satisfies the 3rd rule of E-coherence.
3. Since E is coherent, every message specification mv = s〈pk, qk, lk〈vk〉〉 ∈ m˜v im-
plies that Gy pk → qk : {lkik(xikk : Sikk)〈〈Akik〉〉.Gkik}ik∈I . Since we have message
specifications s : s〈p, q, l〈v〉〉·m˜v′ in E and G y p → q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.G′i}i∈I ,
when message 〈p, q, l〈v〉〉 is absorbed, G s[p,q]?l(v)−−−−−−→ Gj{v/xj}, and the rest interac-
tions pk → qk : {lkik(xikk : Sikk)〈〈Akik〉〉.Gkik}ik∈I are still in Gj{v/xj}, which means
they are still permutable to the top, therefore the 4th rule is satisfied.
Case [E-req-b] With the rule [E-req-b], when E = E0 is coherent and ` = a(s[p] : G),
we have s :G, s[pi] : G  pi where ∀i ∈ I, pi ∈ role(G), and s : ∅ in E′.
1. It is straightforward that E′ satisfies the 1st and 2nd rules of E-coherent.
2. Since there is no message in s : ∅, ∀ p ∈ role(G), G  p− ε  p = G  p = ∆(s[p]).
Thus it satisfies the 3rd rule of E-coherence.
3. Since there is no message, the 4th rule is satisfied.
Other cases are trivial because they do not affect any rule of E-coherence. 
Theorem 7.5.9 (session fidelity w.r.t. E). If N `−→g N ′, and E ` N , E is coherent,
then E `−→g E′, and E′ ` N ′, E′ is coherent.
Proof. If E is coherent, E `−→g E′, then E′ is coherent has been proved in Proposition
7.5.7. Assume Θ0,Γ0,∆0 composes a global environment defined in E.
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Case [sel/selN] For the case when ` = s[p, q]!lj〈v〉, v is either a value or a name,
assume
N = N0 ‖Ms[Ps] ‖ H
by the fact N `−→g N ′ implying ∃ Ms[Ps] ∈ N such that Ms[Ps] `−→M′s[P ′s].
Since E ` N , with rules [E-CO] and [E-PAR], let E = Θ,Γ,∆1,∆2,∆3 such that
Θ,Γ,∆1 `g N0,
Θ,Γ,∆2,∆3 `g Ms[Ps] ‖ H
By rule [E-pm3], ∆3 = s : m˜v so that Γ,∆3 `g H. By rules [E-M] and [Sel] (see
Figure 7.4), let ∆2 = ∆0, s[p]• : T where T y q!{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I , j ∈ I, and
Γ |= Aj{v/xj}, so that
Γ,∆2 `g Ms[Ps]
where
Ms = M0, s[p]
• : T, Aj{v/xj} ↓ true.
based on the factMs
`−→M′s. Therefore, rule [E-sel] says E `−→g E′ because E has s[p]• : T
which approves transition `.
By rule [E-sel], E′ = Θ,Γ,∆1,∆′2,∆′3 where ∆′2 = ∆0, s[p]• : Tj{v/xj} and ∆′3 = s :
m˜v ·s〈p, q, lj〈v〉〉; and by rule [sel], Ms `−→ M′s, thus M′s = M0, s[p]• : Tj{v/xj}. With
rule [E-PM3], they together imply that
Θ,Γ,∆1 `g N0,
Θ,Γ,∆′2,∆
′
3 `g M′s[P ′s] | H ·s〈p, q, lj〈v〉〉
Thus, by applying rules [E-PAR] and [E-CO], we have E′ ` N0 ‖ M′s[P ′s] ‖ H ·
s〈p, q, lj〈v〉〉 = N ′.
Case [bch/bchN] For the case when ` = s[p, q]?lj(v):
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1. When v is a value, let N = N0 ‖ Mr[Pr] ‖ s〈p, q, lj〈v〉〉·H by the fact N `−→g N ′
implying ∃ Mr[Pr] ∈ N , Mr[Pr] `−→ M′r[P ′r], where Mr[Pr] is a receiver. By rule
[bra] (see Figure 7.4), let
Mr = M0, s[q]
• : p?{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Ti}i∈I , Aj{v/xj} ↓ true.
Since E ` N , by rules [E-CO] and [E-PAR], let E = Θ,Γ,∆1,∆2,∆3 such that
Θ,Γ,∆1 `g N0,
Θ,Γ,∆2,∆3 `g Mr[Pr] ‖ s〈p, q, lj〈v〉〉·H
By rule [E-pm3], let ∆3 = s : s〈p, q, lj〈v〉〉·m˜v so that Γ,∆3 `g s〈p, q, lj〈v〉〉·H.
Decompose m˜v. Assume the messages sent from endpoint s[q] are s〈q, pk, lk〈vk〉〉 ∈
H, such that for each k,
s : s〈q, pk, lk〈vk〉〉 `g s〈q, pk, lk〈vk〉〉,
s : s〈q, pk, lk〈vk〉〉 ∈ ∆3.
In E, we have s : G ∈ Θ, with the decomposition of messages above, it should be
in the form:
G = q → p1 : {l1i1(x1i1 : S1i1)〈〈A1i1〉〉....
q → pk : {lkik(xkik : Skik)〈〈Akik〉〉....
q → pm : {lmim(xmim : Smim)〈〈Amim〉〉.p→ q : {li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.G′i}i∈I}..}..}
Since E is coherent and E ` N , we have
G  q − (s〈p, q, lj〈v〉〉·m˜v)  q = G  q − m˜v  q
= p?{li(xi : Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gi  q}i∈I .
Since E has s : G, s[q]• : T , and s : s〈p, q, l〈v〉〉·m˜v, where G y p → q : {li(xi :
Si)〈〈Ai〉〉.Gi}i∈I , by rule [E-bch], E approves this action has transition E `−→g E′.
Since Mr
`−→M′r, by rule [bra], M′r = M0, s[q]• : Tj{v/xj}, and H ∈ N ′.
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Since E `−→g E′, by rule [E-bch], we have Θ′,Γ,∆1,∆′2,∆′3 ∈ E′ where
Θ′ = Θ0, Gj{v/xj},
∆′2 = ∆0, s[q]• : (Gj  q){v/xj} − m˜v  q,
∆′3 = s : m˜v
where (Gj  q){v/xj} − m˜v  q = Tj{v/xj} because
(Gj  q − m˜v  q){v/xj} = (Gj  q){v/xj} − (m˜v  q){v/xj}
= (Gj  q){v/xj} − m˜v  q
= Tj{v/xj}
so that
Θ′,Γ,∆1 `g N0,
Θ′,Γ,∆′2,∆
′
3 `M′r[P ′r] ‖ H.
By rule [E-PAR] and [E-CO], we have E′ ` N0 ‖M′r[P ′r] ‖ H = N ′.
2. When ` = s[p, q]?lj(a) where a is a name, the proof is similar to the one of
` = s[p, q]?lj(v), except setting Γ ∈ E to be Γ ` a : mode(G[p]) and Γ |= Aj ↓ true,
other settings are the same. This setting does not affect transition according to
rule [E-bchN], so that we still have E `−→g E′. After transition takes place, Γ does
not change its configuration, which means that, in E′, for the additional a : O(G[p])
in M′r, Γ ` a : T [p]. Thus E′ ` N ′.
Case [req-b] For the case when ` = a(s[pj ] : G), for the session creation part is
proved here, while for the request of invitation part is proved together with Case [req
f]. Since s 6∈ dom(E) is given and the fact N `−→g N ′ implying ∃ M[P ] ∈ N such that
M[P ]
`−→M′[P ′], let
N = N0 ‖M[P ] `−→g N0 ‖M′[P ] = N ′.
Since E ` N , by rule [E-CO] and [E-PAR], let E = Θ,Γ,∆1,∆2 such that
Θ,Γ,∆1 `g N0,
Θ,Γ,∆2 `g M[P ]
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Let Θ = Θ0 and ∆2 = ∆0, s 6∈ dom(∆0). By Lemma 7.2.6, M `−→ M′ and s 6∈ dom(M).
By [E-req-b], E approves this action and have transition E `−→g E′; again, by [E-Req-b], in
E′, we have Θ′,Γ,∆1,∆′2 ∈ E′ where Θ′ = Θ0, s : G, ∆′2 = ∆0, {s[pi] : G  pi}pi∈role(G)
such that
Θ′,Γ,∆1 `g N0,
Θ′,Γ,∆′2 `g M′[P ′]
By rule [E-PAR] and [E-CO], we have E′ ` N0 ‖M′[P ′].
Case [req-f] For the case when ` = a〈s[p] : G〉 or ` = a(s[p] : G), given the fact
N
`−→g N ′ implying ∃ M[P ] ∈ N such that M[P ] `−→M′[P ′], let
N = N0 ‖M[P ] ‖ H `−→g N0 ‖M′[P ] ‖ H ·a〈s[p] : G〉 = N ′.
Since E ` N , by rule [E-CO] and [E-PAR], let E = Θ,Γ,∆1,∆2,∆3 such that
Θ,Γ,∆1 `g N0,
Θ,Γ,∆2,∆3 `g M[P ] ‖ H
where Γ = Γ0, a : om(G[p]) ∆2 = ∆0, s[p] : T , and ∆3 = s : m˜v such that ∆2 `g
M[P ],∆3 `g H. By rule [E-M], when given M = M0, a : om(G[p]), s[p] : T, a 6∈ dom(M0)
by rule [req-f]. Since E is coherent, the existence of a : om(G[p]) implies the existence
of a : im(G[p]) in E.
By rule [E-req-f], E allows this action and have transition E `−→g E′, again, by rule
[E-req-f], E = E′; therefore, with rule [E-CO], [E-PM1], and given M′ = M0, a : om(G[p]),
we have we have E′ ` N0 |M′[P ′] ‖ H ·a〈s[p] : G〉.
Case [acc-b/f] For case ` = a(s[p] : G) or ` = a〈s[p] : G〉, given the fact N `−→g N ′,
∃ M[P ] ∈ N such that M[P ] `−→ M′[P ′], let N = N0 ‖ M[P ] ‖ a〈s[p] : G〉·H `−→g N0 ‖
M′[P ′] ‖ H = N ′.
Since E ` N , by rule [E-CO] and [E-PAR], let E = Θ,Γ,∆1,∆2,∆3 such that
Θ,Γ,∆1 `g N0,
Θ,Γ,∆2,∆3 `g M[P ] ‖ a〈s[p] : G〉·H
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where ∆3 = s : m˜v,∆3 `g H. By rule [E-M], [E-PM1], and given M = M0, a : im(G[p])
by rule [acc-b/f], Γ = Γ0, a : im(G[p]), and ∆2 = ∆0, s[p] : T .
By rule [E-acc], E approves this action and has transition E `−→g E′. By rule [E-acc],
E = E′, and M′ = M0, a : im(G[p]), s[p] : T . Therefore, with rule [E-CO], we have
E′ ` N0 ‖M′[P ′].
Case [new a] For case ` = new a : im(G[p]), since the fact N `−→g N ′, ∃ M[P ] ∈ N
such that M[P ] `−→M′[P ′]. Let N = N0 ‖M[P ] `−→g N0 ‖M′[P ] = N ′.
Since E ` N , by rule [E-CO] and [E-PAR], let E = Θ,Γ,∆ such that
Θ,Γ,∆ `g N0,
Γ,∆ `g M[P ]
where Γ = Γ0 and a 6∈ Γ0.
By rule [E-new a], E approves this transition as E `−→g E′. By rule [E-new a],
Θ,Γ′,∆ ∈ E′, Γ′ = Γ0, a : im(G[p]). We have M′ = M, a : im(G[p]) by rule [new a]. By
rule [E-CO] and [E-M], we have E′ ` N0 ‖M′[P ′].
Case [join] For case ` = join(s[p]), the proof is trivial. Let
N = N0 ‖M[P ] `−→g N0 ‖M′[P ] = N ′.
Since the fact N `−→g N ′, it implies ∃ M[P ] ∈ N,M[P ] `−→M′[P ′].
Since E ` N , by rules [E-CO] and [E-PAR], let E = Θ,Γ,∆1,∆2 such that
Θ,Γ,∆1 `g N0,
Θ,Γ,∆2 `g M[P ]
where ∆2 = ∆0, s[p] : T by rule [E-M].
By rule [E-join], E approves this action and have transition E `−→g E′; again, by rule
[E-join], Θ,Γ,∆′2 ∈ E′, ∆′2 = ∆0, s[p]• : T .
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Given M′ = M0, s[p]• : T by rule [join], and together with rule [E-CO] and [E-PAR],
we have E′ ` N0 ‖M′[P ′], which is denoted as N ′.
Case [tau] as ` = τ , it is trivial.
243
B. APPENDIX FOR DYNAMIC ASYNCHRONOUSLY MONITORING
244
APPENDIXC
Appendix for Specifying Stateful Asynchronous Properties
for Distributed Programs
C.1 Auxiliary Theorems and Proofs for Strongest Specifi-
cations
Let Θsync,Θasync and Θass be the local specifications projected from global stateful pro-
tocols Gsync, Gasync and Gassign, respectively (refer to Example 8.1.2 and Example 8.1.3),
on the role S (i.e. server). They are defined as follows:
Θsync = 〈ser : I(Gsync[S]);
{sj [S] : C?req(ε)〈〈true ; ε〉〉.C!ans(x : int)〈〈x = c ; c := c+ 1〉〉}j∈J ;
c 7→ ini〉
Θasync = 〈ser : I(Gasync[S]));
{sj [S] : C?req(ε)〈〈true ; ε〉〉.C!ans(x : int)〈〈x 6∈ c; c := c ∪ {x}〉〉}j∈J ;
c 7→ { }〉
Θass = 〈ser : I(Gassign[S]);
{sj [S] : C?req(ε)〈〈true ; c′ := c′ + 1, log := log ∪ {c′}〉〉.
C!ans(x : int)〈〈x ∈ log ; log := log \ {x}〉〉}j∈J ;
c′ 7→ ini′, log 7→ { }〉
where J is the set of indexes of sessions.
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Lemma C.1.1. For any s′ ∈ prefix(s), s ∈ trace(Θsync), we always have
num(O(s′)) ≤ num(I(s′))
Proof. Simply by the definition of Θsync which specifies that inputs should always
happen before outputs in the same session. Thus, in every possible prefix of s ∈
trace(Θsync), the number of inputs should be more than the number of outputs.
Lemma C.1.2. Assume s ∈ trace(Θsync) and c ∈ field(Θsync). Assume current(c,Θsync, ∅) =
ini. Then ∀s′ ∈ prefix(s), we always have
current(c,Θsync, s′) = num(O(s′)) + ini
Proof. By induction, when num(O(s′)) = 0, which means there is no output action,
0 + ini = current(c,Θsync, s′). It is correct because no output action in s′ means no
update c := c+ 1 applied according to Θsync.
Let Θ′sync be the configuration from Θsync
s′−→ Θ′sync. Assume num(O(s′)) = k so that
current(c,Θsync, s′) = k + ini, which means current(c,Θsync, s′) = val(c,Θ′sync) =
k + ini. For s′ ·`:
1. When ` is an input, num(O(s′·`)) = num(O(s′)) = k, and according to Θsync, state
c is not updated, which means
current(c,Θsync, s′ ·`) = current(c,Θsync, s′) = k + ini = num(O(s′)) + ini.
2. When ` is an output, num(O(s′·`)) = num(O(s′)) + 1 = k+ 1. According to Θsync,
state c is updated by c := c + 1. Therefore, let Θ′′sync be the configuration from
Θ′sync
`−→ Θ′′sync, we have
current(c,Θsync, s′ ·`) = val(c,Θ′′sync) = val(c,Θ′sync) + 1 = (k + ini) + 1
which means
current(c,Θsync, s′ ·`) = (k + 1) + ini = num(O(s′ ·`)) + ini.
By induction, the statement is proved.
Lemma C.1.3. Assume s ∈ trace(Θsync) and c ∈ field(Θsync). For any s′ ∈ prefix(s),
current(c,Θsync, s′) ≤ current(c,Θsync, s).
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Proof. According to Θsync, c is updated by c := c+ 1 when an output happens, which
means the value of current(c,Θsync, s′′) depends on the number of outputs happening
in s′′. Because the number of outputs in s′ is smaller than or equal to the number of
outpus in s, we always have current(c,Θsync, s′) ≤ current(c,Θsync, s). 
Lemma C.1.4. Assume s ∈ trace(Θsync) and c ∈ field(Θsync). Then for any ` ∈
O(s′), s′ ∈ prefix(s), v(`) < current(c,Θsync, s′).
Proof. By Lemma C.1.3, we always have current(c,Θsync, s0) ≤ current(c,Θsync, s′)
whenever s0 is a prefix of s′ because num(s0) ≤ num(s′).
Let `∗ be the last output in s′ = s0 ·`∗ ·s1, which means there is no output in s1.
Then, according to Θsync, v(`∗) = current(c,Θsync, s0). This fact implies two things:
(a) For any other ` ∈ O(s′), we know ` ∈ s0 = s′0 ·`·s′′0 because `∗ is the last output.
According to Θsync, v(`) = current(c,Θsync, s′0) ≤ current(c,Θsync, s0) = v(`∗).
(b) v(`∗) = current(c,Θsync, s0) < current(c,Θsync, s0 ·`∗) = current(c,Θsync, s′),
so that
v(`∗) < current(c,Θsync, s′)
Together with (a) and (b), for any ` ∈ s′, s′ ∈ prefix(s), v(`) < current(c,Θsync, s′).

Lemma C.1.5. Assume s ∈ trace(Θsync) and c ∈ field(Θsync). Assume current(c,Θsync, ∅) =
ini. ∀s′ ∈ prefix(s), we have
ini ≤ current(c,Θsync, s′) ≤ num(I(s′)) + ini.
Proof. By Lemma C.1.2, current(c,Θsync, s′) = num(O(s′))+ini so that ini ≤ current(c,Θsync, s′).
Moreover, by Lemma C.1.1 which states that num(O(s′)) ≤ num(I(s′)), we have
∀s′ ∈ prefix(s), ini ≤ current(c,Θsync, s′) = num(O(s′)) + ini ≤ num(I(s′)) + ini.
Then the proof is done. 
Lemma C.1.6. Assume s ∈ trace(Θsync), c ∈ field(Θsync). Assume current(c,Θsync, ∅) =
ini. ∀` ∈ O(s′), s′ ∈ prefix(s), we always have ini ≤ v(`) < num(I(s′)) + ini.
Proof. Immediately from Lemmas C.1.4 and C.1.5. 
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Lemma C.1.7. Assume s = s1·` and s ∈ trace(Θsync). If ` can permute with s1 such
that s1 ·`y s′1 ·`′, then num(I(s′1)) > num(O(s′1)).
Proof. When s ∈ trace(Θsync), only when ` is input then it can permute with an output
or an input in s1. Therefore, num(I(s′1)) > num(O(s′1)). 
Lemma 8.5.13. Assume c ∈ field(Θsync) and current(c,Θsync, ∅) = ini. Assume
every session si guided by Gsync has been established. Θsync is defined as below:
Θsync = 〈ser : I(Gsync[S]) ;
{si[S] : C?req(ε)〈true ; ε〉.C!ans(x : int)〈x = c ; c := c+ 1〉}i∈I ;
c 7→ ini〉
where I is the index of sessions. If s′ ∈ trace(Θsync), then for any s resulting from
permutations s′ y s, s satisfies the followings:
cond 1. If session s ∈ ses(s), then s ∈ ses(Θsync).
cond 2. ∀s′′ ∈ prefix(s), num(I(s′′)) ≥ num(O(s′′));
cond 3. If s0 ·` ∈ s ∩ ` = s[S,B]!ans(v), then ∃ `′ ∈ s0, `′ = s[B,S]?req(ε).
cond 4. ∀`, `′ ∈ O(s), ` 6= `′, then v(`) 6= v(`′);
cond 5. ∀` ∈ O(s′′), s′′ ∈ prefix(s), ini ≤ v(`) < num(I(s′′)) + ini.
Proof. First of all, for any s′ ∈ trace(Θsync), s′ satisfies all these conditions: condition
0 is satisfied because s′ is valid according to Θsync which means, for any s ∈ ses(s′),
Θsync should include this session so that it can verify the actions involving in this
session. Conditions 1,2, 3 are satisfied simply by the definition of Θsync and condition
4 is satisfied by Lemmas C.1.6. So the main proof below is to show, when s′ satisfies
these five conditions and s′ y s, s satisfies all these conditions.
For cond 1. Since any permutation of s′ does not add or subtract any session from s′, any
trace s permuted from s′ y s has the sessions as same as s′ does. We have any
s ∈ ses(s) implies s ∈ ses(s′), which again implies s ∈ ses(Θsync).
For cond 2. By the permutation rules defined in Definition 8.4.12,
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(a) for any action sequence `·`′ ∈ s′, where ` is output and `′ is input, if they are
permutable and are permuted by doing `·`′ y `′ ·`, so that it makes s′ y s,
s still satisfies cond 2 because the number of inputs in every s′′ ∈ prefix(s)
is more than the number of inputs in every s′′′ ∈ prefix(s′).
(b) for any action sequence ·`` ′ ∈ s′, which are both inputs (resp. outputs), after
permutations ` ·`′ y `′ ·`, which leads to s′ y s, the number of inputs or
the number of outputs in every s′′ ∈ prefix(s) is as same as that in every
s′′′ ∈ prefix(s′).
For cond 3. Based on s′ ∈ trace(Θsync), since the permutation of s′ y s only moves input
actions ahead of output actions in s, s still satisfies cond 3.
For cond 4. Since s′ ∈ trace(Θsync), every outputted value of a trace in s′ is unique. Then
for every s permuted from s′ y s, every outputted value of s is still unique.
For cond 5. Based on s′ ∈ trace(Θsync) and s′ satisfies cond 5, when s is the result from
permutation s′ y s, because the valid permutations only make inputs move ahead
of outputs, or two inputs (resp. two outputs) permute to each other, overall the
permutations only increase the number of input actions ahead of output actions
in s, while the value of any output action is not changed. By Lemma C.1.7, s
satisfies cond 5. 
Remark C.1.8. Based on Lemma 8.5.13, some trace s ∈ trace(Θasync) may not satisfy
these conditions because trace(Θasync) is much bigger than the set
{s | s′ ∈ trace(Θsync), s′ y s}.
Definition C.1.9 (contiguous series). For a set {v0, ..., vn} of numbers, where v0
is the minimum element and vn is the maximum element. If , except vn, any v ∈
{v0, ..., vn}, ∃v′ ∈ {v0, ..., vn} such that v′ = v + 1, then the set is called a contiguous
series.
Lemma C.1.10. The states c′ and log in Θass repectively have the following attributes:
1. For state c′, for any s,
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(a) when ` is an input, current(c′,Θass, s·`) = current(c′,Θass, s) + 1.
(b) when ` is an output, current(c′,Θass, s·`) = current(c′,Θass, s).
2. For state log, for any s,
(a) when ` is an input, current(log,Θass, s·` ) = current(log,Θass, s)∪{current(c′,Θass, s·
`)}.
(b) when ` is an output, current(c′,Θass, s·`) = current(c′,Θass, s) \ {v(`)}.
Proof. It is proved directly from the mechanism of Θass.
Proposition 8.5.14. Assume c′, log ∈ field(Θass)and current(c′,Θass, ∅) = ini′ =
ini−1, current(log,Θass, ∅) = { }. Assume every session si guided by Gassign has been
established. Θass is defined below:
Θass = 〈ser : I(Gassign[S]) ;
{si[S] : C?req(ε)〈true ; c′ := c′ + 1, log := log ∪ {c′}〉.
C!ans(x : int)〈x ∈ log ; log := log \ {x}〉}i∈I ;
c′ 7→ ini′, log 7→ { }〉
where I is the index of sessions. s satisfies all conditions listed in Lemma 8.5.13, if and
only if s ∈ trace(Θass).
Proof. (For ⇒): Assume s satisfies all conditions listed in Lemma 8.5.13. We only
need to make sure that every output action in s always satisfies the predicate at output
obligation (i.e. x ∈ log). The reasonings are as follows:
(1) Based on cond 1, 2, and 3, for any session s ∈ ses(s), its actions are either
s′ ·s[C, S]?req(ε)·s′′ ·s[S,C]!ans(v) or s′ ·s[C, S]?req(ε) where s[S,C]!ans(v) 6∈ s′.
Thus the sequence of actions satisfy that Θass defines, for a session, its input
action should happen before its ouput.
(2) Although an input is anyway valid because of the predicate true at input obliga-
tion, with the update c′ := c′ + 1 and log := log ∪ {c′}, it affects the elements of
set log and thus may affect the judgement of predicate x ∈ log when replacing x
with the value of the upcoming output action.
For the effects caused by inputs the statement we have for s satisfying the five
conditions:
250
C.1 Auxiliary Theorems and Proofs for Strongest Specifications
Claim. current(c′,Θass, s) = num(I(s)) + ini′.
This is because c′ is a counter at input obligation whose predicate is true, any
output action does not update c′ and, for any s, c′ will be updated whenever an
input happens. Note it does not matter whether s ∈ trace(Θass) or not (at this
point this has not been proved).
This statement can be proved similarly as the proof in Lemma C.1.2. In Lemma
C.1.2, the statement is current(c,Θsync, s) = num(O(s)) + ini′ because c is a
counter at output obligation in Θsync, while c′ is a counter at input obligation in
Θass. Remember, the predicate in Θass for any input is true and any output action
cannot update c′. We only need to replace every c with c′ and Θsync with Θass,
and change num(O(s)) to num(I(s)), other steps of the proof are the same.
(3) For any output action ` in s, since more than one inputs may have happened
before ` according to cond 2 and cond 3, to satisfy the predicate x ∈ log when
replacing x with v(`), the followings should be considered:
For any s, let s = s0 ·`·s1, where s0 only has inputs so that ` is the first output.
(a) Up to s0, Θass accepts s0 because it only has inputs. According to updates
c′ := c′ + 1 and log := log ∪ {c′} at input obligation, where c′ has initial
value ini′, and log has initial value { }, the minimum (first) element in log
is ini′ + 1 = ini, we therefore have,
current(log,Θass, s0) = {ini′+1, ..., ini′+num(s0)} = {ini, ..., (ini−1)+num(s0)}
Thus for any s′′ ∈ prefix(s0),
current(c′,Θass, s′′ ·`′) = current(c′,Θass, s′′) + 1
whenever `′ is an input. Thus we have {ini′ + 1, ..., ini′ + num(s0)} is a con-
tiguous set with minimun ini′ + 1 and maximum ini′ + num(s0).
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(b) Up to s0 ·`, by cond 5,
ini ≤ v(`) < num(I(s0 ·`)) + ini = num(I(s0)) + ini = num(s0) + ini
which implies v(`) ∈ current(log,Θass, s0) so that Θass accepts s0 ·`. Note
that, for any s, num(I(s0 ·`)) = num(I(s0)) whenever ` is an output.
(c) Assume for any s′ ∈ prefix(s), s′ = sf ·`. Assume Θass accepts sf and let
{` | ` ∈ O(sf )} = out(sf ) be the set of output values happening in sf . So,
up to sf , we have
current(log,Θass, sf ) = {ini′ + 1, ..., ini′ + num(I(sf ))} \ out(sf )
where {ini′ + 1, ..., ini′ + num(I(sf ))} is a contiguous series.
Firstly, it needs to prove that {ini′ + 1, ..., ini′ + num(I(sf ))} is a contigu-
ous series. Assume sf = s0 ·s′f where s0 only contains inputs, then it is
straightforward that {ini′+1, ..., ini′+num(I(s0))} is a contiguous series sim-
ply from (a). The following claims that, if a set is a contiguous series, then
after adding new elements to it because of inputs, the resulting set is still a
contiguous series.
Claim. For s0 ·s′1 = s′, s′ ∈ prefix(s) where s0 only contains inputs, and
let out(s′1) be the set of output values of s′1. If current(log,Θass, s0) =
{ini′ + 1, ..., ini′ + num(I(s0))}, then
current(log,Θass, s0 ·s′1)
= {ini′ + 1, ..., ini′ + num(I(s0))} ∪
{ini′ + num(I(s0)) + 1, ..., ini′ + num(I(s0)) + num(I(s′1))} \ out(s′1)
= {ini′ + 1, ..., ini′ + num(I(s0)) + num(I(s′1))} \ out(s′1)
= {ini′ + 1, ..., ini′ + num(I(s0 ·s′1))} \ out(s′1)
and the set {ini′ + 1, ..., ini′ + num(I(s0 ·s′1))} is a contiguous series.
This claim can be proved by the following reasoning: according to Θass, once
an input happens, it updates c′ := c′+1 and log := log∪{c′}. The new ele-
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ments added by the inputs in s′1 are in the range from current(c′,Θass, s0·` ),
where ` is the first input of s′1, to current(c′,Θass, s0 ·s′1) where
current(c′,Θass, s0 ·`)
= current(c′,Θass, s0) + 1
= ini′ + num(I(s0)) + 1
and
current(c′,Θass, s0 ·s′1)
= current(c′,Θass, s0) + num(I(s′1))
= ini′ + num(I(s0)) + num(I(s′1))
Because num(I(s0)) + num(I(s′1)) = num(I(s0 ·s′1)), the set of new elements
added to current(log,Θass, s0) is
{ini′ + num(I(s0)) + 1, ..., ini′ + num(I(s0 ·s′1))}
which is a contiguous series set by the same reasoning of (a). Because the
minimum element of set {ini′+num(I(s0))+1, ..., ini′+num(I(s0·s′1))}, which
is ini′+num(I(s0)) + 1, is one more bigger than the maximum element of set
{ini′, ..., ini′+ num(I(s0))}, which is ini′+ num(I(s0)), the union of these two
contiguous sets is still a contiguous series set. Moreover,
current(log,Θass, s0 ·s′1) = {ini′ + 1, ..., ini′ + num(I(s0 ·s′1))} \ out(s′1)
simply according to the updates c′ := c′ + 1 and log := log ∪ {c′} for every
input, and the update log := log \ v(`) for every output `.
Continue to prove that sf ·` is anyway accepted by Θass. When ` is an input,
Θass accepts sf ·` because Θass accepts any input. When ` is an output, then
by cond 5, ini ≤ v(`) < ini + num(I(sf ·`)) = ini + num(I(sf )), we know that
v(`) ∈ {ini′+1, ..., ini′+num(I(sf ))} because it is a contiguous series set with
ini′ = ini− 1.
Further, by cond 4 we know v(`) is different from any value of actions in
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out(sf ). They together imply v(`) is in
current(log,Θass, sf ) = {ini′ + 1, ..., ini′ + num(I(sf ))} \ out(sf )
Therefore, by induction, every output in s is accepted by Θass, which means every s
satisfies all conditions in Lemma 8.5.13, s ∈ trace(Θass).
(For ⇐): Assume s ∈ trace(Θass) is given. The reasonings are as follows:
1. s ∈ trace(Θass) means that the sessions declared in s has been validly established
(as si, i ∈ I), which implies s satisfies cond 1.
2. By the definition of Θass, if s ∈ trace(Θass), then the inputs should always hap-
pen before the outputs in the same session, thus s satisfies cond 2, and cond 3.
3. log is updated while an input happens by updating log := log ∪ {c′}; therefore,
for any v1 and v2 in log, v1 is always different from v2 simply because whenever
an input happens, c′ updates to a different value (i.e. c′ := c′ + 1) and this new
value is added to set log (i.e. log := log ∪ {c′}). Since every outputted value v
in s should be selected from set log through verifying the predicate v ∈ log, and,
when outputting v, log is updated by log := log \ {v}, they together ensure that
for any outputs ` and `′ in s, v(`) 6= v(`′). Thus s satisfies condition 3.
4. By the definition of Θass, the initial value of c′ is ini′ and c′ is updated by in-
creasing one when an input happens. Therefore, for every s′ ∈ prefix(s), again,
current(c′,Θass, s′) defined before is used to represent the lastest value of c′ when
the actions in s′ have happened. Then we know
current(c′,Θass, s′) = num(I(s′)) + ini′
because the lastest value of c′ is the summation of the number of inputs hap-
pening in s′ plus the starting value ini′. Since for every outputted value v in
s′ ∈ prefix(s), there exists an input belonging to the same session of v ahead
of it, and it is selected from set log by verifying through predicate v ∈ log, v is
always in the range from ini′+1, the minimum element in log, to num(I(s′))+ ini′,
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the maximum element in log. Therefore we have
ini′ + 1 ≤ v ≤ current(c′,Θass, s′) = num(I(s′)) + ini′,
which implies
ini ≤ v ≤ num(I(s′)) + ini′ < num(I(s′)) + ini
due to ini′ = ini− 1. So that s satisfies cond 5.
5. Therefore, ∀s ∈ trace(Θass), s satisfies all conditions defined in Lemma 8.5.13.
Proposition 8.5.19. P |=sync Θass then P |=async Θass.
Proof. It can be proved simply by proving that Θass is commutative (so that it is
asynchronous verifiable), or proved by the following reasoning. Let `in represent an
input action, and `out represent an output action. For every s ∈ Obss(P ), in which
P |=sync Θass, according to Θass, it is an input-output alternating sequence with the
following shape
s = `in1 ·`out1 ·`in2 ·`out2 .....
which will end up with `ink or `
in
k ·`outk for some k, and satisfies all conditions listed in
Lemma 8.5.13. Since the permutations only move inputs ahead of outputs, no con-
dition is affected by the permutations. Thus ∀s y s′, s′ ∈ trace(Θass) i.e. s′ ∈
Obsa(P ), P |=async Θass.
Lemma C.1.11. Let `outi be the ith output action and `
in
i be the ith input action.
s ∈ trace(Θsync) if and only if
1. `out1 = ini, and
2. for any `outi ∈ s, there exist `ini positioning before `outi , and
3. for any `outi , `
out
i−1 ∈ s, v(`outi ) = v(`outi−1) + 1.
Proof. For (⇒), according to Θsync and Lemma C.1.2, for any s ∈ trace(Θsync), let
s = s0 ·`outi−1 ·s′0 ·`outi ·s1, where s′0 only contains input actions because `outi is the next
output action after `outi−1. The three conditions are proved as followings.
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1. For the value of the first output according to Θsync, let s0 contains only inputs
and i = 2, then we have v(`out1 ) = current(c,Θsync, s0) = num(O(s0)) + ini = ini.
2. According to Θsync, whenever s ∈ trace(Θsync), there always exists `ini−1 in s0 and
`ini in s
′
0.
3. Moreover we have
v(`outi−1) = current(c,Θsync, s0) = num(O(s0)) + ini
and
v(`outi ) = current(c,Θsync, s0 ·`outi−1 ·s′0) = num(O(s0 ·`outi−1 ·s′0)) + ini
where
num(O(s0 ·`outi−1 ·s′0)) + ini = num(O(s0)) + 1 + ini
therefore we have v(`outi ) = v(`
out
i−1) + 1 for any `
out
i and `
out
i−1 in such s.
For (⇐), the prove is done by induction. Assume s′′0 ∈ prefix(s), s′′0 ∈ trace(Θsync).
We can always find such s′′0 by letting s′′0 be a trace which only contains input actions.
Consider s′′0 ·`out1 , where `out1 is the first output so that s′′0 contains only inputs,
current(c,Θsync, s′′0) = num(O(s
′′
0)) + ini = ini = v(`
out
1 )
which means that s0 ·`out1 is valid to Θsync because the outputted value is equal to the
current value of state c.
Let s′′0 = s0 ·`outi−1 where s0 may contain some inputs and outputs or only inputs.
Without loss of generality, assume s′′0 is valid according to Θsync. It means
v(`outi−1) = current(c,Θsync, s0) = num(O(s0)) + ini
Consider trace s0 · `outi−1 · s′0 · `outi , where `outi is the next output of `outi−1 and s′0 only
contains inputs. Because Θsync always approves input actions, it implies that s0·`outi−1·s′0
is valid according to Θsync. Because for every v(`outi ), v(`
out
i−1) ∈ s, we always have
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v(`outi ) = v(`
out
i−1) + 1, therefore, we have the following equations:
current(c,Θsync, s0 ·`outi−1 ·s′0) = num(O(s0 ·`outi−1 ·s′0)) + ini
= num(O(s0)) + 1 + ini
= current(c,Θsync, s0) + 1
= v(`outi−1) + 1 = v(`
out
i )
which means the outputted value is equal to the current value of state c, so that s0 ·
`outi−1 ·s′0 ·`outi is valid according to Θsync. By Induction, for any s satisfying these three
conditions, we know s ∈ trace(Θsync).
Proposition 8.5.20. Assume s is an input-output alternating sequence. If s ∈
trace(Θass), then s ∈ trace(Θsync).
Proof. It is proved by induction. s ∈ trace(Θass) if and only if s satisfies all conditions
listed in Lemma 8.5.13 gives the following reasonings:
1. For the first output action `out1 , by cond 5, ini ≤ v(`out1 ) < num(I(`in1 ·`out1 )) + ini.
Due to ini′ = ini− 1 and according to Θass, we have
v(`out1 ) ∈ {ini′ + 1} = {ini}
which means v(`out1 ) = ini.
2. For the second output action `out2 , by cond 5, ini ≤ v(`out2 ) < num(I(`in1 ·`out1 ·`in2 ·
`out2 ) + ini. Due to ini
′ = ini− 1 and according to Θass, we have
v(`out2 ) ∈ {ini′ + 1, ini′ + num(I(`in1 ·`out1 ·`in2 ·`out2 ))} \ {ini′ + 1}
{ini′ + 1, ini′ + 2} \ {ini′ + 1}
which means v(`out2 ) = ini
′ + 2 = ini + 1.
3. Let s0 = `in1 ·`out1 ...`ini−1 ·`outi−1. Assume for the ith output action `outi we have
v(`outi ) ∈ {ini′ + 1, ...ini′ + num(I(s0 ·`ini ·`outi ))} \ {ini′ + 1, ..., ini′ + num(I(s0))}
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so that
v(`outi ) ∈ {ini′ + 1, ..., ini′ + (i− 1), ini′ + i} \ {ini′ + 1, ..., ini′ + (i− 1)}
which means v(`outi ) = ini
′ + i = ini + (i− 1).
Then for the (i + 1)th output action `outi+1, by cond 5, ini ≤ v(`outi+1) < num(I(s0 ·
`ini ·`outi ·`ini+1 ·`outi+1) + ini. Due to ini′ = ini− 1 and according to Θass, we have
v(`outi+1) ∈ {ini′ + 1, ...ini′ + num(I(s0 ·`ini ·`outi ·`ini+1 ·`outi+1))}
\{ini′ + 1, ..., ini′ + num(I(s0 ·`ini ·`outi ))}
so that
v(`outi+1) ∈ {ini′ + 1, ..., ini′ + i, ini′ + i+ 1} \ {ini′ + 1, ..., ini′ + i}
therefore we have v(`outi+1) = ini
′ + (i+ 1) = ini + i.
Finally we have v(`outi+1) = v(`
out
i ) + 1. Therefore, by Lemma C.1.11, s ∈ trace(Θsync).

Note that, although Proposition 8.5.14 says that the set of traces satisfying condi-
tions listed in Lemma 8.5.13 is equal to trace(Θass), and Proposition 8.5.20 says that
Gassign is an asynchronously verifiable specification realising synchronous behaviours
w.r.t Θsync, s ∈ trace(Θass) does not imply s ∈ Obsa(P ) such that P |=sync Θsync. It
is simply because trace(Θass) is bigger than Obsa(P ) in which P |=sync Θsync. The
following example illustrates this point.
Example C.1.12. Consider a sequence of actions below:
s1[C, S]?req(ε)·s2[C, S]?req(ε)·s1[S,C]!ans(v)
if it is a trace in Obsa(P ) such that P |=sync Θsync, then v can only be 1; however if it
is a trace in trace(Θass), v can be either 1 or 2.
C.2 Proofs for SPs’ Commutativity
Here we illustrate the main obligations in the SPs introduced in examples (see § 8.1 and
§ 8.1.4). Note that, only the state(s) updated at every input/output action appear(s)
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in the obligations.
Proof (Gsync is not asynchronous). Assume ξisync (for input) and ξosync (for output) are
the notations for the obligations in Gsync.
ξisync
def
= B?req(ε)〈true; ε〉
ξosync
def
= B!ans(x : int)〈x = c; c := c+ 1〉
pred(ξisync)
def
= λε, c.(true)
pred(ξosync)
def
= λx, c.(x = c)
upd(ξisync)
def
= λε, c.〈ε〉
upd(ξosync)
def
= λx, c.〈c+ 1〉
Then for ξosync, ξosync, we start from c’s current value is w = 1:
c = w = 1.
pred(ξosync)(1, 1) = true
and
pred(ξosync)(2, upd(ξ
o
sync)(1, 1)) = pred(ξ
o
sync)(2, 2) = true.
Then we have
pred(ξosync)(2, 1) = false.
Thus condition 1. in Definition 8.5.29 does not hold. Similarly, ξisync and ξosync are not
commutative. 
Proof (Gassign is asynchronous). Assume ξiass and ξoass are the notations for obligations
in Gassign.
ξiass
def
= B?req(ε)〈true; t := t+ 1 c := c ∪ {t}〉
ξoass
def
= B!ans(x : int)〈x ∈ c ; c := c \ {x}〉
pred(ξiass)
def
= λε, t, c.(true)
pred(ξoass)
def
= λx, t, c.(x ∈ c)
upd(ξiass)
def
= λε, t, c.〈t+ 1 c ∪ {t}〉
upd(ξoass)
def
= λx, t, c.〈c \ {x}〉
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As for ξoass, ξoass, let c = w, where w is a set. Assume
pred(ξoass)(v, w) = true
and
pred(ξoass)(v
′, upd(ξoass)(v, w)) = pred(ξ
o
ass)(v
′, w \ {v}) = true.
Then, v′ 6= v, we have
pred(ξoass)(v
′, w) = true
and
pred(ξoass)(v, upd(ξ
o
ass)(v
′, w)) = pred(ξoass)(v, w \ {v′}) = true.
Moreover,
upd(ξoass)(v
′, upd(ξoass)(v, w)) = upd(ξ
o
ass)(v
′, w \ {v}) = w \ {v} \ {v′},
which is equal to
upd(ξoass)(v, upd(ξ
o
ass)(v
′, w)) = upd(ξoass)(v, w \ {v′})) = w \ {v′} \ {v}.
So that conditions 1. and 2. in Definition 8.5.29 both hold.
We can similarly check ξiass, ξiass. Let t = w1 and c = w2. w1 is the current value
of state t, and w2 is the current set of state c. Condition 1. in Definition 8.5.29 holds
immediately since the predicate is always true in ξiass. Condition 2. also holds immedi-
ately since the interaction variable is always ε.
As for ξoass, ξiass, let t = w1 and c = w2. w1 and w2 are the current sets of states t
and c. Assume
pred(ξoass)(v, w2) = true
and
pred(ξiass)(ε, upd(ξ
o
ass)(v, w2)) = pred(ξ
i
ass)(ε, w2 \ {v}) = true.
Then we have
pred(ξiass)(ε, w1 w2) = true
and
pred(ξoass)(v, upd(ξ
i
ass)(ε, w1 w2)) = pred(ξ
o
ass)(v, w2 ∪ {w1 + 1}) = true.
260
C.2 Proofs for SPs’ Commutativity
Moreover,
upd(ξiass)(ε, upd(ξ
o
ass)(v, w2)) = upd(ξ
i
ass)(ε, w1 w2 \ {v}) = w1 + 1, w2 \ {v} ∪ {w1 + 1},
which is equal to
upd(ξoass)(v, upd(ξ
i
ass)(ε, w1 w2)) = upd(ξ
o
ass)(v, w1+1 w2∪{w1+1})) = w1+1, w2∪{w1+1}\{v}.
However, ξiass, ξoass are not forward commutative. Assume
pred(ξiass)(ε, w1 w2) = true
and
pred(ξoass)(v, upd(ξ
i
ass)(ε, w1 w2)) = pred(ξ
o
ass)(v, w1 + 1 w2 ∪ {w1 + 1}) = true.
However pred(ξoass)(v, w2) needs not be equal to truth. So ξoass, ξiass are forward commu-
tative, but not commutative.
Then by Definition 8.5.31, Gassign is commutative, thus Gassign is asynchronous by
Propositions 8.5.34 and 8.5.25. 
Proof (Gasync is asynchronous). Assume ξiasync and ξoasync are the notations for obligations
in Gasync.
ξiasync
def
= B?req(ε)〈true; ε〉
ξoasync
def
= B!ans(x : int)〈x 6∈ c ; c := c ∪ {x}〉
pred(ξiasync)
def
= λε, c.(true)
pred(ξoasync)
def
= λx, c.(x 6∈ c)
upd(ξiasync)
def
= λε, c.〈ε〉
upd(ξoasync)
def
= λx, c.〈c ∪ {x}〉
As for ξoasync, ξoasync, let c = w, where w is a set. Assume
pred(ξoasync)(v, w) = true
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and
pred(ξoasync)(v
′, upd(ξoasync)(v, w)) = pred(ξ
o
async)(v
′, w ∪ {v}) = true.
Then, since
pred(ξoasync)(v
′, w ∪ {v}) = true
implies v′ 6= v and v′ 6∈ w, we have
pred(ξoasync)(v
′, w) = true
and
pred(ξoasync)(v, upd(ξ
o
async)(v
′, w)) = pred(ξoasync)(v, w ∪ {v′}) = true.
Moreover,
upd(ξoasync)(v
′, upd(ξoasync)(v, w)) = upd(ξ
o
async)(v
′, w ∪ {v}) = w ∪ {v} ∪ {v′},
which is equal to
upd(ξoasync)(v, upd(ξ
o
async)(v
′, w)) = upd(ξoasync)(v, w ∪ {v′})) = w ∪ {v′} ∪ {v}.
So that conditions 1. and 2. in Definition 8.5.29 both hold.
We can easily prove that ξiasync, ξiasync, and ξiasync, ξoasync, and ξoasync, ξiasync are semi-
commutativities. By Definition 8.5.31, Gassign is commutative, thus Gassign is asyn-
chronous by Propositions 8.5.34 and 8.5.25. 
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